govinfo:USCOURTS-ctd-3_25-cv-01487-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT 
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3:25-CV-1487 (SFR) 
JAMES HARNAGE, 
 
Plaintiffs, 
 
v. 
 
COLLEEN GALLAGHER, et al., 
 
Defendants. 
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INITIAL REVIEW ORDER 
 
Plaintiff James Harnage, currently incarcerated at MacDougall -Walker Correctional 
Institution (“MacDougall”), has filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that 
MacDougall officials violated his rights under the Constitution, the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”).1 The 43-count Complaint claims 
damages and injunctive relief from 37 defendants in their individual and official capacities. 
For the following reasons, Harnage ’s Eighth Amendment excessive force and conditions of 
confinement claims, as well as his ADA and RA claims as they relate to the use of black-box 
restraints and access to a typewriter , may proceed to service against Defendants Decateau, 
Thomas, Strauskas, Robledo, Griffin, Cage, Demartino, Gallagher, Daugher ty, Haye, and 
Grimaldi. All other claims are dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend. 
 
1 Harnage also mentions other statu tes including 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986, Compl. ¶ 1, ECF 
No. 1, but “mere mention of a statutory violation is not sufficient to state a claim for relief under 
that statutory provision.” Crispin v. Connecticut, No. 3:23-CV-1636 (SVN), 2024 WL 3860068, 
at *14 (D. Conn. Aug. 19, 2024). 

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I. BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Background 
Although I do not set forth all the facts asserted in Harnage ’s complaint, I will 
summarize his basic factual allegations here to give context to my ruling below. 
Harnage entered the Department of Correction (“DOC”) with injuries to his hand, wrist, 
lower back, and hip, which he sustained during an accident in 1991. Compl. ¶¶ 45-46, ECF 
No. 1. Harnage has continuously sought treatment for these injuries since entering DOC. Id. ¶ 
49. Harnage has also complained that the “black-box” restraint system used during transports 
has gradually worsened the condition of his dominant hand and caused “extreme pain.” Id. ¶ 
50. The black-box restraint system consists of double-locked handcuffs, ankle shackles, a waist 
chain, a lead chain from the ankles, and a black, “plastic clamshell” over the handcuffs that 
connects with the waist and lead chains and is secured by a padlock. Id. ¶¶ 51-52. The black-
box restraint system “draws the inmate [’]s wrist inwards and prevents [ the inmate ] from 
adjusting the position of the handcuffs.” Id. ¶ 54. This aspect of the black-box restraint is “most 
harmful to inmates like Harnage, who[] are obese and have short arms.” Id. ¶ 57. 
Harnage has “informed each of the defendants, both verbally and in writing, that the 
use of the black -box on him for transport or other purposes[] causes an extreme [e] ffect and 
degradation of his injury.” Id. ¶ 61. The black-box restraints “cause[] a worsening of the injury 
by creating hyperextension[] of the joints at both the base of the thumb and the middle joint of 
the thumb.” Id. ¶ 63. As a result, Harnage now experiences “immobility of his dominant hand,” 
which limits his ability to lift and hold a drinking cup or hold and use a writing instrument. Id. 
¶ 72. 
In January 2023, c orrectional officer Decateau placed Harnage in restraints for return 

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transport from Federal District Court in Hartford to MacDougall . Id. ¶ 79. Harnage told 
Decateau that the handcuffs were too tight. Id. ¶ 80. Decateau responded that he did not want 
to go back to the facility with loose restraints. Id. ¶ 81. Harnage told Decateau of the injuries 
to his hand and the effects of the black-box restraints on those injuries. Id. ¶¶ 82-83. Decateau 
placed his finger on the inside of Harnage’s wrists and told Harnage that “if he could place his 
finger in the handcuff that it was not too tight.” Id. ¶ 84. When Decateau added the black-box 
restraints to the handcuffs, “it created extreme pain and force to Harnage ’s injury.” Id. ¶ 87. 
Decateau refused to loosen the handcuffs despite Harnage ’s “protestations.” Id. ¶ 88. As a 
result, Harnage “suffered another extreme hyperextension of his injury affecting the use of his 
dominant hand.” Id. ¶ 94. The Complaint states that a doctor has concluded that surgery will 
be necessary to “restore function to [Harnage’s] hand.” Id. ¶ 115. 
Harnage filed a grievance against Decateau when Harnage returned to the facility. Id. 
¶ 89. Decateau responded by “making rude and derogatory statements” to Harnage, including 
calling Harnage a “faggot.” Id. ¶¶ 90-91. In response to this, Harnage filed other grievances 
and a Prison Rape Elimination Act complaint against Decateau. Id. ¶ 92. 
Harnage also submitted “ADA requests,” one of which was approved in March 2023 
by ADA Coordinator Colleen Gallagher and MacDougall Warden Daniel Daugherty. Id. ¶ 73. 
The approval of Harnage ’s ADA request resulted in a “custody agreement” providing two 
accommodations to Harnage: a black -box restraint restriction and a ccess to a typewriter. Id. 
¶ 74. Prison officials placed an “ extra” typewriter in Harnage ’s housing unit, id. ¶ 118, but 
prison officials did not communicate the black-box restraint restriction to prison staff or make 
an entry on Harnage’s “face sheet” indicating that prison officials were prohibited from using 
the black-box restraints on Harnage. Id. ¶ 75. 

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1. Transport with Black-Box Restraints 
In June 2024, correctional officer Thomas placed Harnage in restraints for a transport 
to UConn’s medical center . Id. ¶ 96. Harnage informed Thomas of the custody agreement 
containing the black- box restraint restriction. Id. ¶ 97. Thomas told Harnage that the “ face 
sheet” did not show a black-box restraint restriction or custody agreement. Id. ¶ 98.2 Harnage 
told two nearby correctional officers—Robledo and Griffin—about the injuries the black- box 
restraints had caused him previously and asked them to verify the restraint accommodation. 
Id. ¶¶ 99-100. These officers told Harnage that no accommodation was on their clipboards. Id. 
¶ 101. Harnage insisted the officers call the medical unit to verify the accommodation. Id. ¶ 
102. After Griffin called Nurse Jennifer in the medical unit, Griffin told Harnage that no 
restraint accommodations were listed in Harnage’s medical records. Id. ¶ 103. 
Correctional officers insisted that Harnage be transported using black-box restraints. 
Id. ¶ 104. Harnage told Thomas that the handcuffs were applied too tightly. Id. Thomas inserted 
his finger into the inner wrist space of the handcuffs to determine fit. Id. Harnage insisted that 
officers call a lieutenant. Id. ¶ 105. Lieutenant Cage arrived, but she would not permit officers 
to use another restraint system for Harnage or permit Harnage to go to his cell to retrieve his 
custody agreement. Id. ¶ 106. Cage t old Harnage that if the accommodation was not in her 
computer, she did not have to honor it. Id. When Harnage told Cage that the handcuffs were 
digging into his wrists, Cage put her finger between Harnage ’s wrist and the handcuffs and 
told Harnage that if she could do so, the handcuffs were not too tight. Id. ¶ 107. Cage instructed 
Thomas to transport Harnage with the black-box restraints. Id. ¶ 108. The black-box restraints 
 
