govinfo:USCOURTS-akd-3_24-cv-00074-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT COURT OF ALASKA 
MICHAEL WADE DA VISON, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
EDWARD C. MOONEY, 
 
Defendant. 
 
 
 
3:24-cv-00074-ACP 
 
ORDER GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
[Dkt. 22] 
 
Michael Wade Davison (the Plaintiff) was carrying a long knife on his belt and 
blustering around at a Fourth of July event . After Davison squared up to a bystander as if 
preparing to fight, Officer Edward Mooney (the Defendant) placed him under arrest for 
disorderly conduct. But no other officers were nearby. So, when Davison refused the 
command to raise his hands and began walking away, Officer Mooney deployed his taser 
on Davison five times in total before securing Davison in handcuffs. Davison later pleaded 
guilty to two criminal charges stemming from the incident. 
Davison then filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that Officer 
Mooney’s taser use constituted excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. Officer 
Mooney moved for summary judgment on two grounds (1) he did not use excessive force 
and (2) he is entitled to qualified immunity. As explained below, the Court concludes that 
Officer Mooney is entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established that 
using a taser on Davison was unconstitutional. The motion for summary judgment is 
therefore GRANTED. 

 
I. BACKGROUND 
The best evidence of what happened comes from video footage of the event.1 While 
the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to Davison, as the non-moving 
party, it does not need to accept a view of the facts that is contradicted by video footage.2 
When viewing the video, three pieces of context are important. First, Officer Mooney had 
already been warned that someone fitting Davison’s description (i.e., “a male wearing a 
black cowboy hat”) “had been hostile to other officers in the area” earlier in the day. 3 
Second, Davison has a large knife on his belt during the entire encounter. Third, Officer 
Mooney is the only officer on the scene. 
The video footage begins with Davison antagonizing three young men and Officer 
Mooney. Approximately thirty seconds into the recording, Davison moved directly into a 
bystander’s face in an aggressive manner, suggesting that he was preparing to fight. The 
two stood roughly one foot apart. Davison then turned and squared up to Officer Mooney 
as if challenging him. Although several people were speaking at once, Officer Mooney 
warned Davison not to engage in disorderly conduct. Davison then stepped back, placin g 
himself out of striking distance, while continuing to verbally antagonize the group. 
 
1 Each party submitted video evidence of the event. Officer Mooney’s body-camera 
footage is at Docket 23; cellphone footage submitted by Davison is at Docket 27. Readers 
can assume that sentences in this section summarize relevant video footage unless 
indicated otherwise. 
2 See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378-80 (2007). 
3 Dkt. 22-1 at 1. 

 
Officer Mooney told the bystanders to “ignore [Davison]” because “he’s got nothing 
better to do.” Davison responded that “this cop [is] not gonna do nothing for you guys.” 
A few seconds later, one of the bystanders turns to Davison and challenges him “do 
something about it.” Davison then says “come on, come on” and steps toward the 
bystander. A different bystander says “can you please hit one of us so we can break you.” 
At that point Officer Mooney apparently decided enough disorderly conduct had 
occurred to affect an arrest. Mooney told Davison “causing a fight, put your hands up now” 
while raising his taser. Davison took three or four steps backward and did not raise his 
hands. Officer Mooney then deployed the taser in dart mode, striking Davison. 4 Despite 
being hit with a taser, Davison turned and ran away for several seconds before crashing 
into a car and falling to the ground. 
Officer Mooney physically apprehended Davison, while commanding him to “put 
[his] hands behind [his] back.” Cell phone footage from a bystander shows that Davison 
put one hand behind his back, but the other hand remained free and holding a cell phone. 
While struggling to detain Davison, Officer Mooney deployed the taser in drive-stun mode5 
several times, and Davison did not immediately comply by placing his free hand behind 
his back. 
 
