govinfo:USCOURTS-ksd-2_25-cv-02145-5

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 
 
MEGHANN R. MILLER, ) 
 ) 
 Plaintiff, ) CIVIL ACTION 
 ) 
v. ) No. 25-2145-KHV 
 ) 
KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND ) 
FAMILIES, ASHLEY BEAUCHAMP, in her ) 
individual and official capacity, MICHELLE ) 
MERRITT, in her individual and official capacity, ) 
JOHN DOE SUPERVISORS 1–5, in their ) 
individual and official capacities, and RANDY ) 
MCCALLA, in his individual and official capacity, ) 
 ) 
 Defendants. ) 
____________________________________________) 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
 
 In a child custody dispute betw een plaintiff and her former husband, the District Court of 
Johnson County, Kansas ordered that plaintiff not have contact with her five children. On 
March 21, 2025, plaintiff filed suit pro se against the Kansas Department of Children and Families 
(“DCF”), and various individuals who are either DCF employees or provide services for DCF. 
Plaintiff alleges viol ation of her civ il rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986, and her 
rights under the Americans With Disabilities Ac t (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. She also 
brings various state law claims. On Nove mber 20, 2025, the Court sustained the Motion To 
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint Pursuant To Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) 
And (6) And Memorandum In Support (Doc. #31) which DCF, Ashley Beauchamp and Michelle 
Merritt filed July 16, 2025 and dismissed all clai ms against those defendants. See Memorandum 
And Order And Order To Show Cause (Doc. #46) at 29–30. As to Randy McCalla and John Doe 
Supervisors 1–5, the Court ordered plaintiff to show cause why the Court should not also dismiss 

 
 
 
 
 
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those defendants. See id. at 30. 
 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Response To Order To Show Cause Under 28 
U.S.C. § 1915A(b) (Doc. #50) filed December 7, 2025. For reasons stated below, plaintiff has not 
shown good cause and the Court therefore dismi sses her claims agains t McCalla and the Doe 
Supervisors. 
Factual Background 
 Highly summarized, plaintiff’ s First Amended Verified Complaint (Doc. #13) filed May 8, 
2025, alleges as follows:1 
 In the District Court of Johnson County, pl aintiff and her former husband have a pending 
dispute which involves the cust ody of their five children. On January 29, 2024, based on 
 
 1 Throughout the amended compla int, plaintiff refers to numerous exhibits, but she 
has not attached them to the complaint or otherw ise included them in the record. See, e.g., First 
Amended Verified Complaint (Doc. #13) at 4 (Exhibits A, B, C, EEE, NNN, UUU, VVV); id. at 
5 (Exhibits D, E, F, P, Y, OO, PP, FFF, III); id. at 6 (Exhibits Z, AA, GGG, III, PPP, SSS, XXX); 
id. at 7 (Exhibits C, E, G, H, I, J, K, P, EEE, NNN, UUU, VVV). As best the Court can ascertain, 
plaintiff refers to exhibits which the Clerk file d on her behalf in Miller v. McCalla, Case No. 25-
2180, which is also before the undersigned judge. See Exhibits In Support Of Complaint (Doc. 
#7, #8 and #9 filed April 8, 2025 in Case No. 25-2180). Because plaintiff did not include the case 
number on the exhibits and she did not submit exhibits with her amended complaint in this action, 
it appears that plaintiff intended that the Clerk w ould file the exhibits in both actions before the 
undersigned judge. Defendants do not argue that they did not rece ive the exhibits. The Court 
therefore considers the allegations in the First Amended Verified Complaint (Doc. #13) in this 
action and to the extent that plaintiff has re ferenced exhibits, the more than 800 pages of 
attachments to plaintiff’s complaint filed in Case No. 25-2180. 
In addition to the exhibits which plaintiff ha s referenced in her amended complaint, the 
Court takes judicial notice of the orders in Matter Of Marria ge Of Meghann R. Miller And Craig 
R. Miller, Case No. 17-cv-3002, Div. 1, which plai ntiff has included as attachments to her 
complaint filed in Case No. 25-2180, as well as the publicly available docket sheet in that case. 
When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b )(6), the Court may consider facts which are 
subject to judicial notice, i.e. facts which are not subject to reasonable dispute because they are 
generally known or capable of accurate and re ady determination from sources whose accuracy 
cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. R. Evi d. 201(b); see Grynberg v. Koch Gateway Pipeline 
Co., 390 F.3d 1276, 1278 n.1 (10th Cir. 2004) (facts s ubject to judicial no tice may properly be 
considered in a motion to dismiss). 

