govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-1_25-cv-04133-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
 
CHARLES C., 
 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 
SECURITY, 
 
Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
No. 25-cv-04133 
 
OPINION 
 
 
APPEARANCES: 
Thomas J. Giordano, Jr. 
D
ISABILITY JUSTICE 
200F Market Street, Suite 350 
Philadelphia, PA 19103 
 
 On behalf of Plaintiff 
 
Erica Adams 
Shawn Cheree Carver 
S
OCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 
OFFICE OF PROGRAM LITIGATION 
6401 Security Boulevard 
Baltimore, MD 21235 
 
On behalf of Defendant PageID: <pageID>
2 
 
O’HEARN, District Judge. 
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Charles C .’s1 (“Plaintiff”) appeal from a 
denial of Social Security disability benefits by the Commissioner of Social Security 
(“Commissioner”). (ECF No. 1). The Court did not hear oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 
78.1. For the reasons that follow, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The Court recites herein only those facts necessary for its determination on this appeal. 
A. Administrative History 
Plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits on February 7, 2023, alleging 
disability beginning September 29, 2021. (AR 58). The Social Security Administration denied the 
claim initially on August 15, 2023, and again upon reconsideration on October 12, 2023. 
(AR 79, 85). 
Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (AR 109). 
The ALJ held a telephonic hearing on May 7, 2024, at which Plaintiff testified and was represented 
by counsel. (AR 34, 41–52). An impartial vocational expert (“VE”) also testified at the hearing. 
(AR 52–56). 
On May 30, 2024, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision, concluding that Plaintiff was 
not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act from September 29, 2021, through the 
date of the decision. (AR 14–28). Plaintiff appealed that decision to the Appeals Council, which 
denied review on March 6, 2025. (AR 1, 157 –58). Plaintiff timely appealed to this Court. 
(ECF No. 1). 
 
1 Pursuant to this Court’s Standing Order 2021- 10, this Opinion will refer to Plaintiff solely 
by first name and last initial. PageID: <pageID>
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B. Plaintiff’s Background and Testimony 
Plaintiff was 51 years old on the alleged onset date. (AR 171). He graduated from high 
school and completed two years of college. (AR 41). Before the onset of his alleged disability, 
Plaintiff worked primarily as a merchandiser, which involved building displays, setting store 
layouts, stocking merchandise, and maintaining inventory. (AR 44–45, 195). In April 2023, he 
began working as a food delivery driver for DoorDash. (AR 42–43). This work was limited and 
flexible, typically amounting to only two or three hours per day. (Id.). As of the date of the 
administrative hearing, Plaintiff continued to work for DoorDash, but he explained that he stops 
working when fatigue requires him to rest. (AR 42 –44). He testified that he could otherwise not 
perform heavier aspects of food delivery work, such as lifting a case of water, and that his girlfriend 
often assisted with driving and deliveries. (AR 44). 
Plaintiff is a cancer survivor in remission. (AR 51–52). He testified that he has experienced 
persistent fatigue following cancer treatment, describing himself as lacking strength and becoming 
drained quickly. (AR 44, 46, 50). Plaintiff further explained that, due primarily to his cancer 
treatment, he experienced “brain fog,” memory lapses, and episodes of confusion and feeling 
flustered, particularly when something went wrong during a delivery or when he was required to 
keep track of multiple things at once. (AR 46–47, 50–51). In addition, Plaintiff described ongoing 
right-knee problems, including difficulty with stairs, lifting, prolonged standing, and walking any 
significant distance. (AR 46–49). 
C. Medical History 
Plaintiff was diagnosed with Stage III rectal adenocarcinoma, a form of cancer, in 
September 2021. (AR 321). Under the care of Omar Al Ustwani, M.D. (“Dr. Ustwani”), Plaintiff 
completed his cancer treatment in April 2022. (AR 321, 336–38). Subsequent oncology follow - PageID: <pageID>
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ups reflected no evidence of recurrence. (AR 283, 341, 651–54, 659–62). Dr. Ustwani’s treatment 
records documented residual post-treatment symptoms, including significant fatigue, decreased 
stamina, and “brain fogginess.” (AR 277, 553). 
Additionally, until around April 2023, Plaintiff saw Joshua Bleier, M.D. (“Dr. Bleier”) as 
part of his cancer treatment and monitoring while in remission. ( See, e.g., AR 346–59, 615). Dr. 
Bleier’s notes from a January 2023 evaluation found “no evidence of recurrent disease” and 
reported that Plaintiff “reports doing well,” was “[n]egative for depression,” was “alert,” and had 
a “normal” mood. (AR 651–53, 659–61). 
After treatment, Plaintiff continued to report the same residual symptoms, including 
fatigue, reduced stamina, brain fog, anxiety, concentration difficulties, and peripheral neuropathy.2 
(AR 21 –24, 277, 456, 553). Christopher Williamson , Psy.D . (“Dr. Williamson ”) performed a 
consultative mental status evaluation in July 2023. (AR 410–13). Dr. Williamson observed that 
Plaintiff appeared physically uncomfortable, lethargic, fatigued, depressed, and anxious. 
(AR 411). Dr. Williamson also described Plaintiff as sad, down, and despondent, and assessed a 
guarded prognosis. (AR 410–13). At the same examination, Dr. Williamson noted that Plaintiff 
demonstrated intact thought processes, good recall, an average fund of knowledge, and the ability 
to perform simple calculations and serial sevens. (AR 411). Dr. Williamson ultimately diagnosed 
Plaintiff with generalized anxiety disorder, panic disorder, and adjustment disorder with depressed 
mood. (AR 411). 
 
