govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-2_26-cv-03719-0

NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
ISAIAS RAMIREZ ALONZO, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
WARDEN, et al., 
Respondents. 
Case No. 2:26-cv-03719 (BRM) 
 
OPINION 
 
MARTINOTTI, DISTRICT JUDGE 
Before the Court is Petitioner Isaias Ramirez Alonzo’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his continued detention. 
(ECF No. 1.) Respondents filed an O pposition (ECF No. 5), Petitioner replied (ECF No. 6) , and 
Respondents responded (ECF No. 7) . Having reviewed and considered the parties’ submissions 
filed in connection with the Petition and having declined to hold oral argument pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Local Civil Rule 78.1(b), for the reasons set forth below and for 
good cause having been shown, Petitioner’s § 2241 Petition is GRANTED. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Petitioner, a citizen of Guatemala, is subject to a reinstated final order of removal. ( See 
generally ECF No. 5.) Petitioner initially encountered U.S. Border Patrol on April 30, 2006, and 
he was processed as a voluntary departure. (Id. at 1.) Following his departure, Petitioner reentered 
the United States on an unknown date. (Id.) 
On September 27, 2019, Petitioner was arrested on charges of contempt under N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2C:29- 9a. ( Id.) Following his arrest, on October 2, 2019, Immigration and Customs PageID: <pageID>
2 
 
Enforcement (“ICE”) agents arrested Petitioner pursuant to an immigration detainer and served 
him with a notice to appear, placing him in removal proceedings. ( Id.) On February 24, 2020, an 
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Petitioner bond. (Id.) 
On May 27, 2020, an IJ issued an order granting Petitioner’s request for voluntary departure 
until June 26, 2020, with an alternate order of removal to Guatemala. (Id. at 2.) On June 19, 2020, 
ICE released Petitioner subject to the Alternative to Detention program, with reporting 
requirements, while ICE arranged for Petitioner’s voluntary departure. ( Id.) Petitioner did not 
depart by June 26, 2020. (Id.) Petitioner submits international flights were not operating at the time 
due to the COVID -19 pandemic. (E CF No. 1 at 6.) The IJ’s order granting voluntary departure 
with an alternate order of removal converted to a final order of removal on June 27, 2020. (ECF 
No. 5 at 2.) However, Petitioner remained released under reporting requirements until April 15, 
2025. (Id.) 
On April 15, 2025, ICE re-detained Petitioner pursuant to his final order of removal. ( Id.) 
On April 23, 2025, an IJ granted Petitioner a stay of removal , to remain in effect until a 
determination on Petitioner’s motion to reopen. (ECF No. 5-1 ¶ 25.) On May 2, 2025, the IJ granted 
Petitioner’s motion to reopen. ( Id. ¶ 26.) On May 27, 2025, the IJ granted the Department of 
Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) motion for reconsideration of the May 2, 2025 decision. (Id. ¶ 27.) 
On October 15, 2025, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) remanded to the IJ to issue a 
new decision regarding the IJ’s May 27, 2025 decision granting DHS’s motion for reconsideration. 
(Id. ¶ 28.) On December 8, 2025, the IJ granted DHS’s motion to reconsider the IJ’s prior decision 
granting Petitioner’s motion to reopen. (Id. ¶ 30.) The IJ also sua sponte reconsidered the IJ’s prior 
decision gr anting Petitioner’s motion to reopen and denied the motion. (Id. ¶ 30.) Petitioner 
submits he timely appealed that decision to the BIA. (ECF No. 6 at 2.) Respondents assert the BIA PageID: <pageID>
3 
 
Clerk’s Office has confirmed the BIA granted a discretionary stay of removal pending the appeal 
of this motion to reconsider and reopen. (ECF No. 7 at 2.) 
On March 25, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition for review of the BIA’s February 23, 2026 
dismissal of Petitioner’s interlocutory appeal with the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. ( ECF No. 
5-1 ¶ 33.) On April 8, 2026, Petitioner filed a motion for emergency stay of removal with the Third 
Circuit. (Id. ¶ 34.) According to the parties, the petition for review and motion for emergency stay 
remain pending. Petitioner remains detained as of the date of this Opinion, thirteen months after 
he was re-detained on April 15, 2025. 
On April 8, 2026, Petitioner filed the Petition now before the Court challenging his 
prolonged detention. (ECF No. 1.) Respondents filed an answer. (ECF No. 5.) Petitioner replied 
(ECF No. 6), and Respondents responded (ECF No. 7). This matter is ripe for consideration. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c), habeas relief may be extended to a prisoner only when he “is 
in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241(c)(3). A federal court has jurisdiction over such a petition if the petitioner is “in custody” 
and the custody is allegedly “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Maleng v. Cook , 490 U.S. 488, 490 (1989). A district court’s 
authority includes jurisdiction to hear habeas challenges to immigration -related detention. 
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). The burden is on Petitioner to show he is in custody 
in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Walker v. Johnston, 312 
U.S. 275, 286 (1941). PageID: <pageID>
4 
 
