govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-3_20-cr-00161-3

NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
GUY JACKSON, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 3:20-cr-00161 (BRM) 
 
OPINION 
MARTINOTTI, DISTRICT JUDGE 
Before this Court is Defendant Guy Jackson’s (“Jackson”) Second Motion for Reduction 
of Sentence pursuant to the First Step Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (the “Motion”). (ECF No. 
324.) Plaintiff, the United States of America (the “Government”), filed an Opposition to Jackson’s 
Motion. (ECF No. 330.) Jackson filed a Reply. (ECF No. 331.) Having reviewed and considered 
the parties’ submissions filed in connection with the Motion, and having declined to hold oral 
argument, for the reasons set forth below and for good cause having been shown, Jackson’s Motion 
is DENIED. 
I. BACKGROUND 
On February 18, 2020, Jackson pleaded guilty pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure to a one -count Information, which charged that, from on or about 
May 2017 through on or about November 2018, Jackson knowingly and intentionally conspired 
and agreed with others to distribute and possess, with intent to distribute, one kilogram or more of 
a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of heroin, a Schedule I controlled 
substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 and 21 U.S.C. § 846. (ECF No. 287.) On December 3, PageID:
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2021, the Court imposed a sentence of two-hundred months of imprisonment and five years of 
supervised release. (ECF No. 302.) 
Jackson is fifty-three years old and is currently serving his sentence at FCI Beckley in 
Beaver, West Virginia. (ECF No. 330 at 7, 9.) He has committed no disciplinary infractions during 
his time in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) and suffers from several medical 
conditions including sleep apnea, asthma, obesity, nasal polyps, and deteriorating vision. (Id. at 7, 
10.) Jackson has declined all offers to receive the COVID -19 vaccine. ( Id. at 6.) He alleges the 
BOP has failed to provide sufficient medical care for his medical conditions, and less than half of 
the inmates at FCI Beckley have received all recommended doses of the COVID-19 vaccine, 
constituting another threat to his health (Id. at 8–10.) 
Further, Jackson alleges his wife, Lashawn Mealing (“Mealing”), has severe health issues 
and requires significant assistance to complete basic day -to-day tasks. ( Id. at 8–9.) Mealing has 
been living without Jackson’s assistance for over four years and has received help from her mother 
and Jackson’s father. (Id.) She has also received limited assistance from a home aide through her 
insurance. (Id.) Jackson’s son, Aliem, was recently accepted into the Navy and will begin serving 
shortly. (Id.) Jackson alleges he is the only person who can care for Mealing on the full-time basis 
she requires because their parents are elderly with health problems, the home aide comes for a few 
hours per week, and Aliem will soon begin his military service. (Id.) 
At the time of sentencing, Jackson had a pending state criminal matter. (Id. at 4.) The matter 
was later dismissed upon appeal. (Id.) 
 On March 31, 2023, Jackson filed his First Motion for Reduction of Sentence. (ECF No. 
308.) On May 1, 2023, the Government opposed the motion. (ECF No. 311.) On May 18, 2023, PageID:
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Jackson filed a reply. (ECF No. 312.) On August 30, 2023, this Court denied Jackson’s first 
motion. (ECF No. 319.) 
 On January 12, 2026, Jackson filed his Second Motion for Reduction of Sentence. (ECF 
No. 324.) On March 27, 2026, the Government opposed the motion. (ECF No. 330.) On April 10, 
2026, Jackson filed a Reply. (ECF No. 331.) 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
A district court may modify a sentence of imprisonment only in “limited circumstances.” 
Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 824 (2010). One such circumstance is compassionate release 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The statute, as amended by the First Step Act of 2018, 
allows a motion for such relief to be brought by either the Director of the BOP or by defendants 
after exhausting their administrative remedies. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); United States v. Raia, 
954 F.3d 594, 595 (3d Cir. 2020). A court may reduce a sentence if the court finds the following: 
(1) there are “extraordinary and compelling reasons” which warrant a reduction; (2) the reduction 
would be “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission ”; 
and (3) the applicable sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) indicate reducing the sentence 
would be appropriate. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 
The United States Sentencing Commission has promulgated a policy statement (the “Policy 
Statement”), allowing , in relevant part, a court to grant compassionate release or a sentence 
reduction upon a finding of (i) “extraordinary and compelling reasons”; (ii) “the defendant is not 
a danger to the safety of others or to the community ”; and (iii) “release from custody complies 
with the Section 3553(a) factors, to the extent applicable.” United States v. Williams, Crim. A. No. 