2 The Complaint does not define “face sheet.” 

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aggravated a wrist injury for which Harnage was being seen at UConn. Id. ¶ 109-10. 
Harnage later wrote to Daugherty, Gallagher, and Captain Grimaldi about Thomas 
violating the custody agreement. Id. ¶ 111. Harnage also spoke to Grimaldi directly, who told 
Harnage that he had emailed Daugher ty and Gallagher about the incident with Thomas. Id. 
Grimaldi also confirmed the black -box restraint restriction and promised that the restriction 
would be in place for future transports. Id. 
In May 2025, correctional officer Strauskas told Harnage that the black- box restraint 
restriction was not on Harnage’s face sheet and informed him that, without documentation of 
the restriction, Harnage would be transferred to UConn’ s medical center using black- box 
restraints. Id. ¶ 112. Harnage pleaded with correctional officers Demartino and Bassett to call 
the medical unit to confirm the black-box restraint restriction. Id. ¶ 113. Demartino “feign[ed]” 
a call to the medical unit and then told Harnage that a custody agreement was not in his records. 
Id. Demartino told Harnage that there was no one else he could call and that Harnage would 
have to be transported with the black- box restraints. Id . Harnage addressed the black -box 
restraints with Unit Manager Haye before another transport to UConn’ s medical center, but 
the black-box restraint restriction still did not appear on Harnage’s face sheet. Id. ¶ 114.3 
2. Use of Typewriter 
As noted above, the custody agreement also “authorized Harnage’s need for access to 
a typewriter.” Id. ¶ 116. Harnage is known to be a “jailhouse lawyer and active litigator” whom 
defense attorneys have labeled a “Litigation Machine.” Id. ¶¶ 117, 123. Harnage needed the 
typewriter to assist other inmates and seek “redress of his conditions of confinement.” Id. ¶ 
 
3 The Complaint does not clearly state whether Harnage ultimately visited UConn Medical on May 
21, 2025. See Compl. ¶¶ 112-14. 

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118. According to the Complaint, “[i]n an admitted attempt to limit [Harnage’s] access to the 
courts” and “limit [Harnage ’s] assistance to other inmates as a jailhouse lawyer,” prison 
officials “committed to providing an extra typewriter to [Harnage’s] unit,” instead of “issu[ing] 
Harnage a typewriter to accommodate his disability.” Id. Prison officials expected Harnage to 
share this extra typewriter with 96 other inmates in his housing unit. Id. ¶ 119. Prison officials 
did not permit Harnage to use the typewriter in his cell . Id. ¶ 120. Instead, Harnage could use 
the typewriter only in the dayroom during his recreational time and in the company of other 
inmates. Id. The Complaint asserts that other prisoners have been permitted to control and use 
typewriters outside of common areas even without a documented disability. Id. ¶ 121. 
Prison officials also denied Harnage ’s request to purchase a keyboard for his tablet 
from the MacDougall commissary. Id. ¶ 127. The Complaint alleges that MacDougall’s 
intelligence unit—described in the Complaint as the “I.U.” or “intel defendants” —was 
responsible for this decision. Id. ¶¶ 128 -29. The Complaint contends that members of the 
intelligence unit arranged to restrict his access to a personal typewriter “ in retaliation for the 
plaintiff’s legal activities challenging Intel policies and prior grievances against Intel 
members.” Id. ¶ 128. The Complaint also notes that Harnage received a disciplinary report “for 
having extra typewriter ribbons,” even though those same typewriter ribbons had been 
authorized and approved through a prior request for reasonable accommodation. Id. ¶ 145.4 
 
4 Harnage also describes in detail alleged acts of retaliation involving prisoner officials issuing 
false disciplinary reports, confiscating photographs depicting female models, rejecting orders for 
these photographs and religious oils, restricting content tablet usage, limiting time for recreation 
time and meals, locking down the population, and prohibiting the use of personal rugs. See Compl. 
¶¶ 129-56. Because these allegations are related to claims that I will sever, I do not summarize 
those facts in depth here. 

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B. Procedural History 
Harnage initiated this action by filing a Complaint on September 8, 2025. Compl., ECF 
No. 1. Harnage later filed an ex parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 
Preliminary Injunction. ECF No. 9. I granted Harnage’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 
(“IFP”), ECF No. 10, and instructed Defendants to show cause why a TRO or preliminary 
injunction should not enter, ECF No. 11. Defendants responded in opposition to Harnage’s 
Motion for TRO on December 12, 2025. ECF No. 33. Harnage replied in support of his Motion 
for TRO on February 18, 2026. ECF No. 54. I will address Harnage’s eligibility for preliminary 
injunctive relief separately. I also take up separately several of the discovery motions that are 
pending in this case. See ECF Nos. 48, 49, 50, & 53. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
I must review prisoner civil rights complaints and dismiss any portion of the complaint 
that is frivolous or malicious, that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 
that seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915A(a) -(b). In doing so, I must assume the truth of the allegations and interpret them 
liberally to “raise the strongest arguments [they] suggest[].” Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 
639 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Tr acy v. Freshwater , 623 F.3d 90, 101- 02 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(discussing special rules of solicitude for pro se litigants). Although detailed allegations are 
not required, the complaint must include sufficient facts to afford the defendants fair notice of 
the claims and the grounds upon which they are based and to demonstrate a right to relief. Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). Conclusory allegations are not sufficient. 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

