govinfo:USCOURTS-ctd-3_25-cv-01942-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT 
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OMNIBUS 
MEMORANDUM & 
ORDER 
 
3:25-CV-1942 (VDO) 
MANUEL ANTONIO PERALTA, 
 
Petitioner, 
 
-against- 
 
YRONELIS YOKASTA JIMENEZ PERALTA, 
 
Respondent. 
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VERNON D. OLIVER, United States District Judge: 
Petitioner Manuel Antonio Peralta (“Mr. Pera lta”), is a citizen of the Dominican 
Republic, who allowed his minor child, E.P., to visit the child’s mother, Respondent Yronelis 
Yokasta Jimenez Peralta (“Ms. Jimenez”), in the United States . After Ms. Jimenez retained 
E.P. in the United States in July 2025, Mr. Peralta filed a petition to return E.P. to the 
Dominican Republic under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction, art. 2, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89, reprinted in 51 Fed. 
Reg. 10,494 (Mar. 26, 1986) (“Hague Convention” or “Convention”), as implemented by the 
International Child Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”). ICARA “empower[s] courts in the 
United States to determine only rights under the Convention and not the merits of any 
underlying child custody claims.” 22 U.S.C. § 9001(b)(4). 
Pending before the Court is Ms. Jimenez’s motion for appointment of counsel. Also 
pending are Mr. Peralta’s petition for an order returning the child to the Dominican Republic, 
motion for default judgment, and motion for preliminary injunction. For the following reasons, 
Mr. Peralta’s motion for default judgment is denied; Mr. Peralta’s mo tion for preliminary 

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injunction is granted; and Ms. Jimenez’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied. Mr. 
Peralta’s petition remains pending. 
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. State Court Action 
On August 28, 2025, Ms. Jimenez filed a custody application in Connecticut Superior 
Court, Judicial District of Danbury (the “State Custody Proceeding”). 1 Ms. Jimenez is 
represented in the State Custody Proceedi ng by the Thibodeau & Beadnell Law Group, 
specifically by attorney Jeff Be adnell. Mr. Peralta is repres ented in the State Custody 
Proceeding by attorney Mark Shiffrin, his counsel of record in the instant case. 
B. This Action 
Mr. Peralta filed a petition for the return of E.P. to the Dominican Republic and motion 
for preliminary injuncti on on November 20, 2025. 2 After the Court (Garcia, J.) granted Mr. 
Peralta leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the United States Marshals Service effected service 
of process by delivering the papers to Ms. Jimenez’s counsel in the State Custody Proceeding, 
the Thibodeau & Beadnell Law Group. 3 Then, after the Clerk of Court entered default, Mr. 
Peralta filed a motion for default judgment.4 
The Court scheduled an evidentiary heari ng and ordered Ms. Jime nez to appear and 
show cause why the motion for default judgment should not be granted.5 On May 6, 2025, Ms. 
 
1 Jimenez v. Peralta, No. DBD-FA25-5022327-S (Conn. Sup. Ct.) 
2 ECF Nos. 1, 3. 
3 ECF Nos. 23, 28. 
4 ECF Nos. 25, 31. 
5 ECF No. 32. 

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Jimenez filed a motion for appointment of counsel, which was opposed by Mr. Peralta. 6 The 
parties appeared before this Court (Oliver, J.) for an evidentiary hearing on May 12, 2026.7 At 
that hearing, Mr. Peralta, Ms. Jimenez, and an other witness (Manuela Peralta, E.P.’s older 
stepsister) testified with the assistance of a Spanish language interpreter.8 Mr. Peralta then filed 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.9 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Motion for Default Judgment 
First, the Court denies Mr. Peralta’s motion for default judgment. 
Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth a two-step process that allows 
a court to enter a default judgment. Priestley v. Headminder, Inc., 647 F.3d 497, 504 (2d Cir. 
2011). First, the plaintiff must obtain an entry of a default under Rule 55(a) by showing that 
the defaulting party “has failed to plead or ot herwise defend.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Second, 
the plaintiff must “seek a judgment by default under Rule 55(b).” Priestley, 647 F.3d at 505. 
In determining whether to grant default judgment or whether to relieve a party from default, a 
court determine whether there is “good cause” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c) by 
assessing three factors: “(1) whether the default was w illful; (2) whether setting aside the 
default would prejudice the adversary; and (3) whether a meritorious defense is presented.” 
Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 
6 ECF Nos. 34, 35, 36. 
7 ECF No. 38. 
8 ECF No. 39. 
9 ECF No. 40. 

