govinfo:USCOURTS-ohsd-1_24-cv-00422-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 
WESTERN DIVISION 
 
JASON THOMAS, et al., 
 
Plaintiffs, 
 
v. 
 
MITSUBISHI ELECTRIC 
AUTOMOTIVE AMERICA, INC., 
 
Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
JUDGE DOUGLAS R. COLE 
 
OPINION AND ORDER 
The named Plaintiffs in this class action have filed an unopposed motion in 
which they seek final court approval of a proposed class action settlement. (Doc. 31). 
Separately, the named Plainti ffs seek an order awarding attorneys’ fees, litigation 
expenses, and service awards. (Doc. 32). Th e Court held a hearing on those motions 
on April 8, 2026. For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ 
Unopposed Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement (Doc. 31), and 
APPROVES the class action settlem ent. The Court further GRANTS Plaintiffs’ 
Unopposed Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Litigation Expenses, and Class 
Representative Service Awards (Doc. 32). Specifically, it AWARDS class counsel 
attorneys’ fees in the amount of one-third of the common fund, $171,666.67. Beyond 
that, the Court AWARDS $9,218.81 in litigation expenses, and AWARDS 
$10,000 to Jason Thomas, and $2,500 to Joseph Horner, for their service on behalf of 
the class in prosecuting this action. 
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BACKGROUND 
A. Nature of the Suit and Procedural Background 
In its previous Opinion and Order preliminarily approving the settlement 
agreement, the Court described in detail th e time-rounding policy at issue in this 
case, as well as the pr ocedural history. ( See Doc. 28, #332). Considering that the 
factual background of the case has not ch anged since that Opinion and Order, the 
Court will only briefly summarize the facts here. 
Defendant Mitsubishi Electric Automotive America is a large manufacturer of 
automobile parts and systems. (Am. Compl., Doc. 26-1, #191). 1 In order to 
manufacture these parts, Mitsubishi operates many plants, two of which are at issue 
here: one in Mason, Ohio, and one in Maysville, Kentucky. (Id. at #189, 191). At those 
two plants, Mitsubishi relied on an electronic timekeeping system to record 
employees’ hours and potential overtime. (Id. at #191). 
Plaintiffs here challenge the timekeeping policies that system utilized. 
Specifically, they allege that Mitsubishi employed a rounding policy where the system 
would round the time an employee clocked in or out to the official start or end time of 
that employee’s shift. (Id. at #191–93). As an example, “Thomas alleges that one day 
he arrived at 15:23, but the system marked it as 15:30, the official start of his shift.” 
(Doc. 28, #332 (citing Mot. for Prelim. Approval, Doc. 27, #208)). Thus, Thomas was 
 
1 Plaintiffs initially filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. 25) on April 22, 2025, and then several 
days later, they filed a Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint (Doc. 26). Plaintiffs 
needed the Court’s consent to file an amended complaint at that point in the case, see Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 15(a), and the Court granted leave in the preliminary approval opinion, (Doc. 28, 
#339–40). Thus, the Court considers the Amended Complaint attached to the motion, (Doc. 
26-1), as the operative complaint. 
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not compensated for those extra seven minutes. Plaintiffs claim that over time, this 
policy undercompensated them to Mitsubishi’s benefit. (Doc. 26-1, #192). Mitsubishi 
ended this practice in March 2024. (Doc. 27, #209 n.1). 
Frustrated that he had been subjected to this system, Thomas sued Mitsubishi 
five months later on August 9, 2024. (Compl., Doc. 1). He had worked at the Mason, 
Ohio, plant starting from June 22, 2019, until February 7, 2025, past the filing of this 
lawsuit. (Doc. 26-1, #189). Later, in the Amended Complaint, Thomas added a second 
named Plaintiff, Joseph Horner. (Id.). Horner had worked in the Maysville, Kentucky, 
facility from March 5, 2018, until December 15, 2022. (Id.). 
Plaintiffs do not seek relief for only themselves; they assert both FLSA 
collective action claims as well as class action claims. ( Id. at #193–97). Specifically, 
they bring four claims: “unpaid wages and unpaid overtime under the FLSA (Counts 
I and II), which are the collective action claims, and the same under Ohio and 
Kentucky state law (Counts III and IV, respectively), which are the class action 
claims.” (Doc. 28, #333 (citing Doc. 26-1, #197–202)). 
On February 7, 2025, the parties engaged in mediation before Michael Russell, 
“a highly regarded mediator with significant experience in class and collective action 
wage and hour litigation.” (Doc. 31, #378 (citing Asay Decl., Doc. 31-1, #397–98)). 
After further negotiations, the partie s reached a settlement agreement. ( Id.). The 
agreement, however, “is not an admission or proof of any wrongdoing or legal 
violation of any kind.” (Id. at #380). 
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B. Terms of the Proposed Class Action Settlement 
On April 25, 2025, Plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion for preliminary 
approval of their settlement of the class claims, (Doc. 27), atta ching the proposed 
Settlement Agreement, (Doc. 27-1). 2 The Court preliminarily approved the 
Agreement on October 20, 2025. (Doc. 28 ). While the Court granted preliminary 
approval, it expressed concerns about the size of the service awards and lack of detail 
around the class representatives’ contributions to the action. (Id. at #349–50). 
