govinfo:USCOURTS-ksd-6_24-cv-01171-4

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 
 
J. GREG HORINEK, ) 
 ) 
 Plaintiff, ) CIVIL ACTION 
 ) 
v. ) No. 24-1171-KHV 
 ) 
SPIRIT AEROSYSTEMS, INC., ) 
 ) 
 Defendant. ) 
____________________________________________) 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
 
On June 27, 2024, in the District Court of Sedgwick County, Kansas, plaintiff J. Greg 
Horinek filed suit against his former employer, Spirit AeroSystems, Inc ., alleging race 
discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and retaliation for reporting unlawful acts in 
violation of Kansas public policy . See Pretrial Order (Doc. # 55) filed July 2, 2025 . On 
September 23, 2024, defendant removed the case to federal court. On December 8, 2025, the Court 
conducted a jury trial which lasted for four days . On December 11, 2025, the jury returned its 
verdict in favor of Horinek on all claims. On each claim, the jury awarded plaintiff $250,000 in 
non-economic damages, $250,000 in economic damages, and $1,000,000 in punitive damages, for 
a total of $1,500,000. With the parties’ consent, to conform the verdict with the evidence and the 
claims, the Court immediately remitted the $250,000.00 economic damage verdict to $11,497.60. 
See Trial Transcript Volume 4 (Doc. #130) filed December 23, 2025 at 781:6–782:13. After 
remittitur, the total award to plaintiff on both counts was $2,261,497.60.1 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Spirit AeroSystems, Inc. ’s Motion For 
 
1 Prior to jury deliberation, the parties stipulated that plaintiff ’s compensatory 
damages for racial discrimination and retaliatory discharge were indivisible, so if the jury awarded 
compensatory damages, plaintiff would only recover once. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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Judgment As A Matter Of Law (Doc. #132) and Defendant Spirit AeroSystems, Inc.’s Motion For 
Remittitur Or In The Alternative, For Relief Under Rule 59 (Doc. #133), both filed January 8, 
2026. Defendant first seeks judgment as a matter of law on the punitive damage awards, then asks 
the Court to remit plaintiff’s compensatory and punitive damages or, in the alternative, to order a 
new trial. In seeking remittitur, defendant does not suggest what remittitur would satisfy its 
objections. 
For the reasons stated below, the Court overrules defendant’s motions. 
I. Defendant’s Motion For Judgment As A Matter Of Law On Punitive Damage 
Awards 
 Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only if the evidence points but one way and is 
susceptible to no reasonable inferences to the contrary. See Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 172 
F.3d 1232, 1241 (10th Cir. 1999); Riggs v. Scrivner, Inc., 927 F.2d 1146, 1149 (10th Cir. 1991). 
In other words, d efendant is not entitled to judgment unless all the evidence, viewed in the light 
most favorable to plaintiff, reveals no legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for plaintiff. See 
Burrell v. Armijo, 603 F.3d 825, 832 (10th Cir. 2010). Such judgment is proper only when “the 
evidence so strongly supports an issue that reasonable minds could not differ. ” Ryder v. City of 
Topeka, 814 F.2d 1412, 1418 (10th Cir. 1987). Courts should “cautiously and sparingly ” grant 
judgment as a matter of law. Rule 50(b), Fed. R. Civ. P.; Zuchel v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 997 
F.2d 730, 734 (10th Cir. 1993). 
In determining whether to grant judgment as a matter of law, the Court may not weigh the 
evidence, consider the credibility of witnesses or substitute its judgment for that of the jury. See 
Lucas v. Dover Corp., 857 F.2d 1397, 1400 (10th Cir. 1988). Nevertheless, the Court must find 
more than a mere scintilla of evidence favoring plaintiff; it must find that evidence was before the 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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jury upon which it could properly find against defendant. Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 
836 F.2d 1544, 1547 (10th Cir. 1988). 
Defendant argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient for a reasonable jury to award 
punitive damages for either race discrimination or retaliatory discharge. 
A. Punitive Damages For Race Discrimination Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 
To recover punitive damages on a Section 1981 claim, plaintiff must establish that 
defendant’s discrimination was malicious, willful and in gross disregard of plaintiff ’s rights. 
Hampton v. Dillard Dep ’t Stores, Inc., 247 F.3d 1091, 1115 (10th Cir. 2001) . Here, defendant 
does not dispute the jury verdict as to liability or the award of compensatory damages for race 
discrimination. Defendant’s argument is that standing alone, intentional discrimination does not 
establish such malice, willful ness or gross disregard of plaintiff ’s rights as to warrant punitive 
damages and plaintiff did not meet his burden of proof as to punitive damages . Specifically, 
defendant argues that since plaintiff only presented indirect evidence of discrimination, he did not 
establish willfulness. The Court agrees with defendant that the proof of intentional discrimination 
does not, standing alone, justify punitive damages . But what more must be shown to establish 
malice, willfulness or gross disregard of plaintiff’s rights ? The U nited States Supreme Court 
answered that question in Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass ’n, 527 U.S. 526, 536 –37, 119 S. Ct. 2118, 
2125 (1999): plaintiff must prove the employer’s knowledge that it may be acting in violation of 
federal law . In other words, to be liable for punitive damages, “ an employer must at least 
discriminate in the face of a perceived risk that its actions will violate federal law .” Id. The 
Supreme Court conversely described circumstances where intentional discrimination does not give 
rise to liability for punitive damages: 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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 In some instances, the employer may simply be unaware of the relevant federal 
prohibition. There will be cases, moreover, in which the employer discriminates 
with the distinct belief that its discrimination is lawful. The underlying theory of 
discrimination may be novel or otherwise poorly recognized, or an employer may 
reasonably believe that its discrimination satisfies a bona fide occupational 
qualification defense or other statutory exception to liability. 
Id. Here, defendant did not claim to be unaware of the relevant federal prohibition on race 
discrimination, that it discriminated with the distinct belief that its discrimination was lawful, that 
plaintiff’s theory of discrimination was novel or otherwise poorly recognized, or that it reasonably 
believed that its discrimination fell within a statutory exception to liability. 
The jury heard testimony regarding defendant’s training policies, diversity initiatives, 
potential racial quotas that preferred other races over plaintiff ’s, disparate treatment of Ivan 
Quintanar and other shop workers , and defendant’s stated reason for firing plaintiff —a 17-year 
employee—for trashing a part worth less than $2.00. Trial Transcript Volume 3 (Doc. #128) filed 
December 23, 2025 at 534:5, 560:21, 562:19. It also heard conflicting stories from defendant 
about how much production delay (if any) plaintiff had caused by trashing the part, and who made 
the decision to terminate his employment. The jury could have reasonably concluded that 
defendant willfully discriminated against plaintiff in order to promote or retain Hispanic 
employees, and that as to plaintiff, defendant did so in the face of a perceived risk that its actions 
would violate federal anti -discrimination law. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support 
the jury’s conclusion that defendant’s conduct was malicious or done with reckless indifference to 
plaintiff’s rights. See Hampton, 247 F.3d 1091, 1115 . Such proof was sufficient to sustain an 
award of punitive damages. Plaintiff was not required to prove that defendant’s conduct had some 
independently egregious quality. Kolstad, 527 U.S. 526, 536–37. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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Defendant does not challenge the Court’s jury instruction on punitive damages for race 
discrimination.2 The evidence on th is point was not so one -sided that the jury had no legally 
sufficient basis to award punitive damages. See Burrell, 603 F.3d 825, 832. Therefore, the Court 
declines to disturb the jury’s decision to award punitive damages. 
B. Punitive Damages For Retaliatory Discharge Under Kansas Law 
Defendant argues that punitive damages for retaliatory discharge are inappropriate for the 
reasons stated above, and also because Kansas law required that plaintiff prove his retaliatory 
discharge claim (including actual and punitive damages) by “clear and convincing evidence. ” 
 