17-0379, 2021 WL 37536, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 4, 2021) (citing U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual 
(“U.S.S.G.”) § 1B1.13 (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2018)). PageID:
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Neither § 3582(c)(1)(A) nor the Policy Statement define the key terms “extraordinary and 
compelling,” which “provid[es] courts with some flexibility and discretion to consider the unique 
circumstances of a motion for compassionate release.” United States v. Batista, Crim. A. No. 18-
415, 2020 WL 4500044, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 5, 2020). The Sentencing Commission has defined the 
term “under the previous version of section 3582(c)(1)(A), ” but it has not “updated its Policy 
Statement since the passage of the First Step Act.” United States v. Alexander, Crim. A. No. 19-
32, 2020 WL 2507778, at *3 (D.N.J. May 15, 2020) (citing United States v. R odriguez, 451 F. 
Supp. 3d 392, 397 (E.D.P.A. 2020)). Nevertheless, “the present Policy Statement provides useful 
guidance for district courts in identifying extraordinary and compelling reasons for a defendant ’s 
eligibility for compassionate release. ” United States v. Gwaltney , Crim. A. No. 17-00381, 2020 
WL 5983161, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 8, 2020). 
The Policy Statement provides “a defendant may demonstrate extraordinary and 
compelling reasons for compassionate release based on: (1) the medical condition of the defendant; 
(2) the age of the defendant; (3) the defendant’s family circumstances; or (4) for ‘other reasons.’” 
Id. (citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1). The defendant ’s “[m]edical [c]ondition,” constitutes an 
extraordinary and compelling reason when: 
(i) The defendant is suffering from a terminal illness . . . ; [or] 
(ii) The defendant is— 
(I) suffering from a serious physical or medical condition, 
(II) suffering from a serious functional or cognitive 
impairment, or 
(III) experiencing deteriorating physical or mental health 
because of the aging process, that substantially diminishes 
the ability of the defendant to provide self -care within the 
environment of a correctional facility and from which he or 
she is not expected to recover. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A). PageID:
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“Compassionate release is discretionary, not mandatory; even if a defendant is eligible, a 
district court may deny compassionate release upon determining that a sentence reduction would 
be inconsistent with the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Parnell, No. 21-2312, 2022 WL 73754, 
at *1 (3d Cir. Jan. 7, 2022). 
III. DECISION 
A. Exhaustion of Remedies 
 The Government does not dispute Defendant satisfied the statutory exhaustion 
requirement.1 (ECF No. 330 at 13.) The Court, therefore, considers whether (1) “extraordinary and 
compelling reasons” warrant a sentence reduction; and (2) “such reduction is consistent with 
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). 
 B. “Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons” and the Policy Statement 
 1. Jackson has Not Identified a Terminal Illness 
Defendant has not identified a “terminal illness” under the Policy Statement. U.S.S.G. 
§ 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)(i). 2 A “terminal illness” that constitutes an extraordinary and compelling 
reason for release means “a serious and advanced illness with an end of life trajectory,” such as 
“metastatic solid-tumor cancer, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), end-stage organ disease, and 
advanced dementia.” Id. Here, Defendant has not made such a showing. 
 
1 Section 3582(c)(1)(A) provides a court entertains a motion for compassionate release only “upon 
motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal 
a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 
days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility.” See United States 
v. Epstein , Crim. A. No. 14 -287, 2020 WL 1808616 , at * 2 (D.N.J. Apr. 9, 2020) (emphasis 
omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)). 
2 The Sentencing Commission’s Policy Statement found in application note 1(A)(ii) to U.S.S.G. 
§ 1B1.13, while not binding on this Court, may be considered by the Court in its “extraordinary 
and compelling” analysis. United States v. Jefferson, No. 21-2020, 2021 WL 4279626, at *2 (3d 
Cir. Sep. 21, 2021) (quoting United States v. Andrews, 12 F.4th 255, 260 (3d Cir. 2021)). PageID:
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 2. Jackson’s Medical Conditions 
Jackson argues his health condition as he ages , combined with other factors , constitutes 
“extraordinary and compelling” reasons. (ECF No. 324 at 16.) He asserts he suffers from a heart 
condition, exacerbated by his obesity, in addition to deteriorating vision, nasal polyps, asthma, and 
sleep apnea requiring the use of a CPAP machine. (Id.) Jackson further argues the Pandemic 
remains a concern for him because , in addition to the low vaccination rate among the prison 
population, he has endured periods of lockdown comparable to other facilities where courts 
considered the conditions in the facility as a basis for compassionate release. (Id.) 