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Weighing the relevant factors, the Court finds “good cause” to relieve Ms. Jimenez 
from default. First, the Court concludes that the default was not willful. While she failed to 
timely oppose Mr. Peralta’s petition and other filings, Ms. Jimenez complied with the Court’s 
order to appear for an evidentiary hearing. At th at hearing, she described her attempts to find 
counsel and, after concluding that she could no t afford to pay a retainer requested by a law 
firm, worked with her State Cu stody Proceeding counsel to fill out a form to request counsel 
in this matter. Importantly, English is not her primary language. The context provided by Ms. 
Jimenez leads the Court to conclude that the failure to timely defend in this lawsuit “cannot 
accurately be described as willful.” Pecarsky v. Galaxiworld.com Ltd., 249 F.3d 167, 172 (2d 
Cir. 2001) (“Resolving all doubts in favor of the party seeking relief, we cannot say that [a 
party] would not have appeared should it have been able to find new counsel.”). 
Second, the Court finds that setting aside the entry of de fault will not prejudice Mr. 
Peralta because “delay standing alone does not establish prejudice.” Enron, 10 F.3d at 98. 
Third, the Court finds that Ms. Jimenez failed to establish a meritorious defense, as her 
proffered reasons for retaining E.P., including her concerns that the child was subjected to 
emotional danger and that Mr. Peralta had i ssues with finances, would not constitute a 
complete defense here, where Mr. Peralta has established a prima facie case. See New York v. 
Green, 420 F.3d 99, 109–10 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding no clear error in concluding that 
defendants failed to raise a meritorious defens e where a defendant’s “assertions amounted to 
little more than conclusory denials”). Though this factor weighs in favor of granting default 
judgment, it is outweighed by the first two Enron factors tipping against entering default 
judgment. 

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Accordingly, considering the Enron factors and that “all doubts must be resolved in 
favor of trial on the merits” the Court denies the motion for default judgment and relieves Ms. 
Jimenez from default. Enron, 10 F.3d at 96. 
B. Motion for Preliminary injunction 
The Court next grants Mr. Peralta’s moti on for preliminary injunction, as the record 
establishes that there is entitlement to preliminary relief. 
“The court may issue a preliminary injunction only on notice to the adverse party.” Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1). “In general, ‘[a] plaintiff seeking a pre liminary injunction must establish 
that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the 
absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction 
is in the public interest.’” Daileader v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds London Syndicate 1861, 
96 F.4th 351, 356 (2d Cir. 2024) (quoting JTH Tax, LLC v. Agnant, 62 F.4th 658, 667 (2d Cir. 
2023)). While a typical preliminary injunction is “p rohibitory” in that it maintains the status 
quo pending a trial on the merits, a “mandatory” preliminary injunction alters the status quo 
“by commanding some positive act.” Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Ent., Inc. , 60 F.3d 
27, 34 (2d Cir. 1995). Where, as here, a party seeks a mandatory injunction, it must satisfy a 
heightened legal standard and both: “(1) make a strong showi ng of irreparable harm, and (2) 
demonstrate a clear or substantial likelihood of success on the merits.” Yang v. Kosinski, 960 
F.3d 119, 127-28 (2d Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). 
1. Strong Showing of Irreparable Harm 
Plaintiff has made a strong showing that he would suffer irreparable harm that cannot 
be remedied in the absence of a preliminary injunction. 