Given that final approval is now sought, the Court will review the key terms 
of the Agreement here. First, the parties agree to settle the claims of the Settlement 
Class in exchange for Defendants payi ng a total sum of $515,000 into a non-
reversionary common fund, which is to be distributed as the Agreement provides. 
(Doc. 27-1, #239). The Agreement defines th e Settlement Class as “all Mason, Ohio 
Settlement Class Employees and Maysville, Kentucky Settlement Class Employees.” 
(Id. at #243). Those groups are further de fined as “all non-exempt employees of 
[Mitsubishi] who worked at its facility in Mason, Ohio at any point from October 24, 
2021, to May 11, 2024,” and correspondingly, all non-exempt employees who worked 
at the plant in Maysville, Kentucky , during the same time period. ( Id. at #239). In 
the final approval motion, as well as at the final approval hearing, the parties 
clarified that the Settlement Class also includes ten non-exempt employees who were 
 
2 To be clear, while the Settlement Agreement covered both the class and the collective claims, 
the request for Court approval was directed only at the class claims. As this Court has opined 
elsewhere, court approval is not needed for collective action claims under the FLSA, nor do 
courts have authority to provide it. Gilstrap v. Sushinati LLC, 734 F. Supp. 3d 710, 722 (S.D. 
Ohio 2024). 
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physically located at a facility in Northville, Michigan, but who “were listed in 
Defendant’s payroll coding for the Mason, Ohio or Maysville, Kentucky facilities 
because they reported to and supported the work of those facilities, and were subject 
to the same timekeeping practices.” (Doc. 31 , #378–79 n.1). Overall, the class totals 
1,052 employees: 635 employees from the Oh io facility and 417 employees from the 
Kentucky facility. (Id. at #379). 
Importantly, not everyone in the Settlement Class will receive compensation. 
Rather, the Agreement identifies a subset of employees in the Settlement Class that 
it refers to as the Participating Class Members. (Doc. 27-1, #240). Employees become 
part of this subset by returning a claim form in which they agree to also become opt-
in members for the FLSA collective action. (Id. at #240, 294 (opt-in consent)). 
The Agreement contemplates funding and distributing the common fund 
through the following steps. To start, as stated above, Mitsubishi will contribute 
$515,000 as the funding for the non-reversionary common fund. ( Id. at #239, 254). 
From that amount, the Settlement Administra tor, ILYM Group, will first put aside 
$5,000 as a “reserve fund” for potential distribution to “Participating Class Members 
who dispute their allocation amounts, to individuals who were not identified as 
Settlement Class Employees but have a good faith claim for participation in the 
settlement, or any other reasonable purpose.” (Id. at #242, 254). With the remaining 
$510,000, the ILYM Group will next cover the attorneys’ fees, litigation expenses, 
class representative awards, and any administrative expenses. ( Id. at #245). The 
Agreement contemplates the class representative awards shall not exceed $10,000 for 
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Jason Thomas and $2,500 for Joseph Horner, but the Agreement leaves to the Court 
the ultimate determination of the specific amounts. ( Id.). Next, the parties agreed 
class counsel’s fees will not exceed on e-third of the common fund, approximately 
$171,666.67. (Id.). Similarly, litigation expenses shall not exceed $15,000. ( Id.). (To 
clarify, though, Plaintiffs have now also separately moved for the maximum service 
awards and attorneys’ fees, but they seek litigation expenses of only $9,218.81. (Doc. 
32, #438).) Additionally, ILYM Group requests $12,946.20 for administrative 
expenses. (Doc. 31, #382 (citing Polites Decl., Doc. 31-2, #415 (ILYM Group 
representative))). 
Once the ILYM Group pays those amounts, the remainder of the fund will be 
used for distributions to Participating Class Members. (Doc. 27-1, #239, 258). (Again, 
to be clear, Settlement Class Employees who are not Participating Class Members do 
not receive a distribution.) While not stated in the Agreement itself, the parties 
contemplate that approximately $303,668.32 will remain for that distribution. (Doc. 
31, #382). 
As already noted, an employee qualifies as a Participating Class Member if 
they submitted a claim form within the required timeframe. (Doc. 27-1, #240). The 
Court previously summarized the distribution method as follows: 
The settlement administrator will disburse available amounts from the 
common fund on a pro rata basis according to Participating Class 
Members’ eligible work weeks. More specifically, before the 
participation deadline, the administrator will determine each 
Settlement Class Employee’s estimated allocation, or pro rata share, by 
“dividing th[at] Settlement Class Employee’s Eligible Workweeks by the 
total combined Eligible Workweeks for all Settlement Class Employees.” 
Then, for employees who opt-out or do not timely submit a claim form, 
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and thus do not become Participating Class Members, their preliminary 
allocation will be added back to the total fund. Finally, once the 
participation deadline passes and the Court enters final approval, the 
administrator will determine each Participating Class Member’s final 
proportionate share of the net sett lement amount by “dividing the 
Participating Class Member’s Eligible Workweeks by the total combined 
Eligible Workweeks of all Participating Class Members.” In other words, 
each Participating Class Member will be assigned a percentage of the 
funds to be distributed, but Sett lement Class Members who are not 
Participating Class Members (because they opted out or did not return 
a claim form) will not receive payment. 
(Doc. 28, #335–36 (citing Doc. 27-1, #244)). 