 
 
 
 
 
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unsubstantiated allegations of abuse and without an evidentiary hearing or notice to plaintiff, 
District Judge Keven O’Grady ordered that plain tiff not have contact with her children. Before 
January 29, 2024, Michelle Merrit t, a DCF investigator, had informed Randy McCalla, the 
guardian ad litem, that the abus e allegations against plaintiff were unsubstantiated. McCalla 
nevertheless sought to remove the children from plaintiff’s custody. On June 5, 2024, Merritt told 
plaintiff that the abuse allegations were unfounded. Even so, unknown DCF supervisors blocked 
disclosure of this fact to the court. 
 On July 22, 2024, Judge O’Grady ordered plain tiff, her former husband and their children 
to participate in therapy so that plaintiff coul d restore contact with the children. See Exhibit Q 
(Doc. #7-16 filed in No. 25-2180). On August 1, 2024, Judge O’Grady overruled plaintiff’s claim 
that McCalla lacked objectivity and her request to remove him as guardian ad litem. See 
Exhibit DDD (Doc. #9-3 filed in No. 25-2180). 
 On January 22, 2025, after repeated efforts by pl aintiff to correct the record, DCF general 
counsel sent plaintiff a lett er which acknowledged that DCF had previously closed the 
investigation because the allegations against her were unsubstantiated. See Exhibit E (Doc. #7-4 
filed in No. 25-2180). 
 On January 23, 2025, DCF received a new re port which alleged emotional harm to 
plaintiff’s children from her social media activity. Ashley Beauchamp, a DCF social worker, told 
plaintiff that on January 22, 2025, she had interviewed plaintiff’s children about her social media 
activity. Plaintiff denies that Beauchamp could have interviewed the children on January 22. On 
February 6, 2025, Beauchamp admi tted that she relied on sec ondhand therapist and caregiver 
statements, did not review Merritt’s findings and re fused to provide plainti ff dates or sources of 
alleged interviews. 

 
 
 
 
 
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 On February 25, 2025, in the state custody proceeding, plaintiff served DCF with a 
subpoena for records. DCF required that plaintiff and her former husband comply with its standard 
protective order. Plaintiff objected to the protective order because it did not allow her to make or 
retain copies of DCF records. Judge O’Grady overruled plaintiff’s objection because she offered 
no compelling reason why she needed to copy DCF records or ac cess them without supervised 
viewing at the courthouse. See Exhibit SSS (Doc. #9-17 filed in No. 25-2180). 
 On March 14, 2025, Judge O’Grady overruled plai ntiff’s motion to modify the temporary 
parenting plan on account of alle ged violation of her rights to procedural due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See Exhibit TTT (Doc . #9-18 filed in No. 25-2180). He noted that 
plaintiff had notice of the proceedings (including the upcoming trial in April of 2025), the claims 
made and the positions of her former husband and the guardian ad litem. 
 On March 18, 2025, in reliance on fabricated evidence and without interviewing plaintiff, 
Beauchamp concluded that the allegations of harm to plaintiff’s children were substantiated. First 
Amended Verified Complaint (Doc. #13) at 5. Specifically, Beauchamp stated that “[a]ll children 
report a negative impact to their emotional and social wellbeing due to their mother talking about 
them on social media. Negativ e impact was confirmed through inte rviews with the children, the 
children’s therapists, and caregivers.” Exhibit Y (Doc. #7-26 filed in No. 25-2180) at 1. Plaintiff 
alleges that Beauchamp based he r finding of abuse on pl aintiff’s TikTok pos ts and defamatory 
posts by Sarah Jo Crawford and Beth Nichols. 
 A form attached to Beauchamp’s findings ad vised plaintiff that within 30 days, she could 
appeal by filing with the Officer of Administrative Hearings in Topeka, Kansas, a written request 
for fair hearing pursuant to K.A.R. § 30-7-68 et seq. Id. at 2. The form further advised plaintiff 
that if she was dissatisfied wi th the officer’s deci sion, she could request review by the State 

