govinfo:USCOURTS-ohsd-1_25-cv-00507-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 
WESTERN DIVISION 
 
SHAMONT SAPP, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
STANLEY M. CHESLEY, 
 
Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
JUDGE DOUGLAS R. COLE 
Magistrate Judge Silvain 
 
OPINION AND ORDER 
In his September 3, 2025, Report an d Recommendation (R&R, Doc. 9, #64), 
Magistrate Judge Silvain screened Plaintiff Shamont Sapp’s Complaint under 
§ 1915(e) and recommends the Court dismiss this action for failure to state a claim. 
Sapp objected, but that “obj ection” did not challenge th e R&R directly. (Objection, 
Doc. 12). Rather, he asked to amend his complaint to address the flaws the R&R 
identifies. (Id. at #69). While that R&R and obje ction remained pending, Sapp also 
learned that Defendant Stanley M. Chesley had passed away last year. So, Sapp filed 
a Motion to Amend Caption (Doc. 13) to substitute Chesley’s estate as the defendant. 
For the reasons stated more fully below, the Court OVERRULES Sapp’s Objections 
(Doc. 12), ADOPTS the R&R’s conclusions, and so DISMISSES the Complaint (Doc. 
1) WITH PREJUDICE. And because this matter is dismissed, the Court DENIES 
Sapp’s Motion to Amend Caption (Doc. 13) as MOOT. 
BACKGROUND 
 Sapp is currently incarcerated at a Federal Correctional Institution in West 
Virginia. (Doc. 13, #75). In this action, he is suing his former civil attorney from 
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nearly 20 years ago, Stanley M. Chesley. (D oc. 9, #58). According to Sapp, in 2006, 
Chesley represented him in a lawsuit agai nst the Roman Catholic Diocese based on 
Sapp’s allegations of sexual abuse at the hands of a visiting priest. (Id.). That lawsuit 
was unsuccessful, to say the least. Questions about Sapp’s truthfulness emerged, and 
in 2013, Sapp pleaded guilty to federal mail fraud charges in Portland, Oregon, in 
connection with his allegations against the Diocese. ( Id.). Sapp blames Chesley for 
both the failure of the original suit and for his later incarceration. ( Id.). Specifically, 
he alleges that, in 2006, Chesley destro yed Sapp’s reputation and credibility by 
accusing him of lying about the abuse. (Id.). 
 Based on that set of facts, Sapp now br ings claims for defamation, fraud, and 
breach of oral contract against Chesley. (Doc. 1, #7). He seeks $25,000,000 in 
compensatory damages and $50,000,000 in punitive damages. (Id.). 
Because Sapp, a federal prisoner, filed this case pro se, the matter was referred 
under this Court’s General Ord er 22-05 to a Magistrate Judge for initial handling. 
On September 3, 2025, Magistrate Judge Silvain, invoking the Court’s screening 
authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), issued his R&R recommending that the Court 
dismiss Sapp’s Complaint because Sapp failed to state a claim. (Doc. 9, #64). 
The R&R’s analysis began by attempting to decipher how Sapp seeks to invoke 
this Court’s limited jurisdiction. (Id. at #59). While Sapp used a standard complaint 
form for actions arising under federal question jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, he 
wrote the words “diversity of jurisdiction” near the case caption, and also included a 
mysterious reference to “1983 civil ri ghts diversity” on the cover sheet. ( Id.). Given 
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the ambiguous manner in which Sapp invo ked jurisdiction, the Magistrate Judge 
elected to explore that issue more fully. He first found that to the extent Sapp asserts 
any claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they fail because Chesley is not a state actor. (Id. 
at #60). So, Sapp did not have any federal cl aim on which to base federal question 
jurisdiction. But the Magistrate Judge found that diversity jurisdiction existed, see 
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), because, at the time of filing, Sapp and Chesley were citizens of 
different states (as noted above, Chesley has since passed away). (Id.). 
But the Magistrate Judge concluded that the existence of jurisdiction did not 
save Sapp’s Complaint. ( Id.). That is because, applying the law of the forum state 
(Ohio), the Magistrate Judge found Sapp’s defamation and fraud claims time barred. 
(Id. at #61–62). The statute of limitations for defamation is one year, while for fraud 
it is four years. ( Id.). But under the allegations in the Complaint, those two claims 
accrued here, at the latest, sometime in 2013. (Id.). 
By contrast, the R&R concludes that Sapp’s breach of oral contract claim is not 
time barred, as it appears to stem from conduct occurring in 2024. ( Id. at #63). But 
Sapp only makes one factual allegation re garding that claim: “Chesley told me he 
would help to clear my name and help me receive the compensation I was to receive 
in the Covington, Kentucky Diocese class action.” (Id. (citing Doc. 1, #5–6)). And that 
statement, according to the Magistrate Judge, is insufficient for the Court to 
reasonably draw the necessary inference th at Chesley is liable for the misconduct 
alleged. (Id.). So, the R&R recommends dismissing all claims. (Id. at #64). 
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The R&R also advised Sapp that he had fourteen days to serve and file specific 
written objections, noting that failing to ma ke such objections may forfeit rights on 
appeal. (Id. at #65 (citing Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985))); see also Berkshire v. 
Dahl, 928 F.3d 520, 530 (6th Cir. 2019) (noting the “fail[ure] to file an[y] objection[s] 
to the magistrate judge’s R&R … [constitutes a] forfeiture” of such objections). 
Accordingly, Sapp needed to object by September 17, 2025. After asking for an 
extension, (Doc. 10), which was granted, (Doc. 11), he did so, (Doc. 12). 
However, instead of objecting to the R&R’s reasoning, Sapp asks the Court for 
leave to amend his Complaint. (Doc. 12). In that motion, Sapp explains that he 
“wish[es] to cancel the fraud and defamation claims,” states that he is bringing suit 
under “§ 1331(a) diversity jurisdiction,” 1 not § 1983, and asks the Court for leave to 
file an amended complaint. ( Id. at #69). The attached proposed amended complaint 
asserts only the breach of oral contract claim, supported by some additional 
allegations. (Doc. 12-1). There, Sapp explains that “around March and June 2024,” he 
contacted Chesley about “how he felt let down, duped, cheated, [and] robbed by a thief 
who was supposed to be his lawyer.” (Id. at #72). In response, he alleges that Chesley 
offered him $450,000 and agreed to contact the Covington Diocese to correct the lie 
that Chesley had allegedly told in 2006—i.e., Chesley would inform the Diocese that 
Chesley was wrong in 2006 when he told them that the individual who Sapp claims 
 