2 Instruction No. 19 of the Jury Instructions (Doc. #120) filed December 11, 2025 
was as follows: 
 
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff is entitled to actual 
damages for race discrimination under Instruction No. 14, you may —but are not 
required to —award punitive damages on that claim. Punitive damages may be 
imposed to punish the wrongdoer for extraordinary misconduct and to serve as an 
example or warning to others not to engage in such conduct. 
 
To award punitive damages for race discrimination, you must find by a 
preponderance of the evidence that defendant acted with malice or reckless 
indifference to plaintiff ’s federal right not to be discriminated against because of 
his race. “Malice” means to act with an evil motive with knowledge that 
discriminating against plaintiff was in violation of federal law. An act is done with 
“reckless indifference ” if it is done in reckless or callous disregard of, or 
indifference to, the rights of plaintiff. In other words, plaintiff must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that defendant acted with an evil motive or with 
reckless disregard of that law. . . . 
 
Proof that defendant engaged in intentional discrimination is not enough in itself to 
justify an award of punitive damages. But you may award punitive damages if you 
find from a preponderance of the evidence that management officials of defendant 
personally acted with malice or reckless indifference to plaintiff ’s rights under 
federal law and defendant had not made good faith efforts to adopt and enforce 
policies and procedures designed to prohibit such discrimination in the workplace. 
Any award of punitive damages must be fixed with calm discretion and sound 
reason, and must never be awarded, or fixed in amount, because of any sympathy, 
bias or prejudice with respect to any party to the case. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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Hysten v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co. , 530 F.3d 1260, 127 6 (10th Cir. 2008). Defendant 
acknowledges that at the end of the trial, the Court properly instructed the jury that plaintiff must 
prove retaliatory discharge, and all damages resulting therefrom, by clear and convincing 
evidence.3 Defendant argues that at the beginning of trial, however, the Court verbally instructed 
 
3 Instruction No. 10 of the Jury Instructions (Doc. #120) read as follows: 
 
Burden of proof means burden of persuasion. . . . As to plaintiff ’s claim for 
retaliatory discharge, plaintiff must persuade you that his claim is true by clear and 
convincing evidence. Clear and convincing evidence means evidence which shows 
that the truth of the fact asserted is highly probable. 
 
Instruction No. 15 read as follows: 
 
To establish plaintiff’s claim for retaliatory discharge, plaintiff must prove by clear 
and convincing evidence under Instruction No. 10 that each of the following 
elements is true . . . . If plaintiff proves each of the above elements by clear and 
convincing evidence, you must return a verdict in his favor. If not, you must return 
a verdict for defendant. 
 
Instruction No. 17 read as follows: 
 
If you find that defendant is liable under Instruction Nos. 14 or 15, you must 
determine the amount of plaintiff ’s damages. You should allow plaintiff such 
amount of money as will fairly and reasonably compensate him for any damages 
which defendant proximately caused by its unlawful conduct. You may allow 
plaintiff any compensatory damages shown by the evidence, including any 
economic damages, emotional distress, mental anguish or loss of enjoyment of life 
which he suffered as a result of defendant’s unlawful conduct. . . . 
 
Instruction No. 20 read as follows: 
 
If you find by clear and convincing evidence that plaintiff is entitled to actual 
damages for retaliatory discharge under Instruction No. 15, you may—but are not 
required to—award punitive damages on that claim. . . . To award punitive damages 
for retaliatory discharge, you must find by clear and convincing evidence that in 
violating plaintiff’s rights, defendant acted in a willful or malicious manner. . . . In 
other words, plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that defendant 
acted with an evil motive or with reckless disregard of that law. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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the jury that plaintiff’s retaliation claim only required a preponderance of the evidence, which was 
erroneous, prejudicial and confusing to the jury. 
Defendant claims that the Court misstated plaintiff’s burden of proof on the retaliation 
claim on five separate instances. See Defendant Spirit AeroSystems, Inc.’s Motion For Judgment 
As A Matter Of Law (Doc. #132) at 8. Two of the alleged misstatements were outside the hearing 
of the jury, however, and the Court does not address them.4 The first misstatement in the presence 
 