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III. DISCUSSION 
Harnage is subject to the t hree-strikes rule of the PLRA. I begin by explaining the 
operation of the PLRA’s t hree-strikes rule before describing why Counts 23- 43 of the 
Complaint are misjoined and can proceed only in a separate action. I then consider the 
sufficiency of Counts 1-22. Many of the surviving causes of action allege multiple sources of 
law within the same Count. For example, Count Eight alleges violation of the Eighth 
Amendment and the ADA. Compl. 33. In other instances, the Complaint applies the same set 
of operative facts to alternative legal theories. This Initial Review Order is organized based 
upon the source of law. 
A. Three-Strikes Rule 
“As amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. § 1915 
allows indigent prisoners to defer paying filing fees under a structured payment plan.” Chavis 
v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2010). Yet the PLRA prohibits incarcerated plaintiffs 
from filing lawsuits IFP when “the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions . . . brought an 
action . . . that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a 
claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of 
serious physical injury. ” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “But the three -strikes rule itself contains an 
exception: prisoners are permitted to file a lawsuit IFP - even if they have accumulated three 
strikes - if they are ‘under imminent danger of serious physical injury.’” Shepherd v. Annucci, 
921 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). “There must, however, be ‘a 
nexus between the imminent danger . . . and the legal claims asserted in [the] complaint. ’” 
Antrobus v. New York City , 762 F. Supp. 3d 241, 245 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (quoting Pettus v. 
Morgenthau, 554 F.3d 293, 297 (2d Cir. 2009)). 

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Harnage acknowledges he is subject to the three-strikes provision of the PLRA. Compl. 
¶ 396. Harnage may proceed IFP in this action because, as explained previously, I construe the 
Complaint to challenge use of a black- box restraint system, which the Complaint says is 
“caus[ing] a gradual worsening of his injury and extreme pain and suffering to the plaintiff ’s 
dominant hand.” ECF No. 10.5 
B. Joinder 
Because of the limits imposed by the three -strikes rule, courts often analyze whether 
all claims in a prisoner civil rights complaint are properly joined to the claim (or claims) that 
satisfy the “imminent danger” exception to the three -strikes rule. See Webb v. Maldonaldo, 
No. 3:13-CV-144 RNC, 2013 WL 3243135, at *3 (D. Conn. June 26, 2013). 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize a plaintiff to “join . . . as many claims 
as it has against an opposing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). But where, as here, a plaintiff asserts 
claims against multiple defendants, joinder is appropriate only where the complaint asserts 
relief “with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of 
transactions or occurrences;” and “any question of law or fact common to all defendants will 
arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A)-(B). 
“Rule 21 provides that a court ‘may sever any claim against a party.’” Costello v. Home 
Depot U.S.A., Inc., 888 F. Supp. 2d 258, 263 (D. Conn. 2012). In resolving whether a claim 
 
5 The Complaint appears to contend that Harnage should be entitled to proceed IFP because he 
faces an imminent risk of serious injury from being forced to write legal filings and complete 
educational assignments by hand. See Compl. ¶ 396(b). I need not resolve whether this injury is 
sufficiently serious as to also exempt Harnage from the three -strikes rule because I conclude that 
the allegations regarding access to a typewriter are sufficiently related to the black -box restraints 
that they can be brought within this same action consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
20. 

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should be severed for misjoinder, “[c]ourts consider whether: (1) the claims arise out of the 
same transaction or occurrence; (2) the claims present some common question of law or fact; 
(3) whether settlement of the claims or judicial economy would be faci litated; (4) prejudice 
would be avoided; and (5) different witnesses and documentary proof are required for the 
separate claims.” Id . “The decision whether to sever a claim ‘is committed to the sound 
discretion of the trial court.’” Id . (quoting Greystone Cmty. Reinv. Ass ’n v. Berean Capital, 
Inc., 638 F. Supp. 2d 278, 293 (D. Conn. 2009)). 
As I have explained, Harnage is entitled to proceed IFP here because the Complaint 
supports the inference that he faces an “imminent danger of serious physical injury” from 
application of black-box restraints. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Construed liberally, Harnage’s claims 
of excessive force, unlawful seizure, and violation of the E qual Protection Clause (related to 
the use of the restraints), conditions of confinement claims (related to prison officials’ 
reactions to the harm caused by the restraints), retaliation claims (related to seeking redress for 
the harm caused by the restraints), ADA and RA claims (related to the accommodations 
Harnage sought related to his hand injury), and access-to-courts claims (related to deficiencies 
in the accommodations obtained) could conceivably flow from injuries caused by the black-
box restraints. I therefore conclude that those claims are properly joined to this action. 
But many of Harnage’s allegations and claims are not so “logically connected” to the 
use of black -box restraints. Harnage’s other claims relate to prison officials’ confiscation of 
“commercially produced photographs of female models,” Compl. ¶ 305; prison officials ’ 
refusal to allow Harnage to make confidential calls to stenographers, id. ¶ 368; “cell 
lockout[s],” id. ¶ 377; and possession of personal rugs, id. ¶ 383. These claims “arise from 
different circumstances and would require separate analyses,” Cos tello, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 

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264, and thus are not “so logically connected that considerations of judicial economy and 
fairness dictate that all the issues be resolved in one lawsuit.” Harris v. Steinem, 571 F.2d 119, 
123 (2d Cir. 1978).6 Nor is there “‘substantial’ overlap in questions of law or fact across the 
claims,” Ardolf v. Weber, 332 F.R.D. 467, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2019), such that the claims involve 
a “question of law or fact common to all defendants,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). 
Accordingly, I will consider the merits of Counts 1 -22 and sever and dismiss the 
remainder of the claims (Counts 23 through 43) pursuant to Rule 21. See Jordan v. Dep’t of 
Corr., No. 3:24CV227 (VAB), 2024 WL 5112001, at *2 (D. Conn. Dec. 13, 2024) (severing 
and dismissing misjoined claims while permitting properly joined claims to proceed). For this 
reason, Counts 23 through 43 are dismissed without prejudice. 
C. Eighth Amendment Excessive Force Claims (Counts 1, 3, 8, 13) 
Harnage contends that Defendants imposed excessive force in the form of black -box 
restraints in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Compl. ¶¶ 189-93, 201-04, 223-25, 246-
51. An Eighth Amendment excessive force claim comprises both an objective and subjective 
component. See Sims v. Artuz, 230 F.3d 14, 20-21 (2d Cir. 2000). “First, the alleged deprivation 
must be, in objective terms, sufficiently serious. Second, the charged official must act with a 
sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Hurd v. Fredenburgh, 984 F.3d 1075, 1084 (2d Cir. 2021) 
(quoting Francis v. Fiacco, 942 F.3d 126, 150 (2d Cir. 2019)). 
To satisfy the objective component, a n incarcerated plaintiff “ must allege that the 
conduct was objectively ‘harmful enough’ or ‘sufficiently serious ’ to reach constitutional 
 
6 Although Harris arose in the context of Rule 13(a), which applies to compulsory counterclaims, 
“[i]n construing the term ‘ transaction or occurrence’ under Rule 20, many courts have drawn 
guidance from the use of the same term in Rule 13(a).” Barnhart v. Town of Parma, 252 F.R.D. 
156, 160 (W.D.N.Y. 2008) (collecting cases). 