2 Peripheral neuropathy is “a well-known side effect” of chemotherapy. (Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 6 
at 6). It is “caused by damage to the peripheral nervous system” and can manifest in symptoms 
such as “pain, weakness, tingling, numbness, or sensitivity, often in the hands or feet.” Peripheral 
Neuropathy, AM. CANCER SOC’Y (May 25, 2025), https://www.cancer.org/cancer/managing-
cancer/side-effects/pain/peripheral-neuropathy.html. PageID: <pageID>
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Plaintiff had a brain MRI post -cancer treatment in or around March 2024. (AR 830–31). 
The MRI revealed “[a] small number of predominantly punctate frontal white matter lesions,” also 
known as “white-matter disease.” (AR 831). Upon reviewing the MRI scans, Plaintiff’s oncologist, 
Glenda Smith, M.D. (“Dr. Smith”), “characterized [this] as a normal variation.” (AR 833). 
Other medical professionals evaluated Plaintiff’s psychological conditions. State agency 
psychological consultants Teissy Meza, Ph .D. (“Dr. Meza”) and Ada Liberant, P sy.D. (“Dr. 
Liberant”) both found that Plaintiff’s mental limitations were non-severe, and that he possessed no 
limitations in understanding, remembering, and applying information. (AR 58–73). Additionally, 
Plaintiff’s primary care provider, Ashley Odukoya , D.O. (“Dr. Odukoya”) completed a medical 
opinion form addressing Plaintiff’s functional limitations , assessing that Plaintiff would have 
limitations affecting concentration and work endurance, including a need for frequent unscheduled 
breaks and absences of approximately three days per month. (AR 469–70). 
The medical records further catalogue some of Plaintiff’s physical impairments, although 
they are not the primary focus of this appeal. Treatment notes document that Plaintiff suffered 
from knee arthritis as early as September 2021. (AR 326). The record also shows that Plaintiff had 
a right knee meniscus tear as early as 2020, which went untreated due to Plaintiff’s inability to 
afford treatment. (AR 263, 456). More relevant to this appeal, Plaintiff reported to several of his 
doctors that he suffers from peripheral neuropathy in his feet. (AR 289, 295, 326, 341, 440). 
Plaintiff claimed his neuropathy was “mild” and “improving,” and that “some issues” remained as 
of March 2023. (AR 289, 295, 341). But physical examinations reflected otherwise intact 
functioning, including no deficits in motor strength, tone, or sensation in the hands and feet. 
(AR 289, 295, 652–53, 661). PageID: <pageID>
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D. Vocational Expert Testimony 
The VE testified that Plaintiff’s past work was classified under the DOT as a “merchandise 
displayer,” which is a job generally performed at the medium exertional level, but Plaintiff 
performed it at the heavy exertional level. (AR 53). The ALJ then asked the VE to consider an 
individual limited to light work who could occasionally climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and 
crawl; could tolerate occasional exposure to high exposed places and moving mechanical parts; 
could understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions; and could tolerate occasional 
changes in a routine work setting. (AR 53–54). The VE testified that such an individual could not 
perform Plaintiff’s past work, but could perform other light, unskilled jobs existing in the national 
economy, including housekeeper, merchandise marker, and mail sorter. (AR 54). 
The VE further testified that those jobs would remain available if the individual could never 
climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; had to avoid all exposure to high exposed places and moving 
mechanical parts; and could only occasionally push and pull with the upper and lower extremities. 
(AR 54 –55). Finally, the VE testified that competitive employment would be precluded if an 
individual were off task 15% of the workday or absent from work more than one day per month. 
(AR 55). 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
A. Standard of Review 
In reviewing applications for Social Security disability benefits, this Court has the authority 
to conduct a plenary review of legal issues decided by an ALJ. Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 
(3d Cir. 2000). In contrast, the Court reviews the ALJ’s factual findings to determine if they are 
supported by substantial evidence. Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2000); see also 42 
U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). The United States Supreme Court has explained this standard as PageID: <pageID>
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follows: 
Under the substantial -evidence standard, a court looks to an existing 
administrative record and asks whether it contains sufficien[t] evidence to 
support the agency’s factual determinations. And whatever the meaning of 
substantial in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is 
not high. Substantial evidence, this Court has said, is more than a mere scintilla. 
It means—and means only—such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 
 
Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
The substantial evidence standard is a deferential standard, and the ALJ’s decision cannot 
be set aside merely because the Court “acting de novo might have reached a different conclusion.” 
Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. NLRB, 804 F.2d 808, 812 (3d Cir. 1986); see, e.g., Fargnoli v. Halter, 247 
F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Where the ALJ’s findings of fact are supported by substantial 
evidence, we are bound by those findings, even if we would have decided the factual inquiry 
differently.”). 
Nevertheless, the Third Circuit cautions that this standard of review is not “a talismanic or 
self-executing formula for adjudication.” Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(“The search for substantial evidence is thus a qualitative exercise without which our review of 
social security disability cases ceases to be merely deferential and becomes instead a sham.”); see 
Coleman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 15- 6484, 2016 WL 4212102, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 9, 2016). 
The Court has a duty to “review the evidence in its totality” and “take into account whatever in the 
record fairly detracts from its weight.” K.K. ex rel. K.S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 17-2309, 2018 
WL 1509091, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 27, 2018) (quoting Schonewolf v. Callahan, 972 F. Supp. 277, 
284 (D.N.J. 1997) (internal citations and quotations omitted)). Evidence is not substantial if “it is 
overwhelmed by other evidence,” “really constitutes not evidence but mere conclusion,” or PageID: <pageID>
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“ignores, or fails to resolve, a conflict created by countervailing evidence.” Wallace v. Sec ’y of 
Health & Hum. Servs., 722 F.2d 1150, 1153 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing Kent, 710 F.2d at 114). 
Although an ALJ is not required “to use particular language or adhere to a particular format 
in conducting [the] analysis,” the decision must contain “sufficient development of the record and 
explanation of findings to permit meaningful review.” Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (citing Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
B. Sequential Evaluation Process 
The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration has promulgated a five -step, 
sequential analysis for evaluating a claimant’s disability, as outlined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 
404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v). The analysis proceeds as follows: 
At step one, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is performing “substantial 
gainful activity[.]” If he is, he is not disabled. Otherwise, the ALJ moves on to step 
two. 
 
At step two, the ALJ considers whether the claimant has any “severe medically 
determinable physical or mental impairment” that meets certain regulatory 
requirements. A “severe impairment” is one that “significantly limits [the 
claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities[.]” If the claimant 
lacks such an impairment, he is not disabled. If he has such an impairment, the ALJ 
moves on to step three. 
 
At step three, the ALJ decides “whether the claimant’s impairments meet or equal 
the requirements of an impairment listed in the regulations[.]” If the claimant’s 
impairments do, he is disabled. If they do not, the ALJ moves on to step four. 
 
At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s “residual functional capacity” 
(“RFC”) and whether he can perform his “past relevant work.” A claimant’s “[RFC] 
is the most [he] can still do despite [h is] limitations.” If the claimant can perform 
his past relevant work despite his limitations, he is not disabled. If he cannot, the 
ALJ moves on to step five. 
 