4 Outside the hearing of the jury, o n December 10, 2025 , the third day of trial, the 
Court and counsel had the following conversation: 
 
THE COURT: [we] are working on the jury instructions now, but my recollection 
of Kansas law about the clear and convincing evidence for retaliatory discharge is 
that clear and convincing evidence is not a higher standard of proof but just burden 
of proof by clear and con vince -- a preponderance of the evidence by clear and 
convincing evidence. Is that -- 
MS. SCHECK: Yes. 
THE COURT: -- your understanding? 
MS. SCHECK: Which creates a higher standard of proof. 
THE COURT: I guess. I mean, I don’t know exactly what it means, but we do have 
the language from the cases and we ’ll make sure that that ’s reflected in the 
instructions. 
MS. SCHECK: Yeah, clear and convincing is a claim highly probable supported by 
firm and convincing evidence. So it is a higher standard of proof is what we would 
argue. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. We’ll bring the jury in five minutes if that’s all that 
we have.” 
 
Transcript Vol. 3 440:18-441:10. The dialogue continued as follows: 
 
MS. SCHECK: I do want to clarify, and I can submit some cases on the burden of 
proof on the clear and convincing standard, where Kansas courts has been adopted 
by the Tenth Circuit that the clear and convincing standard is considered an 
intermediate standard of proof in between clear -- in between preponderance of the 
evidence and – 
MR. VANFLETEREN: The reasonable doubt. 
MS. SCHECK: -- yes, the reasonable doubt standard. 
THE COURT: I know what the law is on that, and we don ’t need to talk about it 
until jury instructions anyway. So unless you’re concerned about the actual 
(continued. . .) 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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of the jury was on December 8, 2025, just minutes into the first day of trial, when the Court told 
the jury what the case was about: 
So as I said, this is a civil case by plaintiff, Greg Horinek, who alleges that his 
former employer, Spirit AeroSystems, racially discriminated against him in 
violation of the Civil Rights Act, which is, United States Code, Section 1981, and 
retaliated against him for reporting unlawful acts of -- unlawful acts in violation of 
Kansas public policy. Plaintiff claims that defendant terminated his employment 
because of racial discrimination against him as a White person and as retaliation 
for whistle -blowing on unlawful activity of a co -worker. Defendant denies 
plaintiff’s claims. And I want to emphasize that at this point plaintiff ’s claims are 
only allegations. The purpose of this trial is to give plaintiff the opportunity and 
the burden of proving that his claims are true by a preponderance of the evidence. 
This is something we refer to as the burden of proof. And preponderance of the 
evidence means that plaintiff must show that his claims are more probably true than 
not true. An easy way to think about that is that if you took the scales of justice and 
you put all of plaintiff ’s evidence on this side, all of defendant ’s evidence on this 
side, it’s plaintiff’s responsibility -- if you are to return a verdict in his favor, it ’s 
plaintiff’s responsibility to make those scales tip in his favor. They don ’t have to 
tip totally to one side, but they have to tip somewhat in his favor by proof that 
you’re convinced is more probably true than not true. 
 
Transcript Volume 1 (Doc. #125) filed December 23, 2025 at 25:9-26:9. 
The s econd misstatement also occurred on the morning of December 8 , 2025 . When 
questioning a potential juror about his prior service on a criminal jury , the Court referenced 
plaintiff’s burden of proof as follows: 
I’m sure you don ’t remember the details of the instructions which the judge in 
Cowley County gave you at the end of the case 30 years ago, but in a criminal case 
in order to convict the defendant, the government must show beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant did do the acts which are charged . . . in the criminal 
activity. In a civil case like this, the burden of proof is lighter. As I mentioned 
before, it ’s only what is more likely true than not true. Would you have any 
 
2(. . .continued) 
instructions – 
MS. SCHECK: Yeah. 
THE COURT: -- you don’t need to do that. 
 
Transcript Vol. 3 604:20-605:7. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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problem distinguishing those two burdens of proof and applying the preponderance 
of the evidence standard under my instructions? 
 
Id. at 46:11-25. 
 The t hird instance was also on December 8, 2025 , after returning from lunch break , 
immediately after opening statements . Noting the transition from opening statements to the 
presentation of evidence, the Court made the following statement: 
So at this point we’ll move into the presentation of evidence. As I told you, because 
this is a civil case, plaintiff has the burden of proving his claims by what you call a 
preponderance of the evidence, that is evidence which considered all together [and] 
drawing reasonable inferences therefrom shows that his claims are more probably 
true than not true. 
 