 In the event any of the checks remain uncashed and become void, the ILYM 
Group will distribute any of the payments meant for Participating Class Members 
from the Mason, Ohio, facility to the State of Ohio Department of Commerce 
Unclaimed Funds program, and likewise will distribute any funds meant for 
Maysville, Kentucky, Participating Cl ass Members to the Commonwealth of 
Kentucky Treasurer’s Unclaimed Property program. (Doc. 27-1, #260). Last, the 
Agreement also contemplates the possibility of “unused reserve funds,” i.e., unused 
amounts from the $5,000 reserve fund. ( Id.). The settlement agreement directs the 
administrator to first attempt to distribute the remainder to Participating Class 
Members on a pro rata basis, if economically feasible. (Id.). If not, then the funds will 
be equally distributed on a cy pres basis to Legal Aid Society of Greater Cincinnati 
and Legal Aid of the Bluegrass. (Id. at #260–61). 
As for how much each Participating Class Member will actually receive, the 
ILYM Group expects the maximum payment will be $1,466.52, the average payment 
will be $1,104.25, and the lowest will be $33.08. (Doc. 31, #382 (citing Doc. 31-2, 
#414)). 
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On the other side, all members of the Settlement Class release their state-law 
claims. Specifically, the entire class, except for those who timely opt-out, will release 
“any and all state and local claims ar ising from [Settlem ent Class member’s] 
employment that have been asserted in the Action.” (Doc. 27-1, #246–47). Beyond 
that, those class members who submit a cl aim form and thus become Participating 
Class Members have a somewhat broader release. Specifically, the claim form they 
submit includes a consent to join the FLSA collective action, and as a result, they will 
also release all of their federal law claims. (Id.). 
C. Notice Plan and Results 
Under the Settlement Agreement, the ILYM Group was charged with notifying 
the class members of the settlement. (Doc . 27-1, #254–55). Mitsubishi sent ILYM 
Group the contact information for the pote ntial class members, which ILYM Group 
received on November 19, 2025. (Doc. 31-2, #413). On December 3, 2025, ILYM Group 
mailed the Class Notice packet to the 1,052 class members. (Id.). That first round of 
notice led to 63 returned packets. (Id.). From there, it performed a “skip trace” to find 
updated addresses for those employees, which resulted in 56 updated addresses. (Id.). 
ILYM Group re-mailed packets to those addresses, and after that, only 7 packets were 
returned. (Id. at #413–14). ILYM Group could not locate current addresses for those 
class members. (Id. at #414). 
As a result of the notice plan, ILYM Group received 275 valid claims, which 
represents a valid claim rate of approximately 26%. (Id.). It received three timely opt-
outs, but it did not receive any objections. (Id.). 
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Following final approval, ILYM Group is “responsible for calculation of the 
settlement award payments, issuance and ma iling of the settlement award checks, 
the necessary tax filing and reporting on such payments, and any other tasks that 
the Parties agree to and/or the Court orders ILYM Group to perform.” (Doc. 31, #382 
(citing Doc. 31-2, #415)). 
So, as things stand, the Court ha s reviewed the proposed Settlement 
Agreement (Doc. 27-1), Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion for Final Approval of the Class 
Action Settlement (Doc. 31), and Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, 
Litigation Expenses, and Class Representative Awards (Doc. 32). Those matters are 
now ripe for the Court’s consideration. 
LAW AND ANALYSIS 
A. Final Approval of the Settlement Agreement 
Before evaluating the fairness of the proposed settlement, the Court must first 
determine whether to certify the settlement class. See Amchem Prods, Inc. v. 
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997). For settlement purposes, the parties agreed to a 
class consisting of “all Mason, Ohio Settlement Class Employees and Maysville, 
Kentucky Settlement Class Employees.” (Doc. 27-1, #243). Those groups are further 
defined as “all non-exempt employees of [Mit subishi] who worked at its facility in 
Mason, Ohio at any point from October 24, 2021 to May 11, 2024,” or who likewise 
worked at the Maysville, Kentucky plant during the same period. ( Id. at #239). The 
Court conditionally certified that class when it preliminarily approved the 
settlement. (Doc. 28, #345). 
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Under Amchem, the Court must ensure that the proposed settlement class 
meets the requirements of Rule 23. 521 U.S. at 620; see Whitlock v. FSL Mgmt., LLC, 
843 F.3d 1084, 1091 (6th Cir. 2016). Under Rule 23, the Court can certify a class only 
when: 
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; 
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; 
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the 
claims or defenses of the class; and 
(4) the representative pa rties will fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). On top of Rule 23(a)’s requirements, a class must further satisfy 
one of Rule 23(b)’s conditions. Here, the parties point to Rule 23(b)(3), which requires 
“that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any 
questions affecting only indivi dual members, and that a class action is superior to 
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” 
In its Opinion and Order preliminarily certifying the class, the Court concluded 
that the class fulfills each of those re quirements. (Doc. 28, #341–45). Nothing has 
changed since that would disrupt the Court’s previous determinations. That said, the 
Court will briefly address Rule 23(a)’s and Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirements. 
