govinfo:USCOURTS-ctd-3_26-cv-00005-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT 
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26-CV-5 (SFR) 
JAMES POLK, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
ANGEL QUIROS, et al, 
 
Defendants. 
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INITIAL REVIEW ORDER 
 
Plaintiff James Polk, an individual serving a sentence in the custody of the Connecticut 
Department of Correction (“DOC”),
1 brings a civil rights action pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
against nine prison officials. 2 The Complaint alleges that Defendants violated Polk’s 
constitutional rights by refusing to reinstate employment that he lost after another inmate 
assaulted him and by refusing to return him to the Honor Block. The Complaint seeks damages 
(in the form of back wages) and injunctive relief . For the reasons explained below, the 
Complaint is dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend. 
 
1 I may “take judicial notice of relevant matters of public record.” Giraldo v. Kessler , 694 F.3d 
161, 164 (2d Cir. 2012). A search on the publicly available DOC website under the inmate search 
function shows that Polk was sentenced in 2015 and is now housed at Cheshire Correctional 
Institution. 
2 The Complaint asserts claims against nine Defendants: Commissioner of Correction Angel 
Quiros, Warden Jennifer Reiss, Supervisor of Industries Tim Boynton, Market Shop Supervisor 
Scott Lang, Sign Shop Supervisor Colby Beecher, A/P Officer Manillo, Deputy Warden Carlos 
Nunez, Deputy Warden Soley, and Captain Ciarlo. Compl. 3- 5. A tenth defendant is identified 
only as “Population Management (NU).” To the extent Polk seeks to assert a claim against this 
tenth defendant, the Amended Complaint should identify this defendant by name or if Polk cannot 
identify the defendant, he should be listed as a “John Doe” defendant. 

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I. BACKGROUND 
I accept as true the following well -pleaded facts in the Complaint. In April 2024, 
Michael Foster (another prisoner) assaulted Polk while Polk was working in the sign shop at 
Cheshire Correctional Institution (“Cheshire”). Compl. 4, ¶ 1, ECF No. 1 . Polk reported the 
assault to his supervisor. Id. ¶ 2. Prison officials disciplined Foster. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. Polk and Foster 
each signed statements “saying that neither wanted a profile on the other.” Id. ¶ 3. 
One week after the assault in the sign shop, prison officials told Polk he was being 
transferred to MacDougall Correctional Institution (“MacDougall”). Id. ¶ 4. When Polk asked 
a supervisor why he was being transferred, the supervisor told Polk, “Cheshire is a Man’s 
Prison and when a man gets pushed he fights.” Id. Once at MacDougall, Polk filed a grievance 
asking prison officials to return him to Cheshire and reinstate his employment at the sign shop. 
Id. Shortly after filing the grievance, prison official s transferred Polk back to Cheshire and 
placed him in the East Block. Id . at 6, ¶ 5. Polk thereafter filed a grievance asking prison 
officials to return him to the Honor Block and reinstate his employment. Id . Correctional 
Officer Manillo informed Polk that Polk would not be returning to the Honor Block or his 
previous employment. Id . ¶ 6. When Polk asked Manillo if Polk was “being punished for 
complying with DOC rules,” Manillo told Polk, “I guess you can look at it that way.” Id. ¶¶ 6-
7. 
In May 2024, Polk wrote to Deputy Warden Soley asking for her help. Id. ¶ 7. Deputy 
Warden Soley told Polk that she would move Polk to the Honor Block and would speak to 
Industry Supervisor Boynton about reinstating Polk’s employment. Id . ¶¶ 7 -8. When nearly 
one month passed without hearing from Soley , Polk wrote to her again asking if she could 
reinstate his employment, even if he could not return to the Honor Block. Id . ¶¶ 8 -9. Soley 

