govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-2_25-cv-18559-0

Not for Publication 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
 
ZHICHENG CHEN, 
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
LUIS SOTO, Director of Delaney Hall, et 
al., 
 
Respondents. 
 
Civil Action No.: 25-18559 (ES) 
 
OPINION 
 
 
SALAS, DISTRICT JUDGE 
Before the Court is the counseled motion to enforce judgment filed by petitioner Zhicheng 
Chen (“Petitioner”). (D.E. No. 8 (“Motion to Enforce Judgment”)). Respondents filed a letter 
response to the Motion to Enforce Judgment (D.E. No. 9 (“Response”)), and Petitioner filed a letter 
replying to the Response (D.E. No. 12 (“Reply”)). Having considered the parties’ submissions, 
the Court decides this matter without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); L. Civ. R. 78.1(b). 
For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to Enforce Judgment is DENIED. 
I. BACKGROUND 
On December 12, 2025, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 2241 (D.E. No. 1 (“Petition” or “Pet.”)), and a motion for temporary restraining order 
(“TRO”) (D.E. No. 2 (“TRO Motion” or “TRO Mot.”) ). Petitioner is an immigration detainee 
confined at Delaney Hall Detention Facility (“Delaney Hall”) in Newark, New Jersey. (Pet. ¶ 12). 
Petitioner names as respondents (in their official capacities): Luis Soto, the Director of Delaney 
Hall; Todd Lyons, Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”); Kristi PageID: <pageID>
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Noem, the then- Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”); and Pamela 
Bondi, the then-Attorney General of the United States. (Pet. ¶¶ 13–16). 
On December 12, 2025, the Court entered the following Text Order: 
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner ’s petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (D.E. No. 1 (“Petition” 
or “Pet”)) and his motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) 
(D.E. No. 2 (“TRO Motion” or “TRO Mot.”)). Pursuant to the All 
Writs Act, see 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), Respondents SHALL NOT 
TRANSFER Petitioner from the District of New Jersey, and SHALL 
NOT REMOVE Petitioner from the United States, pending further 
order of this Court. Accordingly, to the extent Petitioner moves for 
a TRO temporarily enjoining his removal from the District of New 
Jersey, the TRO Motion is DENIED as moot. To the extent that 
Petitioner seeks a TRO ordering his immediate release from 
immigration detention, the TRO Motion is DENIED without 
prejudice because such release is greater than the relief Petitioner 
could obtain in his underlying Petition. As Petitioner indicates, even 
under his reading of the relevant immigration statutes, he is still 
subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226( a), albeit with an 
entitlement to seek bond from an immigration judge. (See Pet. 5). 
The Clerk of Court shall terminate the Motion pending at D.E. No. 
2. According to Petitioner, Respondents are presently detaining 
Petitioner under the mandatory detention provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 
1225(b), pursuant to a July 8, 2025 Department of Homeland 
Security memorandum and the decision of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals in In Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 
2025). (Pet. 26- 28). Under this Court's recent decision in Diaz 
Rudecindo v. Florentino, No. 25-16942, 2025 WL 3470299 (D.N.J. 
Dec. 3, 2025), the Court holds that Petitioner is subject to detention 
under § 1226(a), which requires an opportunity to seek bond, id. at 
*2-4. Specifically, it appears that: (i) Petitioner entered the country 
without being paroled or admitted, on or about November 30, 2023; 
(ii) two days after he was initially detained, Petitioner was 
subsequently released on his own recognizance; (iii) the Notice to 
Appear charged Petitioner with being an alien present in the United 
States without being admitted or paroled; (iv) Petitioner obtained 
employment authorization and has been working two jobs to support 
himself; and (v) on December 4, 2025, in the interior of the United 
States, Petitioner was detained at a routine U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement check- in. (Pet. 17- 18, 19). Based on these 
alleged facts, Diaz Rudecindo controls this present matter. Diaz 
Rudecindo, 2025 WL 3470299, at *4. In accordance with 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(a), within seven (7) days of the date of entry of this Text PageID: <pageID>
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Order, Respondents shall provide Petitioner with an individualized 
bond hearing before an immigration judge who shall assess whether 
he presents a flight risk or a danger to the community. Within three 
(3) days of that bond hearing, Respondents shall file a written notice 
of the outcome of that hearing with this Court. If Respondents 
contend that Diaz Rudecindo does not control, they shall file an 
expedited answer within five (5) days of the date of entry of this 
Text Order, and Petitioner may file a reply within three (3) days of 
the date of filing of Respondents ’ expedited answer. Finally, the 
Clerk of Court shall forward a copy of the Petition (D.E. No. 1), the 
attached documents (D.E. Nos 1- 1 through 1- 4), the TRO Motion 
and supporting documents (D.E. Nos. 2, 2- 1 & 2- 2), and this Text 
Order to the Chief, Civil Division, United States Attorney’s Office, 
at the following email address: USANJ -HabeasCases@usdoj.gov.. 
So Ordered by Judge Esther Salas on 12/12/2025. (ek) (Entered: 
12/12/2025) 
 