1. Numerosity, Commonality, Typicality, and Adequacy 
The Court finds that each of Rule 23(a )’s four requirements are met as to 
Plaintiffs’ claims. Start with numerosity. A class of 1,052 employees, even divided 
into the two sub-classes of 635 and 417, easily satisfies that requirement. See, e.g., 
Hunter v. Booz Allen Hamilton Inc. , No. 2:19-cv-411, 2023 WL 3204684, at *3 (S.D. 
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Ohio May 2, 2023) (647 class members meets numerosity requirement). At the end of 
the day, 275 class members submitted valid claim forms, so the number of 
Participating Class Members likewise satisfies this requirement. 
Next, consider commonality and typicality. To satisfy commonality, Plaintiffs 
must show that the class claims “depend upon a common contention … capable of 
classwide resolution,” or in other words, that determining the contention’s “truth or 
falsity” will resolve a central issue to the claims “in one stroke.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). And to satisfy typicality, the named Plaintiffs’ 
claims must “arise[] from the same event or practice or course of conduct” as the other 
class members’ claims. Miller v. Charter Nex Films - Delaware, OH, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-
1341, 2020 WL 2896913, at *4 (S.D. Ohio June 2, 2020). Both are met here. A central 
issue to Plaintiffs’ and the other class members’ claims is whether Mitsubishi 
enforced an unlawful time-keeping policy. And since the answer turns on the legality 
of the undisputed policy, not any individualized proof, it’s resolvable in “one stroke.” 
Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350. 
Finally, Plaintiffs have “fairly and adeq uately protect[ed] the interests of the 
class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Class representatives adequately represent the rest of 
the class when (1) they share common interests with the absent class members, and 
(2) vigorously “prosecute the interests of the class through qualified counsel.” Hunter, 
2023 WL 3204684, at *4 (cleaned up). Plaintiffs’ interests seem to align with the 
absent class members’, and they obtained a settlement with an average estimated 
payout of $1,104.25. (Doc. 31, #382). On top of that, one named Plaintiff represents 
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each of the facilities at issue, showing th at there was representation for each set of 
employees. That said, the Court renews its reservations about the amount of the 
requested service awards, which it discusses further below. See infra Law & Analysis, 
Part C.3. Class counsel, mor eover, has adequately represented the class, ultimately 
obtaining a common fund representing 85% of the estimated total loss that the 
Settlement Class employees incurred. (Doc. 31, #392). 
Putting that all together, the Court find s that all the Rule 23(a) factors have 
been satisfied. 
2. Predominance and Superiority 
The Court likewise finds that the class action meets Rule 23(b)(3)’s 
requirements: (1) that the common question to the class predominates, and (2) that a 
class action is superior to other adjudication methods. 
To evaluate predominance, the Court must first determine which issues of fact 
or law are common to the class and then weigh their predominance against individual 
questions which vary from cl ass member to class member. Martin v. Behr Dayton 
Thermal Prods. LLC , 896 F.3d 405, 413 (6th Cir. 2018). Factors relevant to that 
balancing test include: “(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling 
the prosecution or defense of separate actions; [and] (B) the extent and nature of any 
litigation concerning the controversy alre ady begun by or against class members.” 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 
The common questions of fact outweigh any questions which may differ among 
class members. Questions re levant to the whole class include what timekeeping 
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policies Mitsubishi utilized, whether those operated to the benefit of Mitsubishi and 
detriment of its employees, and whether those policies violated provisions of the 
FLSA and related state statutes. The only question that varies between class 
members is damages because of the individu alized nature of timekeeping records. 
Because the Agreement’s distribution formula accounts for differences in the number 
of work weeks, even if it is not as granular as the number of uncompensated minutes, 
the Court finds that the individualized damages issue does not determine the 
predominance question. Further, there is no evidence that any class members had 
already commenced litigation or that an y class members had further interests in 
controlling their case. 
As for superiority, the Court considers the difficulties of managing a class 
action, the alternative adjudication methods to a class action, and the nature of the 
class claims. See Martin, 896 F.3d at 415–16. Because the costs to litigate (or settle) 
hundreds of individual claims arising from the time-keeping policy would likely 
exceed the value of the common fund, let alone the payout to any individual employee, 
a class action better addresses the claims at issue than individualized lawsuits would. 
In other words, this class-wide settlement is efficient and superior to individualized 
litigation. 
The Court finds that the common questions of fact predominate and that a 
class action is superior to other adjudication methods. Accordingly, the Court finally 
certifies the class proposed in the Settlement Agreement. 
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3. Notice 
The Court also finds that the notice procedure was successful. ILYM Group 
distributed the notice to the preliminarily certified class members by U.S. mail after 
receiving the employees’ contact information from Mitsubishi. This process 
constitutes an appropriate notice under Rule 23(c). See Satterly v. Airstream, Inc. , 
Nos. 3:19-cv-32, 3:19-cv-107, 2020 WL 6536342, at *4–5 (S.D. Ohio Sep. 25, 2020) 
(stating that sending notice by first-class mail to the last known addresses of the 
putative class members “provided Class Members with an appropriate notice under 
Rule 23 and met the FLSA’s remedial goals”). Indeed, even just mailing the notice 
once to each class member’s address may constitute “‘th e best notice practicable 
under the circumstances,’ satisfying ‘the notice requirements of Rule 23 and the due-
process requirement as well.’” Harsh v. Kalida Mfg., Inc., No. 3:18-cv-2239, 2021 WL 
4145720, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Sep. 13, 2021) (quoting Vassalle v. Midland Funding, LLC, 
No. 3:11-cv-96, 2014 WL 5162380, at *11 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 14, 2014)). Here, ILYM 
Group distributed notice to all 1,052 Class Members. (Doc. 31-2, #413). While 63 Class 
Notice Packets were returned, ILYM Group performed a skip trace to locate updated 
addresses. (Id.). After it re-mailed those packets, only 7 returned again. (Id. at #414). 