Id. at 118:13-19. 
A litigant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. 
Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553, 104 S.Ct. 845 (1984). The Court acknowledges that it made three 
statements which conflated distinct burdens of proof for racial discrimination under federal law 
(preponderance of the evidence) and retaliatory discharge under Kansas law (clear and convincing 
evidence). As to retaliatory discharge, the statements were in error. Defendant did not make a 
contemporaneous objection to any of the three misstatements, however, and the Court missed the 
opportunity to correct its error in real time . See Taylor v. Denver and Rio Grande We stern 
Railroad Co., 438 F.2d 351, 353 (10th Cir.1971). Likewise, defendant did not seek an instruction 
at the end of the case, directing the jury to disregard the misstatements. 
Overall, the Court finds that its statements, very early on the first day of trial and before 
the presentation of evidence, did not impair defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial. This is 
especially true since the written jury instructions three days later on December 11, 2025, after the 
close of the evidence and immediately before closing arguments, properly instructed the jury. The 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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Court read instructions which stated the correct burden of proof, and each juror had a copy of the 
written instructions which accurately stated the law. The Court assumes that the jury followed the 
written instructions at the end of the case. Osterhout v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm ’rs of LeFlore Cnty., 
10 F.4th 978, 992 (10th Cir. 2021). The record contains no evidence that the jury remembered the 
early, erroneous statement s by the Court, let alone evidence that those statements confused the 
jury. The jury did not ask questions about any discrepancy, and—as noted—defendant did not 
object to the Court’s misstatements or seek any kind of curative instruction at the end of the case. 
Defendant has not established that the Court’s misstatements prejudiced the jury, affected 
its substantial rights, or affected the essential fairness of the trial. Moreover, even if the statements 
warrant a remedy, the remedy would not be judgment as a matter of law but a new trial. See 
Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. Neosho Const. Co., 192 F.R.D. 662, 668 (D. Kan. 2000) n. 1; Greenwood, 
464 U.S. 548, 553. The evidence was not so one-sided that viewed in the light most favorable to 
plaintiff, it provided no legally sufficient evidentiary basis to award punitive damages for 
retaliatory discharge. See Burrell, 603 F.3d 825, 832. Therefore, the Court declines to disturb the 
jury’s decision to award punitive damages. 
II. Defendant’s Motion For Remittitur Or In The Alternative, For Relief Under Rule 59 
Defendant asks the Court to remit plaintiff ’s compensatory and punitive damages , or 
alternatively to order a new trial pursuant to Rule 59, Fed. R. Civ. P. 
The Court exercises discretion in deciding whether to grant remittitur based on an excessive 
damage award. Blanke v. Alexander, 152 F.3d 1224, 1236 (10th Cir. 1998). The Court considers 
the jury award inviolate so long as it is not so excessive or inadequate as to shock the judicial 
conscience and raise an irresistible inference that passion, prejudice, corruption or other improper 
cause invaded the trial. See Prager v. Campbell Cty. Mem ’l Hosp., 731 F.3d 1046, 1062 (10th 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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Cir. 2013); Capstick v. Allstate Ins. Co., 998 F.2d 810, 820 (10th Cir. 1993). Defendant bears the 
heavy burden of demonstrating that the verdict was “clearly, decidedly, or overwhelmingly against 
the weight of the evidence. ” Blanke, 152 F.3d at 1236 (citations and quotations omitted ). In 
determining whether an award of punitive damages is excessive, the Court considers the following 
factors: (1) the nature of the act which caused the injury; (2) the economic status of defendant; and 
(3) the deterrent effect of the award on others. See Capstick, 998 F.2d at 820. 
Under Rule 59, the Court may grant a new trial “for any reason for which a new trial has 
heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court. ” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). In 
deciding whether to grant a motion for new trial, the Court exercises broad discretion. See Unit 
Drilling Co. v. Enron Oil & Gas Co., 108 F.3d 1186, 1194 (10th Cir. 1997). The Court generally 
regards motions for new trial with disfavor and grants them only with great caution. See Franklin 
v. Thompson, 981 F.2d 1168, 1171 (10th Cir. 1992); Utility Trailer Sales of Kansas City, Inc. v. 
MAC Trailer Mfg., Inc. , 734 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1216 (D. Kan. 2010). The party seeking to set 
aside a jury verdict must demonstrate prejudicial trial error or that the verdict is not based on 
substantial evidence. Anderson v. Phillips Petroleum Co. , 861 F.2d 63 1, 637 (10th Cir. 1988), 
overruled on other grounds, Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993); White v. Conoco, 
Inc., 710 F.2d 1442, 1443 (10th Cir. 1983). Motions for a new trial call for an examination of the 
prejudicial impact of an error when viewed in the context of an entire case, and the Court may only 
disturb the jury verdict if prejudicial errors impaired the movant’s right to a fair and impartial trial. 
Owens v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Cnty. & Kansas City, Kansas, 100 F.4th 1177, 1181 (10th 
Cir. 2024). In reviewing a motion for new trial, the Court views the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prevailing party. See Griffin v. Strong, 983 F.3d 1544, 1546 (10th Cir. 1993). The 
Court ignores errors that do not affect the essential fairness of the trial. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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553. 
Defendant argues that the Court should remit plaintiff ’s damage s or order a new trial 
because (1) the punitive damages are unconstitutionally excessive, (2) the compensatory damages 
are not supported by the evidence, (3) the jury was improperly influenced by passion and prejudice 
and (4) the Court erred in its instructions to the jury. 
A. Whether Plaintiff’s Punitive Damage Award Is Unconstitutionally Excessive 
Punitive damages may be imposed to further the state’s legitimate interest in punishing 
unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350, 94 
S.Ct. 2997, 3012 (1974). Here, the jury awarded punitive damages to punish defendant for what 
it determined was extraordinary misconduct and to serve as an example or warning to others not 
to engage in such conduct. 
Only when an award is “grossly excessive” in relation to those legitimate interests does it 
enter the zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1595 (1996). In analyzing the 
constitutionality of punitive damages, the Supreme Court has instructed courts to look to (1) the 
degree of reprehensibility of defendant ’s action; (2) the disparity between the punitive damage 
award and the actual or potenti al harm suffered by plaintiff; and (3) the difference between the 
punitive damage award and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. Id. 
 For the first prong, t o determine the reprehensibility of defendant ’s conduct, courts 
consider whether the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; whether the tortious 
conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; whether 
the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; whether the conduct involved repeated actions 
or was an isolated incident; and whether the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery or 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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deceit or mere accident. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell , 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003). 
Here, as noted, the verdict awarded plaintiff non-economic damages of $250,000.00 for emotional 
distress and (after remittitur) $11,467.60 for economic damages , for a total of $261,497.60 in 
compensatory damages. On the retaliatory discharge claim, the jury found that defendant acted 
with reckless indifference or malice by terminating plaintiff ’s employment because he reported 
serious violations of Kansas crimi nal law, which are laws concerning the health and safety of 
others. Plaintiff was financially vulnerable. The conduct for which plaintiff sought relief (the 
termination of his employment ) was a single incident , but the evidence revealed a history of 
discrimination and retaliation. Overall, the jury could reasonably find that defendant ’s conduct 
was highly reprehensible, especially in light of the fact that plaintiff was a 17 -year employee and 
defendant fired him for trashing a $2.00 part, then offered shifting and inconsistent explanations. 
 Defendant argues that under the second prong—the disparity between the punitive damage 
award and the actual harm—plaintiff’s punitive damages should be limited to a 1:1 ratio of punitive 
damages to compensatory damages, since the latter damages were substantial . In this regard, 
defendant relies on BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore , 517 U.S. at 582. In BMW, the Court refused 
to draw a mathematical bright line between constitutionally acceptable and unacceptable ratios, 
and instead found that punitive damages must bear a reasonable relationship to compensatory 
damages. Id. Thus, “low awards of compensatory damages may properly support a higher ratio 
than high compensatory awards, if, for example, a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a 
small amount of economic damages.” Id. In State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425, the Court held that the 
converse is also true, that substantial compensatory awards may require a lesser ratio, “perhaps 
only equal to compensatory damages ,” and that in practice, few awards exceeding a single -digit 
ratio between punitive and compensatory damages will satisfy due process. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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 Defendant overstates the holdings in BMW and State Farm , which d id not hold that 
punitive damages must be limited to a 1:1 ratio with any “substantial” compensatory award. Both 
cases actually rejected bright-line rules. Instead, the Court looks to whether the punitive damage 
award bears a reasonable relationship to the harm that actually occurred. Here, the jury reasonably 
found that defendant terminated plaintiff’s employment due to racial discrimination and retaliation 
for whistleblowing—conduct which the jury could rightly find is particularly egregious. Further, 
the ratio between punitive damages ($1,000,000) and the post -remittitur actual damages 
($261,497.60) on each claim is 3.825:1 , with the total punitive award at 7.65:1, which is well 
within the generalized single-digit range given by State Farm and is not unreasonable, especially 
when compared to the ratios in BMW and State Farm—500:1 and 145:1, respectively. 
 As to the third prong, defendant argues that Title VII sets a maximum statutory penalty of 
$300,000 for similar conduct , which shows that a punitive damages award of $2,000,000 is 
excessive.5 Alternatively, defendant argues that it lacked fair notice that punitive awards totaling 
$2,000,000 were possible, since Jones v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 674 F.3d 1187, 1207 (10th 
Cir. 2012), capped punitive damages to a 1:1 ratio. In a retaliation case for filing a workman ’s 
compensation claim, Jones held that the punitive damages award of $2,000,000 was 
constitutionally excessive using these three factors . There, plaintiff only sustained economic 
injury, defendant did not act in disregard for the health and safety of others, actual damages of 
$630,307 were substantial in light of the injuries suffered and comparable cases found the jury 
award excessive. Id. 
Since 42 U.S.C. § 1981 has no statutory damage cap, the Court declines to import the 
 