(D.E. No. 3 (“December 12, 2025 Text Order”)). 
 On December 22, 2025, the Court entered a second Text Order granting the parties’ request 
for an extension of time to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing through December 30, 2025. 
(D.E. No. 6). 
 On December 29, 2025, Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Nicole Lane conducted a bond hearing 
and denied Petitioner release on the grounds that he poses a flight risk. (See D.E. No. 7 at 1). 
 Petitioner filed his Motion to Enforce Judgment on January 8, 2026. (D.E. No. 8) . On 
January 20, 2026, Respondents filed their Response (D.E. No. 9), and Petitioner filed his Reply on 
January 29, 2026 (D.E. No. 12). 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
Unde
r 28 U.S.C. § 2241, habeas relief may be granted if an individual “is in custody in 
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); 
Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490 (1989) (per curiam). “[A]bsent suspension, the writ of habeas 
corpus remains available to every individual detained within the United States. U.S. Const., Art. 
I, § 9, cl. 2.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004). A habeas petitioner has “the burden PageID: <pageID>
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of sustaining his allegations by a preponderance of evidence.” Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 
286 (1941). 
This Court does not have jurisdiction to review the IJ ’s discretionary decision to grant or 
deny bond; however, it may review whether a bond hearing was fundamentally unfair and thus 
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Ghanem v. Warden Essex 
Cnty. Corr. Facility , No. 21- 1908, 2022 WL 574624, at *2 (3d Cir. Feb. 25, 2022) (not 
precedential). 
III. DISCUSSION 
 “ In a fundamentally fair bond hearing, due process has three essential elements. ‘An alien: 
(1) is entitled to factfinding based on a record produced before the decisionmaker and disclosed to 
him or her; (2) must be allowed to make arguments on his or her own behalf; and (3) has the right 
to an individualized determination of his [or he r] interests.’” Ghanem, 2022 WL 5474624, at *2 
(alteration in original) (quoting Kamara v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 420 F.3d 202, 211 (3d Cir. 2005)). 
 Petitioner does not dispute that IJ Lane’s factfinding was based on a record produced before 
the IJ and disclosed to Petitioner . Furthermore, it is undisputed that Petitioner, who was 
represented by counsel at the bond hearing, had an opportunity to present arguments on his behalf. 
Petitioner instead argues that “the IJ failed to provide an individualized determination, ignored 
relevant evidence, and made a finding of flight of risk that was conclusory and devoid of reasoned 
consideration.” (D.E. No. 8-1 (“Pet’r’s Mem. of Law”) at 1). According to him, the decision in 
this matter was clearly not individualized because IJ Lane expressed concern about flight risk, 
made passing references to the evidence, and dismissed some of the evidence as failing to 
ameliorate the risk of flight while ignoring “the 129-page evidence packet” regarding the issue of 
flight risk ( including witness letters, a letter from a sponsor, verification of Petitioner’s current PageID: <pageID>
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housing assignment, his driver’s learner’s permit and proof of bank account, his wife’s 
employment authorization and letter of support, his child’s employment authorization and letter of 
support, letters of support from his l awful permanent resident sister and brother-in-law, letters of 
support from his church, and a filed and prima facie eligible asylum application). (Id. at 1, 7; see 
also Reply at 2 (“The IJ made passing references to the evidence but failed to actually evaluate the 
evidence as a whole and ignored large portions of Petitioner’s submissions that go to the heart of 
the flight risk determination . . . .”)). Specifically, IJ Lane purportedly relied solely on Petitioner’s 
length of residence in the United States, without considering the other relevant factors or whether 
an appropriate bond amount could ameliorate the risk of flight, and her decision “makes even less 
sense” because Petitioner was previously released on his own recognizance after entering the 
United States.1 (Pet’r’s Mem. of Law at 7–8; see also Reply at 3 (arguing that the IJ appears to 
have only considered the length of residence factor) ). In addition, Petitioner indicates that 
“mechanistic” reliance on factors that are common to all (or most) detainees is insufficient to 
satisfy the “individualized determination” prong. (Pet’r’s Mem. of Law at 9). 
 “ A bond hearing is individualized ‘if it is not so arbitrary that it would offend fundamental 
tenets of due process’ and ‘if there is a discernible rational basis for the underlying administrative 
 
1 In Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37 (BIA 2006), the BIA enumerated nine factors that IJs may consider 
in determining whether an alien or non-citizen merits release from bond (and the amount of bond that is appropriate): 
 
