govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-2_22-cv-04158-2

1 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
ASDAL HOLDINGS, LLC, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
Civil No.: 22-cv-4158 (KSH) (AME) 
 
 v. 
IDEASOIL, LLC, et al., 
 
 Defendants. 
 
OPINION 
 
Katharine S. Hayden, U.S.D.J. 
I. Introduction 
Plaintiff Asdal Holdings, LLC has moved to vacate Magistrate Judge André Espinosa’s 
August 8, 2025 Order denying leave to amend the complaint. There, Judge Espinosa found that 
Asdal Holdings’ request to reinstate its complaint against previously dismissed defendants and to 
amend its pleading to substitute the estate of one of those defendants fell “far short of satisfying 
the Rule 16 good cause standard as well as the Rule 15 standard to amend the complaint, 
requiring denial.” (D.E. 85, 8/8/25 Order, at 5.) Asdal Holdings now argues that its “excusable 
neglect” permits this Court to vacate the order under Rule 60(b)(1). For the reasons set forth 
below, Asdal Holdings’ motion is denied. 
II. Background 
In May 2022, Asdal Holdings sued defendant IdeaSoil, LLC and its alleged members—
Dean Horowitz, listed in the complaint as deceased, and Alexandra Horowitz (the “Horowitz 
defendants”)—in state court . (See D.E. 1-1, Compl.) The complaint alleged that on July 23, 
2019, Asdal Holdings entered into a joint credit line loan with IdeaSoil for $400,000 that 
IdeaSoil failed to pay back. (Id. ¶¶ 9-10.) It asserted claims for breach of contract (Count One), 
NOT FOR PUBLICATION PageID:
<pageID>
2 
 
breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing (Count Two), promissory estoppel 
(Count Three), unjust enrichment (Count Four), fraud in the inducement (Count Five), and 
piercing the corporate veil (Count Six). (Id. ¶¶ 11-36.) 
In June 2022, IdeaSoil filed a notice of removal and a month later filed a motion to 
dismiss Counts Two through Six. (D.E. 1, 6.) In that motion, IdeaSoil also asserted that “[u]pon 
information and belief, Defendants Dean Horowitz (deceased) and Alexandra Horowitz have not 
been properly joined and served as of the date of this Motion.” (D.E. 6-1, Mtn. to Dismiss, at 3 
n.1.) Plaintiffs—Asdal Holdings , Restless Creation LLC, William Asdal, and Annie Asdal— and 
IdeaSoil stipulated to the dismissal of Counts Two through Six; these counts were dismissed with 
prejudice. (D.E. 10, 11.) 
The deadline to amend the complaint or to add new parties was set at May 3, 2023. (D.E. 
13, Pretrial Scheduling Order ¶¶ 2-3.) On January 11, 2024, Restless Creation LLC, William 
Asdal, and Annie Asdal stipulated to the dismissal of their claims with prejudice against 
IdeaSoil. (D.E. 27.) After several extensions, fact discovery closed on March 27, 2024 (D.E. 
26). (See D.E. 13, 16, 18; see also D.E. 31, 3/27/24 Status Conference Transcript, at 15:2-16:5 
(discussing discovery deadline extensions).) 
On April 11, 2024, Magistrate Judge Espinosa ordered all plaintiffs to show cause as to 
why their claims against the Horowitz defendants should not be dismissed for failure to 
effectuate service and/or for failure to prosecute. (D.E. 33.) In a letter to the Court, plaintiffs’ 
attorney from the inception of this lawsuit, Thomas Lenney, responded that Asdal Holdings “has 
no objection to dismissing Dean Horowitz from the case” because he was deceased. (D.E. 40, 
Lenney 5/7/24 Letter, at 1-2.) Lenney also stated that despite being unserved, Alexandra PageID:
<pageID>
3 
 