5 The relevant number to compare to Title VII ’s statutory maximum would be the 
punitive damage award for race discrimination, $1,000,000, not the total punitive damage award. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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maximum from Title VII. See Hampton v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 247 F.3d 1091, 1117 (10th 
Cir. 2001) (declining to use Title VII statutory cap in third prong analysis). Furthermore, Jones is 
not a useful case to compare to the present case, because intentional discrimination on the basis of 
race is especially reprehensible. See e.g. Flores v. City of Westminster , 873 F.3d 739, 760 (9th 
Cir. 2017). In Jones, plaintiff’s actual damages were entirely economic and defendant did not act 
in disregard for the health and safety of others. A more comparable case is Hampton, which upheld 
a jury award of $56,000 in compensatory damages and $1,100,000 in punitive damages , a 20:1 
ratio, on a race discrimination claim under Section 1981. Id. at 1116. Though the Tenth Circuit 
decided Hampton before the Supreme Court noted that few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio 
will satisfy due process, Hampton performed the same constitutional analysis as here and certainly 
put defendant on notice that in this day and age, race discrimination claims can result in large 
punitive damages awards. 
In addition, Kansas law limits pun itive damages for large corporations like Spirit to $5 
million. K.S.A. § 60-3702(e)(2). Complaints about the reasonableness of a punitive damages are 
much less persuasive when they are within a legislat ively prescribed cap. See E.E.O.C. v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 187 F.3d 1241, 1249 (10th Cir. 1999). Therefore, Spirit, which is headquartered 
in Kansas, was on notice that it could be punished up to $5 million for willfully violating the law 
with regard to retaliatory discharge. 
In addition to the BMW factors, the Tenth Circuit permits consideration of the defendant’s 
economic status when determining whether the punitive damages award is excessive. See Cont’l 
Trend Res., Inc. v. OXY USA Inc., 101 F.3d 634, 641 (10th Cir. 1996) (wealth of defendant must 
remain relevant for punitive award to deter future behavior). Defendant is a large company, and 
on the first day of trial, defendant asked the Court to inform the jury that it was acquired as a 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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wholly-owned subsidiary of the Boeing Company.6 The jury heard testimony that Spirit is a global 
company and is a large employer in the city. Trial Transcript Volume 3 (Doc. #128) at 463:8-13. 
Given defendant’s stature as a substantial corporation in Wichita, a $2,000,000 punitive damage 
award—under the Kansas statutory cap —does not shock the conscience. The jury could 
reasonably find that an award of such magnitude was necessary to fulfill the fundamental purpose 
of punitive damages: to deter future misconduct by defendant and others. See Capstick, 998 F.2d 
810, 822 (“While the Due Process Clause requires that punitive damages not be grossly excessive, 
it does not require that punitive damages be ineffectual and impotent.”). 
Given the reprehensibility of defendant’s conduct, the Court cannot find that the punitive 
damage verdict was unreasonable or constitutionally excessive . The Court therefore declines to 
 
6 Immediately before trial, on December 8, 2025, defendant’s counsel and the Court 
had the following conversation: 
 
MS. SCHECK: So as of this morning, the -- the Boeing transaction did close. 
 
THE COURT: Okay. 
 