 
 
 
 
 
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Appeals Committee and that its decision could be appealed to district court. Id. 
 On April 1, 2025, some three weeks before the sc heduled trial of the custody dispute, Judge 
O’Grady canceled the trial because plaintiff had not paid outstanding guardian ad litem fees. He 
also declined to rule on plaintif f’s renewed request to remove McCalla as the guardian ad litem. 
On April 4, 2025, for punitive reasons, Judge O’Grady imposed a selective Artificial Intelligence 
(“AI”) certification rule which mandated that plaintiff disclose her use of AI in pleadings. Plaintiff 
alleges that the AI certification rule obstructed her access to the courts. 
 On March 21, 2025, plaintiff filed this suit against DCF, McCalla a nd others associated 
with DCF. On April 7, 2025, plaintiff filed a se parate suit against McCalla, the court-appointed 
therapist, a psychologist who evaluated plaintiff and Johnson County. See Miller v. McCalla, Case 
No. 25-2180. At some point, plaintiff apparently filed suit related to a daughter’s child in need of 
care proceeding from 2022 to 2023. First Amended Verified Complaint (Doc. #13) at 2–3. 
Plaintiff also filed suit against two individuals (presumably Crawford and Nichols) who allegedly 
made false and defamatory statements about her parenting and mental health. In this case, plaintiff 
alleges that Beauchamp failed to investigate th ese defamatory statements, which contributed to 
DCF’s finding of abuse. 
 Since January 29, 2024, except for limited weekly reunification sessions with her three 
youngest children, plaintiff has been separated from her children (ages 17, 14, 12, 11 and 11). 
Procedural Background 
 In a nine-count amended complaint in this case, plaintiff alleges violation of her civil rights 
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986, violation of her rights under the ADA and various state 

 
 
 
 
 
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law claims.
2 
 Under Section 1983, plaintiff alleges that all de fendants violated her rights to procedural 
and substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment (Count I) and her right to free 
speech under the First Amendment (Count II). 
 Against Beauchamp, McCalla and the Doe Supervis ors, plaintiff alleges that they conspired 
to interfere with her civil right s in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Count III), violated her 
parental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count V) and 
intentionally inflicted emotional distress in violation of Kansas law (Count VIII). 
 Against Beauchamp and McCalla, plaintiff a sserts that they fraudulently misrepresented 
matters in the state court custody and DCF proceedings (Count VI). 
 Against DCF, Beauchamp and McCalla in his o fficial capacity, plaintiff alleges that they 
excluded or denied her DCF bene fits and services because of her disability and did not 
accommodate her disabilities in violation of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (Count IX).
3 
 The gravamen of plaintiff’s complaint is that McCalla and DCF employees provided 
information which misled Judge O’Grady in the custody dispute. Although plaintiff has not named 
Judge O’Grady as a defendant, she alleges that his conduct has “obstructed her access to justice.” 
 
 2 The Court does not include plaintif f’s allegation—which she apparently 
inadvertently included from a prior lawsuit—that her claims “pertain solely to constitutional and 
statutory injuries” which she and her daughter suffered during a child in need of care proceeding 
from 2022 to 2023. First Amended Verified Compla int (Doc. #13) at 2–3. Plaintiff apparently 
raised those claims in a third action, which she asserts does not duplicate the claims which she has 
raised in this action or in Case No. 25-2180. See id. at 2. 
 