(1) whether the alien has a fixed address in the United States; (2) the alien’s length 
of residence in the United States; (3) the alien ’s family ties in the United States, 
and whether they may entitle the alien to reside permanently in the United States 
in the future; (4) the alien ’s employment history; (5) the alien’s record of 
appearance in court; (6) the alien ’s criminal record, including the extensiveness 
of criminal activity, the recency of such activity, and the seriousness of the 
offenses; (7) the alien’s history of immigration violations; (8) any attempts by the 
alien to flee prosecution or otherwise escape from authorities; and (9) the alien’s 
manner of entry to the United States. Matter of Saelee, 22 I&N Dec. 1258 (BIA 
2000); Matter of Drysdale , [20 I.& N. Dec. 815, 817 (BIA 1994) ]; Matter of 
Andrade, 19 I&N Dec. 488 (BIA 1987). 
 
Id. at 40. PageID: <pageID>
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decision, and the immigration judge applies the correct legal standards, that suffices.’” Haiguang 
Zheng v. Rokosky, No. 26-1689, 2026 WL 800203, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2026) (quoting Vasquez-
Rosario v. Noem, No. 25-7427, 2026 WL 395711, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2026) ); see also Chen 
v. Rose , No. 26- 0501, 2026 WL 473347, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2026) ( “A bond hearing is 
individualized if it is not ‘so arbitrary that it would offend fundamental tenets of due process.’ And 
if ‘there is a discernible rational basis for the underlying administrative decision, and the 
immigration judge applies the correct legal standards, that suffices. ’” (quoting Romero v. Ogle , 
No. 21-1192, 2021 WL 836027, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 2021) )). The Court concludes that the 
bond hearing in this case satisfies these requirements for an individualized administrative 
determination. 
 Petitioner submitted extensive evidence in support of his bond request and the IJ permitted 
both DHS counsel and Petitioner’s attorney to state their positions regarding the request. In fact, 
Petitioner’s counsel argued at some length in support of granting release on bond. (D.E. No. 12-2 
(“Tr.”) at 4:19–7:14). After hearing the parties’ arguments, IJ Lane rendered the following 
reasoned decision on the record: 
THE COURT: All right. As for the Court ’s decision regarding the 
request for bond, it ’s noted there are no jurisdictional issues 
mentioned. As for dangers to community, there ’s been no 
information provided by either side that the Respondent has 
committed any crimes or -- and nothing showing danger to the 
community. However, the court is concerned about flight risk, 
specifically given the short period of time that the Respondent has 
been here. Although it’s noted that he’s with his wife and child, it’s 
noted he came in with his wife and child, and everybody’s in 
removal proceedings, so it doesn’t really add to a level of him having 
some type of a lesser risk of flight, given those concerns. 
 
It's also noted -- and I do understand what Respondent ’s counsel is 
saying that he didn’ t file taxes given the short period of time for 
which he’s been here and by next year he would, and it is noted he 
has employment, but it doesn’ t show overall any meaningful or PageID: <pageID>
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verifiable ties to community. It’s noted that he lives with his 
nephew, but again, it’s not that he owns the property or there ’s any 
tie to the property whatsoever. 
 
So given the concerns of flight risk, the Court at this time would 
deny bond. 
 
(Id. at 7:17–8:9). 
 
 Although IJ Lane could have provided a more thorough discussion of t he parties’ 
contentions and the circumstances weighing for (and against) release on bond, she still provided 
“a discernible rational basis ” for her denial of release on bond, she applied the correct legal 
standards, and the decision was not “so arbitrary” as to violate fundamental due process principles. 
Haiguang Zheng, 2026 WL 800203, at *4 (citation omitted). Petitioner acknowledges that “an 
administrative court ‘is not required to write an exegesis on every contention’” but instead must 
provide “a meaningful bond hearing.” ( Pet’r’s Mem. of Law at 5 (quoting Gallegos Trinidad v. 
Att’y Gen., No. 22- 2687, 2023 WL 6121768, at *4 ( 3d Cir. Sept. 19, 2021) (not precedential)). 
Here, IJ Lane explained that one of the applicable factors—th e noncitizen’s length of residence in 
the United States—weighed in favor of finding that Petitioner is a flight risk. (See Tr. at 7: 17–
8:9); Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 40. However, the IJ did not merely (or “mechanistically”) rely on 
Petitioner’s relatively brief period of residence in the United States. She also considered and 
weighed other Guerra factors and Petitioner’s specific arguments, observing that his wife and child 
are also in removal proceedings, “so it doesn’t really add to a level of him having some type of a 
lesser risk of flight, given those concerns ;” he has not (yet) filed taxes ; “he has employment, but 
it doesn’t show overall any meaningful or verifiable ties to community;” and “[i]t’s noted that he 
lives with his nephew, but again, [he does not] own[] the property.”2 (Id.). 
 