1 Diversity jurisdiction is set out in 28 U.S.C. § 133 2(a), not § 1331(a). Section 1331(a) 
describes federal question jurisdiction. But as Sapp is proceeding pro se, and there is no 
federal question here, the Court construes him as asserting diversity jurisdiction under 
§ 1332(a). 
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“had sex with” him at the Diocese did not exist. (Id. at #70, 72). But Sapp alleges that 
Chesley did not honor that agreem ent and instead “ignored” him. ( Id. at #72–73). 
Sapp followed up by sending letters to Ch esley’s wife, who is a federal judge. ( Id.). 
That led to the U.S. Marshals interviewing Sapp, where Sapp told them about the 
alleged oral contract, as well as his plans to write a “tell it all” book. (Id. at #73). Sapp 
further claims that he agreed to sell the rights to that book to Chesley for $250,000. 
(Id.). 
While the R&R and Sapp’s request to file a new complaint remained pending, 
Sapp learned that Stanley M. Chesley passed away in 2025. So, Sapp also filed a 
Motion to Amend Caption (Doc. 13) to subs titute Chesley’s estate as the defendant. 
The Court now addresses the R&R and Sapp’s proposed amendment, as well as his 
motion to amend the caption. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
Under Federal Rule of Civi l Procedure 72(b)(3 ), “district courts review a[] 
[report and recommendation] de novo after a party files a timely objection .” Bates v. 
Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr. , No. 1:22-cv-337, 2023 WL 4348835, at *1 (S.D. Ohio 
July 5, 2023). But that de novo review requirement extends only to “any portion to 
which a proper objection was made.” Id. (quotation omitted). For any unobjected 
portions of an R&R, “the advisory committee notes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
72(b) suggest that the Court still must ‘satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the 
face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.’” Redmon v. Noel, No. 1:21-
cv-445, 2021 WL 4771259, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 13, 2021) (collecting cases). 
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Beyond that, because Sapp is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, some 
additional standards come in to play. First, Congress ha s authorized courts to sua 
sponte dismiss IFP complaints that fail to s tate a claim upon which relief may be 
granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). To overcome that hurdle, a plaintiff must allege 
“sufficient factual matter ... to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up); see also Hill v. Lappin , 630 
F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (“dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and 
Twombly governs dismissals for failure to state a claim” under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). While a “plausible” clai m for relief does not require a showing of 
probable liability, it requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has 
acted unlawfully.” Id. That means the complaint must allege sufficient facts, taken 
as true, to allow the Court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 
liable.” Id. And a plaintiff must provide a “sho rt and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Keys v. Humana, Inc. , 684 F.3d 605, 
608 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). In deciding whether the plaintiff 
has met that standard, though, a pro se pl aintiff’s complaint must be “liberally 
construed” and is “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 
lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. 
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). 
LAW AND ANALYSIS 
The Court first evaluates what Sapp labels as Objections (Doc. 12), but which 
is in fact a motion for leave to file an amended complaint. Ultimately, the Court finds 
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that the proposed amended complaint fails to state a claim and thus cannot survive 
screening. So, the Court denies Sapp’s motion for leave to amend on futility grounds. 
And because Sapp had no other objections to the R&R, the Court then reviews that 
R&R for clear error. Finding none, the Court adopts it in its entirety, dismissing the 
Complaint. Finally, the Court denies Sapp’s Motion to Amend Caption as moot. 
A. Sapp’s Proposed Amended Comp laint Fails to State a Claim. 
 Normally, a party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within 
21 days of serving. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Here, Chesley has not been served, so that 
clock has not yet started. But that does not end the inquiry. That is because Congress 
has authorized sua sponte dismissal of in forma pauperis complaints that fail to state 
a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). So, in 
evaluating Sapp’s motion for leave, the Court asks, as it did with the initial 
Complaint, whether the proposed amen dment could withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion. Ultimately, the Court finds that it could not. That is because the proposed 
amended complaint’s breach of contract claim fails as a matter of law. 
 Sapp appears to claim that he had tw o separate agreements with Chesley, 
which Chesley then refused to honor. First, Sapp alleges that after contacting Chesley 
in 2024, Chesley offered to make things right by paying Sapp $450,000 and contacting 
the Diocese to inform them that Sapp was not in fact lying in 2006. (Id. at #72). Sapp 
says Chesley never did either. ( Id.). But that does not a contract make. “A valid 
contract must be supported by consideration.” Traton News, LLC v. Traton Corp., 914 
F. Supp. 2d 901, 910 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (citation omitted). Sapp alleges no act, 
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forbearance, or return promise that he offered in exchange for Chesley’s alleged 
promises. Id. (citing Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004)). So, there is no contract, 
and thus no possible breach of contract as to this first alleged agreement. 
 Second, Sapp appears to claim that Che sley bought the rights to his planned 
tell-all book for $250,000. ( Id. at #73). But that claim fails because Sapp does not 
allege how Chesley breached that agreement. And even assuming that there was an 
agreement and the breach was Chesley failing to pay (which Sapp does not plead), a 
contract for a transfer of copyright ownership must be “in writing and signed by the 
owner of th[ose] rights.” 17 U.S.C. § 204(a). Sapp points to no such instrument here. 
Accordingly, because his proposed amended complaint could not survive 
screening, the Court denies Sapp leave to file it. 
B. The Court Adopts the R&R in its Entirety, Dismissing the Complaint. 
 That leaves the Court to consider the R&R on Sapp’s original Complaint. 
Because Sapp offers no substantive objections to the R&R itself, the Court reviews it 
for clear error.2 And, having reviewed the R&R, the Court finds none. 
 The Court agrees that Sapp’s fraud and defamation claims are time barred and 
subject to dismissal. (Doc. 9, #61–62). Th e R&R correctly states the statute of 
limitations for those claims—one and four years—and when those claims accrued 
(sometime before 2013). (Id.). And so it did not clearly err in finding Sapp’s suit to be 
years late. Indeed, Sapp’s defamation and fraud accusations trace back to events that 
 