That means “[o]ver 99% of the Class Members received notice of this settlement.” 
(Doc. 31, #390). This high delivery rate supports the finding that notice was adequate 
in this case. 
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B. Fairness of the Proposed Settlement 
With class certification settled, the Court now reviews the proposed 
settlement’s fairness. Before the Court can finally approve a proposed settlement, the 
Court must hold a hearing, which the Court did, and find that the settlement is “fair, 
reasonable, and adequate.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). To assess fairness, Rule 23(e)(2), 
as amended in 2018, directs the Court to consider whether (1) the class 
representatives and class counsel have ad equately represented the class; (2) the 
proposed settlement was negoti ated at arm’s length; (3) the settlement adequately 
compensates the class; and (4) the settlement treats class members equitably relative 
to each other. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). The Sixth Circuit, though, adopted a longer list 
of considerations some ten years before that, under which the Court must look to: 
(1) the risk of fraud or collusion; (2) the complexity, expense and likely 
duration of the litigation; (3) the amount of discovery engaged in by the 
parties; (4) the likelihood of success on the merits; (5) the opinions of 
class counsel and class representatives; (6) the reaction of absent class 
members; and (7) the public interest. 
Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace, & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 497 F.3d 615, 631 (6th Cir. 2007) (hereinafter UAW). The question then 
is the ongoing relevance of those factors gi ven the amendment to Rule 23(e). In an 
earlier decision regarding class settlement approval, this Court concluded that the 
Rule 23(e)(2) factors had largely subsumed the UAW factors. See Hawes v. Macy’s 
Inc., No. 1:17-cv-754, 2023 WL 8811499, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 20, 2023). But a more 
recent Sixth Circuit decision at least suggests that the reality may be a tad more 
complicated. Specifically, that court suggested that: 
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To assess the reasonableness of a settlement, we consider the factors 
identified in Rule 23(e)(2), as well as (1) the likelihood of success on the 
merits of the case, (2) the complexity, expense, and duration of discovery 
and litigation, (3) the opinions of class members, representatives, and 
counsel, and (4) the risk of collusion or fraud.” 
In re East Palestine Train Derailment, 158 F.4th 704, 713 (6th Cir. 2025) (citing UAW, 
497 F.3d at 631) (emphasis added). 
While the Court still is of the view that the four factors set forth in the as-
amended version of Rule 23(e)(2) already include consideration of the four additional 
factors identified above, out of an abundance of caution, the Court will address all 
eight. But spoiler alert—the Court ultimately finds, based on the information 
Plaintiffs provided in their briefing an d at the hearing, that the Settlement 
Agreement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” 
1. Adequacy of Representation 
For the same reasons explained above when finally certifying the class, see 
supra Law & Analysis, Part A, the Court find s that the class representatives and 
class counsel have adequately represente d the class. The class representatives 
advocated for both plants, and Thomas spec ifically attended the mediation that led 
to the present settlement agreement. (Doc. 31, #391). As for counsel, they have 
extensive wage-and-hour class action experience, and successfully secured a 
settlement representing approximately 85% of the estimated losses. (Doc. 31-1, #398). 
2. Arm’s Length Negotiations 
Based on both class counsel’s and defe nse counsel’s representations at the 
fairness hearing, and the mutual concessions reflected in the Settlement Agreement, 
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the Court is satisfied that the settle ment was negotiated at arm’s length. See Todd 
S. Elwert, Inc. DC v. All. Healthcare Servs., Inc. , Nos. 5:15-cv-2223, 3:15-cv-2673, 
2018 WL 4539287, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Sep. 21, 2018) (“Courts presume the absence of 
fraud or collusion unless there is evidence to the contrary.” (cleaned up)). Moreover, 
much of the settlement was decided throug h a lengthy mediation in front of class-
action mediator, Michael Russell, further supporting the notion that it was an arm’s 
length agreement. (Doc. 31, #391). 
3. Adequacy of Relief 
Rule 23(e)(2)(C) asks whether “the relief provided for the class is adequate.” To 
assess the adequacy of the relief, the Court considers: (1) “the costs, risks and delay 
of trial and appeal”; (2) “the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing 
relief to the class”; and (3) “the terms of any proposed award of attorney’s fees.” Id.3 
The adequacy of the settlement’s propos ed relief far outweighs the potential 
costs and risks of continued litigation. Mi tsubishi would likely have had to expend 
significant resources responding to discov ery requests regarding all work records, 
and it risks an adverse judgment if it proceeds to trial. At least at first glance, it looks 
like the rounding policy may have worked to its favor. On the other hand, if the class 
failed to prove that Mitsubishi utilized an unlawful timekeeping policy, or if the Court 
found the worker time involved to be de mi nimis, the class risks recovering nothing. 
 
3 The parties have identified no agreements (other than the Settlement Agreement) that are 
relevant to the Court’s consideration, so the fourth adequacy-of-relief prong is inapplicable. 