At step five, the ALJ examines whether the claimant “can make an adjustment to 
other work[,]” considering his “[RFC,] . . . age, education, and work experience[.]” 
That examination typically involves “one or more hypothetical questions posed by 
the ALJ to [a] vocational expert.” If the claimant can make an adjustment to other 
work, he is not disabled. If he cannot, he is disabled. PageID: <pageID>
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Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 201–02 (3d Cir. 2019) (alterations in original; citations 
and footnote omitted). 
III. ALJ DECISION 
In a decision dated May 30, 2024, the ALJ applied the five -step sequential evaluation 
process and concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security 
Act from September 29, 2021, through the date of the decision. (AR 17–28). 
At Step One, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity 
since his alleged onset date of September 29, 2021. (AR 19). Although the ALJ noted some post -
onset earnings, including part-time DoorDash work, the ALJ concluded that this work did not rise 
to the level of substantial gainful activity. (AR 19–20). 
At Step Two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had five severe impairments: right knee 
meniscus tear, history of Stage III rectal adenocarcinoma, cognitive disorder, adjustment disorder, 
and generalized anxiety disorder. (AR 20). The ALJ also identified other medically determinable 
conditions—hypertension, pulmonary nodules, renal lesion, thrombocytopenia, COVID -19 
infection, gastroesophageal reflux disease, constipation, insomnia, and anemia —but concluded 
that these were non-severe because the record evidence showed they caused no more than minimal 
work-related limitations. (Id.). 
At Step Three, the ALJ found that none of the claimant’s impairments, alone or in 
combination, met or medically equaled a listed impairment. (Id.). The ALJ specifically considered 
the musculoskeletal listings in Sections 1.15, 1.16, and 1.18, the oncology listings in Section 13.00 
et seq., and the mental health listings in Sections 12.04 and 12.06. (AR 20–21). As to the mental 
listings, the ALJ found moderate limitations in understanding, remembering, or applying 
information; concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and adapting or managing oneself, and PageID: <pageID>
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a mild limitation in interacting with others, but concluded that the paragraph B and paragraph C 
criteria were not satisfied. (AR 21–22). 
Before proceeding to S tep Four, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff’s RFC , finding that Plaintiff 
retained the capacity to perform light work except: 
[H]e cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, he can occasionally climb stairs and 
ramps, balance as described in [Selected Characteristics of Occupations] , stoop, 
kneel, crouch, and crawl. Claimant can occasionally push and pull with his upper 
and lower extremities. Claimant must avoid all exposure to high exposed places 
and moving mechanical parts. Claimant can understand, remember, and carry out 
simple in structions, and he can tolerate occasional changes in a routine work 
setting. 
(AR 22–23). 
At Step Four, relying on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could not 
perform his past relevant work as a merchandise displayer, either as actually performed or 
generally performed. (AR 26). 
At Step Five, however, considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, 
the ALJ found that there were jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy that 
Plaintiff could perform. (Id.). Based on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ identified the representative 
occupations of housekeeper, merchandise marker, and mail sorter. (AR 27). Because the ALJ 
found that Plaintiff could make a successful adjustment to other work, the ALJ concluded that 
Plaintiff was not disabled. (AR 27–28). 
IV. DISCUSSION 
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision should be reversed because : the RFC is not 
supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ fail ed to account for Plaintiff’s psychological 
limitations and ignored Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of symptoms; the ALJ did not properly PageID:
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evaluate Dr. Odukoya’s opinion; and, based on the improper RFC assessment, the ALJ’s Step Five 
finding rested on an incomplete hypothetical to the VE. 
The Court finds none of these arguments persuasive , and will affirm the ALJ’s decision 
because it is supported by substantial evidence. 
A. The RFC is Supported by Substantial Evidence 
Plaintiff makes two arguments as to why the RFC is faulty. He first contends that the RFC 
lacks substantial evidentiary support because the ALJ ’s decision does not “contain sufficient 
development and explanation to permit meaningful judicial review.” (Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 6 at 9). 
Plaintiff’s second argument partly rehashes the first, arguing that the ALJ’s assessment of 
Plaintiff’s various symptoms is both “internally inconsistent” as well as “legally deficient.” (Id. at 
11 (cleaned up)). 
The Court will evaluate each asserted error in turn and ultimately finds that the RFC 
assessment is supported by substantial evidence and legally sufficient. 
1. The ALJ Adequately Explained the RFC Findings 
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to address evidence of his post -cancer cognitive 