Horowitz should remain in the case because she possessed relevant information as the managing 
member of IdeaSoil. (Id.) 
Also in April 2024, IdeaSoil moved for sanctions based upon plaintiffs’ “persistent and 
egregious failure to comply with their discovery obligations and the Orders of this Court 
throughout this litigation.” (D.E. 34-1, Mtn. for Sanctions, at 1.) According to Lenney, “[a]ny 
and all delay in providing discovery responses was due to the fact that multiple plaintiffs were 
not responsive to counsel,” but the “situation has been remedied” through those plaintiffs’ 
voluntary dismissal. (D.E. 35, Lenney 4/19/24 Letter, at 1.) 
Judge Espinosa held a hearing on May 14, 2024 and found that Asdal Holdings failed to 
offer any reasonable justification as to why the Horowitz defendants had not been served (D.E. 
42, Order, at 2) and dismissed them from the case without prejudice (D.E. 43). As Restless 
Creation LLC, William Asdal, and Annie Asdal no longer had any claims against any defendant, 
they were terminated from the case, leaving only Asdal Holdings and IdeaSoil as parties. (D.E. 
43; see unnumbered docket entry at May 16, 2024.) 
On September 6, 2024, Judge Espinosa granted IdeaSoil’s motion for sanctions and 
ordered Asdal Holdings and Lenney to “pay Ideasoil’s attorneys’ fees and costs associated with 
compelling discovery and pursing this motion.” (D.E. 56, 9/6/24 Opinion & Order, at 1.) He 
found sanctions were justified based on Lenney’s failure to appear at several scheduled 
conferences and his and plaintiffs’ failures to timely comply with their discovery obligations and 
abide by Court-ordered deadlines. (Id. at 2-7.) Judge Espinosa directed IdeaSoil to file an 
application for attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id. at 12.) PageID:
<pageID>
4 
 
A week and a half later, Brian Graffeo filed a notice of appearance on behalf of “all 
plaintiffs.”1 (D.E. 59.) In a subsequent letter, he informed the Court that Lenney disassociated 
from their firm, Kaplan Williams & Graffeo, LLC (“WGS”), as of September 3, 2024. (D.E. 62, 
Graffeo 10/3/24 Letter, at 1.) Graffeo requested a conference “to address our firm’s need to file 
a motion to withdraw as counsel for Plaintiffs” since neither Lenney nor plaintiffs were returning 
WGS’s calls or requests for information. (Id.; see also D.E. 64, Graffeo 10/11/24 Letter, at 1-2 
(requesting the same).) 
On November 22, Graffeo advised that he would be continuing as counsel for Asdal 
Holdings. (D.E. 70, Graffeo 11/22/24 Letter, at 1.) IdeaSoil filed its application for attorneys’ 
fees. (D.E. 72.) Asdal Holdings opposed, arguing that IdeaSoil’s recovery should be against 
Lenney alone since it was “without fault for either the delay in the discovery responses or Mr. 
Lenney’s failure to meet pertinent deadlines and attend required conferences.” (D.E. 76, 
Attorneys’ Fees Opp., at 9-10.) 
Judge Espinosa disagreed and ultimately attributed 70% of the awarded sanctions to 
plaintiffs and 30% to Lenney. (D.E. 78, 5/21/25 Opinion & Order Granting Sanctions, at 17-18.) 
He determined that Asdal Holdings was seeking untimely reconsideration of the September 6 
Order, and, in any event, found that 
Plaintiffs’ position that they are “without fault for either the delay in the discovery 
response or Mr. Lenney’s failure to meet pertinent deadlines” is contradicted by 
the record and undermined by submissions even after the September 6 Order and 
Mr. Lenney’s apparent departure from WGS, which reflect that Plaintiffs were not 
responsive to WGS, and that WGS could not obtain direction and did not receive 
sufficient communication from Plaintiffs to timely file an opposition to 
Defendant’s fee petition. 
 
1 By this point, Asdal Holdings was the only remaining plaintiff. However, because Judge 
Espinosa determined that plaintiffs Restless Creation LLC, William Asdal, and Annie Asdal 
were at fault for the discovery delays in this matter, it appears that Graffeo continued to represent 
their interests in opposition to IdeaSoil’s application for attorneys’ fees. PageID:
<pageID>
5 
 