4 “Dart mode involves propelling a pair of metal darts at a rate of more than 160 feet 
per second and delivering a 1200-volt electrical charge that instantly overrides the 
recipient’s central nervous system, causing temporary paralysis.” Isayeva v. Sacramento 
Sherrif’ s Dep’t, 872 F.3d 938, 948 n.4 (9th Cir. 2017). 
5 “Drive-stun mode involves pushing two electrode contacts directly against the 
individual and delivering an extremely painful electric shock” that is “less incapacitating” 
than dart mode. Id. at 943 n.1, 950 (citation modified). 

 
With no other officers around, Officer Mooney called to bystanders for help, yelling 
“give me a hand.” After waiting several seconds, and before the bystanders arrived, Officer 
Mooney tased Davison again while he was on the ground. The taser was engaged for about 
8-9 seconds. 
Officer Mooney again told Davison to put his hands behind his back. Davison 
protested that he couldn’t move, while still holding his cell phone. After Officer Mooney 
tased Davison again for a few seconds before he found that he could, in fact, move and 
placed his hand behind his back.6 
Officer Mooney again informed Davison that he was under arrest for disorderly 
conduct and explained that he needed to keep his hands behind his back or he would be 
tased again. Two bystanders helped Officer Mooney keep Davison pinned down until he 
was handcuffed, more officers arrived, and the commotion died down. 
Davison later pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct and harassment. 7 He also filed 
this lawsuit. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
Summary judgment is granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 8 At this stage, the “facts 
 
6 It is not clear precisely when each taser event begins and ends, but the parties do not 
dispute that Davison was tased a total of five times, once is dart mode and four times in 
drive-stun mode. 
7 Dkt. 22-1 ¶ 5 (Mooney Declaration). 
8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

 
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party .”9 But the Court will 
not adopt a view of the facts that is “blatantly contradicted by the record.”10 
The moving party has the “initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine 
issue of fact for trial.”11 If this showing is made, the non-moving party must offer evidence 
“set[ting] forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”12 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Qualified immunity shields officers from liability unless they violate clearly 
established law. 
 Qualified immunity provides sweeping protection from liability to police officers 
serving in the line of duty. The doctrine balances the “need to shield officials from 
harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably” against 
the “need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly.”13 
But the Supreme Court has, without question, tended to fall on the side of shielding officers 
and protecting them for all but egregious violations of well-established law.14 Indeed, the 
Supreme Court regularly reverses courts that deny qualified immunity to officers. 15 
 
9 Scott, 550 U.S. at 380. 
10 Id. 
11 Deveraux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001). 
12 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
13 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). 
14 See id.; Zorn v. Linton, 607 U.S. , 9 (2026) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (calling 
modern doctrine an “absolute shield”) (quoting Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 121 
(2018); see also Pina v. Est. of Dominguez, 604 U.S. , 145 S. Ct. 527, (2025) (Alito, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
15 Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 8 (2021) (per curiam); City of Tahlequah v. 
Bond, 595 U.S. 9, 13-14 (2021) (per curiam); City of Escondido v. Emmons, 586 U.S. 38, 
44 (2019) (per curiam); Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 108 (2018) (per curiam); Dist. of 

 
 Those reversals explain that the doctrine of qualified immunity protects officers 
“unless their conduct violates clearly established law.” 16 This is a difficult showing to 
make. The right in question must be “sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would 
have understood that what he is doing violates that right.”17 In other words, a right is clearly 
established only if precedent “places the constitutional question beyond debate.” 18 That 
usually requires “a case where an officer acting under similar circumstances . . . was held 
to have violated” the Constitution.19 And the case must “define the right with a high degree 
of specificity, so that every reasonable official would interpret it to establish the particular 
rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.” 20 General principles like “an officer may not use 
unreasonable and excessive force” are not enough. 21 Instead, an officer must be able to 
“read the relevant precedent beforehand and know that it proscribed their specific 
conduct.”22 
 
Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 68 (2018); White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 81 (2017) (per 
curiam); Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822, 827 (2015) (per curiam); Mullenix v. Luna, 577 
U.S. 7, 19 (2015) (per curiam); City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 
600, 617 (2015). 
16 Zorn, 607 U.S. at *3. 
17 Id. (quoting Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5 (2021) (per curiam)). 
18 Id. (quoting Rivas-Villegas, 595 at 5) (citation modified). 
19 Escondido, 586 U.S. at 43 (quoting Wesby, 583 U.S. at 64). 
20 Zorn, 607 U.S. at 3 (quoting Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63) (citation modified). The Supreme 
Court has “repeatedly told courts—and the Ninth Circuit in particular —not to define 
clearly established law at a high level of generality.” Sheehan, 575 U.S. at 613. 
21 Zorn, 607 U.S. at 4 (quoting Kisela, 584 U.S. at 105). 
22 Id. (quoting Sheehan, 575 U.S. at 616) (citation modified). 

 
B. Officer Mooney’s conduct was not clearly unconstitutional. 
This case involves the right to be free from excessive force under the Fourth 
Amendment. However, that statement of the law is not specific enough to pierce qualified 
immunity.23 The Court must decide whether the caselaw is so clear that “every reasonable 
official would have understood” that Officer Mooney could not use his taser on Davison.24 
The Court concludes otherwise. The caselaw does not clearly establish that Officer Mooney 
violated the Constitution. 
A survey of Ninth Circuit cases involving tasers reveals a jurisprudence providing 
little to no concrete guidance to officers (or district judges) in all but the most 
straightforward cases. Rather than placing the lawfulness of Mooney’s conduct “beyond 
debate,” relevant caselaw sows confusion bordering on bewilderment.25 And the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly refused to impose liability on officers tasked with protecting the 
public amidst that confusion. This Court follows that approach. 
Turning to circuit precedent, it is well-established that citizens have the “right to be 
free from the application of non-trivial force for engaging in mere passive resistance” to 
arrest.26 So even when someone resists arrest, officers may be barred from using non-trivial 
 
23 Sheehan, 575 U.S. 613 (“Qualified immunity is no immunity at all if ‘clearly 
established’ law can simply be defined as the right to be free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures.”). 
24 See Zorn, 607 U.S. at 3 (quoting Rivas-Villegas, 595 U.S at 5). 
25 See id. (quoting Rivas-Villegas, 595 U.S. at 5) (citation modified). 
26 Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 1093 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that right 
“was clearly established prior to 2008”). 

 
force if the resistance is not “particularly bellicose.”27 And “a taser in dart mode constitutes 
more than trivial force.” 28 But ending the inquiry at such a high level of abstraction 
contravenes the mandate that to be clearly established, a right must be defined with a “high 
degree of specificity .”29 How is an officer supposed to distinguish, in a split second, 
whether conduct is nearly bellicose, particularly bellicose, or especially bellicose? 30 It is 
difficult to imagine the Supreme Court concluding that this bellicosity-continuum standard 
is clearly defined. 31 Instead of focusing on abstract characterizations of conduct (e.g., as 
“particularly bellicose”), Courts must “compare the facts of [its] case to facts that are 
sufficiently similar to allow a meaningful comparison.”32 
1. It is not clear that using the taser in dart mode was unconstitutional. 
In Jones v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, the Ninth Circuit held that 
“a police officer acted reasonably when he used a taser in dart mode to ‘subdue’ a fleeing 
suspect who ‘had neither threatened officers nor committed a serious offense, 
and . . . didn’t appear to have a weapon.’”33 The Ninth Circuit has since relied on Jones to 
 
