govinfo:USCOURTS-txed-4_25-cv-00764-0

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION

ROBERT COELLO, et al.

PAUL M. DAVIS, et al.
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NO. 4:25-CV-00764-ALM-BD
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pro se plaintiﬀs Robert Coello and Amy Coello ﬁled three ex parte motions seeking various
service-related relief. Dkts. 30, 36, 37. The ﬁrst two of those motions will be granted in part. The
third will be struck as duplicative.
BACKGROUND
In July 2025, the Coellos sued a law ﬁrm and several people for defamation, intentional
inﬂiction of emotional distress, civil conspiracy, tortious interference with employment and
business relations, and breach of ﬁduciary duty and professional misconduct. Dkt. 1 at 27 –33. A
month later, they amended their complaint to add more defendants and claims. Dkt. 10 at 136–67.
Amy Coello was employed by and a client of the defendant law ﬁrm, Paul M. Davis &
Associates, P.C. Id. at 2. While employed there, Amy “sought to vindicate her rights against
neighbors who falsely accused her of pedophilia, alcoholism, and sexual misconduct with law ﬁrm
clients.” Id. at 3. Most of the defendants are those neighbors. The remaining defendants include
Paul Davis, a neighbor and lawyer at the defendant law ﬁrm, and one of the ﬁrm’s clients. Id. at 2–
3. According to the Coellos, “[w] hat began as a community smear campaign escalated into a
calculated conspiracy involving fabricated criminal charges, manipulated billing records, and a
fraudulent State Bar grievance —all designed to silence [Amy] who wouldn’t comply.” Id. at 2.
Robert Coello, Amy’s spouse , joins as a plaintiﬀ because, “[a] s a result of the coordinated
defamatory campaign targeting [Amy], [he] suﬀered loss of consortium, emotional distress,
reputational injury, and economic harm, including disruption to the family’s livelihood.” Id. at 8. PageID #:
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Since initiating this action, the Coellos have face d diﬃculty serving all the defendants. In
granting their request to proceed in forma pauperis, the court ordered the United States marshal
to serve process and extended their initial deadline to do so. Dkt. 14. Two months later, at the
marshal’s request, the court extended the service deadline again. Dkt. 18. And a month after that,
the Coellos again moved to extend their deadline and to use alternative service methods of email
and social media. Dkts. 19, 20, 22. The court granted those requests. Dkt. 23.
A month later, the Coellos ﬁled three ex parte motions seeking a service -deadline extension,
sealing of all service-related ﬁlings, and additional alternative -service methods. Dkts. 30, 36, 37.
They also asked the court to direct the United States marshal to attempt service again. Dkts. 30,
36. Their motions argue that good cause exists to extend their deadline to serve the remaining
defendants and that some of the defendants deleted their social- media accounts after they were
identiﬁed in court summonse s. Dkt. 30 at 7 –8. To address the defendants’ alleged evasiveness,
they ask the court to seal all service-related information. Id.
Finally, the Coellos ask the court to authorize a private person to help eﬀect service or to serve
the remaining defendants by publication. Dkt. 36 at 6, 13 –16. They explain that their colleague,
Brandon Elliott, “is over 18 years old ” and “ is willing and able to serve Defendants via veriﬁed
email and social media using secure cloud links with access -tracking capabilities.” Id. at 6. Before
receiving the court’s response, Elliott attempted to serve most of the defendants. See, e.g. ,
Dkts. 38, 39, 40. As to their request for service by publication, the Coellos state that “there are
four defendants that Plaintiﬀs have no idea where their exact location is and citation by publication
is appropriate in city of last known address.” Dkt. 36 at 6. They go on to note that “[they] can
provide two sources of evidence that the Defendants currently live the cities herein.” Id. at 7. But
they provide no supporting evidence. See id. at 7–8.
Since the Coellos ﬁled those motions, three defendants have appeared, see Dkts. 46, 49, and
the marshal successfully served three more, see Dkts. 47, 50. PageID #:
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DISCUSSION
I. The Propriety of the Coellos’ Ex Parte Motions
“In our adversary system, ex parte motions are disfavored.” Ayestas v. Davis, 584 U.S. 28, 40
(2018). They “ deprive the opposing party [of] fair notice and an opportunity to be heard,
fundamentally undermining the adversarial process. ” Dutschmann v. City of Waco , No. 6:22-CV-
00094-ADA-JCM, 2022 WL 837500 , a t * 2 ( W . D . T e x . F e b . 2 3 , 2 0 2 2 ) . As such, “ [e]x parte
motions are rarely justiﬁed.” Yokohama Tire Corp. v. Dealers Tire Supply, Inc., 202 F.R.D. 612, 613
(D. Ariz. 2001) (footnote omitted).