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(C)(iv). 
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The settlement thus provides an efficient mechanism to resolve this dispute with 
overall cost, time, and risk avoidance for all parties. 
As for distributing relief to the class, the Court does not foresee any issues. 
This class action centers on underpayment of employees due to an unlawful rounding 
policy. So providing payments to cl ass members should prove relatively 
straightforward—Mitsubishi had all of their employment paperwork and likely 
contact information. To the extent Mitsubishi lacked current addresses, ILYM Group 
successfully tracked down updated ones. A dditionally, the settlem ent’s distribution 
formula is based on the number of weeks worked, so those who were likely underpaid 
the most will receive the largest payouts, at least if they filed a claim form to become 
a Participating Class Member. Such an allocation suggests fairness. See Hawes I , 
2023 WL 8811499, at *12. 
That leaves the proposed attorneys’ fees award, which likewise does not weigh 
against the adequacy of the class recovery under the Settlement Agreement. That’s 
because the Settlement Agreement itself does n’t require payment of attorneys’ fees; 
it simply says that class counsel will seek them. (The Court separately addresses the 
amount of such fees it is authorizing below. See infra Law & Analysis, Part C.1.) 
4. Equitable Treatment Among Class Members 
The Settlement Agreement also treats cl ass members, at least Participating 
Class Members, equitably. The Settlement Administrator will distribute the common 
fund on a pro rata basis based on each Participating Class Member’s number of 
eligible work weeks. (Doc. 27-1, #244). While that may differ slightly from that 
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employee’s proportion of uncompensated minut es, the Court finds it is an efficient 
and equitable distribution formula. 
That said, the Court does have a couple of concerns. First, as noted, the 
distributions go only to Participating Cl ass Members, which represent about 26% of 
the total Settlement Class Employees. (Doc. 27-1, #254; Doc. 31-2, #414). Given that 
the parties represent that the non-reversionary common fund purportedly represents 
roughly 85% of the total alleged harm th at the Settlement Class Employees as a 
whole incurred, (Doc. 31, #392), that means that Participating Class Members are 
receiving payments that likely exceed their own harm (as a common fund 
representing 85% of total damages is being distributed to 26% of the employees who 
incurred that harm). Yet, all of the Settlement Class Employees, even those who did 
not file claims forms to become Participating Class Members and thus will receive no 
distribution, are still releasing their stat e-law claims. (Doc. 27-1, #276). Ultimately, 
though, the Court concludes that this does not, in and of itself, prevent a finding that 
the distribution mechanism is equitable. Courts often approve class settlements in 
which only those class members who send in a claim form receive a distribution. 
Cullen v. RYVL Inc. , No. 3:23-cv-185, 2025 WL 2836651, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 
2025) (granting preliminary approval where all class members release claims, 
whether or not they submitted a claim form to receive compensation); Herrell v. L & 
B Transp., LLC, No. 3:24-cv-965, 2025 WL 2425745, at *2 (M.D. La. Aug. 21, 2025) 
(granting final approval); see also Dick v. Sprint Commc’n Co. L.P. , 297 F.R.D. 283, 
291–92 (W.D. Ky. 2014) (approving settlement to convey easement to defendant, even 
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where class members did not file a claim fo rm to receive compensation but did not 
opt out); Manual for Complex Litigation, § 21.66 (4th ed. 2025) (“Class members must 
usually file claims forms providing details about their claims and other information 
needed to administer the settlement.”). Short of a bright-line rule that such 
arrangements are never permissible, which the Court declines to adopt, there seems 
nothing particularly egregious about the pr oportions at issue here (i.e., a 26% claim 
rate). Moreover, as to any employee who is a Settlement Class Member but not a 
Participating Class Member, that employ ee will not release his federal claims, 
meaning they could still seek recovery under the FLSA if they are so inclined. In sum, 
the Court finds that the distribution mechanism here fits within the broad umbrella 
of an equitable distribution. 
Separately, though, the Court also has expressed concerns about the size of the 
service awards that the class representa tives seek. But that likewise does not 
preclude a finding that the Settlement Agr eement is equitable. That is because the 
Agreement doesn’t require a fixed service aw ard—it merely states that the awards 
are “not to exceed” $10,000 for Jason Thomas and $2,500 for Joseph Horner. (Doc. 27-
1, #245). The Settlement Agreement’s inclusion of the mere potential for service 
awards does not categorically render that agreement inequitable under Rule 23. (Id.). 
That said, while the size of the requested service awards does not impact approval, 
the Court has more to say about the actual amount of the appropriate service awards 
below. See infra Law & Analysis, Part C.3. 
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In sum, the Court finds that the Settlement Agreement meets Rule 23(e)’s 
requirements. That leaves the four other factors from UAW that the Sixth Circuit 
identified as potentially separate: (1) the likelihood of success on the merits of the 
case, (2) the complexity, expense, and dura tion of discovery and litigation, (3) the 
opinions of class members, representatives, and counsel, and (4) the risk of collusion 
or fraud. See In re East Palestine Derailment, 158 F.4th at 713. 