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dimensions.” Harris v. Miller, 818 F.3d 49, 64 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Crawford v. Cuomo, 
796 F.3d 252, 256 (2d Cir. 2015) ). “Although not ‘every malevolent touch by a prison guard 
gives rise to a federal cause of action, ’ the Eighth Amendment is offended by conduct that is 
‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’” Crawford, 796 F.3d at 256 (quoting Hudson v. 
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992)). “Actions are repugnant to the conscience of mankind if they 
are ‘incompatible with evolving standards of decency’ or involve ‘the unnecessary and wanton 
infliction of pain.’” Id. (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 10); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 
97, 102 (1976) (stating that the Eighth Amendment “embodies broad and idealistic concepts 
of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency . . . against which we must evaluate 
penal measures”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
“To meet the subjective element, a plaintiff must show that the prison officials had ‘ a 
state of mind that is the equivalent of criminal recklessness .’” Matzell v. Annucci, 64 F.4th 
425, 435 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Francis, 942 F.3d at 150). “The subjective component of the 
claim requires a showing that the defendant had the necessary level of culpability, shown by 
actions characterized by wantonness in light of the particular circumstances surrounding the 
challenged conduct.” Harris, 818 F.3d at 63 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
“For excessive force claims, as contrasted with other actions or inactions that rise to the level 
of Eighth Amendment violations, the test for wantonness ‘is whether the force was used in a 
good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause 
harm.’” Id. (quoting Scott v. Coughlin, 344 F.3d 282, 291 (2d Cir. 2003)). “ To determine 
whether defendants acted maliciously or wantonly, a court must examine several factors 
including: the extent of the injury and the mental state of the defendant, as well as the need for 
the application of force; the correlation between that need and the amount of force used; the 

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threat reasonably perceived by the defendants; and any efforts made by the defendants to 
temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id. (quoting Scott, 344 F.3d at 291). 
Here, Harnage suffered an “extreme hyperextension of his injury affecting the use of 
his dominant hand.” Compl. ¶ 94. This “nontrivial” injury is sufficient to satisfy the objective 
component. Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 39. At this stage, Harnage’s allegations are also sufficient to 
satisfy the subjective component. “The Second Circuit has recognized that the application of 
excessively tight handcuffs or restraints ‘ in excess of what was necessary under the 
circumstances’ may rise to the level of a constitutional excessive force violation. ” Mason v. 
Connecticut Dep’t of Correction, No. 3:21-CV-1088 (MPS), 2022 WL 19341, at *5 (D. Conn. 
Jan. 3, 2022) (quoting Davidson v. Flynn, 32 F.3d 27, 30 (2d Cir. 1994) ); accord Mitchell v. 
Maldonado, No. 3:25-CV-253 (KAD), 2025 WL 2098141, at *5 (D. Conn. July 25, 2025). The 
Complaint posits that Defendants could have secured prisoners using a “CTU setup,” which 
would have imposed “less stress in the force applied at the wrists.” Compl. ¶¶ 76- 78. These 
allegations suffice for purposes of initial review to state a claim of excessive force in violation 
of the Eighth Amendment. 
However, Harnage may not pursue damages on his excessive force claim against all 
Defendants. Harnage seeks damages against Defendants in their official and individual 
capacities. See Compl. ¶¶ 8-43, 394. To the extent Harnage asserts official capacity claims for 
monetary damages against Defendants (all state employees), such claims are dismissed as 
barred by state sovereign immunity. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 (1985). To 
the extent Harnage seeks damages from any defendant in their individual capacity, he must 
allege facts establishing the personal involvement of each defendant in the alleged 
constitutional violation. See Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994). 

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“The Second Circuit has defined ‘personal involvement’ to mean direct participation, 
such as ‘ personal participation by one who has knowledge of the facts that rendered the 
conduct illegal,’ or indirect participation, such as ‘ordering or helping others to do the unlawful 
acts.’” Rivera v. Viger, No. 3:21-cv-00470 (VAB), 2021 WL 3269095, at *3 (D. Conn. July 
30, 2021) (quoting Provost v. City of Newburgh, 262 F.3d 146, 155 (2d Cir. 2001)). When a 
defendant is a supervisory official, as many are here, “a plaintiff must plead and prove the 
elements of the underlying constitutional violation directly against the official without relying 
on a special test for supervisory liability.” Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 620 (2d Cir. 
2020). A plaintiff may not sue a defendant for a constitutional violation committed by another 
defendant solely based on his or her “high position of authority in the prison system.” Wright, 
21 F.3d at 501. 
Not all Defendants were personally involved in using excessive force against Harnage. 
Harnage asserts that he “informed each of the defendants, both verbally and in writing, that 
the use of the black -box on him for transport or other purposes[] causes an extreme [e] ffect 
and degradation of his injury.” Compl. ¶ 61. But “[a]s a corollary of the personal involvement 
requirement, complaints that rely on ‘ group pleading’ and fail to differentiate as to which 
defendant was involved in the alleged unlawful conduct are insufficient to state a claim.” 
Gonzalez v. Yepes, No. 3:19-CV-00267 (CSH), 2019 WL 2603533, at *7 (D. Conn. June 25, 
2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (collecting cases). As such, Harnage cannot maintain 
a claim against a D efendant based only on an allegation that he told the Defendant that the 
black-box restraints were injuring him . See, e.g., Foster v. Connecticut , No. 3:24- CV-773 
(JAM), 2024 WL 4528874, at *3 (D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024). I will therefore dismiss Harnage’s 