MS. SCHECK: And so it doesn’t impact the trial at all except for on the questions 
about does anyone know anyone who works at Spirit or have you worked at Spirit 
before. I think we would need to have you ask the question Spirit is now a wholly 
owned subsidiary of the Boeing company. And so just voir dire questioning I think 
we would need to add that to the line of questions. 
 
THE COURT: So I probably will let you do that since this is late breaking news. 
I’ll try to cover that. But if I forget it, then you follow up. I assume that will be a 
big story down here [in Wichita] in the news or at least a story. 
 
MS. SCHECK: It ’s been a story for a year that it ’s -- that the transaction was 
happening. It’s just waiting for approval, and it happened last week. . . . 
 
Transcript Volume 1 (Doc. #125) at 17:1-17. Defendant chose not to ask potential jury 
members questions about Boeing, while plaintiff, without objection, did ask some , 
concerning if the merger would affect the juror’s ability to be fair. See id. at 17-67. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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remit or eliminate the punitive damage awards, or order a new trial on punitive damages. 
B. Whether The Evidence Supports Plaintiff’s Compensatory Damages Award 
By way of economic damages, p laintiff only sought $11,497.60 for interest accrued on 
credit card debt which he incurred for living expenses after defendant terminated his employment. 
The jury awarde d plaintiff $250,000 in economic damages, which counsel agree d to remit to 
$11,497.60 to recover the credit card interest. Defendant asks the Court to further remit plaintiff’s 
economic damages to $0 because plaintiff did not present evidence that linked his credit card 
interest to the termination of his employment. Plaintiff testified that he endured financial hardship 
after defendant terminated his employment , however, and he presented credit card statements 
which showed interest incurred from the termination of his employment to when he was 
reinstated.7 Defendant had the opportunity to impeach this evidence at trial, but it did not even try 
to do so. This award does not shock the judicial conscience; it has evidentiary support and is not 
excessive. Therefore, the Court declines to reduce the award or grant a new trial on economic 
damages. 
C. Whether The Jury Was Improperly Influenced By Passion And Prejudice 
Defendant argues that the punitive damage award is excessive under common law 
standards and should be remitted . The Court exercises discretion in deciding whether to grant 
remittitur based on an excessive damage award. Blanke, 152 F.3d 1224, 1236 (10th Cir. 1998). 
The Court considers the jury award inviolate so long as it is not so excessive or inadequate as to 
 
7 Defendant’s motion argues that these interest statements “do not even total the 
requested damages amount,” but does not state what it thinks the amount should be. Motion For 
Remittitur Or New Trial (Doc. #133) at 8. By the Court’s calculation, plaintiff misstated his claim 
by nine cents. Since defendant did not request remittitur to that amount, the Court declines to 
order it. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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shock the judicial conscience and raise an irresistible inference that passion, prejudice, corruption 
or other improper cause invaded the trial. See Campbell, 731 F.3d 1046, 1062 (10th Cir. 2013); 
Capstick, 998 F.2d 810, 820 (10th Cir. 1993). Defendant bears the heavy burden of demonstrating 
that the verdict was “clearly, decidedly, or overwhelmingly against the weight of the evidence. ” 
Blanke, 152 F.3d at 1236 (citations and quotations omitted). Defendant points to prejudice arising 
from (1) plaintiff’s mention of Boeing during the trial, (2) comparator evidence and (3) the 
unsupported award of $250,000 in actual damages. 
i. Boeing 
Defendant argues that the jury was prejudiced because plaintiff mentioned Boeing, a non-
party. Defendant cites two such references—both during plaintiff’s closing argument.8 Defendant 
did not object to either reference at trial or seek a limiting instruction. In fact, defendant had asked 
the Court to question potential jury members about Boeing, since Spirit had become a wholly-
 
8 On December 11, 2025, plaintiff’s counsel argued during closing: 
 
So Spirit AeroSystems is a global company that brings in north of a billion a year. 
And this week you got to see behind the curtains. You got to see how this place 
really works. It’s the biggest employer in the state probably and now it’s got a new 
parent—Boeing. 
 
Trial Transcript Volume 4 (Doc. #130) at 755:10-14. Plaintiff’s counsel later stated: 
 
Well, know how to seek guidance. Okay, how do we seek guidance? Ask yourself 
what would my family or friends think? Well, Spirit just got adopted this week. 
It’s got a new mom. Her name is Boeing. I don’t know what Boeing is going to 
think about whistleblower retaliation, okay. I don’t know if they’ll care. But what 
if this goes viral? Think about that. Speak to these people in a language they 
understand, and that’s money. They listen to Wall Street. 
 
Id. at 764:6-13. Defendant did not contemporaneously object to either statement or seek 
an instruction for the jury to disregard them. 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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owned subsidiary of Boeing on the morning of the first day of trial and that fact was in the news. 
Trial Transcript Volume 1 (Doc. #125) at 17:1. Defense counsel agreed that the Boeing acquisition 
had been a big piece of local news in Wichita over the last year, and acknowledged that most of 
the jury pool likely already knew of the Boeing/Spirit merger . During jury selection , however, 
defendant elected not to question jurors about prejudice against Boeing or whether the acquisition 
might impact their deliberations. Overall, in these circumstances, the Court is convinced that the 
passing references did not prejudice the jury and they therefore afford no basis for a new trial. 
ii. Comparator Evidence 
Defendant argues that the jury was prejudiced by evidence concerning defendant ’s 
response to Ivan Quintanar ’s misconduct in 2023, two to six months after the termination of 
plaintiff’s employment. This evidence generally included an incident on June 14, where Quintanar 
was accused of creating a hostile work environment, complaints about Quintanar, incidents on July 
17 and 19, where Quintanar falsified documentation, an interview between HR and Quintanar on 
July 17, concerning allegations that he was creating a hostile work environment, problems with 
Quintanar and whether to move his shift, and an incident on August 16, where Quintanar caused a 
work stoppage. According to defendant, t his evidence involved different decisionmakers and 
different categories of conduct, which invited the jury to infer discriminatory intent to explain the 
difference in treatment between plaintiff and Quintanar , and that it should have been excluded 
under Rule 403, Fed. R. Evid. 
Before jury selection, on the first morning of trial, defendant asked the Court to exclude 
this evidence. The Court overruled its motion. Trial Transcript Volume 1 (Doc. #125) at 9:16–
15:10. The Court ruled that plaintiff’s supervisor, Jasen Venn, was directly involved in these 
instances, that the evidence was closely related in time to the termination of plaintiff’s employment 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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on March 9, 2023 , and the question whether Quintanar’s conduct was substantially similar to 
plaintiff’s conduct was for the jury to determine. See Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn , 
552 U.S. 379, 388, 128 S. Ct. 1140, 1147, 170 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2008) . For substantially the same 
reasons it overruled defendant’s original motion—that the evidence was relevant and not unduly 
prejudicial under Rule 403 —the Court overrules defendant ’s motion for a new trial on that 
question. 
iii. Economic Damages 
Defendant argues that the jury’s original award of $250,000 in economic damages 
demonstrates that the jury did not carefully follow the instructions and reached its verdict based 
on improper considerations. 
The Court agrees that in awarding plaintiff $250,000 in economic damages —more 
compensatory damages than he proved or even claimed—the jury may have been confused. Any 
confusion, however, was understandable. 
Instruction No. 12 instructed the jury that plaintiff was seeking $11,497.60 in economic 
damages for interest on credit card debt. In a union arbitration, p laintiff had already recovered 
economic damages and had been reinstated to his position with defendant.9 Aside from attorney’s 
 