But they are appropriate, and common, in several contexts, including those involving requests
for expedited discovery, see Alamo Area Mut. Hous. Ass’n, Inc. v. Lazenby, No. 5:17-CV-634-DAE,
2017 WL 7052289, at *4 (W.D. Tex. July 19, 2017), or discovery for use in foreign proceedings, see
In re Xiaomi Inc., 801 F. Supp. 3d 635, 636–38 (N.D. Tex. 2025); applications for search warrants
and the like in criminal cases , see Ayestas, 584 U.S. at 40–41; and certain motions for temporary
restraining orders , see Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 (b)(1). They are also appropriate for service-related
motions of the sort at issue here. See River N. Furr’s, LLC v. FMP SA Mgmt. Grp., LLC, No. 5:19-
cv-00757-OLG, 2019 WL 13168919, at *1–2 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2019).
The Coellos ﬁled this lawsuit in the summer of 2025. Dkt. 1. Since then, the United States
marshal has attempted to serve the evasive defendants, see Dkt. 23 at 2, by various means, see, e.g.,
Dkts. 21, 48. The Coellos assert that several defendants deleted their social-media accounts after
seeing them in docketed summonses, Dkt. 30 at 7, and that some defendants acknowledged the
Coellos’ eﬀorts to serve them in YouTube videos, Dkt. 36 at 4. Against that backdrop, the ex parte
ﬁlings were justiﬁed. At this point, though, the court will instruct the clerk of court to place the m
on the public record . See Binh Hoa Le v. Exeter Fin. Corp. , 990 F.3d 410, 417 (5th Cir. 2021)
(explaining that “[j]udicial records belong to the American people; they are public, not private,
documents”). PageID #:
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II. The Coellos’ Entitlement to Some of the Relief They Seek
“If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is ﬁled, the court—on motion
or on its own after notice to the plaintiﬀ —must dismiss the action without prejudice against that
defendant or order that service be made within a speciﬁed time . ” F e d . R . C i v . P . 4(m). The
Coellos’ motions ask the court to further extend the deadline to serve the defendants, to seal future
service-related ﬁlings, and to authorize service via publication. Alternatively, they ask the court to
order the United Sta tes marshal to attempt service again and authorize both the marshal and a
private person to attempt service via email and social media.
The Coellos are entitled to an extension of their service deadline. Although they are not entitled
to sealing, they are entitled to redaction of future ﬁlings. And although they have not at this point
shown entitlement to service by publication, their request to allow service by email and social media
by a private person is well taken.
A. Deadline extension
The motions detail the Coellos’ eﬀorts to locate the defendants, see Dkts. 30, 36, and the docket
reﬂects their attempts to eﬀect service through both the United States marshal and a private
person. See, e.g., Dkts. 27, 34, 38, 47, 48. Some of those activities did not comply with federal and
state rules for service. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1); Tex. R. Civ. P. 103. Nevertheless, the Coellos
should have a chance to serve the remaining defendants, and they need another extension for that
purpose. The new deadline will be 30 days from the entry of this order.
B. Redaction as an alternative to sealing
Although “ sealing information placed in the judicial record” is “heavily disfavor[ed], ” June
Med. Servs., L.L.C. v. Phillips, 22 F.4th 512, 519–20 (5th Cir. 2022), there are good reasons to seal
some court documents , such as when public disclosure of “sensitive information . . . could
endanger lives or threaten national security,” Binh Hoa Le, 990 F.3d at 417. But before ordering a
document sealed, “the court must balance the public’s common law right of access against the
interests favoring nondisclosure.” SEC v. Van Waeyenberghe , 990 F.2d 845, 848 (5th Cir. 1993). PageID #:
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To do that, a court in this circuit should “undertake a case-by-case, document-by-document,
line-by-line balancing of the public’s common law right of access against the interests favoring
nondisclosure,” Binh Hoa Le , 990 F.3d at 419 (cleaned up) , and should consider “ less drastic
alternatives” to sealing entire documents , id. at 420. For example, where the movant’s interests
can be protected by redacting parts of a document, rather than sealing the entire document, courts
generally favor redaction as a les s drastic alternative. See, e.g., Mach Flynt Inc. v. Veritiv Operating
Co., No. 2:24-CV-01444, 2025 WL 56333, at *2 (W.D. La. Jan. 9, 2025).
Asserting that the defendants are “weaponiz[ing] court transparency” by “ using the public
nature of court ﬁlings to evade service and obstruct justice ,” Dkt. 30 at 14, the Coellos argue that
any future summonses should be sealed to avoid alerting unserved defendants of the service
methods the y plan to use . Id. at 7 –8, 14 –16. But sealing would be overkill. Redaction is the
appropriate way to balance the public’s right of access and the Coellos’ interest in keeping physical
addresses, email addresses, and social-media accounts conﬁdential . That information should be
redacted in all future docketed summonses.