III. DECISION 
In his Petition, Petitioner challenges his ongoing post -final order of removal detention 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231, arguing his detention has become prolonged, and his removal is not 
likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.1 (See generally ECF No. 1.) 
Section 1231(a)(1)(A) states , “when a[] [noncitizen] is ordered removed, the Attorney 
General shall remove the [noncitizen] from the United States within a period of 90 days.” If the 
noncitizen is not removed after the 90-day period expires, he “may be detained beyond the removal 
period and, if released, shall be subject to the terms of supervision” outlined in the statute. 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1231(a)(1), (6). Once the 90-day removal period of § 1231(a) has passed, and after “removal is 
no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute,” and the 
noncitizen must be released. Zadvydas , 533 U.S. at 699. “ [I]ndefinite, perhaps permanent, 
detention” is not authorized. Id. To the contrary, the United States Supreme Court has found that 
interpreting the statute to allow for indefinite detention would raise “a serious constitutional 
threat.” Id. 
Therefore, in Zadvydas, the Supreme Court interpreted § 1231(a)(6) to limit post-removal 
order detention to a period “reasonably necessary to bring about that [noncitizen]’s removal from 
the United States.” Id. at 689. The Court found a post-removal order detention period of six-months 
was “presumptively reasonable”; however, beyond those six months, if removal no longer is 
reasonably foreseeable, continued detention becomes unauthorized. Id. at 701. 
 
1 In his reply, Petitioner argues based on the BIA’s discretionary stay of removal, he is no longer 
subject to a final order of removal. The Court disagrees. Only a judicial order granting a stay of 
removal converts a final order of removal to a non- final order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(ii) 
(“[T]he removal period beings on the latest of the following: . . . if the removal order is judicially 
reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the removal of the [noncitizen], the date of the court’s final 
order.”). The BIA’s discretionary stay is not a judicial order. As such, Petitioner remains subject to 
a final order of removal. PageID: <pageID>
5 
 
“After this 6–month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no 
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must 
respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id. Therefore, a noncitizen is not 
necessarily entitled to release at the conclusion of six months of post -removal order detention. 
Instead, DHS may continue detention until no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably 
foreseeable future exists. Id. But “as the period of prior postremoval confinement grows, what 
counts as the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’ conversely would have to shrink.” Id. 
Petitioner argues he has a pending appeal before the Third Circuit Court to Appeals, as well 
as an emergency motion to stay removal, and as a result his removal is not significantly likely in 
the reasonably foreseeable future. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Respondents acknowledge the BIA’s grant of 
a discretionary stay of removal “affects the likelihood-of-removal analysis.” (ECF No. 7 at 2.) 
However, Respondents argue Petitioner “cannot carry his burden of demonstrating ‘good reason 
to believe there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.’” (Id.) 
Respondents contend there are cases denying prolonged detention claims when the petitioner 
cannot demonstrate a good reason why his removal is unlikely once a stay of removal is lifted. (Id. 
at 2–3.) Respondents rely on the fact that ICE is in possession of a valid passport for Petitioner in 
support of their argument that he cannot show there is no significant likelihood of removal in the 
reasonably foreseeable future. (ECF No. 5 at 5.) 
Respondents position is unconvincing. Although Respondents submit ICE has a 
Guatemalan passport for Petitioner, they do not argue they have made any attempt to remove 
Petitioner following the end of the COVID-19 flight interruptions. Additionally, there is currently 
a discretionary stay on Petitioner’s removal, and there is no indication of when that stay may be 
lifted. As Petitioner cannot be removed at this time, the Court find s Petitioner has met his initial PageID: <pageID>
6 
 
burden of showing that after thirteen months of detention, his removal is not likely in the 
reasonably foreseeable future. 
Accordingly, Respondents have failed to meet their burden of rebutting Petitioner’s 
showing that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, as 
the Government has not provided the Court with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. 
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. As such, Petitioner is entitled to release under an order of supervision, 
and the Petition shall be granted. 
IV. C
ONCLUSION 
For the reasons expressed above, Petitioner’s § 2241 Petition (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED, 
and Respondents shall RELEASE Petitioner from custody under the same conditions of release 
that existed immediately prior to his April 15, 2025 re-detention. The Court also finds it appropriate 
to PROHIBIT Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner unless there is a significant likelihood of 
his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion. 
 
 
/s/ Brian R. Martinotti 
HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
Dated: May 27, 2026 PageID: <pageID>

Passage view · GavelSight