 
(Id. at 6-7.) 
On May 30, 2025, Asdal Holdings filed a three-page letter that initiated the instant 
dispute. (D.E. 81, Graffeo 5/30/25 Letter.) In it, Asdal Holdings requested “the Court’s 
permission to reinstate Plaintiff’s Complaint” against the Horowitz defendants—who had been 
dismissed one year prior—and to “amend the pleading nunc pro tunc so that the Estate of Dean 
Horowitz . . . can be substituted in as the correct party in interest.” (Id. at 1.) Asdal Holdings 
maintained that it only recently learned of Alexandra Horowitz’s address—3 Linden Lane, 
Greensboro, North Carolina 27410—after an independent investigation. ( Id. at 1-2.) 
But IdeaSoil had provided Asdal Holdings that address for Alexandra Horowitz in its 
June 2023 interrogatories responses. (D.E. 82, Mintz 6/4/25 Letter, at 4-6.) And although Asdal 
Holdings excused its delay in bringing the Estate of Dean Horowitz because it learned of Dean 
Horowitz’s passing “during the course of the litigation” (D.E. 81, Graffeo 5/30/25 Letter, at 1), 
in fact Dean Horowitz is listed as “deceased” in the complaint Asdal Holdings filed in state court 
on May 10, 2022. Before Judge Espinosa, the parties filed submissions arguing back and forth 
on the merits of adding the Estate, including Asdal Holdings’ assertion that IdeaSoil may no 
longer be solvent, leaving it without a remedy should the Horowitz defendants not be reinstated. 
(D.E. 82, 83, 84.) 
Judge Espinosa issued an eight-page order denying Asdal Holdings’ requests (“the 
August 8 Order”). (D.E. 85, 8/8/25 Order.) He determined that Asdal Holdings was “seeking 
leave to amend the complaint to add parties pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15” and 
found “sufficient information in the parties’ letters and in the record to decide questions without 
further briefing.” (Id. at 3 n.2.) But because Asdal Holdings made these requests “over two 
years after the deadline for motions to amend,” Judge Espinosa first analyzed “whether there is PageID:
<pageID>
6 
 
good cause under Rule 16(b)(4) to consider this late request before proceeding to a Rule 15 
analysis.” (Id. at 3.) 
Judge Espinosa found that Asdal Holdings’ justifications for failing to serve Alexandra 
Horowitz or timely moving to add Dean Horowitz’s Estate as the correct party in interest “strains 
credulity,” as these justifications were flatly contradicted by the record. (Id. at 5-6.) He 
determined that Asdal Holdings did not offer any other justifications for its dilatory conduct and 
undue delay, and that addition of these previously-dismissed parties “will prejudice IdeaSoil by 
expanding this action over one year after the conclusion of fact discovery and by injecting 
further undue delay into its resolution.” (Id. at 6-8 & n.5.) As a result, there was no good cause 
to consider Asdal Holdings’ late request under Rule 16(b)(4), and Asdal Holdings’ “unjustifiable 
and undue delay in raising these requests merits denial under Rule 15.” (Id. at 5-7 & n.3.) 
Before this Court, Asdal Holdings has moved to vacate the August 8 Order under the 
“excusable neglect” ground of Rule 60(b)(1). (D.E. 86.) Its motion in essence casts all blame on 
Lenney. (See 86-14, Mov. Br., at 7 (Lenney failed “to adequately update Plaintiff as to the status 
of the litigation” and Asdal Holdings “was not aware of any issues concerning service of the 
Complaint”); id. at 9 (Asdal Holdings’ “delay in requesting reinstatement of the Complaint 
against Mr. Horowitz was outside of [its] control”); id. at 10 (Asdal Holdings “relied on Mr. 
Lenney to provide accurate updates on the status of the litigation”); id. at 11 (“Failing to properly 
serve Mrs. Horowitz was outside of the Plaintiff’s control.”); see also D.E. 86-10, Certification 
of William Asdal ¶¶ 5-9 (President of Asdal Holdings certifying to the same).) 
IdeaSoil’s opposition argues that “an attorney’s negligence is not a basis for finding 
excusable neglect under Rule 60(b).” (D.E. 87, Opp., at 6-8.) In its reply, Asdal Holdings raised 
a new issue: that “Mr. Lenney’s misconduct also permits Plaintiff to obtain relief under Fed. R. PageID:
<pageID>
7 
 