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excessive force claim against any Defendant who did not actually impose or have some role in 
addressing the impact of the black-box restraints on Harnage. 
Nonetheless, the Complaint does allege facts that support the inference that Decateau, 
Thomas, Strauskas, Robledo, Griffin, Cage, and Demartino were personally involved in the 
alleged violations of Harnage’s right to be free from excessive force . Decateau personally 
applied the black-box restraints to Harnage despite Harnage’s “protestations” in January 2023. 
Compl. ¶ ¶ 79, 88. Thomas and Strauskas later did the same in June 2024 and May 2025, 
respectively. Id. ¶¶ 96, 112. The se defendants “personal[ly] participat[ed]” in the allegedly 
unconstitutional conduct, so Harnage may claim damages from them . See Rivera, 2021 WL 
3269095, at *3. And although it does not appear that they actually applied black-box restraints, 
Robledo, Griffin, and Cage insisted that Harnage be transported with the black -box restraints 
in June 2024. Compl . ¶ 104. Demartino did the same in May 2025. Id. ¶ 113. Because these 
officers “help[ed] others to do the unlawful acts,” Rivera, 2021 WL 3269095, at *3, Harnage 
may also pursue damages against Robledo, Griffin, Cage, and Demartino. 
The remainder of the defendants mentioned in connection with this claim were 
supervisors. After Harnage returned to the prison with Decateau in January 2023, Harnage 
submitted an ADA request. Compl. ¶ 73. Harnage asserts that Gallagher and Daugherty 
approved his ADA request in March 2023 and promulgated a “custody agreement” containing 
accommodations. Compl. ¶¶ 73-74. Harnage also asserts that Grimaldi confirmed the black -
box restriction remained in place and promised that the restriction would be in place for future 
transports after Harnage complained . Id. ¶ 111. These actions are sufficient to state a claim 
against Gallagher, Daugherty, and Grimaldi. See Bourgoin v. Weir, No. 3:10-CV-391 (JBA), 
2011 WL 4435695, at *5- 6 (D. Conn. Sept. 23, 2011) (noting that a deputy warden “may be 

16 
liable . . . for failure to remedy a wrong after being informed through a report or appeal, where 
he or she acts or responds in an inadequate fashion to a prisoner’s letter of protest or request”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
Harnage also claims damages from Haye, the “new unit manager.” Compl. ¶¶ 17, 114. 
The facts alleged as to Haye are sparse: the Complaint alleges that after Harnage complained 
to Haye (along with other unnamed defendants) that his “face sheet” did not include the black-
box restriction, the face sheet continued to omit the black-box restriction. Id. ¶ 114. I exercise 
my discretion to conclude for purposes of initial review that Harnage may proceed on the claim 
against Haye for further development of the record. 
For these reasons , Harnage may proceed on his Eighth Amendment excessive force 
claim for damages from Decateau, Thomas, Strauskas, Robledo, Griffin, Cage, and Demartino 
and supervisors Gallagher, Daugherty, Haye, and Grimaldi. 
D. Eighth Amendment Conditions of Confinement Claims (Counts 6, 
9, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18) 
Harnage also brings claim s under the Eighth Amendment related to his conditions of 
confinement.7 Compl. ¶¶ 215-17, 227-29, 235-40, 242-44, 260-65, 267-69, 271-75, 277-81. 
To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment related to conditions of confinement, a plaintiff 
must allege facts showing that: (1) he was confined under conditions that posed a substantial 
risk of serious harm; and (2) the prison official both knew that the plaintiff faced a substantial 
 
7 Although this claim relies upon many of the same oper ative facts as those involved in the 
excessive force claims, I analyze the two Eighth Amendment claims separately . See Suarez, 170 
F.4th at 59 (“Although they are necessarily factually intertwined, we evaluate Suarez’s two Eighth 
Amendment claims —based on conditions of confinement and inadequate medical care —
separately.”); Reshard v. City of New York , No. 24-CV-2531 (MKV), 2026 WL 550007, at * 2-5 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2026) (engaging in separate analyses for conditions of confinement and 
excessive force claims rooted in same operative facts). 

17 
risk of serious harm and failed to take reasonable actions to abate or avert the harm. Farmer v. 
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Hayes v. New York City Dep’t of Corr., 84 F.3d 614, 620 
(2d Cir. 1996). Determining a substantial risk of harm depends on the context of the alleged 
violation. Lewis v. Siwicki, 944 F.3d 427, 432 (2d Cir. 2019). The question is thus “whether 
prison officials, acting with deliberate indifference, exposed a prisoner to a ‘sufficiently 
substantial risk of serious damage to his fut ure health.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 (quoting 
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993)). As to the subjective component of the claim, 
“[a]n official acts with the requisite deliberate indifference when that official knows of and 
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts 
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he 
must also draw the inference.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 2000) ( internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). A plaintiff must show more than mere negligence. Id. 
at 106. Rather, the prison official must have acted with “a mental state equivalent to subjective 
recklessness, as the term is used in criminal law.” Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 280 (2d 
Cir. 2006). “It is well-settled that one may disregard a risk – and thus be deliberately indifferent 
to it – through either action or inaction.” Suarez v. Morton, 170 F.4th 33, 60 (2d Cir. 2026) . 
“Although Farmer requires that a plaintiff prove actual knowledge of a risk, evidence that the 
risk was obvious or otherwise must have been known to a defendant is sufficient to permit a 
jury to conclude that the defendant was actually aware of it.” Brock v. Wright , 315 F.3d 158, 
164 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002) 
(“We may infer the existence of this subjective state of mind from the fact that the risk of harm 
is obvious.”). 

18 
Harnage has satisfied the objective component by alleging that the black-box restraints 
aggravated a long-standing wrist injury. See Mitchell , 2025 WL 2098141, at *6 ( concluding 
that plaintiff’s allegations that “(1) he was handcuffed from behind for at least three hours; (2) 
he complained of his hands turning purple and being in pain; (3) was treated with medication 
and ice packs daily for approximately one week after being handcuffed; and (4) and his back 
injuries were exacerbated as a result of being han dcuffed from behind for three hours” were 
sufficient to establish objective component). 
Harnage has also satisfied the subjective component by alleging that correctional 
officers applied black-box restraints even after he told officers that the restraints were too tight. 
See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 80, 104; see also Mitchell, 2025 WL 2098141, at *6 (plaintiff’s allegation 
that “notwithstanding his visible pain and injuries, [lieutenant] ordered [plaintiff] to remain 
handcuffed from behind in the dayroom for an extended period of time” satisfied subjective 
component). Because Harnage has alleged facts satisfying both components, these claims may 
proceed. But, as with Harnage’s excessive force claims, the conditions of confinement claims 
may proceed only against the Defendants whom the Complaint plausibly alleges were 
personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations. Because these claims are 
“necessarily factually intertwined,” see Suarez, 170 F.4th at 59, I will exercise my discretion 
to permit Harnage to proceed against the same Defendants identified whom I have concluded 
are potentially liable for the excessive force claims . The Eighth Amendment conditions of 
confinement claim may therefore proceed against Defendants Decateau, Th omas, Strasuskas, 
Robledo, Griffin, Cage, Demartino, and supervisors Gallagher, Daugherty, Haye, and 
Grimaldi. 

