govinfo:USCOURTS-cand-3_22-cv-04273-2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
TARAN PIETOSI, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
 
HP, INC., 
Defendant. 
 

 
 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO 
PLAINTIFF RAMOS; DENYING 
ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION AS 
MOOT; GRANTING AMD SEALING 
REQUESTS 
Re: Dkt. Nos. 331, 332, 342, 349 
 
 
HP’s motion for summary judgment as to Ramos and administrative motion to apply the 
Ramos ruling to the other plaintiffs’ claims is denied. AMD’s sealing requests are granted. This 
order assumes the reader’s familiarity with the facts of the case, the parties’ arguments, and the 
applicable law. 
Motion for summary judgment. The Court previously granted summary judgment for 
HP on the other named plaintiffs’ fraud-based claims, unjust enrichment claim, and on security-
related issues. As the parties acknowledge, those issues were extensively litigated and those 
holdings apply to Ramos as well. Thus, the only claims at issue are Ramos’s merchantability 
claims. 
HP argues that, on this record, Ramos cannot show a defect that rendered his computer 
“unfit for its ordinary purpose.” Tietsworth v. Sears, 720 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1142 (N.D. Cal. 
2010). According to HP, there is no evidence the device stuttered while using basic applications 
like Word, Excel, or PowerPoint, and any stuttering that did happen was because Ramos was 
using applications that required a higher-end computer. HP also argues that the stutter was too 
minor to rise to the level of a defect that would render the computer unmerchantable, as shown 
by the videos created by Ramos’s expert, and by the fact that Ramos continued to use the laptop 
for six months after the stutter began. 

 
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The question of whether a defect rises to the level required to sustain a merchantability 
claim depends on: (1) what the device’s ordinary purpose is, as informed by the expectations of 
reasonable customers; and (2) whether the defect significantly impairs that purpose. See In re 
Carrier IQ, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 1051, 1108–10 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Day v. Advanced Micro 
Devices, Inc., 2023 WL 6998188, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2023). The parties disagree as to the 
ordinary purpose of Ramos’s laptop. HP points to its marketing materials to argue that Ramos 
opted for a budget model containing an entry-level processor, Ryzen 3, that was only suitable for 
basic computing. Ramos points to those same marketing materials to show that HP was 
marketing the Ryzen 3 processors as a good choice for gaming. It seems unlikely that a 
reasonable customer would think the budget model was appropriate for someone who wanted to 
use their laptop primarily for photo and video editing and gaming. But ultimately, this is a fact-
heavy question, and given that the HP marketing materials advertise Ryzen 3 processors as an 
“excellent choice” to “handle working from home and casual gaming during the week,” a 
reasonable jury could find that the ordinary use of Ramos’s laptop was something more than the 
very basic computing uses—such as web browsing, document editing, and email—that HP 
suggests its core functionality was limited to. See Dunne Decl. Ex. 19 (Dkt. 337-20) at 7. 
As to whether the stutter constituted a significant impairment, the key evidence is 
Ramos’s testimony and videos created by Ramos’s expert, Steve Novak, that purport to show 
that “stressing” the fTPM on Ramos’s computer results in stuttering.1 While the videos go 
towards showing that the stuttering issue can be traced to the fTPM and what the stutter looks 
like when it happens, they do not show how frequently the stutter would occur in regular use. 
The frequency of the stutter is key to the question of how significantly the alleged fTPM defect 
impaired the use of the computer. For example, a stutter or two in a full day of use may be 
annoying but would not come close to rendering a product unsuitable for its ordinary use. But 
 
1 The methodology used by Novak is explained in the Novak Declaration. See Dkt. No. 337-32 at 
pp. 2–3, 6–8. As summarized at the hearing, Novak’s experiments essentially trigger the write or 
erase functions of the fTPM, which in turn results in computer stuttering. See Hearing Transcript 
at 19:12–20:25. 