Courts consistently consider two components when inquiring about the existence of 
extraordinary and compelling reasons : “(a) identification of a medical condition that renders the 
defendant particularly vulnerable to serious consequences if infected with COVID-19; and (b) the 
likelihood of COVID -19 infection, with particular reference to conditions in the institution in 
which the defendant is incarcerated.” United States v. Moore , Crim. A. No. 19-101, 2020 WL 
4282747, at *3 (D.N.J. July 27, 2020). 
The Third Circuit has held “the mere existence of COVID-19 in society and the possibility 
that it may spread to a particular prison alone cannot independently justify compassionate release.” 
Raia, 954 F.3d at 597. The mere presence of COVID-19 in a prison does not entitle every offender 
with a medical condition to compassionate release. See, e.g., United States v. Roeder, 807 F. App’x 
157, 161 n.16 (3d Cir. 2020). 
Accordingly, “[f] or the prisoner ’s health to count as an extraordinary and compelling 
reason,” Jackson must overcome a “high bar.” United States v. Estevez-Ulloa, No. 21-2432, 2022 
WL 1165771, at *1 (3d Cir. Apr. 20, 2022). Most importantly, the Third Circuit concluded “with 
access to the vaccine, an inmate largely faces the same risk from COVID-19 as those who are not PageID:
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incarcerated.” Id. at *2 (quoting United States v. Lemons , 15 F.4th 747, 751 (6th Cir. 2021)) . 
Therefore, against the backdrop of Jackson’s access to the COVID-19 vaccine, his refusal of the 
COVID-19 vaccine “undermines any claim that his risk of contracting the virus justifie[s] relief.” 
United States v. Rene, No. 22-1642, 2022 WL 1793023, at *1 (3d Cir. June 2, 2022). 
Sleep apnea is not listed as a risk factor for COVID-19 by the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (“ CDC”). See CDC, People with Certain Medical Conditions, 
https://perma.cc/4PZA-M9UV (last updated June 11, 2025) (last visited May 27, 2026). However, 
“[a]sthma, if moderate or severe, is among the medical conditions that the [CDC] . . . list[s] as 
presenting an increased risk of severe illness from a COVID-19 infection.” United States v. Alston, 
Crim. A. No. 03-844, 2023 WL 2238297, at *4 (D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2023) (citing CDC, People with 
Certain Medical Conditions, https://perma.cc/4PZA-M9UV). Obesity (a body mass index greater 
than 30) is also listed as a condition that could increase the risk of an individual for severe COVID-
19-related complications. CDC, People with Certain Medical Conditions, https://perma.cc/4PZA-
M9UV. However, “having a listed condition does not automatically satisfy the standard in the 
[P]olicy [S]tatement .” Alston, 2023 WL 2238297, at *4. Both asthma and obesity have been 
frequently rejected as a basis for satisfying the standard. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Hernandez, 
No. 06-736-5, 2022 WL 17820248, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 19, 2022); United States v. McNair, 481 F. 
Supp. 3d 362, 369 –70 (D.N.J. 2020); United States v. Zaffa , Crim. No. No. 14-050-4, 2020 WL 
3542304, at *2–4 (D.N.J. June 29, 2020); United States v. Munoz, Crim. A. No. 15-324, 2020 WL 
7074351, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 3, 2020); United States v. Preschel, Crim. A. No. 19-186, 2021 WL 
3930716, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 2, 2021) . Notably, Jackson has refused to receive the COVID -19 
vaccine. (ECF No. 330 at 6.) 
Courts have also frequently rejected lockdowns due to COVID-19 as a basis for satisfying PageID:
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the standard. See, e.g., United States v. Ali, Crim. A. No. 11-0752, 2022 WL 3357915, at *4 (D.N.J. 
Aug. 15, 2022) (“Separately, the fact . . . Defendant has experienced strict lockdowns because of 
COVID-19 is not a reason that justifies compassionate release.”); United States v. Wright, 569 F. 
Supp. 3d 158, 161–62 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) (denying compassionate release to movant with obesity, 
high blood pressure and seizures who had been under extended lockdown due to the pandemic); 
United States v. Hall , Crim. A. No. 04-0323, 2022 WL 2105975 , at *2 (D. Md. June 10, 2022) 
(rejecting inmate’s argument the “persistent lockdowns” due to COVID -19 were extraordinary 
and compelling circumstances after separately finding he had not sufficiently alleged extraordinary 
medical circumstances). Jackson’s argument for release based upon his facility’s lockdowns is not 
persuasive. 