Civ. P. 60(b)(6).” (D.E. 90, Reply, at 8-9.) The Court grants IdeaSoil’s motion (D.E. 91) for 
leave to file a sur-reply and further agrees with the authority that IdeaSoil presents: “[a] party 
may not raise new arguments in their reply brief.” Bernstein v. City of Atl. City, 2011 WL 
2559369, at *3 (D.N.J. June 27, 2011) (Hillman, J.); see also In re Surrick, 338 F.3d 224, 237 
(3d Cir. 2003) (declining to consider a claim that was omitted from appellant’s initial brief and 
raised for first time in a reply brief). As a result, the Court will not address Asdal Holdings’ 
Rule 60(b)(6) argument. 
III. Legal Standard 
Under Rule 60(b)(1), a court “may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding” by reason of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) (emphasis added). A motion under Rule 60(b)(1) must be 
brought within a “reasonable time,” and no later than one year of the entry of the order. See Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). 
“The test for ‘excusable neglect’ is equitable, and requires [courts] to weigh the ‘totality 
of the circumstances.’” Orie v. Dist. Att’y Allegheny Cnty., 946 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2019) 
(quoting Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 193-94 (3d Cir. 2007)). Four non-exhaustive factors, 
identified by the Supreme Court in Pioneer Investment Services v. Brunswick Associates, must 
be considered: “(1) the danger of prejudice to the non-movants, (2) the length of delay and the 
potential impact on judicial proceedings, (3) the reason for the delay, including whether it was 
within the reasonable control of the movant and (4) whether the movant acted in good faith.” 
Liguori v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2015 WL 71384, at *1 (D.N.J. Jan. 6, 2015) (Thompson, J.) (citing 
Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993)). PageID:
<pageID>
8 
 
However, “[a]n attorney’s negligence is generally not excusable.” Andreotta v. Renegade 
RV, 2021 WL 838336, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 4, 2021) (McNulty, J.) (citing Orie, 946 F.3d at 192); 
see Sokol v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2023 WL 7002563, at *6 (D.N.J. Oct. 24, 2023) (Shipp, J.) 
(“[A]n attorney’s failure to respond or manage cases does not meet the ‘excusable neglect’ 
standard set forth in Rule 60(b)(1).”). Indeed, an attorney’s “misunderstandings based on law or 
procedure rarely constitute excusable neglect” especially where there is “a pattern of deliberate 
dilatoriness and delay.” Mullin v. Balicki, 875 F.3d 140, 154 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Jennings v. 
Rivers, 394 F.3d 850, 857 (10th Cir. 2005)). 
In such circumstances, a plaintiff’s “recourse is limited to . . . pursuing a negligence 
action against counsel”; he or she cannot otherwise “avoid the consequences of the acts or 
omissions of this freely selected agent.” Sokol, 2023 WL 7002563, at *7 (quoting Link v. 
Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962)). “[C]lients must be held accountable for the acts 
and omissions of their attorneys”; “each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent 
and is considered to have ‘notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney.’” 
Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 396-97 (quoting Link, 370 U.S. at 633-34). 
IV. Discussion 
At the outset, “[i]t is well-settled that orders granting or denying motions to add parties 
are not ‘final’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” Michelson v. Citicorp Nat. Servs. Inc., 
138 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1998). Asdal Holdings submits that “[o]rders denying reinstatement 
of a complaint are considered final.” (D.E. 86-14, Mov. Br., at 5 (citing DeJesus v. Mohammad, 
2013 WL 5963018, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 7, 2013) (Hillman, J.)).) However, despite Asdal 
Holdings’ framing, Judge Espinosa’s August 8 Order did not deny it leave to reinstate a PageID:
<pageID>
9 
 