27 See id. (emphasizing that resistance “was not particularly bellicose” (quoting Smith v. 
City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 703 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citation modified)). 
28 Id. 
29 Zorn, 607 U.S. at 3 (quoting Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63) (citation modified). 
30 Sheehan, 575 U.S. at 612 (“The Constitution is not blind to ‘the fact that officers are 
often forced to make split-second judgments.’” (quoting Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 
765, 775 (2014)). 
31 Id. at 612. 
32 Johnson v. Myers, 129 F.4th 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2025) (emphasis added). 
33 Oneal v. Roberts, No. 23-15429, 2025 WL 444427, at *1 (9th Cir. 2025) (unreported 
but quoting and summarizing Jones v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 873 
F.3d 1123, 1130 (9th Cir. 2017)); Hyde v. City of Wilcox, 23 F.4th 863, 872 (9th Cir. 2022) 
(“[I]n Jones, we concluded that the officers were at first justified in using a Taser on a 

 
find qualified immunity in a case involving a taser because the suspect was “walking away 
from officers as they approached him and commanded him to get out of the street.”34 Thus 
under the Ninth Circuit’s approach, it appears that as of 2025 officers may sometimes use 
a taser on suspects walking away from an arrest, even if they are unarmed. Here, Davison 
admitted that he “took a couple of steps backward” when told he was under arrest. 35 And 
unlike the suspect in Jones, Davison had large knife on his belt, which made him 
considerably more dangerous. 36 Officer Mooney thus could have read Jones (or Oneal’s 
summary of Jones) and, at a minimum, have made a “reasonable mistake of law regarding 
the constitutionality of” using his taser in dart mode on Davison.37 
Davison relies on Hyde v. City of Wilcox, which found it unreasonable to use a taser 
on someone who was suspected of a traffic violation and “no longer threatened the officers 
after being re strained for two minutes.” 38 But the holding of Hyde is that it can be 
unreasonable to use a taser on a “restrained and non-resisting suspect.” 39 When Officer 
Mooney used the taser in dart mode, Davison was not restrained. That is a critical 
 
suspect who had run away from a traffic stop but neither threatened the officers nor 
committed a serious offense.”). 
34 Oneal, 2025 WL 444427, at *1. 
35 Dkt. 26 at 7. 
36 Dkt. 26 at 8. 
37 See Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 833 (9th Cir. 2010) (denying en banc 
rehearing). 
38 23 F.4th 863, 872 (9th Cir. 2022). 
39 Id. (emphasizing that, unlike here, the suspect was “handcuffed, shackled, and 
exhausted” when constitutional violation occurred). 

 
distinction, and Hyde does not clearly establish that Davison had a right to be free from the 
use of a taser. 
Davison also cites Hermosillo v. County of Orange, where a district court found it 
clearly established that “an individual who is stationary, has complied with all officer 
commands, and is not posing an immediate threat” had a right to be free from being tased 
in dart mode. 40 As an initial matter , a district court decision can not create a clearly 
established right.41 But in any event, Davison was beginning to walk away and did not put 
his hands up when instructed—he was neither stationary nor complying with commands. 
An officer reading Hermosillo thus could reasonably conclude that Officer Mooney was 
authorized to use his taser in dart mode on Davison. 
This conclusion can be reconciled with other Ninth Circuit cases involving tasers. 
For example, in Bryan v. MacPherson the Ninth Circuit found that it was clearly unlawful 
to use a taser on a suspect who was “noticeably unarmed, made no threatening statements 
or gestures, did not resist arrest, [and] was standing inert twenty to twenty-five feet 
away.”42 Here, Davison was noticeably armed, had just squared up to a bystander and an 
officer, and began walking away when put under arrest. 
And in Mattos v. Agarano, it was unconstitutional (but not clearly so) to use a taser 
on someone who “posed no threat to the officers,” tried “to comply with” officer 
 
40 562 F.Supp.3d 802, 812 (C.D. Cal 2021). 
41 Spencer v. Pew, 117 F.4th 1130, 1142 n.6 (9th Cir. 2024). 
42 630 F.3d at 809 (Wardlaw, J., concurring, joined by Pregerson, Reinhardt, and Fletcher, 
JJ.). 