 
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imagine instead a computer that stutters much more frequently, interrupting Zoom calls or the 
types of games that HP markets the Ryzen 3 as being suitable for. In that situation, a reasonable 
jury could plausibly arrive at the conclusion that the computer was not fit for its ordinary 
purpose. The only evidence as to the frequency of the stutter is Ramos’s interrogatory response 
describing the stuttering as occurring “nearly every time he used his HP laptop” and stating that 
the issue was “pervasive.” See Dunne Decl. Ex. 17 (Dkt. No. 337-18) at 13. As discussed at the 
hearing, this is far from compelling. Nevertheless, absent strong evidence from HP showing that 
testimony to be untrue, it is enough for the plaintiffs to defeat summary judgment. See Hearing 
Transcript 23:2–24:21. 
Apart from its argument that there is no defect, HP argues that HP has no implied 
warranty obligations for computers it did not sell and that Ramos has not shown sufficient 
evidence that he purchased the HP computer. Ramos has not produced a receipt or other 
documentation of the purchase. He is also unable to remember the specific store he purchased the 
laptop from and only recalls that he purchased it from a brick-and-mortar store in Long Beach. 
But, as Ramos points out, the laptop’s serial number confirms that it is a genuine HP product, 
and HP has the information necessary to determine which retailer HP sold the laptop to. Given 
that this information is in HP’s domain, and that the plaintiffs have not had the chance to seek it, 
HP is not entitled to summary judgment based on the absence of evidence that HP sold the 
laptop. 
HP also argues that Ramos cannot establish privity with HP. As an initial matter, this 
argument does not apply to Ramos’s claim under the Song-Beverly Act. See Biederman v. FCA 
US LLC, 765 F. Supp. 3d 920, 949 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (“Unlike the California Commercial Code, 
the Song-Beverly Act does not require vertical privity between the parties as an element of an 
implied warranty claim.”). But even as to Ramos’s claim under the California Commercial Code, 
the law is not clear whether lack of privity would bar the claim. That is because there is an 
argument that Ramos would be covered by the third-party beneficiary exception to the privity 
requirement. See Day v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 2023 WL 6998188, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 

 
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23, 2023); see also In re Natera Prenatal Testing Litigation, 664 F. Supp. 3d 995, 1011 (N.D. 
Cal. 2023); Dang v. Samsung Electronics Co., 2018 WL 11348883, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 2, 
2018). But see Quackenbush v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 650 F. Supp. 3d 837, 843 
(N.D. Cal. 2023); Biederman, 765 F. Supp. 3d at 948. At the summary judgment stage, one could 
imagine that the answer to whether an end consumer is covered by the third-party beneficiary 
exception depends on the evidence that is put on the record, including the specifics of the 
contract between the manufacturer and the retailer. See Eastern Aviation Group, Inc. v. Airborne 
Express, Inc., 6 Cal. App. 4th 1448, 1453 (1992). But again, those key details are in HP’s 
domain. Absent any indication that the contract between HP and the retailer was specifically 
drawn to benefit the retailer, rather than the end consumer, the reasonable inference is that the 
end consumer is an intended third-party beneficiary of the manufacturer-retailer contract. 
 Finally, HP asserts that even if Ramos is an intended third-party beneficiary, summary 
judgment is warranted because the limited warranty is the “exclusive warranty remedy available” 
to Ramos and there is no evidence that he requested warranty service during the limited 
warranty’s one-year term. In support of that proposition, HP cites cases that say that a third-party 
beneficiary cannot assert greater rights than the promisee of the contract putatively made for the 
third-party’s benefit. See Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 2009). But 
unless the limited warranty foreclosed the implied warranty of merchantability, promisees under 
the contract could assert a claim for breach of that implied warranty. Thus, the limited warranty 
would only bar Ramos’s claim to the extent that it effectively disclaimed the implied warranty of 
merchantability for direct promisees. Under the Song-Beverly Act, such disclaimers are only 
possible for “as is” sales. Cal. Civ. Code § 1792.3 (“No implied warranty of merchantability 
. . . shall be waived, except in the case of a sale of consumer goods on an “as is” or “with all 
faults” basis.”). HP does not contend that Ramos’s laptop was sold on an “as is” basis. As for the 
California Commercial Code, to be effective, a disclaimer of the implied warranty of 
merchantability must be conspicuous and specifically mention merchantability. Cal. Com. Code 
§ 2316(2) (“[T]o exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the 

 
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language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous.”). HP only 
points to a warranty page accessed on its website in February 2026. This is not sufficient to show 
that HP effectively disclaimed the implied warranty of merchantability as to Ramos’s computer. 
Administrative motion. In light of the denial of summary judgment as to Ramos’s 
merchantability claims, HP’s motion to apply this ruling to the identical claims asserted by the 
other named plaintiffs is denied as moot. 
Sealing requests. AMD’s sealing requests at Dkt. Nos. 342 and 349 are granted. Within 
7 days, Ramos must refile his opposition to HP’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 337) 
with the narrowed redactions described in AMD’s sealing requests. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: May 27, 2026 
______________________________________ 
VINCE CHHABRIA 
United States District Judge 
 

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