3 As noted, plaintiff asserts nine counts, but the remaining two counts do not involve 
DCF, Beauchamp and Merritt. As to the Doe Superv isors, plaintiff asserts that they neglected to 
prevent the conspiracy to interfere with her civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (Count IV). 
As to McCalla, plaintiff asserts that he maliciously abused the legal process in violation of Kansas 
law (Count VII). 

 
 
 
 
 
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First Amended Verified Complaint (Doc. #13) at 6, 8. 
 As noted above, on April 7, 2025, plaintiff file d a separate suit against McCalla, the court-
appointed therapist, a psychologist who evaluated plaintif f and Johnson County. Case No. 25-
2180. In that lawsuit, on November 24, 2025, Magi strate Judge Teresa J. James recommended 
that the Court dismiss plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim on which 
relief could be granted and because McCalla has quasi-judicial immunity. See Report And 
Recommendation For Dismissal Of Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. #26). On January 5, 2026, the 
Court adopted the report and recommendation. Under the abstention doctrine of Younger v. 
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971), the C ourt dismissed plaintiff’s claims for equitable relief for lack 
of jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i ii) and because McCalla is entitled to quasi-
judicial immunity, the Court dis missed plaintiff’s federal claims for monetary damages against 
him (Counts I, II, III, IV, VI, V II, X and XI). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the Court 
dismissed Counts I, II, III, IV, VI, VII, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XV against all defendants for 
failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Finally, th e Court declined to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over plai ntiff’s claims in Counts V, V III and IX and dismissed those 
claims without prejudice. 
Legal Standards 
 The Court affords a pro se plaintiff some leni ency and liberally construes her filings. See 
James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013). Although the Court holds a pro se litigant’s 
filings to a less stringent standard than formal pl eadings drafted by attorneys, a pro se party must 
follow the same rules of procedure as all othe r litigants. See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & 
Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 In determining whether to dism iss plaintiff’s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 

 
 
 
 
 
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the Court considers under Rule 12(b)(1) whether the face of the complaint establishes jurisdiction, 
so the Court presumes the accuracy of plaintiff’s factual allegations and does not consider evidence 
outside the complaint. Baker v. USD 229 Blue Valley, 979 F.3d 866, 872 (10th Cir. 2020). 
 In determining whether plain tiff has stated a claim under Ru le 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., 
the Court assumes as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and determines whether they 
plausibly give rise to an entitle ment of relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). To 
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must cont ain sufficient factual ma tter to state a claim 
which is plausible—and not merely conceivable—on its face. Id.; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief, 
the Court draws on its judicial experience and common sense. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679–80. 
 Plaintiff bears the burden to frame her clai ms with enough factual ma tter to suggest that 
she is entitled to relief; it is not enough to make threadbare recitals of a cause of action 
accompanied by conclusory statements. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Plaintiff makes a facially 
plausible claim by pleading factual content fro m which the Court can reasonably infer that 
defendants are liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff must show more 
than a sheer possibility that defendants acted unl awfully—it is not enough to plead facts that are 
“merely consistent with” liability. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 
 A pleading which offers labels and conclusions , a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 
cause of action or naked assertions devoid of fu rther factual enhancement will not stand. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. at 678. Similarly, where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the Court to infer more 
than the mere possibility of misconduct, th e pleading has alleged—but has not shown—that the 
pleader is entitled to relief. See id. at 679. The de gree of specificity ne cessary to establish 
plausibility and fair notice depends on contex t, because what constitutes fair notice under 

 
 
 
 
