govinfo:USCOURTS-ohsd-1_26-cv-00251-2

ELIJAH HORTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 
WESTERN DIVISION - CINCINNATI 
Case No. l:26-cv-251 
Judge Matthew W. McFarland 
LIEUTENANT ALBRIGHT, et al., 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND OPINION 
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Objection to Magistrate Judges to 
Deny Motion for Appointment of Legal Counsel (Doc. 10). In the Objection, Plaintiff asks 
that the Court overturn the Magistrate Judge's Order (Doc. 9) denying his request for 
appointment of legal counsel. 
As reason for this request, Plaintiff states that he has reached out to two legal 
centers for assistance but has been unable to retain counsel. (Objection, Doc. 10.) Attached 
to his Objection are two letters, one from the ACLU and one from the Ohio Justice & 
Policy Center, indicating that he had contacted them for legal assistance, but they were 
unable to provide it for him. (See Letters, Doc. 10, Pg. ID 174-77.) Additionally, Plaintiff 
states that he struggles to "understand a vast majority of the law," and lacks adequate 
time to study in the law library. (Objection, Doc. 10, Pg. ID 171.) He specifically has "a 
very hard time understanding the decisions and terms the court uses." Thus, he objects 
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to the Magistrate Judge's Order denying him appointment of counsel and asks that this 
Court grant his request. (Id.) 
When a party files timely objections to a magistrate judge's non-dispositive order, 
such as a ruling on appointment of counsel, the district court "must consider [the] timely 
objections and modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is 
contrary to law ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(A); Brahmamdam v. TriHealth, 
Inc., No. l:19-CV-152, 2021 WL 4260418, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 20, 2021). "A decision is 
'clearly erroneous' when, 'although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court 
on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed,' or where the magistrate judge improperly applies the law or employs an 
erroneous legal standard ." In re Chrysler Pacifica Fire Recall Prods. Liab. Litig., 737 F. Supp. 
3d 611,615 (E.D. Mich. 2024) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 
364, 395 (1948); Beck v. Haik, 377 F.3d 624, 636 (6th Cir. 2004)). The Court begins this 
analysis below . 
To be sure, the Magistrate Judge's Order denied Plaintiff's initial Motion for 
Appointment of Legal Counsel (Doc. 6) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). (Order, Doc. 9.) 
Under this code section, appointment of counsel here is discretionary, as such 
appointment in a civil case is not a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); see also Lavado 
v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 605-06 (6th Cir. 1993). The Magistrate Judge noted that 
appointment of counsel in civil suits "is a privilege that is justified only by exceptional 
circumstances." (Order, Doc. 9 (quoting Lavada, 992 F.2d at 606) (cleaned up).) 
Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge "evaluated whether such exceptional circumstances 
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exist and determine[ d] that the appointment of counsel is not warranted at this juncture." 
(Id.) 
Having examined the Order and Plaintiff's Objection with the proper standard in 
mind, the Court finds that the Magistrate Judge's decision is not clearly erroneous. 
Indeed, appointment of counsel in civil matters is not a constitutional right. Lavada v. 
Keohane, 992 F.2d 601,605 (6th Cir. 1993). But, district courts have discretion to "appoint 
counsel for an indigent civil litigant." Id. at 604; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). As Magistrate Judge 
Vascura aptly pointed out, appointment of counsel is a privilege "justified only by 
exceptional circumstances." Lavada, 992 F.2d at 606. Courts have denied such motions 
without prejudice at early stages in a case, allowing prose plaintiffs to renew the motion 
if their claims survive the summary judgment stage. See, e.g., Bryan v. Jewell, Case No. 
l:21-cv-315, 2022 WL 4592480, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2022); Sherrills v. Wells Fargo Home 
Mortg., Case No. 1:15 CV 1733, 2016 WL 5462961, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 28, 2016). Here, 
Plaintiff's case is at a very early stage; moreover, no other exceptional circumstances exist 
to warrant appointment of counsel. While the Court is sympathetic to Plaintiff's status as 
both indigent and prose, these circumstances are not extraordinary. Thus, the Magistrate 
Judge employed the correct standard of law and applied it properly; denial of 
appointment of counsel at this juncture is appropriate. 
Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff's Objection (Doc. 10). The Magistrate 
Judge's Order (Doc. 9) is ADOPTED in its entirety. 
IT IS SO ORDERED . 
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UNITED ST ATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 
By ~--w.--1'1~ 
JUDGE MATTHEW W. McFARLAND 
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