previously dismissed complaint; rather, Judge Espinosa denied it leave to amend the complaint to 
add previously dismissed defendants. 
Asdal Holdings’ motion is therefore attempting to vacate a non-final order, which is 
procedurally improper; if Asdal Holdings wished to appeal Judge Espinosa’s August 8 Order to 
this Court, it had 14 days to do so pursuant to L. Civ. R. 72.1(c)(1). Its September 5, 2025 
motion was not brought within 14 days of August 8, 2025 and is not timely as an appeal. The 
Court rejects Asdal Holdings’ workaround by way of this motion, construes it as an untimely 
appeal from the Magistrate Judge’s August 8 Order, and denies the application as untimely. 
To be sure, even if Asdal Holdings’ motion to vacate by reason of “excusable neglect” 
was a procedurally proper application, it still fails on the merits. Asdal Holdings bases its 
excusable neglect argument squarely on Lenney, arguing that he “fail[ed] to adequately update 
Plaintiff as to the status of the litigation” and failed to serve the Horowitz defendants, which 
resulted in their dismissal. (D.E. 86-14, Mov. Br., at 7, 9-10.) Both sides use the four Pioneer 
factors to support their respective positions on whether Asdal Holdings has shown excusable 
neglect warranting the relief it seeks. 
A. Danger of Prejudice to the Non-Movant 
Under the first factor, Asdal Holdings argues that there is no danger of prejudice to 
IdeaSoil if the Court were to grant its motion because “the matter pertains to a straightforward 
breach of contract” and IdeaSoil “has failed to articulate any additional discovery that would be 
required if the Horowitz Defendants appear in this matter.” (Id. at 8.) 
In the August 8 Order, Judge Espinosa found that “permitting Plaintiff to amend the 
complaint to add these previously-dismissed parties will prejudice IdeaSoil by expanding this 
action over one year after the conclusion of fact discovery and by injecting further undue delay PageID:
<pageID>
10 
 
into its resolution.” (D.E. 85, 8/8/25 Order, at 7-8.) The Court agrees. Fact discovery was 
initially ordered to end on July 3, 2023. (D.E. 13, Pretrial Scheduling Order ¶ 1.) It did not 
conclude until March 27, 2024, prompting IdeaSoil to bring a successful motion for sanctions 
due to plaintiffs’ noncompliance with their discovery obligations and court orders. (D.E. 34-1, 
Mtn. for Sanctions, at 1.) 
The Horowitz defendants were dismissed on May 15, 2024. (D.E. 43.) Asdal Holdings 
waited a full year before it sought to “reinstate” them. (D.E. 81, Graffeo 5/30/25 Letter.) During 
that time, Asdal Holdings retained new counsel who represented to the Court within months that 
Asdal Holdings was not responding to his firm’s messages on how it would like to proceed in the 
case—apparently continuing its cycle of dilatoriness in this matter. ( See D.E. 62, Graffeo 
10/3/24 Letter, at 1; D.E. 64, Graffeo 10/11/24 Letter, at 1; see also D.E. 72, Application for 
Attorneys’ Fees, at ¶ 6(a)-(m) (cataloging Asdal Holdings’ delays in responding to Graffeo and 
prosecuting the case).) Asdal Holdings does not explain why it waited eight months from the 
time new counsel came into the case before seeking the relief it requests now. 
Courts have found that prejudice to the non-movant is exacerbated where a considerable 
length of time has elapsed from the date of injury to a motion requesting to restart the case from 
square one. Sokol, 2023 WL 7002563, at *4 (finding prejudice to defendant where more than 
two years passed since the inception of the case); Malik v. GEICO Ins., 2026 WL 160662, at *8 
(D.N.J. Jan. 21, 2026) (Martinotti, J.) (finding prejudice to defendant where “more than four 
years [passed] since the date of the injury and more than two years [passed] since the inception 
of this matter without discovery”). The passage of time destroys evidence and makes it more 
likely that witnesses will become unreachable or unavailable for trial. Sokol, 2023 WL 7002563, 
at *4. Here, the alleged injury occurred between 2019 and 2022, the case was removed in June PageID:
<pageID>
11 
 