5. Likelihood of Success on the Merits. 
As already noted in discussing the adequacy of the relief, it is difficult to predict 
with accuracy who would have prevailed at trial. The class seems to have a strong 
argument that the time system, which Mits ubishi has since discontinued, may have 
systematically worked to Mitsubishi’s benefit. And the claims at issue do not have an 
intent requirement, so it matters little whether Mitsubishi was aware of, or intended, 
that effect. On the other hand, the time at issue on a per employee basis may have 
been so small as to be de minimis, or perhaps Mitsubishi could have showed that the 
rounding sometimes worked to the employees’ benefit. 
At bottom, it seems to the Court that the class had a substantial likelihood of 
success on the merits, but not a slam dunk by any means. So a common fund that 
represents 85% of the total time at issue strikes the Court as reasonable. 
6. Complexity, Expense, and Duration of Litigation 
The issues here were perhaps not that complex, but the litigation certainly 
threatened to be expensive and long-lived. Mitsubishi had produced substantial time 
records for its employees. Working through those records, and then attempting to 
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assess how much rounding occurred as to ea ch employee, threatened to be a time-
consuming (and thus expensive) endeavor. Without the settlement, Mitsubishi would 
have spent the money otherwise in the common fund on counsel to defend the action. 
Instead, that money now compensates its employees. And it brings what otherwise 
would be time-consuming litigation to an early resolution. All of that counts in favor 
of the settlement. 
7. Opinions of Class Members, Representatives, and Counsel 
The named representatives and class counsel have both indicated that they 
strongly approve of the settlement. From what the Court can glean from the record, 
that is true of the absent class members, as well. As noted above, 99% of the class 
received notice of the class settlement. (Doc. 31, #390). Only three class members 
opted out, and no class member objected. (Doc. 31-2, #414). So this factor supports 
approval. 
8. Risk of collusion or fraud 
The same reasons the Court noted above that strongly suggest this settlement 
was the result of an arm’s length negotiation also suggest that there was no risk of 
fraud or collusion. See supra Law & Analysis, Part B.2. This factor supports approval, 
as well. 
 As all eight factors support the settlement, the Court concludes that it is fair, 
reasonable, and adequate. With that, the Court turns to the other pending motion, 
which involves attorneys’ fees, expenses, and service awards. 
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C. Attorneys’ Fees, Expenses, and Service Awards 
1. Attorneys’ Fees 
The Court starts with Class Counsel’s request for fees. But before undertaking 
the analysis, the Court starts by briefly addressing why Plaintiffs must make such a 
request. The Court has covered the issue in some detail before. See In re Cinfed Fed. 
Credit Union Data Breach Litig. , No. 1:23-cv-776, 2025 WL 1637686, at *10 (S.D. 
Ohio June 10, 2025). So in the interest of brevity, the Court incorporates that 
discussion by reference and merely reiterates the key points here. 
Typically, attorneys’ fees are a matte r between attorneys and their clients, 
subject to loose control only through ethics rules and bar complaints. But, in class 
actions, absent class members generally do not play any role in selecting class 
counsel, nor do they “agree” to the fees th ose counsel charge. Rather, at most, they 
get notice and an opportunity to be heard on that topic in connection with settlement. 
So courts must be on the lookout for pote ntial conflicts of interest between class 
counsel and absent class members. See Evans v. TIN, Inc. , No. 11-2067, 2013 WL 
4501061, at *11 (E.D. La. Aug. 21, 2013) (“The Court is well aware of its obligation to 
protect the interests of the class in its role as a fiduciary and to ensure the 
reasonableness of attorney’s fees.”). 
At the same time, the Court must also remain mindful that counsel are entitled 
to be “fairly compensated for the amount of work done as well as for the results 
achieved.” Rawlings v. Prudential-Bache Props., Inc., 9 F.3d 513, 516 (6th Cir. 1993) 
(citation omitted). After all, without class counsel, the class would not have recovered 
from Mitsubishi at all. 
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Against that backdrop, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h) specifically 
authorizes a court to “award reasonable attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs that are 
authorized by law or by the parties’ agreem ent.” From there, “[d]istrict courts apply 
a two-part analysis to assess the reason ableness of an attorney fee petition.” Harsh 
v. Kalida Mfg., Inc. , No. 3:18-cv-2239, 2021 WL 4145720, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Sep. 13, 
2021) (citation omitted). The first step is to “determine the appropriate method to 
calculate the fees, using either the percentage of fund or the Lodestar approach.” Id. 
After that, the Court turns to the six Ramey factors, so-named for Ramey v. 
Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 508 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1974). Those factors include: 
(1) the value of the benefit rendered to the [plaintiff] class; (2) society’s 
stake in rewarding attorneys who produce such benefits in order to 
maintain an incentive to others; (3) whether the services were 
undertaken on a contingent fee basis; (4) the value of the services on an 
hourly basis; (5) the complexity of the litigation; and (6) the professional 
skill and standing of counsel involved on both sides. 
Swigart v. Fifth Third Bank, No. 1:11-cv-88, 2014 WL 3447947, at *6 (S.D. Ohio July 
11, 2014) (modification omitted) (quoting Ramey, 508 F.2d at 1196). 