19 
E. Fourth Amendment Seizure Claims (Counts 2, 4, 10, 14) 
Harnage also maintains that prison officials unlawfully seized him by using the black-
box restraints in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Compl. ¶¶ 195-99, 206-09, 231-33, 253-
58. The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend . 
IV. But the Supreme Court has made clear that, with respect to sentenced prisoners, “the Eighth 
Amendment serves as the primary source of substantive protection in cases where the 
deliberate use of force is challenged as excessive and unjustified.” Graham v. Connor , 490 
U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). For this reason, “the 
constitutionality of the use of force by prison officials against a sentenced prisoner is governed 
by the Eighth Amendment rather than the Fourth Amendment.” Raynor v. Maldonado, No. 
3:24-CV-1221 (JAM), 2024 WL 4533748, at *6 (D. Conn. Oct. 21, 2024); accord Bonilla v. 
Jaronczyk, 354 F. App’x 579, 581 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order). Because Harnage’s claims 
are properly analyzed under the Eighth Amendment rather than the Fourth Amendment, I will 
dismiss his Fourth Amendment claim for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). 
F. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claim (Count 7) 
I next consider Harnage’s equal protection claim. Compl. ¶¶ 219- 21. Under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1. The 
Complaint alleges that Defendants violated the Equal Protection Clause by imposing a more 
restrictive means of restraint than used upon “other inmates within the state.” Compl. ¶ 221. 
I construe Harnage to raise a class-of-one claim because the Complaint challenges the 
way that he was treated as compared to other sentenced prisoners in Connecticut. Compl. ¶¶ 

20 
220-21. Harnage may bring a “class of one” equal protection claim if the Complaint plausibly 
alleges “that []he has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and 
that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 
528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam). In the Second Circuit, a class-of-one plaintiff “must 
show an extremely high degree of similarity between themselves and the persons to whom 
they compare themselves.” Clubside v. Valentin, 468 F.3d 144, 159 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation 
omitted). In particular, “a plaintiff must establish that he an d a comparator are prima facie 
identical by showing that (i) no rational person could regard the circumstances of the plaintiff 
to differ from those of a comparator to a degree that would justify the differential treatment on 
the basis of a legitimate government policy; and (ii) the similarity in circumstances and 
difference in treatment are sufficient to exclude the possibility that the defendant acted on the 
basis of a mistake.” Hu v. City of New York , 927 F.3d 81, 92 (2d Cir. 2019) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
“Courts in the Second Circuit routinely dismiss class -of-one equal protection claims 
where a plaintiff is unable to identify in their pleadings a similarly -situated comparator.” 
Crenshaw v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 24-CV-439 (SFR), 2025 WL 2776975, at *5 (D. Conn. Sept. 
25, 2025). Here, the Complaint does not allege that Harnage was treated differently than other 
individuals at MacDougall. See Compl. ¶ 219. Nor does the fact that Harnage was treated 
differently than people held at other state prisons support an inference of improper disparate 
treatment. See Gardner v. Harry, No. 1:22-CV-1007, 2023 WL 4166091, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 
23, 2023) (collecting cases in support of the proposition that “[i]nmates housed in different 
prisons with different housing and security needs are not similarly situated to one another”). I 

21 
therefore dismiss Harnage’s equal protection claim for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 
1915A(b)(1). 
G. First Amendment Retaliation Claim (Count 21) 
Harnage also brings a First Amendment retaliation claim. Compl. ¶ ¶ 293-95. The 
Complaint notes that Defendants “granted Harnage access to a typewriter” as an ADA 
accommodation. Id. ¶ 293. In response to Harnage’s grievances (which I assume to relate to 
the black -box restraints), the Complaint alleges that Defendants retaliated against him by 
restricting his access to the typewriter. Id. ¶ 294. 
To prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show “‘(1) that the 
speech or conduct at issue was protected, (2) that the defendant took adverse action against the 
plaintiff, and (3) that there was a causal connection between the protec ted speech and the 
adverse action.’” Brandon v. Kinter , 938 F.3d 21, 40 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Gill v. 
Pidlypchak, 389 F.3d 379, 380 (2d Cir. 2004)). “Courts must approach prisoner retaliation 
claims with skepticism and particular care, because virtually any adverse action taken against 
a prisoner by a prison official—even those otherwise not rising to the level of a constitutional 
violation—can be characterized as a constitutionally proscribed retaliatory act.” Walker v. 
Senecal, 130 F.4th 291, 298 (2d Cir. 2025) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Accordingly, courts require “prisoner retaliation claims [to] be supported by specific and 
detailed factual allegations, not stated in wholly conclusory terms.” Id. at 299 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
The first requirement is clearly satisfied because it is well established that “the filing of 
a lawsuit or a grievance is protected conduct .” Walker, 130 F.4th at 298. As to the second 
requirement, Harnage appears to contend that he experienced an adverse action insofar as 

22 
Defendants prevented him from using a typewriter. Although it is not clear from the current 
record how exactly Defendants blocked Harnage from using a typewriter, I assume for 
purposes of this analysis that Harnage might be able to satisfy the adverse action requirement. 
Nonetheless, I dismiss the retaliation claim because the Complaint does not support the 
inference that any adverse action was actually caused by Harnage’s protected speech or 
expression. 
“[T]o satisfy the causation requirement, allegations must be sufficient to support the 
inference that the speech played a substantial part in the adverse action.” Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Walker, 130 F.4th at 298. “[A] plaintiff may not rely on conclusory assertions 
of retaliatory motive to satisfy the causal link.” Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F.3d 89, 108 (2d Cir. 2004). 
The Complaint alleges upon information and belief that the intelligence unit at MacDougall 
orchestrated to prevent Harnage from purchasing a keyboard. Compl. ¶¶ 127-28. Beyond this 
conclusory allegation, the Complaint does not describe when Harnage first received access to 
a typewriter, state how his access to a typewriter changed, or offer any other explanation to 
connect Harnage’s protected activities with his difficulties accessing a typewriter or related 
accessories. Nor does the Complaint include non-conclusory allegations to suggest that any of 
the named Defendants knew about Harnage’s protected activities and participated in the 
decision to restrict his access to a typewriter. 
Accordingly, Harnage’s First Amendment retaliation claim is dismissed for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). 