limitations, such as fatigue, reduced stamina, lethargy, and anxiety, as well as physical limitations 
resulting from the peripheral neuropathy in his feet. (Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 6 at 9 (citing Jones, 364 
F.3d at 505; Burnett, 220 F.3d at 121)). In Plaintiff’s view, the ALJ focused on Plaintiff’s cancer 
remission while overlooking the allegedly disabling residual effects of his treatment. (Id.). 
The RFC represents “the most [a claimant] can still do despite [their] limitations.” 20 
C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). In determining the RFC, the ALJ considers “all of the relevant medical 
and other evidence” in the record. Id. § 404.1545(a)(3). However, the ALJ need not incorporate 
limitations that are not credibly established . Hess, 931 F.3d at 213. To that end, the ALJ may PageID:
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discount a claimant’s subjective complaints if they are inconsistent with the evidence of record. 
Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c). 
At bottom, “so long as ‘there is sufficient development of the record and explanation of findings 
to permit meaningful review[,]’” a reviewing court will not disturb the ALJ’s RFC findings. 
Tompkins v. Astrue , No. 12- 1897, 2013 WL 1966059, at *13 (D.N.J. May 10, 2013) (quoting 
Jones, 364 F.3d at 505). 
Here, with respect to Plaintiff’s cognitive impairments, the ALJ’s RFC assessment is 
supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ noted Plaintiff’s “allegations of cognitive 
decline . . . after chemoradiation therapy” and that he underwent a brain MRI which “revealed 
some evidence of white matter disease[.]” (AR 24). Though the ALJ credited Plaintiff’s allegations 
of diminished cognitive functionality, the ALJ explained that “the intensity, persistence, and 
limiting effects” of the post-cancer cognitive symptoms “are not fully consistent with the medical 
evidence and other evidence in the record.” (AR 23). To support that finding, the ALJ canvassed 
the medical evidence, and found that “ clinical findings from various examiners, including 
neurology and psychology, have generally been unremarkable . . . .” (AR 23–24). The ALJ 
specifically relied on Dr. Williamson’s consultative examination. While Dr. Williamson’s report 
notes that Plaintiff appeared “sad,” “lethargic,” and “fatigued,” the report also emphasized that 
Plaintiff “did not report any significant history of psychiatric treatment” and was otherwise “able 
to do simple mathematical calculations and had an average fund of knowledge[,]” “complete serial 
sevens, and had good recall[.]” (AR 24). Buttressing the ALJ’s finding is Dr. Bleier’s January 
2023 evaluation, which notes that Plaintiff “reports doing well,” was “[n]egative for depression,” 
was “alert,” and had a “normal” mood. (AR 651 –53, 659–61). All of this indicates that the ALJ PageID:
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reviewed all of the evidence related to Plaintiff’s cognitive limitations, but ultimately determined 
that the medical evidence supported no greater limitations than those imposed by the RFC. 
Plaintiff’s argument concerning the ALJ’s assessment of his physical impairments —
specifically, neuropathy in his feet—is no more persuasive. In essence, Plaintiff contends that, had 
the ALJ properly assessed his neuropathy-related limitations, the RFC limiting him to light work 
with only occasional pushing and pulling would have included additional restrictions, such as 
limitations related to attendance. (Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 6 at 9–10). 
The Court finds no error in the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s neuropathy- related 
limitations. The ALJ explained that no further limitations were warranted because the clinical 
findings “essentially showed physical exam results within normal limits” and c haracterized 
Plaintiff’s neuropathy as “mild.” (AR 25). Indeed, the ALJ derived the push- and-pull limitation, 
at least in part, from the assessment of Dr. Odukoya —the same physician whom Plaintiff later 
claims the ALJ did not sufficiently credit. (Id.; see Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 6 at 10). In any event, the 
ALJ then explained why he did not credit the remainder of Dr. Odukoya’s opinion, including the 
limitation to three to four hours of concentrated work: “there is no consistent or supportable 
evidence to show that claimant cannot engage in sustained or full- time work activity.” (AR 25). 
Plaintiff identifies no evidence undermining that determination, and the ALJ’s conclusion that 
further neuropathy-related limitations were not required is supported by the record evidence of 
Plaintiff’s neuropathy being “mild” and “improving.” (AR 289, 295, 651, 659); see Cheryl G. v. 
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 20- 15617, 2022 WL 1104968, at *6 (D.N.J. Apr. 13, 2022) (“[I]t is 
Plaintiff's burden to prove that [ his] condition is disabling or that additional limitations are 
necessary.”). PageID:
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In sum, the ALJ thoroughly explained the RFC assessment as to both Plaintiff’s mental and 
physical limitations, including why some evidence was credited over other conflicting evidence. 
See Cruz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 244 F. App’x 475, 479 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[W]here there is 
conflicting evidence, the ALJ must explain which evidence he accepts and which he rejects, and 
