govinfo:USCOURTS-tnwd-2_26-cv-02407-1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
WESTERN DIVISION 
JULIAN HERNANDEZ ROCHA, 
Petitioner, 
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No. 2:26-cv-02407-SHL-cgc 
v. 
CHRISTOPHER BULLOCK, Acting Director 
of the New Orleans Field Office of ICE, in his 
official capacity, 
Respondent. 
 
ORDER GRANTING PETITION 
 
 
 Before the Court is Petitioner Julian Hernandez Rocha’s Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, filed April 9, 2026. (ECF No. 1.) Hernandez Rocha challenges 
his continued detention in the West Tennessee Detention Facility under 8 U.S.C. § 
1225(b)(2)(A), arguing that § 1226(a) is the applicable provision. (Id. at PageID 1, 3.) He seeks 
immediate release from Respondent’s custody. (Id.) On April 15, Respondent responded in 
opposition. (ECF No. 11.) The next day, Hernandez Rocha replied. (ECF No. 12.) 
On May 14, the Court directed Respondent to update his position in light of the Sixth 
Circuit’s recent decision in Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, --- F.4th ---, 2026 WL 1283891 (6th Cir. 
2026). (ECF No. 13.) In response, Respondent sought to distinguish this case from Lopez-
Campos. (ECF No. 14 at PageID 62.) According to Respondent, Hernandez Rocha “falls 
outside the scope of Lopez-Campos” because he has lived in the United States for only two years 
and because he “was encountered shortly before,” and not after, “illegally entering the United 
States.” (Id. at PageID 63.) In reply, Hernandez Rocha argues that the detention at issue is not 
that initial encounter with border patrol in 2024, but the recent detention on February 26, 2026, PageID
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when he was detained indefinitely under the wrong statute. (ECF No. 15 at PageID 69.) 
 For the reasons stated below, the Petition is GRANTED. 
BACKGROUND 
 Hernandez Rocha is a citizen of Nicaragua who entered the United States on January 15, 
2024, near Lukeville, Arizona. (Id.) Since then, according to Hernandez Rocha, he has 
“demonstrated exemplary compliance with all conditions of his release, including the Intensive 
Supervision Appearance Program (ISAP) and Alternatives to Detention (ATD) protocols.” (Id. 
at PageID 69–70.) He has maintained steady employment. (Id. at PageID 70.) His asylum 
application remains pending. (Id.) He has no criminal record. (Id.) Nevertheless, on February 
26, 2026, he was detained during a scheduled check-in at the Memphis ICE sub-office. (Id.) 
ANALYSIS 
 Hernandez Rocha seeks immediate release from Respondent’s custody, arguing that his 
detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) is “unlawful and void ab initio.” (Id. at PageID 79.) 
 Respondent, while acknowledging that Lopez-Campos, 2026 WL 1283891, “is binding 
on this Court,” contends that it “does not control the outcome of this matter.” (ECF No. 14 at 
PageID 62–63.) His two arguments against applying Lopez-Campos here are that (1) Hernandez 
Rocha has not spent “significant time . . . within the interior of the United States” (id. at PageID 
63 (quoting Lopez-Campos, 2026 WL 1283891, at *13)), and (2) “Petitioner was encountered 
shortly before illegally entering the United States” (id. at PageID 63). 
 As to the first argument, Respondent cites no authority for the conclusory assertion that 
Hernandez Rocha’s continuous two-year residence is not a “significant time . . . within the 
interior of the United States” under Lopez-Campos. Nor is the Court aware of any such 
authority. In fact, the Court has granted the petitions of multiple two-year interior residents. PageID
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See, e.g., Landeros Quintero v. Bullock, No. 26-CV-02511, 2026 WL 1382323, at *1 (W.D. 
Tenn. May 18, 2026) (noting that petitioner entered the United States in 2024 and was detained 
in 2026). Thus, this first argument is unavailing. 
As for Respondent’s second argument—that , unlike the petitioners in Lopez-Campos, 
border agents encountered Hernandez Rocha before he entered the United States—it lacks both 
factual and legal support. Respondent points to Hernandez Rocha’s Notice to Appear (“NTA”), 
which he refers to as Exhibit 2, but which he failed to attach. However, assuming that the NTA 
to which he refers is the same document attached to an earlier filing (ECF No. 11-1), it still does 
not help him. The document says nothing about the chronology of Hernandez Rocha’s arrival, 
except that he entered on January 15, 2024, and that immigration officials issued the NTA four 
days later. (Id. at PageID 46.) Moreover, Respondent offers no authority that puts at issue the 
chronology of a petitioner’s border crossing. 
More importantly, however, the question before the Court is not the chronology of the 
2024 encounter, but the legality of the current detention initiated on February 26, 2026. And, 
like the petitioners in Lopez-Campos, Hernandez Rocha was detained indefinitely under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) without the possibility of a bond hearing, despite having lived “significant time . 
. . within the interior of the United States.” Lopez-Campos, 2026 WL 1283891, at *13. Thus, 
Respondent’s second argument also fails. 
In the alternative, Respondent “maintains that the Court should require Petitioner to 
exhaust his administrative remedies.” (ECF No. 14 at PageID 64 n.1 (citing McCarthy v. 
Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992)).) However, as the Court has ruled in recent immigration 
habeas petitions, e.g., Lopez Soza v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 26-CV-02224, 2026 WL 
1104329, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 23, 2026), Petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative PageID
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remedies is EXCUSED. The legal questions presented by the Petition are fit for prompt 
resolution, and exhaustion would be futile because Petitioner cannot seek meaningful and timely 
administrative relief. McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 144 (explaining that where a statute is silent as to 
exhaustion, requiring exhaustion is within a court’s discretion); Contreras-Lomeli v. Raycraft, 
No. 25-cv-12826, 2025 WL 2976739, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 21, 2025) (“Bond denial appeals 
‘typically take six months or more to be resolved at the BIA.’” (citation omitted)). 
Finally, Respondent contends that, “[i]n accordance with the remedy affirmed in Lopez-
Campos, if the Court does not first require exhaustion, the Court should order that Petitioner be 
provided a custody redetermination hearing within 10 business days, and if that does not occur, 
Petitioner should be released from custody.” (ECF No. 14 at PageID 63–64.) However, 
Petitioner “rightfully state[s] that [he has] a liberty interest to be free from detention.” Lopez-
Campos, 2026 WL 1283891, at *13. ICE’s decision to detain him without a bond hearing 
violated that liberty interest, which cannot be casually tossed aside. Thus, he is entitled to 
immediate release. See Villafranca Lara v. Ladwig, No. 26-CV-02079, 2026 WL 401204, at *10 
(W.D. Tenn. Feb. 12, 2026) (“Because ICE purported to detain [Petitioner] under § 
1225(b)(2)(A), which includes no provision for a bond hearing, the Court will not now order a 
bond hearing under § 1226(a).”).
 
Therefore, consistent with Lopez-Campos and this Court’s decision in Villafranca Lara, 
2026 WL 401204, and after consideration of the record, the Petition is GRANTED. 
CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons stated above, the Petition is GRANTED. Respondent is ORDERED to 
release Petitioner immediately. Respondent is ENJOINED from pursuing Petitioner’s detention PageID
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under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Respondent is further ORDERED to file a Status Report with 
this Court within two business days, to certify compliance with this Order. 
 IT IS SO ORDERED, this 21st day of May, 2026. 
 s/ Thomas L. Parker 
 THOMAS L. PARKER 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE PageID
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