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responded that Polk was on a waiting list to be hired at the sign shop, and if the sign shop 
wanted to hire Polk again, the sign shop could hire Polk while he was housed in the East Block. 
Id. ¶ 9. 
Prison officials later summoned Polk to the counselor’s office to speak to the Honor 
Block unit manager, Captain Ciarlo . Id. ¶¶ 9-10. Ciarlo told Polk that someone had emailed 
the DOC Commissioner about reinstating Polk’s employment and returning him to the Honor 
Block. Id. ¶ 10. Ciarlo told Polk that she was not going to return him to the Honor Block 
because “it was too soon after the incident,” and that Polk had been placed on a waiting list to 
be hired at the sign shop but they were not hiring. Id . at 7. Polk explained to Ciarlo that he 
“discerned that this was retaliation for the pending litigation that [Polk] . . . had filed against 
the Medical Department.” Id. When Polk asked the unit manager for the “official reason” Polk 
was transferred to MacDougall, the unit manager told Polk that she did not know. Id. 
Polk wrote to Commissioner Quiros to complain about the above events and to request 
an investigation. Id . Polk also wrote to Soley , who responded to Polk’s correspondence by 
stating that, “You have obtained a job in Commissary and are appropriately housed.” Id. 
Polk seeks (1) reinstatement of his employment at the sign shop with “full back pay 
(including all overtime)”; (2) placement in the Honor Block; (3) single -cell status; and (4) 
“assur[ances] that there will be no further retaliation against [him].” Id. at 6. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, courts must review civil complaints in which an 
incarcerated plaintiff seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer and dismiss any 
portion that “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 

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U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2). Although highly detailed allegations are not required, the complaint 
must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. 
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 
pleads factual content that allows the Court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant 
is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 
“It is well established that a court is ordinarily obligated to afford a special solicitude 
to pro se litigants.” Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101 (2d Cir. 2010). Consistent with this 
duty, the “submissions of a pro se litigant must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise 
the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 
474 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
III. DISCUSSION 
Polk does not identify which provision of federal law or the Constitution that 
Defendants violated. To the extent Polk maintains that Defendants violated Polk’s federally 
protected rights by refusing to reinstate his employment at the Cheshire sign shop, “[i]t is well-
established that inmates have no constitutionally protected property or liberty interest in an 
assignment to a prison job.” Burton v. Salerno, No. 3:20-CV-1926 (VAB), 2021 WL 3493621, 
at *9 (D. Conn. Aug. 9, 2021) (collecting cases). And to the extent that Polk maintains that 
Defendants violated Polk’s federally protected rights by refusing to return him to the Honor 
Block, it is equally well -established that “[i]nmates do not have a right to be housed at a 
specific facility or in a specific type of housing.” Parks v. Blanchette , 144 F. Supp. 3d 282, 
339 (D. Conn. 2015) (collecting cases). 
 I therefore analyze whether Polk can state a First Amendment retaliation claim based 

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on his loss of a prison job and loss of his position in the Honor Block. To state a First 
Amendment retaliation claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must plausibly allege “(1) that the 
speech or conduct at issue was protected, (2) that the defendant took adverse action against the 
plaintiff, and (3) that there was a causal con nection between the protected speech and the 
adverse action.” Dolan v. Connolly , 794 F.3d 290, 294 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation and internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted) . The Sec ond Circuit has “instructed district courts to 
approach prisoner retaliation claims with skepticism and particular care, because virtually any 
adverse action taken against a prisoner by a prison official—even those otherwise not rising to 
the level of a co nstitutional violation—can be characterized as a constitutionally proscribed 
retaliatory act.” Id. at 295 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
I construe Polk to assert two separate retaliation claims predicated on two different 
forms of protected speech or conduct: first, relating to Polk’s suit against the “Medical 
Department,”3 and second, relating to Polk’s decision to report his assault to Supervisor Colby 
Beecher, Compl. 4, ¶ 2. As I explain, I cannot conclude from the current record that the adverse 
actions described in the Complaint were causally connected to either form of protected speech. 
A. Retaliation for Polk’s Pending Lawsuit 
 The first requirement for a retaliation claim is clearly satisfied because it is well 
established that “the filing of a lawsuit or a grievance is protected conduct.” Walker v. Senecal, 
130 F.4th 291, 298 (2d Cir. 2025) . Thus, Polk’s assertion that prison officials would not 
reinstate his employment in “retaliation for the pending litigation that [Polk] had filed against 
 