the reasons for that determination.”). The RFC is therefore supported by substantial evidence and, 
“[t]o the extent Plaintiff asks this Court to re -evaluate the weight assigned to [the] evidence that 
was adequately considered . . . [t]his Court declines to do so.” Alycea K. v. Kijakazi, No. 17-02683, 
2022 WL 17733663, at *7 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2022). 
2. The ALJ Did Not Err in Assessing Plaintiff’s Symptoms 
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ ’s evaluation of his self-reported symptoms under 
20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 is “legally deficient” because the ALJ discounted his testimony regarding 
fatigue, cognitive difficulties, neuropathy, and limited stamina by relying too heavily on cancer 
remission and isolated normal clinical findings. (Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 6 at 11–12). Much of this 
argument reprises Plaintiff’s broader RFC challenge that the Court rejected above. But to the extent 
this argument alleges any legal error in the RFC analysis, the Court finds none. 
Subjective allegations of pain or symptoms do not alone establish a disability. See Miller 
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 719 F. App’ x 130, 134 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(a) ). 
Rather, objective medical evidence is required to corroborate the subjective complaints of the 
claimant. Prokopick v. Comm ’r of Soc. Sec., 272 F. App’ x 196, 199 (3d Cir. 2008) . When 
evaluating a claimant’s subjective statements, the ALJ follows a two -step inquiry. First, the ALJ 
must determine whether there is a medically det erminable physical or mental impairment that 
could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant’s alleged pain or other symptoms using a 
number of factors. See SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *3–4. If such an impairment exists, the PageID:
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ALJ must then assess the “intensity, persistence, and limiting effects” of the symptoms to 
determine the extent to which they limit the claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities. Id. 
In conducting this analysis, the ALJ must explain why the claimant’s statements regarding the 
intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms are discounted. Scott R. v. Kijakazi , 
643 F. Supp. 3d 483, 495 (D.N.J. 2022). 
Here, the ALJ followed this two-step evaluation process and her conclusions are supported 
by substantial evidence. The ALJ first considered Plaintiff ’s underlying, medically determinable 
physical or mental impairments, specifically referencing his history of cancer . (See AR 23–24). 
The ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff’s testimony regarding his residual symptoms from treatment, 
including neuropathy, chronic pain, brain fog, fatigue, anxiety, and concentration difficulties. (Id.). 
Although the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably 
cause these symptoms, s he concluded that his “statements concerning the intensity, persistence, 
and limiting effects of these symptoms are not fully consistent with the medical evidence and other 
evidence in the record. ” (AR 23). In doing so, the ALJ identified treatment notes and clinical 
findings that contradicted the severity of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, such as “unremarkable” 
neurological and psychological examinations where Plaintiff “is often noted to be feeling well with 
no complaints” and possessed an average fund of knowledge, could complete serial sevens, and 
had good recall. (AR 24). The ALJ further noted that the record did not reflect “any significant 
history of psychiatric treatment.” (Id.). Finally, the ALJ canvassed the relevant medical evidence 
in the record, explaining which evidence was credited over others and why, and concluding that 
“the medical opinions . . . are generally inconsistent with the allegations of disabling work-related 
functional limitations[.]” (Id.). PageID:
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Based on these findings, the ALJ reasonably concluded that Plaintiff’s subjective 
complaints were not fully supported by the record and reached that conclusion under the applicable 
two-step framework. The Court therefore finds no basis to reverse the ALJ’s conclusion. 
**** 
In sum, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC assessment. The ALJ considered the 
conflicting medical evidence, addressed Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, and applied the proper 
analytical framework. The Court therefore finds no basis to disturb the ALJ’s RFC determination.
3 
B. The ALJ Properly Evaluated Dr. Odukoya’s Opinions 
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of his treating physician, Dr. 
Odukoya. (Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 6 at 10–11). According to Plaintiff, the ALJ’s finding that Dr. 
Odukoya’s limitations were “not supported by clinical findings” was too conclusory and “legally 
insufficient” to satisfy 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c because it failed to meaningfully address the 
required supportability and consistency factors. (Id. at 10). 
“The most important factors” for the ALJ in evaluating the persuasiveness of medical 
opinions are “supportability” and “consistency.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a), (b)(2). While the ALJ 
must probe those factors, the ALJ “need not reiterate the magic words ‘support’ or ‘consistent’ for 
each doctor,” and may “weave [discussion of] supportability and consistency throughout her 
 