C. The Coellos’ failure to show the propriety of service by publication
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) (1) generally permits service on an individual by
“ following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in
the state where the district court is located or where service is made .” One such state -law
provision, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 109, provides that,
[w]hen a party to a suit, his agent or attorney, shall make oath that the residence of
any party defendant is unknown to aﬃant, and to such party when the aﬃdavit is
made by his agent or attorney, or that such defendant is a transient person, and that
after due diligence such party and the aﬃant have been unable to locate the
whereabouts of such defendant, or that such defendant is absent from or is a
nonresident of the State, and that the party applying for the citation has attempted
to obtain personal service of nonresident notice as provided for in Rule 108, but has
been unable to do so, the clerk shall issue citation for such defendant for service by
publication. In such cases it shall be the duty of the court trying the case to inquire
into the su ﬃciency of the diligence exercised in attempting to ascertain the PageID #:
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residence or whereabouts of the defendant or to obtain service of nonresident
notice, as the case may be, before granting any judgment on such service.
The Coellos’ request to proceed under that rule is not well taken at this stage . The Coellos
have not provided an affidavit explaining their service efforts. See Burt v. M&S Brothers Trucklines,
Inc., No. 4:19-CV-00391-RWS, 2019 WL 13210615, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2019). Nor have they
met the other requirements of Rule 109. See Hogan v. Goodwin, No. 5:21-CV-144-RWS-JBB, 2025
WL 1551445, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2025) (explaining the requirements and noting that “Texas
state courts disfavor publication as a method of service because it is the least calculated to notify
the defendant of the pendency of a judicial action” (quotation marks omitted) ), report and
recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 1550221 (E.D. Tex. May 30, 2025).
As noted, the Coellos do not know the exact location or residence of at least four defendants.
Dkt. 36 at 6. In their view, that makes “citation by publication . . . appropriate in [the] city of last
known address” for those defendants. Id. They claim to have two sources of evidence that the
defendants live in specific cities, but they have not shared that evidence with the court. Id. at 7.
Instead, they propose newspapers for use in serving by publication various defendants, some of
whom have recently appeared or been served. Id. at 7–8; see Dkts. 46, 47. But they do not explain
how their proposed newspapers have any connection to the defendants. They are therefore not
entitled to service by publication at this time. That said, if service problems persist after the Coellos
pursue the relief this order allows, the Coellos could file a renewed motion for service by
publication in an effort to satisfy Rule 109’s requirements.
D. Authorization for service by a private person
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 103 provides, in part, that “ [p]rocess including citation and
other notices, writs, orders, and other papers issued by the court may be served anywhere by . . .
any person authorized by law or by written order of the court who is not less than eighteen years of
age.” The court’s “ order authorizing a person to serve process may be made without written
motion.” Id; see Hunsinger v. Camino, No. 3:26-cv-385-X-BN, 2026 WL 966586, at *1 (N.D. Tex.
Apr. 8, 2026) (authorizing a process server to serve the defendant by email). PageID #:
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The Coellos ask the court to issue an order authorizing their colleague, Brandon Elliott, to serve
the defendants via email and social-media accounts. Dkt. 36 at 6. They note that Elliott is over 18
years old. Id. He is also not a party to this dispute. Although Elliott’s previous attempts to contact
the defendants were apparently successful, see, e.g., Dkts. 38, 39, they were made without a court
order authorizing them . This order provides the needed authorization. If he is able to serve the
defendants, Elliott must provide the Coellos with executed summonses and proofs of service, and
the Coellos must ﬁle the executed summonses and proof s of service by the new service deadline
this order establishes.
The Coellos ask that both the United States marshal and Elliott attempt service . Because the
court will authorize Elliott to eﬀect service via email and social media, to avoid redundancy, the
court will not order the United States marshal to attempt service at this time. If Elliott is
unsuccessful in serving the defendants, the Coellos may re -urge their request to have the marshal
attempt service.
CONCLUSION
It is ORDERED that:
1) the clerk of court UNSEAL the Coellos’ ex parte motions, Dkts. 30, 36, 37;
2) the ﬁrst two of those motions, Dkts. 30, 36, are GRANTED in part, such that (a) the
new deadline to serve the defendants who have not been served or appeared is 30 days
from the day this order is docketed and (b) Brandon Elliott is authorized to serve those
defendants via email or social media;
3) the same motions, Dkts. 30, 36, are DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the extent
they request service by publication or by the United States marshal;
4) the third motion, Dkt. 37, is STRUCK as duplicative; and
5) the Coellos ﬁle all executed summonses and proofs of service , redacted as required by
this order, by the deadline set in this order. PageID #:
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