23 
H. Access-to-Courts Claims (Counts 20, 22) 
I next consider Harnage ’s access-to-courts claims related to the typewriter and tablet 
keyboard. Compl. ¶¶ 289- 91, 297- 300. “[T]he Supreme Court has long recognized that 
prisoners have a right to meaningful access to the courts and that prison officials are barred 
from actively interfering with inmates ’ attempts to prepare legal documents.” Kaminski v. 
Semple, 796 F. App’ x 36, 38- 39 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996) (citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 
817 (1977))). “The Supreme Court has grounded the right of access to courts in the Article IV 
Privileges and Immunities Clause, the First Amendment Petition Clause, the Fifth Amendment 
Due Process Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses.” Dixon v. Lupis , No. 3:20CV1754 (VLB), 2021 WL 4391246, at *9 n.2 (D. Conn. 
Sept. 24, 2021) (cleaned up) (quoting Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 n.12 (2002)). 
To state an access-to-courts claim, “a prisoner must show that: (1) he suffered an actual 
injury, . . . (2) to a non- frivolous legal claim, (3) concerning his criminal conviction, habeas 
corpus petition, or conditions of confinement.” Kaminski, 796 F. App’x at 39 (quoting Lewis 
v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996)). “Whether an access claim turns on a litigating opportunity 
yet to be gained or an opportunity already lost, the very point of recognizing any access claim 
is to provide some effective vindication for a separate and distinct right to seek judicial relief 
for some wrong.” Christopher , 536 U.S. at 414-15. Accordingly, “[t]he underlying cause of 
action and its lost remedy must be addressed by allegations in the complaint sufficient to give 
fair notice to a defendant” and must be “described well enough to apply the ‘nonfrivolous’ test 
and to show that the ‘arguable’ nature of the underlying claim is more than hope.” Id. at 416. 

24 
Because Harnage makes no attempt to describe his legal claim well enough for me to 
determine whether it is frivolous, arguable, or “more than hope,” Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416, 
the first and second requirements of this claim remain unsatisfied. See Mitchell v. Martin, No. 
3:23-CV-902 (JAM), 2023 WL 8114344, at *4 (D. Conn. Nov. 22, 2023) (dismissing access-
to-courts claim because complaint “d[id] not describe by name or with any precision any past 
or present legal claim or defense that has been thwarted b y any of the defendants’ actions” or 
“establish that any such actions are or were arguably meritorious and not frivolous ”). 
Accordingly, Harnage’s access-to-courts claims must be dismissed for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). 
I. ADA and RA Claims (Counts 5, 18, 19, and 22) 
Finally, Harnage brings claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and 
the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”) . See Compl. ¶¶ 211- 13, 283- 87. Count Five contends that 
Defendants violated the ADA and RA when they applied the black -box restraint system even 
after Harnage informed Defendants that his recognized disability would be aggravated by this 
restraint. Id. ¶ 211. Count 18 alleges that Defendants violated the ADA by imposing additional 
restrictions on Harnage’s use of a typewriter such that the typewriter accommodation was no 
longer reasonably accessible to Harnage. Id. ¶¶ 277- 81. Count 19 submits that Defendants 
injured Harnage in violation of the ADA and RA (as well as the Eighth Amendment) by 
depriving him of access to a typewriter, which they knew or should have known would 
aggravate the injury to his hand. Id. ¶¶ 284-87. And Count 22 challenges Defendants’ decision 
to decline Harnage’s request to purchase a keyboard for his prison tablet. Id. ¶¶ 297-302. 

25 
“The only difference between the ADA and RA is that the RA applies to entities 
receiving federal financial assistance while Title II of the ADA applies to all public entities, a 
distinction not relevant here.” Jones v. Baran, No. 3:23-CV-1039 (VDO), 2025 WL 2910278, 
at *14 n.97 (D. Conn. Aug. 4, 2025). “Because the standards under both statutes are the same, 
courts treat claims under the ADA and RA identically.” Laboy v. Beaulieu, 3:18- CV-361 
(KAD), 2019 WL 2076810, at *2 (D. Conn. May 10, 2019) (citing Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 
331 F.3d 261, 272 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, Harnage “must show that 1) he is a qualified 
individual with a disability; 2) [DOC] is an entity subject to the [ADA]; and 3) he was denied 
the opportunity to participate in or benefit from [DOC ’s] services, programs, or activities or 
[DOC] otherwise discriminated against him by reason of his disability.” Wright v. New York 
State Dep ’t of Corr., 831 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2016). “A qualified individual can base a 
discrimination claim on any of three available theories: (1) intentional discrimination 
(disparate treatment); (2) disparate impact; and (3) failure to make a reasonable 
accommodation.” Fulton v. Goord, 591 F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). I construe Harnage to advance only claims that Defendants failed to make reasonable 
accommodations. See Compl. ¶ 213 (stating that defendants “fail[ed] and refus[ed] to utilize a 
readily available alternative restraint system, as a reasonable accommodation, after being 
informed of the plaintiff’s qualified disability”). 
I assume for purposes of initial review that Harnage is a qualified individual with a 
disability and DOC is subject to the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (defining physical 
disability); Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209 (1998) (holding that the 
ADA “unmistakably includes State prisons and prisoners within its coverage”). I also 

26 
conclude—for purposes of initial review —that the Complaint supports the inference that 
Defendants failed to make a reasonable accommodation for Harnage’s disability. 
When evaluating a reasonable accommodation claim, a court asks “whether a plaintiff 
with disabilities as a practical matter was denied meaningful access to services, programs or 
activities to which he or she was legally entitled.” Wright, 831 F.3d at 72 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). “Services, programs, or activities” include “recreational ‘activities,’ medical 
‘services,’ and educational and vocational ‘programs.’” Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 210. “A plaintiff 
need not demonstrate that [he] is entirely precluded from accessing a benefit; rather, difficulty 
in accessing a benefit is sufficient to sustain a reasonable accommodation claim.” Goode v. 
Salias, No. 3:24- CV-1010, 2024 WL 3718268, at *7 (D. Conn. Aug. 8, 2024) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
Harnage is clearly entitled to access specialist medical appointments at outside 
providers. Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 210- 11. The Complaint plausibly alleges that black- box 
restraints served as an unreasonable impediment to Harnage accessing outside medical 
appointments insofar as the restraints caused additional pain and suffering in transferring 
Harnage to outside medical appointments. See, e.g., Nesbitt v. Williams, No. 13 C 9241, 2017 
WL 1079240, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2017) (concluding that incarcerated plaintiff stated 
claim under ADA and RA because the “ pain [plaintiff] suffers when he travels in order to 
access medical treatment” was caused by defendants’ “refus[al] to accommodate his physical 
condition by using medical restraints instead of black box restraints ”). Although Defendants 
Gallagher and Daugherty approved Harnage’s request for an accommodation, the Complaint 
suggests that this accommodation was never communicated to prison staff or properly entered 
into Harnage’s records. Compl. ¶ 75. Ineffective accommodations are not considered 