 
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Rule 8(a)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., depends on the type of case. Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 
1248 (10th Cir. 2008). 
Analysis 
 I. Claims For Equitable Relief Against Doe Supervisors 
 As plaintiff concedes, this case (Case No. 25-2145) and Case No. 25-2180 involve the same 
core facts, name McCalla as a defendant and present common questions of law and fact. Plaintiff’s 
Motion To Consolidate Related Cases Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a) (Doc. #47) filed November 21, 
2025 at 1. In both cases, plaintiff claims that McCalla and others gave information which misled 
Judge O’Grady in the custody dispute. Here, plaintiff also alleges that the Doe Supervisors at DCF 
did not prevent DCF employees from misleadi ng Judge O’Grady. Although plaintiff has not 
named Judge O’Grady as a defendant, she alleges that his conduct has “obs tructed her access to 
justice.” First Amended Verified Complaint (Doc. #13) at 6, 8. In effect, plaintiff’s present lawsuit 
is simply an attempt to evade Judge O’Grady’s rulings. Se e Exhibit DDD (Doc. #9-3 filed in 
No. 25-2180) (on August 1, 2024, Judge O’Grady overruled plaintiff’s claims that McCalla lacked 
objectivity and plaintiff’s request to remove him as guardian ad litem); Exhibit TTT (Doc. #9-18 
filed in No. 25-2180) (on March 14, 2025, Judge O’Grady overruled plaintiff’s motion to modify 
parenting plan on account of violation of her rights to procedural due process). 
 Under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971), federal courts should not interfere with 
state court proceedings by granting equitable reli ef when the state forum provides an adequate 
avenue for relief. Weitzel v. Div. of Occupational & Pro. Licensing of Dep’t of Com. of State of 
Utah, 240 F.3d 871, 875 (10th Cir. 2001). Federal courts shoul d abstain from exercising 
jurisdiction when (1) state criminal, civil or administrative proceedings are ongoing, (2) the state 
court provides an adequate forum to hear claims raised in the federal complaint and (3) the state 

 
 
 
 
 
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proceedings involve important state interests. Winn v. Cook, 945 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2019) 
(quoting Chapman v. Oklahoma, 472 F.3d 747, 749 (10th Cir. 2006)). 
 Because state court proceedings appear to be ongoing and for substantially the reasons 
stated by Judge James in her Report And Recommendation (Doc. #26 in Case No. 25-2180), under 
the Younger abstention doctrine, the Court lacks ju risdiction over plaintiff’s claims for equitable 
relief against the Doe Supervisors.4 
II. Claims For Money Damages Against Doe Supervisors 
 For substantially the reasons stated in th e Court’s Memorandum And Order And Order To 
Show Cause (Doc. #46), the Court dismisses all cl aims against the Doe Supervisors. The Court 
dismisses for lack of jurisdiction Counts I, II, III, IV and V, wh ich sue them in their official 
capacities. See Memorandum And Order And Order To Show Cause (Doc. #46) at 10 (complaint 
fails to allege claim for prospective relief to halt ongoing constitutional violations because it does 
not specify how DCF investigator or DCF social worker had particular duty to enforce specific 
statute and demonstrated willingness to exercise that duty). Because they are entitled to qualified 
immunity, the Court dismisses for lack of jurisdiction Counts I, II, III and V, which sue the Doe 
Supervisors in their individual capacities. See id. at 12–22. Because plaintiff has not stated a 
claim against any de fendant for conspiracy to interfere with her ci vil rights under Section 1983, 
the Court also dismisses for failure to state a claim plaintiff’s claim that the Doe Supervisors 
neglected to prevent the conspiracy (Count IV). 
 
4 Judge O’Grady continued the bench trial scheduled for April 22, 2025. Neither 
party has provided information which indicates that the stat e case is no longer ongoing. The 
publicly available docket sheet in the state court case indicates that on February 5, 2026, plaintiff 
filed a motion to vacate void orders for due proce ss violations and futile conditions. See Docket 
Sheet for Matter Of Marriage Of Meghann R. Mi ller And Craig R. Miller, Case No. 17-cv-3002, 
Div. 1, available at https://casesearch.kscourts.gov/Home/CaseDetail (accessed May 19, 2026). 