3 I assume that this is a reference to Polk v. Fisher, No. 3:23-cv-728 (SFR), 2025 WL 969665 (D. 
Conn. Mar. 31, 2025). 

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the Medical Department,” Compl. 7, satisfies the first element. The same assertion also 
satisfies the second element because “removal from a prison job may constitute adverse action 
under certain circumstances.” Gill v. Calescibetta , No. 9:00- CV-1553 GTS/DEP, 2009 WL 
890661, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009). 
 But to state a First Amendment retaliation claim, Polk must also allege facts satisfying 
the third element—“that there was a causal connection between the protected speech and the 
adverse action.” Dolan, 794 F.3d at 294 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Polk 
must allege facts “suggesting that the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor 
in the prison official’s decision to take action against him.” Lewis v. Stango, No. 3:22- CV-
1248 (OAW), 2023 WL 4684666, at *6 (D. Conn. July 21, 2023) (cleaned up). In other words, 
Polk must allege facts suggesting that his lawsuit against the “Medical Department” was a 
substantial or motivating factor in prison officials’ refusal to reinstate his employment. “[A] 
plaintiff may not rely on conclusory assertions of retaliatory motive to satisfy the causal link.” 
Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F.3d 89, 108 (2d Cir. 2004). “[W]ide-ranging speculation about what may 
have motivated [a defendant] to act . . . [w]ithout some proof in the record that [a defendant] 
possessed retaliatory animus toward” the plaintiff is insufficient to establish a causal 
connection between the protected speech and the adverse action. Deters v. Lafuente, 368 F.3d 
185, 190 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 Here, Polk maintains that he “ discerned” that prison officials’ refusal to reinstate his 
employment “was retaliation for the pending litigation.” Compl. 7 (emphasis added). But Polk 
does not allege that any of the Defendants in this action knew he had brought an action against 
the Medical Department. Nor does Polk explain why any of the Defendants named here might 
seek to retaliate against him because of his prior action against other individuals. This omission 

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is significant because “[t]he Second Circuit as well as other district courts within the Circuit 
have observed that it is difficult to establish one defendant’s retaliation for complaints against 
another defendant.” Dixon v. Lupis, No. 3:20-CV-1754 (VLB), 2021 WL 4391246, at *9 (D. 
Conn. Sept. 24, 2021) (cleaned up) (collecting cases). 
 As such, Polk has failed to plead facts suggesting a causal connection between Polk’s 
protected speech and any adverse action. I therefore dismiss this First Amendment retaliation 
claim without prejudice and with leave to amend. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). 
B. Retaliation for Reporting Assault to Prison Staff 
I separately analyze whether Polk can state a First A mendment retaliation claim 
predicated on the claim that he was transferred to MacDougall and lost his prison job for 
“complying with DOC rules” and reporting that he had been assaulted by Foster. Compl. 6, ¶ 
6. Although this predicate for a retaliation claim is not clearly articulated in the Complaint, I 
analyze it here consistent with the Second Circuit’s instruction that pro se pleadings should be 
“construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” 
Triestman, 470 F.3d at 474. 
I assume that reporting an assault by a fellow prisoner is conduct protected by the First 
Amendment. Cf. Dolan, 794 F.3d at 294- 95 (describing the rights of incarcerated people to 
petition for redress on behalf of themselves and on behalf of the prison population). And as I 
explained previously, the Complaint satisfies the adverse action requirement insofar as it states 
that Polk was transferred to a less-desirable cellblock and lost his prison employment. But I 
cannot conclude from the current record that these adverse actions were substantially caused 
by Polk’s protected speech or conduct. To be sure, the Complaint states that, after Polk asked 
Manillo whether Polk was being punished “for complying with the DOC mandated rules o[f] 

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conduct,” Manillo responded by saying, “I guess you can look at it that way.” Compl. 6, ¶ 7. 
And when Polk was waiting to be transferred, Lang told Polk “Cheshire is a Man’s Prison and 
when a man gets pushed he fights.” Id. at 4, ¶ 4. These allegations suggest that Lang and 
Manillo believed that Polk did not need to involve prison officials in his dispute with Foster . 
But th ese allegations do not support the inference that Lang and Manillo specifically—or 
indeed any of the Defendants named here —sought to transfer Polk from Cheshire to 
MacDougall as punishment for Polk reporting Foster’s conduct to officials . Indeed, the 
Complaint does not identify who Polk believes was responsible for the decision to transfer him 
to another facility in retaliation for his protected conduct. 
For these reasons, I conclude that a retaliation claim predicated on Polk’s complaint 
about the assault must also be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDERS 
Based on the foregoing, the Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice and with leave 
to amend. If Polk wishes to attempt to replead any of the claims asserted in his Complaint that 
have been dismissed to attempt to state a viable claim, he may file an Amended Complaint on 
or before June 30, 2026. An Amended Complaint, if filed, will completely replace the 
Complaint, and the Court will not consider any allegations made in the original Complaint in 
evaluating any Amended Complaint. If Polk does not file an Amended Complaint on or before 
June 30, 2026, the Court will direct the Clerk of Court to close this case. 
SO ORDERED. 
New Haven, Connecticut 
May 28, 2026 
/s/Sarah F. Russell 
SARAH F. RUSSELL 
United States District Judge 

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