2 Indeed, in his proposed amended complaint, Sapp seeks to abandon the defamation and 
fraud claims he raised in his original complaint. (See Doc. 12, #69). 
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happened twenty years ago. And the R&R likewise did not clearly err in finding 
Sapp’s tolling argument—that he was prompt ed to sue when he found out (in 2024) 
about Chesley’s unsavory representation of clients in an unrelated 2018 case, see 
McGirr v. Rehme, 891 F.3d 603 (6th Cir. 2018)—unavailing.3 (See Doc. 9, #62). 
Likewise, the Court finds no clear error in the R&R’s recommendation that the 
Court dismiss Sapp’s breach of contract clai m for failing to allege sufficient facts 
under Twombly and Iqbal. In fact, the Court considered that claim with the benefit 
of the additional allegations in the propos ed amended complaint and still found the 
claim wanting. 
As the Court finds no clear error in the recommendation to dismiss Sapp’s 
Complaint (Doc. 1), the Court adopts the R& R in full and dismisses the Complaint. 
And because that terminates the matter, th e Court denies Sapp’s Motion to Amend 
Caption (Doc. 13) as moot. 
One last wrinkle though—the Magistra te Judge did not recommend whether 
the dismissal should be with or without prejudice. Here, beca use Sapp has already 
attempted to amend his Complaint to address the concerns that the Magistrate Judge 
raised, but fell short for the reasons se t forth above, the Court concludes that 
dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. 
 
3 Sapp’s defamation and fraud claims (and any other claim stemming from the 2006 
representation) may also be barred by res judicata. It appears that Sapp sued Chesley in 
2014 on similar claims. ( See Compl., Sapp v. Chesley , No. 2:14-cv-45 (E.D. Ky. March 10, 
2014), Doc. 2). And while that case was dismis sed on Sapp’s request, the judge did so with 
prejudice. (See Order, No. 2:14-cv-45 (E.D. Ky. June 13, 2014), Doc. 14). 
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Court OVERRULES Sapp’s Objections (Doc. 12). 
Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the R&R (Doc. 9) in its entirety, DISMISSING the 
Complaint (Doc. 1) and the entire matter, WITH PREJUDICE . Because that 
terminates this matter, the Court DENIES Sapp’s Motion to Amend Caption (Doc. 
13) as MOOT. The Court further CERTIFIES, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an
appeal of this Opinion and Order woul d not be made in good faith, and DENIES
Plaintiff leave to appeal in for ma pauperis. Finally, the Court DIRECTS the Clerk 
to enter judgment and to TERMINATE this case on its docket.
SO ORDERED.
May 26, 2026 
DATE DOUGLAS R. COLE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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