 
 
 
 
 
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III. Claims Against McCalla 
 Plaintiff does not oppose dismissal of her ADA claim against McCalla without prejudice 
(Count IX). Plaintiff’s Response To Order To Show Caus e Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) (Doc. 
#50) at 2. For substantially the reasons stated in the Court’s Memorandum And Order And Order 
To Show Cause (Doc. #46), plaintiff has not alleged a plausible ADA claim that McCalla denied 
her benefits or discriminated against her because of her disability. The Court therefore dismisses 
plaintiff’s ADA claim against McCalla for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. 
 As to the remaining claims against McCalla in his individual capacit y, he is entitled to 
quasi-judicial immunity. See Memorandum And Order (Doc. #28 in Case No. 25-2180) (adopting 
report and recommendation); Report And Recommendation (Doc. #26 in Case No. 25-2180) at 9–
10. As guardian ad litem, McCall a assumes no obligation to the missi on of the state. Meeker v. 
Kercher, 782 F.2d 153, 155 (10th Cir. 1986). Instead, he owes his undivided loyalty to the minor 
children. Id. In his capacity as guardian ad litem, McCalla must exercise independent, 
professional judgment, so he did not act under color of state law for purposes of Section 1983. Id.; 
see Fuller v. Davis, 594 F. App’x 935, 939 (guardia n ad litem entitled to absolute immunity for 
participation in furtherance of judicial process). 
 Even if plaintiff could allege that McCalla’s actions on behalf of the children were “too far 
removed from the judicial process to implicate quasi-judicial immunity,” she has not alleged that 
he was a state actor for purposes of Section 1983. Fuller, 594 F. App’x at 939–40. Therefore, for 
purposes of liability under Section 1983, McCalla was not a state actor proceeding under color of 
state law. See Meeker, 782 F.2d at 155 (guardia n ad litem not state actor when engaged in 
advocacy for client). While a guardian ad litem’s actions as part of a conspiracy with state actors 
could constitute state action, plaintiff’s allegations of McCalla’s conspiracy with Beauchamp and 

 
 
 
 
 
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the Doe Supervisors at DCF are too speculative and conclusory to state a claim. The mere fact 
that in the state custody case, McCalla and DC F employees reached the same conclusion that 
plaintiff should not have custody of her children does not establish a conspiracy. See Fuller, 594 
F. App’x at 939–40 (conjecture that guardian ad lit em conspired with state actors to create 
unenforceable no-contact order t oo speculative and conclusory to allege state action); Beedle v. 
Wilson, 422 F.3d 1059, 1073 (10th Cir. 2005) (concluso ry allegation of conspiracy with state 
actors insufficient to extend Section 1983 liability to private defendant); see also Gee v. Pacheco, 
627 F.3d 1178, 1183 (10th Cir. 2010) (to establish plausible conspiracy under Twombly, plaintiff 
must set forth specific factual allegations, rather than speculative conclusions). 
 For the above reasons, plaintiff has failed to state a federal claim on which relief can be 
granted against McCalla in his individual capacity. Because plaintiff has not alleged facts which 
establish that McCalla is a state actor for purposes of Section 1983, plaintiff has also failed to state 
a federal claim against McCalla in his official capacity. The Court therefore dismisses plaintiff’s 
federal claims against McCalla in both his individual and official capacities. 
IV. State Law Claims 
 Plaintiff also alleges various state law cla ims against McCalla and the Doe Supervisors at 
DCF. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) and (c)(3), the Court has supplemental ju risdiction over state 
law claims which are integrally related to a federal claim, but it may refuse to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction if it dismisses the federal law claims. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 
U.S. 500, 514 (2006). The Court normally dismisses supplemental state law claims after all federal 
claims have been dismissed, particularly when the federal claims are dismissed before trial. United 
States v. Botefuhr, 309 F.3d 1263, 1273 (10th Cir. 2002) (suggesting di strict court should retain 
jurisdiction only if parties have expended great deal of time and energy on state law claims). The 

