govinfo:USCOURTS-laed-2_26-cv-00493-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 
 
 
EMANUEL GERARD CIVIL ACTION 
 
VERSUS NO. 26-00493 
 
SELENE FINANCE LP SECTION “N” 
 
 
ORDER & REASONS 
 
 B efore the Court is a motion to remand by Plaintiff Emanuel Gerard. 1 
Defendant Selene Finance LP (“Selene”) responded in opposition,2 and Gerard replied 
in further support of his motion.3 Having considered the parties’ memoranda, the 
record, and the applicable law, the Court issues this Order & Reasons granting the 
motion to remand. 
I. Factual Background 
On January 13, 2026, Gerard filed a Verified Petition for Injunctive Relief and 
Temporary Restraining Order in the Fortieth Judicial District Court for the Parish 
of St. John the Baptist, Louisiana, against Defendant Selene. 4 The dispute arises 
from a mortgage serving dispute and threatened foreclosure concerning Gerard’s 
residential property. Gerard is seeking to enjoin any foreclosure while the parties 
resolve the dispute .5 Under the heading “Illegal Foreclosure & Defenses,” Gerard 
alleges that “Selene is attempting to enforce a mortgage debt that is not properly 
 
1 Rec. Doc. 7. 
2 Rec. Doc. 11. 
3 Rec. Doc. 12. 
4 Rec. Doc. 3-2. 
5 Id. 

stated, not properly accounted for, and inflated by unlawful fees” 6; that “Selene’s 
actions constitute:” dual -tracking under 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41, false regulatory 
representations, improper foreclosure fee capitalization, payment rejection and 
manufactured default, and violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 
(“RESPA”), under 12 U.S.C. § 2605 7; and that “[t]hese violations are legal defenses 
to executory process and foreclosure under La. C.C.P. art. 2751.”8 Invoking Louisiana 
Code of Civil Procedure articles 2751 and 3601, Gerard seeks equitable relief to halt 
foreclosure and prohibit Selene from seeking a writ of seizure or sale. Selene was 
served with the petition on February 24, 2026. 
On March 6, 2026, Selene filed a Notice of Removal with this Court pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441, and 1446, alleging federal-question jurisdiction.9 Gerard 
moved to remand the matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) on March 16, 2026.10 
II. Law & Analysis 
A. Federal jurisdiction must exist for removal. 
A party may remove any civil action from state court to federal court if the 
federal court has original jurisdiction over the action .11 Because federal courts are 
courts of limited jurisdiction, the removal statute is strictly construed, and any doubts 
or ambiguities are resolved against removal and in favor of remand. 12 “We must 
 
6 Id. ¶ 11. 
7 Id. ¶ 12. 
8 Id. ¶ 13. 
9 Rec. Doc. 1. 
10 Rec. Doc. 7. 
11 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 
12 Vantage Drilling Co. v. Su, 741 F.3d 535, 537 (5th Cir. 2014). 

presume that a suit lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of 
establishing federal jurisdiction rests on the party seeking the federal forum.” 13 For 
jurisdictional purposes, the Court must consider the claims in the state court petition 
as they existed at the time of removal.
14 
District courts have original jurisdiction of all civil actions “arising under the 
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”15 This statutory language traces 
to Article III, section 2 of the Constitution, which sets forth the cases and 
controversies to which the “judicial Power” of the United States “shall extend.” In 
particular, the federal judicial power extends to “all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising 
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under their Authority.”
16 The framing history of Article III reveals 
that the “arising under” jurisdiction emerged from the Constitutional Convention “as 
a mechanism for ensuring, along with the Supremacy Clause, the proper enforcement 
of federal law.”
17 Otherwise, “the constitution, laws, and treaties [] may receive as 
many constructions as there are States.” 18 Thus, arising under jurisdiction employs 
the judicial authority of the federal courts to ensure uniform and proper enforcement 
of federal law.19 “Although the language of § 1331 parallels that of the ‘arising under’ 
clause of Article III, [the Supreme Court] never has held that statutory ‘arising under’ 
 