3 In addition to challenging the RFC, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s Step Five finding is not 
supported by substantial evidence because the hypothetical posed to the VE, which incorporated 
the ALJ’s RFC assessment, failed to include all credibly established limitations. However, b y 
Plaintiff’s own framing, this argument rises and falls with his RFC challenge. (See Pl.’s Br., ECF 
No. 6 at 12 (cleaned up) (“Because the RFC omitted supported limitations . . . the Step-Five finding 
lacks substantial evidence.”)). Because t he Court rejects Plaintiff’s challenge to the RFC here, 
Plaintiff’s challenge to the ALJ’s Step Five determination necessarily fails, and the Court 
otherwise finds the ALJ’s Step Five determination to be supported by substantial evidence. PageID:
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analysis of which doctors were persuasive. ” Zaborowski v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 115 F.4th 637, 
639 (3d Cir. 2024). 
Here, the ALJ adequately evaluated the supportability and consistency of Dr. Odukoya’s 
medical opinions. As to supportability, the ALJ rejected Dr. Odukoya’s opinion because it 
consisted of a checkbox- style form that did not cite supporting clinical evidence explaining why 
Plaintiff would be unable to sustain full-time work. (AR 25). That is a permissible consideration ; 
a conclusory form opinion, particularly one offering severe limitations without narrative 
explanation or citation to objective findings, may reasonably be found less persuasive. See Mason 
v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1065 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Form reports in which a physician’s obligation 
is only to check a box or fill in a blank are weak evidence at best”). Thus, although t he ALJ’s 
supportability explanation was perhaps less fulsome than ordinarily provided, i t nevertheless 
provides this Court with sufficient insight to conclude that Dr. Odukoya’s opinion in this regard 
was fairly considered and reasonably rejected by the ALJ. 
As to consistency, the ALJ explicitly noted that several of Dr. Odukoya’s limitations —
namely, “that [Plaintiff] needs a fifteen to twenty-minute unscheduled break every two hours, that 
claimant will be absent from work three days per month, and that claimant will experience frequent 
interference with the attention and concentration needed to perform simple tasks”—were “not 
supported by the [other] clinical findings in the record.” (AR 25) . That particular determination 
was made based on other evidence of Plaintiff’s performance during mental-status testing, and by 
reference to conflicting evidence of work-related functional limitations, including the “mild mental 
limitations” assigned by Drs. Meza and Liberant and consistent reports of Plaintiff’s neuropathy 
being “mild.” (AR 25). Read together, these findings provide a discernible and reasonable rationale PageID:
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for why the ALJ rejected Dr. Odukoya’s more restrictive limitations as inconsistent with the rest 
of Plaintiff’s medical evidence. 
Accordingly, nothing is “legally deficient” about the ALJ’s consideration of Dr. Odukoya’s 
medical opinion, and the ALJ’s decision is otherwise supported by substantial evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court AFFIRMS the final decision of the Commissioner. 
An appropriate Order will follow. 
 
 
Date: May 27, 2026 ________________________ 
CHRISTINE P. O’HEARN 
United States District Judge PageID:
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