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In order to satisfy the irreparable harm requirement, a plaintiff must “demonstrate that 
absent a preliminary injunction [he] will suffer an injury that is . . . act ual and imminent, and 
one that cannot be remedied if a court waits until the end of trial to resolve the harm.” Faiveley 
Transp. Malmo AB v. Wabtec Corp. , 559 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). “Where 
there is an adequate remedy at law, such as an award of money damages, injunctions are 
unavailable except in extraordinary circumstances.” Moore v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 409 
F.3d 506, 510 (2d Cir. 2005). 
Here, Mr. Peralta has strongly established th at he would suffer irreparable harm. The 
record is replete with aggrava ting undisputed facts, including that Ms. Jimenez breached the 
agreement with Mr. Peralta for E.P. to tem porarily visit Ms. Jimenez during the summer of 
2025. Specifically, Ms. Jimenez retained E.P. in the United States without Mr. Peralta’s 
consent by placing E.P.’s passport into a safe , which prevented E.P. from accompanying his 
stepsister on their return flight, despite E.P. having a round-trip ticket. Moreover, since then, 
Ms. Jimenez has not only interfered with se veral of Mr. Peralta’ s daily attempts to 
communicate with E.P., but also blocked atte mpts by Manuela to communicate with E.P 
through social media. The damage caused by Mr. Peralta’s separation from E.P. and Ms. 
Jimenez interfering with the attempts to c ontact their child is difficult to quantify. 
Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 404 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Irreparable harm may be 
found where damages are difficult to establish and measure.”). 
2. Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits 
Plaintiff has made a clear showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits. 
The Hague Convention “reflects a de sign to discourage child abduction.” Lozano v. 
Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 16 (2014). “To that end, the Convention ordinarily requires the 

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prompt return of a child wrongfully removed or retained away from the country in which she 
habitually resides.” Monasky v. Taglieri, 589 U.S. 68, 72 (2020). “Ord ering a return remedy 
does not alter the existing allocation of custody rights . . . but does allow the courts of the home 
country to decide what is in the child's best interests.” Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 20 (2010). 
The record developed during the evidentiary hearing reveals that Mr. Peralta has proved 
his prima facie case against Ms. Jimenez for wrongful retenti on of their child, E.P., in the 
United States. To prevail, Mr. Peralta must pr ove by a preponderance th at “(1) the child was 
habitually a resident in one State and has been removed to or retained in a different State; (2) 
the removal or retention was in breach of the petitioner’s cust ody rights under the law of the 
State of habitual residence; and (3) the petitioner was exercising those rights at the time of the 
removal or retention.” Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124, 130–31 (2d Cir. 2005). Here, Mr. Peralta 
and Ms. Jimenez are married and have been living apart in different countries. While they have 
been living apart, they agreed for Mr. Peralta to live with E.P. in the Dominican Republic, 
where E.P. has been going to sc hool at Cendi and been under the care of a pediatrician. The 
parties also agreed for E.P. to visit Ms. Ji menez during the summers, which Mr. Peralta has 
facilitated multiple times. With the consent of Mr. Peralta, E. P. came to the United States in 
the summer of 2025 with his stepsister for a va cation with E.P.’s mother, with a return ticket 
for July 20, 2025. Then, after concluding that E.P. was in emotional danger, Ms. Jimenez 
unilaterally decided to retain E.P. in the Un ited States. Before info rming Mr. Peralta and 
Manuela of this decision, Ms. Jimenez locked E.P.’s passport in a safe. E.P. is currently living 
with Ms. Jimenez in Danbury, Connecticut. These facts affirmatively show that Mr. Peralta is 
entitled to an order facilitating th e prompt return of E.P. to the Dominican Republic, where 
E.P. habitually resided. 