13 Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001). 
14 Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002). 
15 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
16 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. 
17 Anthony J. Bellia Jr., The Origins of Article III “Arising Under” Jurisdiction, 57 Duke L.J. 263, 294 
(2007). 
18 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 377 (1821). 
19 See id. at 415. 

jurisdiction is identical to Article III ‘arising under’ jurisdiction.”20 Indeed, while the 
“arising under” provision of Article III “may extend to all cases in which a federal 
question is ‘an ingredient’ of the action, [the Supreme Court has] long construed the 
statutory grant of federal-question jurisdiction as conferring a more limited power.’”21 
Under § 1331, “[a] federal question exists ‘only [in] those cases in which a well-
pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or 
that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial 
question of federal law.’”
22 In most cases, federal -question jurisdiction is invoked 
because the plaintiff “plea[ds] a cause of action created by federal law ,” such as a 
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 23 A district court thus can exercise jurisdiction if it 
“appears from the [complaint] that the right to relief depends upon the construction 
or application of [federal law].” 24 Nevertheless, a state -law claim may arise under 
federal law where the “ state-law claim necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue, 
actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without 
disturbing any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial 
responsibilities.”25 This test emerges from a long line of precedent in which t he 
Supreme Court has “confined federal-question jurisdiction over state- law claims to 
 
20 Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 494 (1983). 
21 Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807 (1986) (internal citation omitted); see 
also Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 320 n.* (2005) (Thomas, 
J., concurring) (“This Court has long construed the scope of the statutory grant of federal-question 
jurisdiction more narrowly than the scope of the constitutional grant of such jurisdiction.”). 
22 Singh v. Duane Morris LLP, 538 F.3d 334, 337-38 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. 
Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983)) (alteration in original). 
23 Grable, 545 U.S. at 312. 
24 Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921). 
25 Grable, 545 U.S. at 314. 

those that ‘really and substantially involv[e] a dispute or controversy respecting the 
validity, construction or effect of [federal] law.’”26 “[F]ederal jurisdiction demands not 
only a contested federal issue, but a substantial one, indicating a serious federal 
interest in claiming the advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum.”27 If a 
claim passes this test, t he court still must evaluate whether exercising federal 
jurisdiction is “consistent with congressional judgment about the sound division of 
labor between state and federal courts.”28 
 In short, “federal question jurisdiction exists where (1) resolving a federal issue 
is necessary to resolution of the state- law claim; (2) the federal issue is actually 
disputed; (3) the federal issue is substantial; and (4) federal jurisdiction will not 
disturb the balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.”
29 
B. Remand is appropriate because Gerard’s claims do not arise under 
federal law. 
Gerard argues that this Court lacks federal -question jurisdiction over his 
petition because he seeks purely state law equitable relief. He posits that his petition 
does not assert a federal cause of action; rather, federal laws are referenced only as 
servicing standards and defenses to foreclosure .
30 Selene counters that the petition 
asserts federal claims on its face, and resolution of the suit necessarily involves a 
substantial question of federal law.31 
 
26 Id. at 313 (quoting Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569 (1912)) (alterations in original). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Singh, 538 F.3d at 338. 
30 See Rec. Doc. 7 at 2. 
31 See Rec. Doc. 11 at 3-4. 

 A plain reading of the petition shows that it asserts no federal cause of action. 
Gerard does not seek relief under RESPA or any other federal law ; instead, the 
complaint alleges Selene engaged in RESPA violations and dual tracking , among 
several other improper actions, in the context of a Louisiana -based wrongful 
foreclosure process.32 While federal law provides for a private right of action for dual 
tracking, this is not a case in which the plaintiff has asserted such a violation as an 
independent cause of action or sought r ecovery for the violation under 12 U.S.C. § 
2605(f).33 
Gerard references dual tracking and RESPA violations in alleging that Selene 
violated certain standards of conduct that provide a defense against foreclosure under 
state law. The petition states that jurisdiction arises under Louisiana Code of Civil 
Procedure article 2751, which allows a defendant in an executory proceeding to arrest 
the seizure and sale of property by injunction in defined circumstances, and article 
3601, which authorizes issuance of an injunction where irreparable injury, loss, or 
damage may otherwise result to the applicant . The prayer for relief seeks only 
injunctive and equitable remedies. The petition does not seek damages or other relief 
under any federal law. 
 