2 Petitioner argues that “[t]he IJ’s mechanistic decision in this case is akin that found [sic] in other cases such 
as Y.S.G. v. Andrews, [No. 25-1884, 2025 WL 2979309] (E.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2025) and Wilkins v. Doll, [No. 17-2354, PageID: <pageID>
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Accordingly, “Petitioner’s challenge to [the IJ’s] finding that Petitioner poses a flight risk 
is a challenge to the judge’s credibility determination and weighing of the evidence, which are 
discretionary determinations beyond this Court’s review.” Le ma Leon v. Bondi , No. 26-0193, 
2026 WL 685688, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2026) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e); Ghanem , 2022 WL 
574624, at *2) (rejecting the petitioner’s arguments that the IJ’s finding that he did not meet his 
burden of establishing he was not a flight risk because the IJ’s finding lacked any reasoning or 
support given “the voluminous supporting documentation” filed with the bond request and that it 
was “evident that the [IJ] did not consider the Petitioner’s facts and evidence” (citations omitted)); 
see also Ibrahim v. Rokosky , No. 25- 17189, 2026 WL 948230, at *1–2 (D.N.J. Apr. 8, 2026) 
(indicating that the argument that the bond hearing was fundamentally unfair because the IJ relied 
on “mechanistic” factors challenged the weighing of the evidence falling within the IJ’s discretion 
and was not subject to the court’s review); De Souza v. Soto, No. 25-18734, 2026 WL 102946, at 
*3 (D.N.J. Jan. 14, 2026) (“Petitioner’s arguments that the IJ ‘summarily’ deemed Petitioner a 
flight risk is a challenge to the judge’s credibility determination and weighing of the evidence, 
which are discretionary determinations beyond this Court’s review.” (citations omitted)); Cano v. 
Soto, No. 25-18008, 2026 WL 63486, at *1 (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2026) (concluding that the petitioner’s 
arguments that the IJ failed to consider his history of appearing for ICE check-ins and focused on 
irrelevant details were challenges to the weight of the evidence). The Court does not express any 
 
2018 WL 3388032] (D.N.J. July 12, 2018).” (Reply at 3). However, in the present matter, the IJ did “meaningfully 
discuss the probative evidence petitioner submitted demonstrating his significant ties to the communit y,” and, in any 
event, Petitioner agrees that, unlike in Y.S.G., the burden of proof in the current matter was on Petitioner. (Pet’r’s 
Mem. of Law at 8 & n.2 (quoting Y.S.G., 2025 WL 297 9309, at *11 )). Likewise , the Wilkins court concluded that 
“the IJ relied almost exclusively on a ‘mechanistic factor’ common to virtually all immigration detainees that are 
subject to prolonged detention, i.e., the existence of a removal order entered by an IJ.” Wilkins , 2018 WL 3388032, 
at *2 (“Under this reasoning , every detainee who has a pending appeal of a removal order would be ineligible for 
bond. Such a determination is not sufficiently individualized.”) (citing Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1205 (9th Cir. 
2011); Sanchez v. Sabol, No. 15-2423, 2016 WL 742619, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 2016)). The IJ in the present case 
did not “rely almost exclusively” on Petitioner’s length of residence. In addition, there is no indication that “virtually 
all immigration detainees” entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226(a) have resided in this country for a relatively brief 
period of time. PageID: <pageID>
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opinion on whether the IJ reached the correct conclusion; however, the record compels a finding 
that Petitioner received the individualized bond hearing required under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and 
Ghanem. Any challenge to the IJ’s denial of bond must be presented to the BIA.3 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES the Motion to Enforce Judgment . An 
appropriate order follows. 
 
 s/ Esther Salas______ 
 Esther Salas, U.S.D.J. 
 
 
3 Petitioner also contends that Petitioner is “now detained and stuck in administrative limbo due to no fault of 
his own” because, following the bond hearing conducted by IJ Lane of the Elizabeth, New Jersey Immigration Court, 
an IJ with the Otero, New Mexico Immigration Court issued an order terminating the immigration proceeding without 
prejudice because DHS failed to produce Petitioner (who had been returned to Delaney Hall under this Court’s 
December 12, 2025 Text Order ) for a master calendar hearing. (Pet’r’s Mem. of Law at 9 –10 (emphasis omitted)). 
However, subsequently, on February 24, 2026, the Elizabeth Immigration Court held a removal proceeding, denied 
Petitioner’s applications for asylum and withholding of removal, and ordered him removed to China. ( See D.E. No. 
14 at 1). Petitioner’s administrative appeal from this removal order remains pending. See EOIR Automated Case 
Information, https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation (last visited May 26, 2026). PageID: <pageID>

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