27 
“reasonable.” See Dean v. Univ. at Buffalo Sch. of Med. & Biomedical Scis., 804 F.3d 178, 
189 (2d Cir. 2015) (“The hallmark of a reasonable accommodation is effectiveness.”); Wright, 
831 F.3d at 74 (concluding that mobility assistance program was ineffective and thus failed to 
provide a reasonable accommodation). I therefore conclude that Count Five may proceed. 
Counts 18 and 19 contend that Defendants imposed additional restrictions that 
prevented Harnage from accessing a typewriter, which he required to participate in prison 
educational programs and other services. Because the Complaint plausibly alleges that 
Defendants’ actions meant that the typewriter accommodation was no longer an effective 
means for Harnage to participate in rehabilitative or educational services, I will permit both 
Counts to proceed to service. 
In Count 22, however, Harnage challenges Defendants’ decision to deny his request to 
purchase a tablet keyboard. Compl. ¶¶ 297- 302.8 Harnage sought permission to purchase a 
tablet keyboard “to facilitate [his] access to the state Tablet Program.” Id. ¶ 297. Although the 
Complaint contends that Harnage’s treatment provider supports Harnage using a keyboard, id. 
¶ 299, the Complaint does not describe why Harnage’s disability prevents him from using the 
prison tablet as currently configured. For this reason, Count 22 is dismissed with leave to 
amend. 
 
8 Although this Count is brought under every cause of action set forth elsewhere in the Complaint, 
I construe Count 22 to seek relief only under the ADA and RA because it is premised upon 
Harnage’s efforts to participate in educational programming on his prison-provided tablet. To the 
extent Harnage asserts that Defendants violated the Eighth Amendment or the Equal Protection 
Clause by denying his requests to purchase a tablet keyboard, such a claim is dismissed without 
prejudice for failure to state a claim. 

28 
Furthermore, Harnage “may not bring a claim pursuant to Title II of the ADA against 
a state actor in her individual capacity.” Lenti v. Connecticut , No. 3:20-CV-127 (SRU), 2020 
WL 4275600, at *7 (D. Conn. July 24, 2020) (citing Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr. of 
Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2001)). Accordingly, any individual capacity ADA or RA 
claim must be dismissed. See id. (dismissing individual capacity ADA claim). However, 
“[u]nder certain circumstances, an inmate may assert a Title II ADA claim for money damages 
against a state actor in her official capacity.” Id. And Harnage “may assert a Title II ADA 
claim against a state actor in her official capacity for prospective injunctive relief.” See Harris 
v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009). Because “an official-capacity suit is, in all respects 
other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity,” Graham , 473 U.S. at 166, I will 
permit Harnage to proceed with a claim for damages and prospective injunctive relief against 
the defendants who may be sued in connection with other claims ( Decateau, Thomas, 
Strauskas, Robledo, Griffin, Cage, Demartino, Gallagher, Daugherty, Haye, and Grimaldi) in 
their official capacities. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDERS 
 Consistent with the foregoing, I enter the following orders: 
(1) Harnage’s Eighth Amendment claim excessive force related to the black-box 
restraints may PROCEED against Decateau, Thomas, Strauskas, Robledo, Griffin, Cage, 
Demartine, Gallagher, Daugherty, Haye, and Grimaldi in their individual capacities. 
(2) Harnage’s Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim related to 
imposition of the black-box restraints may PROCEED against Decateau, Thomas, Strauskas, 

29 
Robledo, Griffin, Cage, Demartino, Gallagher, Daugherty , Haye, and Grimaldi in their 
individual capacities. 
(3) Harnage’s ADA and RA claims related to imposition of the black- box restraints in 
contravention of Harnage’s accommodation and denial of access to a typewriter may 
PROCEED against Decateau, Thomas, Strauskas, Robledo, Griffin, Cage, Demartino, 
Gallagher, Daugherty, Haye, and Grimaldi in their official capacities. 
(4) All other claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE , 28 U.S.C. § 
1915A(b)(1), and all other defendants are terminated. 
(5) Harnage has two options as to how to proceed in response to this Initial Review 
Order: 
If Harnage wishes to proceed immediately only on the claims and the Defendants 
identified in paragraphs (1) – (3), he may do so without further delay. If Harnage selects this 
option, he shall file a notice on the docket on or before June 30, 2026, informing the court that 
he elects to proceed with service as to the claims identified above. The court will then begin 
the effort to serve process in the capacity described above. 
Alternatively, if Harnage wishes to attempt to replead any of the claims asserted in his 
complaint that have been dismissed in order to attempt to state a viable claim, he may file an 
amended complaint on or before June 30, 2026. An amended complaint, if filed, will 
completely replace the complaint, and the court will not consider any allegations made in the 
original complaint in evaluating any amended complaint. The court will review any amended 
complaint after filing to determin e whether it may proceed to service of process on any 
defendants named therein. If Harnage elects to file an amended complaint, the complaint 
addressed by this Initial Review Order will not proceed to service of process on any defendant. 

30 
If the court receives no response from Harnage on or before June 30, 2026, the court 
will presume that Harnage wishes to proceed on the complaint as to the claims permitted to go 
forward in this Initial Review Order, and Harnage will have to show good cause if he seeks to 
amend the complaint in any manner in the future. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). 
(6) If Harnage changes his address at any time during the litigation of this case, Local 
Court Rule 83.1(c)2 provides that he MUST notify the court. Failure to do so can result in the 
dismissal of the case. Harnage must give notice of a new address even if he is incarcerated. He 
should write “PLEASE NOTE MY NEW ADDRESS” on the notice. It is not enough to just 
put the new address on a letter without indicating that it is a new address. Because Harnage 
has more than one pending case, he should indicate all of the case numbers in the notification 
of change of address. He should also notify Defendants or defense counsel of his new address. 
(7) While incarcerated, Harnage shall use the Prisoner Electronic Filing Program when 
filing documents with the court. Harnage is advised that the Program may be used only to file 
documents with the court. Local rules provide that discovery requests are not filed with the 
court. D. Conn. L. Civ. R 5(f). Therefore, discovery requests must be served on Defendant ’s 
counsel by regular mail. 
SO ORDERED. 
 
 
New Haven, Connecticut 
May 27, 2026 
 
/s/Sarah F. Russell 
SARAH F. RUSSELL 
United States District Judge 
 
 

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