32 “Dual tracking” refers to “situations in which the lender actively pursues foreclosure while 
simultaneously considering the borrower for loss mitigation options.” Gresham v. Wells Fargo Bank, 
N.A., 642 Fed. App'x 355, 359 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41). 
33 Cf. Jones v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153516, 2016 WL 6581279, at *5 
(N.D. Tex. Oct. 12, 2016) (“Plaintiff does not merely mention these violations as proof that 
Defendants violated some other state law cause of action”; “Plaintiff alleges these violations as 
independent causes of action.”), rec. adopted, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153001, 2016 WL 6566538 (N.D. 
Tex. Nov. 3, 2016).
 

“State courts frequently handle state-law consumer protection suits that refer 
to or are predicated on standards set forth in federal statutes.” 34 There is a “long -
settled understanding that the mere presence of a federal issue in a state cause of 
action does not automatically confer federal -question jurisdiction.” 35 Unlike in 
Grable, where the interpretation of federal law was not only an essential element of 
the plaintiff’s claim but the only legal or factual issue contested in the entire case, 36 
the interpretation of RESPA or dual tracking is not a necessary element of Gerard’s 
claims and certainly does not create a substantial federal issue. The petition alleges 
a number of improper actions as a defense to foreclosure, including false regulatory 
representations and improper foreclosure fee capitalization, that do not require 
adjudication of federal law to provide the requested relief. 
This Court joins numerous other courts to hold that alleg ations that a 
defendant breached duties imposed by RESPA as part of their state-law claims do not 
raise a substantial federal issue.
37 To find federal-question jurisdiction for the state-
law foreclosure process at issue here would ignore the Supreme Court’s warning in 
Merrell Dow against opening the floodgates to the garden variety state law s that 
commonly adopt standards from federal law. Foreclosure is a state- centric process. 
 
34 Nevada v. Bank of America Corp., 672 F.3d 661, 676 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Grable, 545 U.S. at 319); see 
also Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 817. 
35 Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 813; see also MSOF Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 295 F.3d 485, 490 (5th Cir. 
2002) (mere reference to violation of federal law in a complaint alleging state-law claims “does not 
suffice to render the action one arising under federal law”). 
36 Grable, 545 U.S. at 315. 
37 See, e.g., Milutinovic v. Bank of America, N.A., 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40047, 2026 WL 539137 
(W.D. Wash. Feb. 26, 2026); Hyde v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54438, 2015 WL 
1893149 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2015); Brewster v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
175625, 2013 WL 6501261 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2013). 

Moving the dispute to federal court would disturb the balance of federal and state 
judicial responsibilities and invite federal courts to entangle themselves in an area of 
the law that has long been the province of the states.38 
C. Fee shifting is not warranted. 
 Finally, the Court declines to award fees and costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1447(c). This fee-shifting provision acts to “reduce[] the attractiveness of removal as 
a method for delaying litigation and imposing costs on the plaintiff.” 39 Accordingly, 
the “appropriate test for awarding fees under § 1447(c) should recognize the desire to 
deter removals sought for the purpose of prolonging litigation and imposing costs on 
the opposing party, while not undermining Congress’ basic decision to afford 
defendants a right to remove as a general matter, when the stat utory criteria are 
satisfied.”40 “Absent unusual circumstances, courts may award attorney’s fees under 
§ 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for 
seeking removal.”41 The Court finds no grounds for shifting fees and costs under these 
standards. There is no evidence that the defendant sought to delay the proceedings, 
and the petition’s reference to federal standards provided an objectively reasonable 
basis for seeking removal. 
III. Conclusion 
Accordingly, 
 
38 See Honeyman v. Hanan, 302 U.S. 375, 378 (1937). 
39 Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 140 (2005). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 141. 

IT IS ORDERED that the motion for remand is GRANTED. This matter is 
remanded to the 40th Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. John the Baptist, 
State of Louisiana. Plaintiff’s request for an award of costs and expenses is DENIED. 
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 18th day of May, 2026. 
 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
ANNA ST. JOHN 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 

Passage view · GavelSight