2022, fact discovery closed in March 2024, and Asdal Holdings brought its motion to vacate in 
September 2025. Asdal Holdings’ delays throughout this matter exacerbate the prejudice to 
IdeaSoil. 
Although Asdal Holdings maintains in its brief that “there is no outstanding or additional 
discovery necessary to address the substance of Plaintiff’s Complaint” (D.E. 86-14, Mov. Br., at 
2), its earlier May 30 letter contemplated that “limited discovery” would be needed (D.E. 81, 
Graffeo 5/30/25 Letter, at 2 n.3). Its amended complaint seeks to add contract, quasi-contract, 
and piercing the corporate veil claims against the Horowitz defendants (D.E. 86-13, Proposed 
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13-34), which would more likely than not require reopening discovery, 
depositions, and initiate renewed motion practice. Add to that scenario Asdal Holdings’ 
representations that “[t]he discovery in this matter has been limited” (D.E. 86-14, Mov. Br., at 8), 
and that Alexandra Horowitz has knowledge of relevant information as the managing member of 
IdeaSoil (D.E. 40, Lenney 5/7/24 Letter, at 1-2). 
Moreover, Asdal Holdings argues that it will be prejudiced if the Horowitz defendants are 
not reinstated, as it “would be deprived of the opportunity to pursue its claims in a singular 
action to recoup any monies owed.” (D.E. 86-14, Mov. Br., at 9.) But Asdal Holdings’ concern 
about IdeaSoil’s solvency is not enough to justify prejudicing IdeaSoil in further delaying this 
matter. This factor strongly favors denying relief. 
B. Length of Delay and Potential Impact on Judicial Proceedings 
Notwithstanding the history of delays that plague this docket, Asdal Holdings argues the 
resolution of this matter will not be delayed by the addition of two parties and five claims to a 
case with one breach of contract claim against one defendant. (D.E. 86-14, Mov. Br., at 9 
(“[A]ny delay in proceedings will be minimal and will have limited impact on judicial PageID:
<pageID>
12 
 
proceedings[.]”).) This is not persuasive. The Court easily finds that reinstating the Horowitz 
defendants “would infringe on the District Court’s ‘strong interest in case management,’ which 
[plaintiff] repeatedly had rebuffed.” Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Levco-Route 46 Assocs., L.P., 
121 F. App’x 974 (3d Cir. 2005). 
C. Reason for Delay 
The third factor considers “the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the 
reasonable control of the movant.” Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395. Asdal Holdings’ “excusable 
neglect” justification is based on its prior attorney’s conduct, which is not cognizable as a basis 
for relief under Rule 60(b)(1). See Orie, 946 F.3d at 192 (affirming the district court’s finding 
that the attorney’s “overall negligence in handling the matter precludes us from finding 
‘excusable neglect’” as “clients must be held accountable for the acts and omissions of their 
attorneys” (citations omitted)); Sokol, 2023 WL 7002563, at *6 (an attorney’s failure to respond 
or to manage cases is not excusable neglect). Asdal Holdings “is deemed bound by the acts of 
[its] lawyer-agent and is considered to have ‘notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged 
upon the attorney.’” Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 397 (citing Link, 370 U.S. at 634). This factor 
strongly favors denying relief. 
D. Good Faith 
The final factor considers “whether the movant acted in good faith.” Id. at 395. IdeaSoil 
argues that Asdal Holdings’ justifications for not amending sooner are demonstrably false, which 
showcases bad faith. (D.E. 87, Opp., at 12-13.) 
Judge Espinosa has properly found that Asdal Holdings’ justifications for not amending 
sooner “strains credulity,” as the May 2022 complaint identifies Dean Horowitz as “(deceased)” 
and IdeaSoil’s June 2023 interrogatories list the same address for Alexandra Horowitz that Asdal PageID:
<pageID>
13 
 
Holdings identified in its May 30 letter. (D.E. 85, 8/8/25 Order, at 5-6.) In its papers on this 
motion, Asdal Holdings has effectively ignored these observations. (See generally D.E. 83, 
6/9/25 Letter; D.E. 86-14, Mov. Br.; D.E. 90, Reply.) Where the record so convincingly 
demonstrates otherwise, the Court is constrained to find that good faith is lacking in the 
justifications offered for delay and this fourth factor weighs in favor of denying relief. 
Having considered the totality of the circumstances in conjunction with the Pioneer 
factors, the Court concludes that Asdal Holdings has not established that it is entitled to relief 
from the August 8, 2025 Order. 
V. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, Asdal Holdings’ motion to vacate is denied. An appropriate 
order accompanies this opinion. 
 
Dated: May 27, 2026 /s/ Katharine S. Hayden 
Katharine S. Hayden, U.S.D.J. PageID:
<pageID>

Passage view · GavelSight