9 Three months before trial, an arbitrator for the Federal Mediation and Conciliation 
Service sustained plaintiff’s grievance under defendant’s collective bargaining agreement with the 
International Association of Machinists, Local 839. As an interim award, the arbitrator ordered 
defendant to reinstate plaintiff to his position as metals mechanic in department 328-E on the first 
shift and that defendant confer with the union on what retroactive pay and benefits were due to 
make plaintiff financially whole, including lost income, payments to procure new medical or dental 
health insurance coverage, payments to health care providers, lost payments to a roll-over health 
savings account, lost employer contributions to any profit sharing, pension or retirement plan, and 
any other direct financial losses. On October 31, 2025, as the final award, the arbitrator ordered 
defendant to pay plaintiff $103,108.40 in back wages (after subtracting plaintiff ’s supplemental 
income which he earned), $28,288.56 in overtime pay, $10,506 to his pension, and $21,143.61 in 
other bonus and insurance remedies for a total award of $163,046.57 without prejudgment interest. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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fees, credit card interest and emotional distress damages, the arbitration award compensated 
plaintiff for his losses and made him fully whole. Prior to trial, t he Court was concerned about 
whether (and how) this information should be communicated to the jury. Based on its 34 years of 
experience, the Court feared that because verdicts for wrongful termination and damage awards 
for lost wages go hand in hand —even among lay jurors —the jury was exceedingly likely to be 
confused by the fact that plaintiff was not claiming lost wages or benefits for his job loss. At some 
point, while it was preparing jury instructions, the Court discussed with the parties what details of 
the union arbitration would be received at trial, stating: “I think we ’re going to have to say 
something to the jury about this .” See Trial Transcript Volume 1 (Doc. #125) at 6:17-18. Both 
parties were adamant, however, for reasons related to their independent trial strategies, that the 
jury not learn anything about the arbitration award. The jury instructions did not explicitly state 
that plaintiff was not claiming lost wages or benefits and the jury never learned why they were not 
(and could not be) an issue in the case. To adhere to the parties’ wishes, the Court simply instructed 
the jury in Instruction No. 22: “You may not award plaintiff lost wages or benefits for any period 
after the termination of his employment on March 9, 2023. Those are not issues for you to decide.” 
In context, the obvious explanation for the jury’s award of $250,000 in economic damages 
is that , notwithstanding Instruction No. 22, it was intending to award lost pay and benefits . 
Defendant terminated plaintiff’s employment on March 9, 2023 and reinstated him on September 
5, 2025, two years, five months and 27 days later. He earned $38 per hour at the time of his 
termination. Lacking more specific evidence of lost wages and benefits, the jury could have easily 
(although crudely) estimated them at around $240,000. This amount, added to the credit card 
interest, would have been entirely consistent with the evidence, even if the jury could not properly 
award it. On the unique facts of this case, the $250,000 for economic damages award shows 

 
 
 
 
 
 
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understandable confusion —which the parties jointly induced and could have prevented —but 
certainly not passion, prejudice, corruption or another improper cause. 
Defendant is correct that the $250,000 award was excessive, but within minutes of the jury 
verdict, while the jury was still in the courtroom, the Court granted a remittitur with the parties’ 
consent.10 The remittitur cured any problem with excessive economic damages. As noted, the 
parties invited jury confusion on the issue of lost wages and benefits by refusing to explicitly 
address it at trial. Here, the record suggests a jury trying to do justice in the face of inadequate 
evidence and instruction—and certainly not a jury inflamed by passion and prejudice. The Court 
therefore declines to grant a remittitur or order a new trial on this ground. 
D. Whether The Court Erred In Its Instructions To The Jury 
Defendant argues that it is entitled to remittitur or a new trial because the Court refused to 
instruct the jury on its affirmative defense to an award of punitive damages under Kolstad v. Am. 
Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 536–37 (1999): that it made good faith efforts to comply with federal 
anti-discrimination law. The parties had jointly proposed an instruction on Kolstad, as follows: 
[P]unitive damages cannot be imposed on an employer where its employees acted 
contrary to the employer ’s own good faith efforts to comply with the law by 
implementing policies and procedures designed to prevent unlawful discrimination 
in the workplace. 
 
You therefore may not award punitive damages related to Plaintiff ’s race 
discrimination claim if you find that Defendant made the following good faith 
attempts to comply with the law: 
 
1. Adopted anti-discrimination policies; 
2. Made a good -faith effort to educate its employees about these policies 
and statutory prohibitions; 
3. Made good-faith efforts to enforce its anti-discrimination policies. 
 