Jackson’s reliance on United States v. Ali is also misplaced. In Ali, the court granted 
compassionate release to an inmate who was sixty-three years old, would not be released until he 
was almost eighty, and suffered from severe back pain and muscle weakness that required surgery 
and left him temporarily unable to walk , no muscle mass, and weakness in his left arm . United 
States v. Ali , 738 F. Supp. 3d 584 , 590 (E.D. Pa. 2024) . The inmate in Ali also had contracted 
COVID-19 at least twice, despite receiving th e vaccine, exacerbated by his thyroid disease and 
high blood pressure. ( Id.) The court found Ali’s medical condition did not rise to the level of 
extraordinary and compelling circumstances, but noted his age, conditions, and length left of his 
sentence meant he was feasibly facing a life sentence. ( Id. at 591.) Instead, the court granted 
compassionate release on the grounds that Ali’s original mandatory minimum sentence of thirty -
two years for three robberies, including one where he brandished a handgun, was an extraordinarily 
long sentence combined with changes in the sentencing laws calling for a mandatory minimum of 
fourteen years at the time the opinion was issued. (Id. at 597.) PageID:
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This is legally distinct from the argument set forth in Jackson’s motion, which is not based 
upon an extraordinarily long sentence or subsequent change to sentencing laws. To the extent the 
feasibility of a defendant’s sentence becoming a life sentence due to his medical condition factored 
into the Ali court’s analysis, Jackson presents a factually distinct record as well. Jackson is fifty -
three and, with good time credit, has almost six years left to serve. (ECF No. 330 at 22.) He will 
be approximately sixty when he is released, unlike Ali who would have been almost 80. ( See id.) 
He has not alleged he has contracted COVID-19, despite not receiving the vaccine. (ECF No. 330 
at 6.) He has not alleged medical conditions to the severity of the inability to walk after surgery. 
(Id.) 
Accordingly, the Court finds J ackson has not shown his medical conditions create an 
extraordinary and compelling reason for his compassionate release, in part, because his refusal of 
the COVID-19 vaccine “ undermines any claim that his risk of contracting the virus justifie [s] 
relief.” Rene, 2022 WL 1793023, at *1. 
 3. Jackson’s Family Circumstances 
 Jackson argues that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist to justify his release 
because Mealing requires significant assistance to complete even the most basic day-to-day tasks 
and no one besides Jackson can provide the care she needs. (ECF No. 324 at 9.) 
Although not determinative, the current guidance by the Sentencing Commission as 
incorporated by § 3582(c) is instructive. United States v. Andrews, 12 F.4th 255, 260 (3d Cir. 2021) 
(“The court correctly recognized that although the [P]olicy [S]tatement is no longer binding, it still 
sheds light on the meaning of extraordinary and compelling reasons. ”). The comments to the 
Policy Statement, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, state in reducing a sentence the court may consider the 
defendant’s “family circumstances,” that is, whether there is “incapacitation of the caregiver of the PageID:
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defendant’s minor child” or the “incapacitation of the defendant’s spouse . . . when the defendant 
would be the only available caregiver for the spouse.” Id. § 1B1.13 cmt. 1(C)(i)–(ii). 
Here, Jackson has not shown he is the only available caregiver for a family member because 
he alleges his father, Mealing’s mother, and a home health aide have been assisting Mealing since 
the denial of his First Motion for Reduction of Sentence. (ECF No. 324 at 9.) Nor does the need 
to care for elderly or ill family members generally rise to the level of an extraordinary and 
compelling circumstance warranting release. United States v. Siberio -Rivera, Crim. A. No. 17-
00320-6, 2020 WL 7353367, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2020) (quoting United States v. Moore, Crim. 
A. No. 14-209-2, 2020 WL 7024245, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2020) ); see also United States v. 
Canzater, Crim. A. No. 18-578, 2022 WL 1602163, at * 10 (D.N.J. May 20, 2022) (finding an 
insufficient basis for compassionate release where the defendant had not established his constant 
presence was required to care for his ailing mother or that no other arrangements were available). 
Jackson’s Second Motion includes a new letter from Mealing’s doctor containing materially 
similar information from his First Motion. (ECF No. 324, Ex. G; ECF No. 308, Ex. I.) The Court 
considered Mealing’s poor health at her sentencing and found a special condition of twenty-four 
months of home detention would be sufficient. The Court later reduced this special condition to 
merely a curfew to further accommodate her health issues. She has continued without Jackson’s 
care for the entirety of his period of incarceration. Her mother, Jackson’s father, and a home health 
aide have been participants in her care. Jackson’s Reply included a new letter from Mealing’s 
doctor and certification from Mealing reiterating she is relatively immobile in her home and can 
only walk with assistance, and her mother and Jackson’s father are elderly with their own 
infirmities and can no longer meaningfully help her. (ECF No. 331, Ex. A, B.) She further certifies 
there is no one else to care for her full time. (Id.) To be sure, the Court appreciates the difficulties PageID:
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Mealing faces but notes limited ambulation and limited caregiving, however imperfect, do not rise 
to the level of an extraordinary and compelling circumstance. Accordingly, Jackson’s family 
circumstances do not present an extraordinary and compelling reason for his compassionate 
release. 