 
commands, and “begged everyone not to wake her sleeping children.” 43 That is nothing 
like the situation here. Davison was armed, acting like he wanted to fight, and walking 
away from the arrest. With these factual differences in mind, an officer reading Bryan and 
Mattos could reasonably conclude using a taser in dart mode on Davison was lawful, even 
if judges later see the situation differently .44 Officer Mooney thus is entitled to qualified 
immunity for using his taser in dart mode on Davison. 
2. It is not clear that using the taser in drive-stun mode was 
unconstitutional. 
Officers have a duty “to reassess their use of force” when they have “enough time” 
to do so.45 Based on this duty, Davison argues that “the four tasings on the ground were 
unjustified given that [he] was attempting to comply but incapable of putting his arm 
behind his back while he was being tased and then had complied . . . prior to the final 
tasing.”46 These tasings happened in drive- stun mode, which is “less incapacitating” than 
dart mode.47 At this stage, the Court must credit Davison’s assertions that (1) he tried to 
comply with Officer Mooney’s order to place his hand behind his back and (2) he was 
unable to either because he was being tased or because he was physically restrained. But 
 
43 Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 451 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
44 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (barring judges from relying on the 
“20/20 vision of hindsight”). 
45 Hyde, 23 F.4th at 871. 
46 Dkt. 26 at 23. 
47 See Isayeva v. Sacramento Sherrif’ s Dep’t, 872 F.3d 938, 950 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation 
modified). 

 
even ac cepting those facts, precedent does not clearly establish that Officer Mooney’s 
conduct was unconstitutional. 
Officer Mooney was the lone officer arresting a blustering suspect armed with a 
long knife who did not comply with an order to put his hands up and started running away 
after being tased the first time. Under those circumstances, the cases cited by Davison do 
not clearly establish that it was unconstitutional to use a taser on him in drive-stun mode. 
Crucially, the cases Davison cites all involve multiple officers on the scene. For 
example, in Hyde it was unreasonable to use a taser when there were multiple officers 
present, the suspect was “restrained for two minutes[,] and [he] was no longer capable of 
resisting in the final stages of the scuffle.”48 That is not the situation Officer Mooney faced. 
When he deployed the taser in drive-stun mode, Officer Mooney was alone, Davison had 
been on the ground far less than two minutes, and he arguably was not restrained at all. 
The Hyde court also quotes Jones, emphasizing that once “Jones was prone and 
surrounded by multiple officers . . . there [was] no continuing justification for using 
intermediate force.”49 Again, Officer Mooney was the only officer on the scene and needed 
bystander assistance to restrain Davison. Plus, Officer Mooney had been warned that 
Davison was “hostile to other officers in the area” that very day.50 These facts are not minor 
differences, because the “most important single element” in the constitutional analysis is 
 
48 Hyde, 23 F.4th at 863. 
49 Id. (quoting 873 F.3d at 1130) (emphasis added); see Drummond ex re. Drummond v. 
City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2003) (saying force no longer necessary 
once suspect “was handcuffed and lying on the ground”). 
50 Dkt. 22-1 at 1. 

 
whether Davison posed and “immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others.”51 The 
Court is not permitted to second guess Officer Mooney’s heat-of-the-moment decision that 
bystander help was appropriate or that using his taser was necessary to keep them safe. 
Because no case clearly establishes that the Constitution bars a lone officer from using a 
taser on a suspect like Davison before securing handcuffs, Officer Mooney is entitled to 
qualified immunity. 
I V. CONCLUSION 
 Officer Mooney’s motion for summary judgment at Docket 22 is GRANTED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 DATED May 28, 2026 at Anchorage, Alaska. 
/s/ Aaron Christian Peterson 
Aaron Christian Peterson 
United States District Judge 
 
 
 
51 Id. 

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