10 Had the parties not agreed, the Court would have given further instructions and 
ordered the jury to further deliberate on economic damages. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
-23- 
 
 
Proposed Jury Instructions (Doc. #100) filed November 24, 2025 at 18 -19. The proposed 
instruction did not explain whether to defeat punitive damages, defendant was required to prove 
good faith efforts or whether to recover punitive damages, plaintiff was required to prove lack of 
good faith efforts.11 
Kolstad held that an employer may not be vicariously liable for punitive damages for the 
discriminatory employment decisions of managerial agents where these decisions are contrary to 
its good faith efforts to comply with federal anti-discrimination laws. 527 U.S. 526, 526 (1999); 
see also Wright v. C & M Tire, Inc. , 545 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1207 (D. Kan. 2008) . To avail itself 
of the Kolstad good-faith-compliance standard, defendant must at least adopt anti -discrimination 
policies, make a good faith effort to educate its employees about these policies and the statutory 
prohibitions, and make good faith efforts to enforce anti -discrimination polic ies. McInnis v. 
Fairfield Communities, Inc., 458 F.3d 1129, 1138 (10th Cir.2006). 
Defendant objected to the lack of a Kolstad instruction, and the Court cited three reasons 
for declining to give it. First, the pretrial order did not allege that defendant had made good faith 
efforts to adopt and enforce policies and procedures designed to prohibit discrimination in the 
workplace or whether—as required to impute liability to defendant for punitive damages —
management officials were acting outside the scope of their employment. Therefore, that issue 
was outside the issues for trial. Second, at trial, defendant presented no evidence or argument that 
any identified management employee had violated policies and procedures that were designed to 
prohibit discrimination . Therefore, factually , such an instruction was unwarranted. Third, to 
recover punitive damages, the proposed Kolstad instruction would have required plaintiff to prove 
 
11 Throughout trial, though the proposed instruction did not so state, defendant 
referred to its Kolstad argument as a “defense.” 

 
 
 
 
 
 
-24- 
 
 
not only malice and reckless indifference, but also lack of good faith efforts to adopt and enforce 
policies and procedures to prohibit discrimination . Id. at 724-25. Therefore, the Court declined 
to separately instruct on Kolstad, pending further instruction by the Tenth Circuit or the Supreme 
Court on whether such an instruction is an affirmative defense or whether plaintiff must disprove 
defendant’s good faith compliance with Title VII . See Harsco Corp. v. Renner , 475 F.3d 1179, 
1189 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007) (“This Court has not yet decided whether this so -called ‘defense’ 
‘represents an affirmative defense on which the defendant bears the burden of proof or whether 
the plaintiff must disprove the defendant’s good faith compliance with Title VII.’” (quoting Davey 
v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 301 F.3d 1204, 1209 (10th Cir. 2002)). 
In retrospect, if the Court did err in instructing on Kolstad, it possibly erred by telling the 
jury that generally, it could consider the Kolstad elements as relevant factors in deciding whether 
to award punitive damages . Specifically, Instruction 19 informed the jury that it could award 
punitive damages “if you find from a preponderance of the evidence that management officials of 
defendant personally acted with malice or reckless indifference to plaintiff ’s rights under federal 
law and defendant had not made good faith efforts to adopt and enforce policies and procedures 
designed to prohibit such discrimination in the workplace.” In essence, Instruction 19 incorporated 
the issue of good faith compliance but perhaps incorrectly placed on plaintiff the burden of proving 
lack of good faith efforts by defendant.12 
More to the point, the Court does not need to decide whether Kolstad is an affirmative 
defense on which defendant has the burden of proof. The Court declined to give the parties’ 
proposed instruction on Kolstad to avoid jury confusion on issues that were irrelevant under the 
 
12 Plaintiff did not object, however, to Instruction No. 19. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
-25- 
 
 
pretrial order and the evidence .13 For the same reasons, it overrules defendant ’s motion for 
remittitur or a new trial. 
Defendant also argues that the Court erred by refusing to use the portion of the parties’ 
proposed instruction which reads : “in determining whether defendant’s stated reasons for 
termination of plaintiff are genuine or pretextual, you must examine the facts as they appeared to 
the people making the employment decision at the time the decision was made.” Parties’ Proposed 
Joint Jury Instructions (Doc. #100) at 17. Defendant made no objection to the Court’s failure to 
give this instruction. Rule 51, Fed. R. Civ. P. states that “[n]o party may assign as error the giving 
or the failure to give an instruction unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to 
consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the 
objection.” Given that defendant did not object, the Court reviews the instruction only for plain 
error. 
A court will reverse due to an instructional error under the plain error standard only in “an 
exceptional circumstance—one where the error was ‘patently plainly erroneous and prejudicial.’” 
Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. Neosho Const. Co., 192 F.R.D. 662, 671 (D. Kan. 2000), quoting Giron 
v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 191 F.3d 1281, 1289 (10th Cir.1999). Defendant cites no authority 
that this exclusion was incorrect, let alone prejudicial enough to constitute plain error. The Court 
omitted this instruction because it was not necessary. The Court’s decision was not “patently 
plainly erroneous ,” if erroneous at all. Therefore, the Court overrules defendant ’s motion for 
remittitur or a new trial. 
 
13 To avail itself of Kolstad, the Court would have expected defendant to identify a 
particular management agent whose conduct was contrary to defendant ’s good faith efforts to 
comply with federal anti-discrimination law. 

 
-26-
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Spirit AeroSystems, Inc.’s Motion For 
Judgment As A Matter Of Law (Doc. #132) and Defendant Spirit AeroSystems, Inc.’s Motion For 
Remittitur Or In The Alternative, For Relief Under Rule 59 (Doc. #133), both filed January 8, 
2026 are OVERRULED. 
Dated this 26th day of May, 2026 at Kansas City, Kansas. 
s/ Kathryn H. Vratil 
KATHRYN H. VRATIL 
United States District Judge 

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