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3. Balance of Equities and Public Interest 
The Court concludes that the balance of the hardships and public interest tip decidedly 
in Mr. Peralta’s favor. 
In analyzing the balance of the equities and whether injunctive relief would be in the 
public interest, the Court “must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the 
effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). 
As an initial matter, the Court acknowledges the hardships that both Mr. Peralta and 
Ms. Jimenez have experienced by being separa ted from their child. But, as discussed, Mr. 
Peralta has consistently lived with E.P. in th e Dominican Republic sin ce shortly after E.P.’s 
birth. For several previous years, while living w ith Mr. Peralta, E.P. ha s attended school and 
has been treated by a pediatrician in the Dominican Republic. In contrast, Ms. Jimenez moved 
to the United States years ago to pursue opportunities and did not live with E.P. on a daily 
basis. Ms. Jimenez instead agreed for E.P. to visit her during the summers, which Mr. Peralta 
has facilitated multiple times. Thus, the ongoing injury to Mr. Peralta, including by being 
separated from E.P., far outweighs any injury to Ms. Jimenez that would stem from returning 
E.P. to the Dominican Republic. On balance, the equities tip in favor of granting the 
preliminary injunction. 
Next, the Court concludes that the public interest would not be harmed or disserved by 
issuance of a preliminary injunction. Congress has found that “[t]he international abduction or 
wrongful retention of children is harmful to their well-being,” 22 U.S.C. § 9001(a)(1), and has 
authorized courts to “take or cause to be ta ken measures under Federal or State law, as 
appropriate, to protect the well-being of the ch ild involved or to prevent the child’s further 

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removal or concealment before the final disposition of the petition” brought under the Hague 
Convention. 22 U.S.C. § 9004(a). Th e public interest is therefor e served by ensuring that the 
minor child is returned to his habitual residence. 
4. Security 
Under Rule 65(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may “issue a 
preliminary injunction . . . only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court 
considers proper to pay the co sts and damages sustained by a ny party found to have been 
wrongfully enjoined or restrained .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). It is “within the discretion of the 
district court to decide that, under the ci rcumstances, no security [is] required.” Corning Inc. 
v. PicVue Elecs., Ltd. , 365 F.3d 156, 158 (2d Ci r. 2004). Here, cons idering Mr. Peralta’s 
history of compliance with the legal process and representations that he will comply with any 
court orders, and Ms. Jimenez’s failure to offer any proof of harm, the Court exercises its 
discretion to enter the injunction without requiring Mr. Peralta to post bond. 
C. Motion for Appointment of Counsel 
Finally, the Court denies Ms. Jimenez’s motion for appointment of counsel. 
“[E]xcept when faced with the prospect of imprisonment, a litigant has no legal right 
to counsel in civil cases.” Guggenheim Cap., LLC v. Birnbaum , 722 F.3d 444, 453 (2d Cir. 
2013). But, after weighing the factors set forth in Hodge v. Police Officers , 802 F.2d 58 (2d 
Cir. 1986), a court “may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.” 
42 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); see also Dolan v. Connolly , 794 F.3d 290, 297 (2d Cir. 2015). The 
relevant factors include “(1) whether the party’s claim has s ubstantial merit; (2) whether the 
nature of the factual issues requires an in vestigation, and whether the party’s ability to 
investigate is inhibited; (3) whether the cl aim’s factual issues turn on credibility, which 

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benefits from the skills of those trained in presentation of evidence and cross-examination; (4) 
the party’s overall ability to pr esent its case; and (5) whether the legal issues presented are 
complex.” Garcia v. USICE (Dep ’t of Homeland Sec.) , 669 F.3d 91, 98–99 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(citing Hodge, 802 F.2d at 60–61). In considering a motion for appointment of counsel, a 
district court must “ask[] first whether the cl aimant has met a threshold showing of some 
likelihood of merit.” Johnston v. Maha, 606 F.3d 39, 41 (2d Cir. 2010) 
Ms. Jimenez fails to satisfy the threshold requirement of likely merit. The Second 
Circuit has “reiterated the importance of requiring indigent litigants seeking appointed counsel 
to first pass the test of likely merit,” where a court determines whether the litigant’s “position 
seems likely to be of substance,” or show “some chance of success,” because “even where the 
claim is not frivolous, counsel is often unwarrant ed where the indigent’s chances of success 
are extremely slim.” Ferrelli v. River Manor Health Care Ctr. , 323 F.3d 196, 204 (2d Cir. 
2003) (cleaned up). In order to show “some change of success,” Ms. Jimenez must demonstrate 
that Mr. Peralta is unlikely to meet his burden of showing, by a prep onderance of evidence, 
that “(1) the child was habitually resident in one State and has been removed to or retained in 
a different State; (2) the removal or retentio n was in breach of the petitioner’s custody rights 
under the law of the State of ha bitual residence; and (3) the petitioner was exercising those 
rights at the time of the removal or retention.” Gitter, 396 F.3d at 130–31. 
But, as previously discussed, the evidentiary hearing revealed that Mr. Peralta has 
proved his prima facie case against Ms. Jimenez fo r wrongful retention of their child in the 
United States. Nor has Ms. Jimenez set forth any facts that would conceivably support her 
burden of opposing the return of E.P. to the Dominican Republic. Tereshchenko v. Karimi, 102 
F.4th 111, 125 (2d Cir. 2024) (“Once a petitioner ma kes out a prima facie case that removal 