 
 
 
 
 
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Court considers the nature and extent of pretrial proceedings, judicial economy, convenience and 
whether retaining jurisdiction would serve fairness. Anglemyer v. Hamilton Cnty. Hosp., 58 F.3d 
533, 541 (10th Cir. 1995). In the usual case, the balance of factors points towards declining to 
exercise jurisdiction over remain ing state law claims. McWilli ams v. Jefferson Cnty., 463 F.3d 
1113, 1118 (10th Cir. 2006); see Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988). 
 Here, plaintiff has not obtained service on McCalla and does not know the identity of the 
Doe Supervisors. At this preliminary stage, th e Court finds no persuasive reason to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction to decide the merits of plaintiff’s state law claims. See Thatcher Enter. 
v. Cache Cnty. Corp., 902 F.2d 1472, 1478 (10th Cir. 1990) (absent compelling reasons to 
contrary, notions of comity and federalism demand that state court try its own lawsuits). Allowing 
the state courts to adjudicate the state law claims will not adversely affect the parties. In sum, the 
Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisd iction over plaintiff’s st ate law claims against 
McCalla and the Doe Supervisors based on cons iderations of judici al economy, convenience, 
fairness and comity. See Bauchman for Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 549 (10th Cir. 
1997). 
V. Request To Amend Complaint 
 In responding to the Court’s order to show cause , plaintiff states that if the Court finds that 
her complaint is deficient, she seeks leave to amend. Plaintiff’s Response To Order To Show 
Cause Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) (Doc. #50) at 2–3. The Court disregards any motion or request 
to amend which does not comply with District of Kansas Rule 15.1(a). Under that rule, a party 
filing a motion to amend that may not be filed as a matter of ri ght must (1) set forth a concise 
statement of the amendment or leave sought; (2) attach the proposed pleading or other document; 
and (3) attach a redlined version of the proposed amendment that shows all proposed changes to 

 
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the pleading. D. Kan. Rule 15.1(a); see Requena v. Roberts, 893 F.3d 1195, 1204 n.3 (10th Cir. 
2018) (insufficient to merely suggest that part y should be allowed to amend if judge finds 
pleadings deficient; party must file written motion for leave to amend, givi ng adequate notice of 
basis of proposed amendment). In her response dated December 7, 2025, plaintiff acknowledged 
the above requirements and stated that she was “actively preparing” and intended to promptly file 
a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. Plaintiff’s Response To Order To Show 
Cause Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) (Doc. #50) at 3. To date, nearly six months later, plaintiff has 
not done so. The Court therefore overrules her request to amend. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff has not sh own cause why the Court 
should not dismiss her claims against Randy McCalla and the John Doe Supervisors 1–5. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pur suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) and 
Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., the Court dismisses Counts I, II, III, V and IX of the First 
Amended Verified Complaint (Doc. #13) against Randy McCalla in his individual and 
official capacities for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), Rule 12(b)(1), 
Fed. R. Civ. P. and the Younger abstention doctrine, the Court dismisses claims for equitable 
relief in Counts I, II, III, IV and V against the John Doe Supervisors 1–5 in their official and 
individual capacities. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) and Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., 
the Court dismisses claims for money damages in Counts I, II, III, IV and V against the John 
Doe Supervisors 1–5 in their official and individual capacities for failure to state a claim on 
which relief can be granted. 
 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Co urt declines to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims agai nst Randy McCalla (Counts VI, VII and 

 
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VIII) and the John Doe Supervisors 1–5 (Count VIII) and dismisses these claims without
prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion For Leave To Complete Service By 
Alternative Means And To Extend Time Under Rule 4(m) (Doc. #53) filed January 6, 2026 is 
OVERRULED as moot. 
The Clerk is directed to enter final judgment as to all defendants. 
Dated this 26th day of May, 2026 at Kansas City, Kansas. 
s / K a t h r y n H . V r a t i l 
KATHRYN H. VR ATIL 
United States District Judge 

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