 C. Section 3553(a) Factors 
Even if the Court were to find extraordinary and compelling reasons were present, Jackson 
has not demonstrated early release would be appropriate under § 3553(a). 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). 
Jackson renews and bolsters his arguments that he has undergone “extraordinary post-arrest 
rehabilitation,” including: working as a n orderly ; previously working as a chef ; obtaining a 
Commercial Driver’s License; becoming OSHA certified in both 2023 and 2025 ; completing a 
forklift class and obtaining his Operator Driving Certificate; taking additional classes such as Self-
Study Post-Release Prep, Self-Study Job Search Skills, Self -Study Pre-Release Prep, SHU ACE 
GED Thinking Skills 2, Pre 1800 History, and Finding a Job When You Have a Record. (ECF No. 
324 at 5–6.) He also claims he has served a significant portion of his sentence despite serving less 
than half of his 200-month sentence. (Id. at 2.) Finally, he argues his state criminal matter, which 
was pending at the time of his sentencing, was dismissed in full on appeal and should merit 
consideration in his motion for reduction of his sentence because this Court weighed the nature 
and circumstances of the unresolved charge at sentencing. (Id. at 15.) 
The Government counters that the nature and circumstances of the offense and the inherent 
seriousness of the offense still do not warrant relief. (ECF No. 330 at 21–23.) The Government 
further argues the facts underlying Jackson’s then -pending state criminal matter were relevant at PageID:
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sentencing and remain relevant here. ( Id. at 19.) The Court agrees with the Government and 
concludes the Section 3553(a) factors favor continued confinement. 
The Court again applauds Jackson’s significant efforts to better himself while incarcerated 
and encourages him to persist in those efforts . Nonetheless, the Court finds the applicable 
sentencing factors under Section 3553(a) do not weigh in favor of granting Jackson’s motion for 
compassionate release and reducing his sentence. 
The Court agrees with the Government that the n ature and circumstances of Jackson’s 
offense are serious. Jackson pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to 
distribute one kilogram or more of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of 
heroin. The Court concludes Jackson’s serious offense requires “a significant period of 
incarceration,” United States v. Pawlowski , 967 F.3d 327, 331 (3d Cir. 2020), and the Court’s 
conclusion remains the same as when the Court sentence d Jackson. See United States v. Moore , 
Crim. A. No. 19-101, 2020 WL 4282747, at * 8 (D.N.J. July 27, 2020) (denying compassionate 
release based on section 3553(a) factors although defendant only had four months remaining on 
sentence). Jackson has only served approximately eight years of his sixteen-year-and-eight-month 
sentence. 
The commentary to § 6A1.3 provides, in pertinent part: “In determining the relevant facts, 
sentencing judges are not restricted to information that would be admissible at trial.” United States 
v. Miele, 989 F.2d 659, 665 n.6 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3 cmt. n.1); see also United 
States v. Cossey, 632 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2011) (“In deciding upon a sentence, a district court has 
the discretion to rely on the wide array of facts before it, including information set forth in the pre-
sentence report, as well as evidence that would not be admissible at trial, so long as the defendant 
is given an opportunity to contest the accuracy of that information.”). Jackson admitted under oath PageID:
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to the commission of the underlying crime in his state case and he signed a “C-plea” with the 
Government, after which the state agreed not to seek a consecutive sentence. (ECF No. 324 at 19.) 
His state matter was dismissed after the search that led to the discovery of the evidence against 
him was found unconstitutional, and the evidence was therefore suppressed. (Id.) This Court is not 
constrained by what evidence would have been admissible in the state prosecution. While under 
indictment, Jackson admitted to continuing to distribute controlled substances . His conduct 
informed the parties’ agreement to the “C-plea.” The dismissal o f the state prosecution due to 
police error does not mitigate this Court’s prior analysis of the need for specific deterrence at 
Jackson’s sentencing. 
Accordingly, because Jackson has failed to demonstrate the applicable sentencing factors 
under § 3553(a) indicate reducing his sentence would be appropriate, the Motion is DENIED. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons set forth above, Jackson’s Motion is DENIED. An appropriate order 
follows. 
/s/ Brian R. Martinotti 
 HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
Dated: May 27, 2026 PageID:
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