11 
or retention was wrongful, the court must order the child’s prompt return unless the respondent 
shows that one of the Convention's ‘narrow’ exceptions applies.”). 
Accordingly, based on the ample evidence from the hearing and record, the Court finds 
that any defense Ms. Jimenez would assert in opposition to Mr. Peralta’s petition is unlikely 
to be of substance and denies the motion for appointment of counsel. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, the Court denies Mr. Peralta’s motion for default 
judgment and Ms. Jimenez’s motion for appointment of counsel. The Court grants Mr. 
Peralta’s request for a preliminary injunction. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. On or before June 18, 2026, Ms. Jimenez must get in contact with Mr. Peralta’s 
counsel (attorney Mark Shiffrin) vi a contemporaneous means (video or 
telephone) to discuss the logistics of returning E.P. to the Dominican Republic. 
2. On or before June 20, 2026, the parties shall file a joint status report regarding 
the status of discussions surrounding th e return of E.P. to the Dominican 
Republic. 
3. On or before July 15, 2026 , Ms. Jimenez must either return E.P. to the 
Dominican Republic or allow E.P., accompanied by a chaperone, to return to 
the Dominican Republic. 
Considering the Supreme Court’s admonition th at courts should take steps to decide 
cases brought under the Hague Conv ention “as expeditiously as po ssible, for the sake of the 
children,” Chafin v. Chafin , 568 U.S. 165, 179 (2013), th e Court enters the following 
scheduling order: 
1. On or before June 18, 2026, Ms. Jimenez must answer or otherwise respond to 
Mr. Peralta’s petition for an order retu rning E.P. to the Dominican Republic. 
Failure to file an answer that states her affirmative defens es may lead to the 
Court finding that Ms. Jimenez forfeited her defenses. Tereshchenko, 102 F.4th 
at 128. 

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2. The parties shall appear for a bench trial on July 15, 2026, at 10:00 A.M. At 
that trial, Ms. Jimenez must show cause why Mr. Peralta’s petition for an order 
of return should not be granted. Considering that Mr. Peralta has already proved 
his prima facie case, the parties are on notice that Ms. Jimenez’s failure to timely 
assert affirmative defenses in an answer may lead the Court to “advance the trial 
on the merits and consolidate it with the hearing” on the preliminary injunction 
previously held on May 12, 2026. Fed R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2) (“Before or after 
beginning the hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the court may 
advance the trial on the me rits and consolidate it with the hearing. Even when 
consolidation is not ordered, evidence that is received on the motion and that 
would be admissible at tria l becomes part of the tria l record and need not be 
repeated at trial.”). 
3. The parties are again on notice that the Court is unable to provide a Spanish 
language interpreter for any proceedings. 
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to mail a copy of this order to Ms. Jimenez 
and her counsel in the State Cu stody Proceeding, Jeff Beadnell of the Thibodeau & Beadnell 
Law Group. 
 
 
Hartford, Connecticut 
May 28, 2026 
 
/s/Vernon D. Oliver 
VERNON D. OLIVER 
United States District Judge 

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