So how do those factors apply here? Cla ss Counsel request attorneys’ fees of 
$171,666.67, representing one-third of the common fund. (Doc. 32, #438). The Court 
finds that request reasonable. To start, district courts routinely award attorneys’ fees 
of 20% to 50% of the common fund. Brotherton v. Cleveland, 141 F. Supp. 2d 907, 910 
(S.D. Ohio 2001); Connectivity Sys. Inc. v. Nat’l City Bank, No. 2:08-cv-1119, 2011 WL 
292008, at *12 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 26, 2011) (colle cting cases). So an award of one-third 
of the common fund falls well within the normal range. 
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Beyond that, the Ramey factors also show that the requested fee is reasonable. 
First, Class Counsel have achieved considerable beneficial results for the class, 
including securing a settlement representing approximately 85% of the total unpaid 
wages allegedly owed. (Doc. 32, #442). Additionally, Participating Class Members will 
receive an average payout of $1,104.25, which is not insignificant, particularly in a 
class action. (Doc. 31, #382). And they will receive it now (or shortly after final 
approval), unlike if the case had continued. Beyond that, as already mentioned, 
“[s]ociety has a stake in awarding attorneys who achieve a result that the individual 
class members probably could not obtain on their own.” Myers v. Mem’l Health Sys. 
Marietta Mem’l Hosp. , No. 15-cv-2956, 2022 WL 4079559, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Sep. 6, 
2022) (quotation omitted). It also is wort h noting that Class Counsel worked on a 
contingency basis, meaning they undertook the expenses so far without promise of 
compensation. 
As for the fourth factor, the value of the services on an hourly basis, the Court 
performs a lodestar cross-check. This ch eck prevents counsel from “receiving a 
windfall” and “ensure[s] that the fee award is still roughly aligned with the amount 
of work the attorneys contributed.” In re Cardinal Health Inc. Sec. Litig., 528 F. Supp. 
2d 752, 764 (S.D. Ohio 2007). In doing so, however, the Court does not “exhaustively 
scrutinize[]” counsel’s hours and documentation, unlike a full lodestar analysis. Id. 
at 767 (quotation omitted). 
Here, Class Counsel alleges they have spent approximately 190.6 hours on this 
matter. (Doc. 31-1, #401). Based on their normal rates, they estimate the current 
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combined lodestar is $104,007.50. (Id.). Compared to the one-third of the fund at the 
time of distribution, Class Counsel estimates that the lodestar multiplier is 1.65. (Id.). 
This is within the range of lodestar multipliers that courts in this Circuit have found 
acceptable. Lowther v. AK Steel Corp., No. 1:11-cv-877, 2012 WL 6676131, at *5 (S.D. 
Ohio Dec. 21, 2012) (finding lodestar mu ltiplier of 3.06 “very acceptable” and 
collecting cases approving multiples up to 8.74); Smith v. Fifth Third Bank, No. 2021 
WL 11713313, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 31, 2021) (citing In re Cardinal Health Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 528 F. Supp. 2d at 767–78) (approving of lodestar multipliers between 1.3 and 
4.5). So this likewise supports a finding that the fee request here is reasonable and 
not a windfall. 
As for the final two factors, “[w]age and hour litigation is inherently complex 
and time-consuming.” Smith v. Local Cantina, LLC , No. 2:20-cv-3064, 2022 WL 
1183325, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 19, 2022) (citation omitted). Beyond that, this case 
involves two different plants across two states, adding to the complexity. And the 
Court finds that counsel’s professional skill on both sides of this dispute also supports 
the requested fee. 
Putting that all together, the Court fi nds the requested attorneys’ fees are 
reasonable. The Court thus awards $171,666.67, representing one-third of the 
common fund. 
2. Litigation Expenses 
Additionally, “under the common fund doctrine, class counsel is entitled to 
reimbursement of all reasonable out-of-pocket litigation expenses and costs in the 
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prosecution of claims, and in obtaining settlement, including but not limited to 
expenses incurred in connection with document products, consulting with and 
deposing experts, travel and other litigation-related expenses.” Karpik v. Huntington 
Bancshares Inc., No. 2:17-cv-1153, 2021 WL 757123, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 18, 2021) 
(cleaned up) (quoting In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig. , 218 F.R.D. 508, 535 (E.D. 
Mich. 2003)). Here, Class Counsel requests $9,218.81 for costs and expenses. (Doc. 
32, #447; (citing Doc. 31-1, #404)). Having reviewed Asay’s declaration and the 
attached expense chart, the Court finds these costs and expenses are reasonable. 
Thus, the Court awards Class Counsel $9,218 .81 in e xpenses, to be paid from th e 
common fund. 
3. Class Representatives’ Service Awards 
Last, Plaintiffs move for service awards of $10,000 for Jason Thomas and 
$2,500 for Joseph Horner. Awards are generally appropriate for “class 
representatives who have had extensive involvement in a class action litigation [and] 
deserve compensation above and beyond amounts to which they are entitled to by 
virtue of class membership alone.” Lonardo v. Travelers Indem. Co., 706 F. Supp. 2d 
766, 787 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (citation omitted). That said, service awards should not be 
windfalls either. Hawes v. Macy’s Inc., No. 1:17-cv-754, 2024 WL 2125640, at *6 (S.D. 
Ohio May 13, 2024). 
Here, Class Counsel provided a desc ription of Thomas’s and Horner’s 
contributions as well as affidavits from both named Plaintiffs. (Doc. 32, #448–49; 
Thomas Decl., Doc. 32-2; Horner Decl., Doc. 32-3). Specifically, they estimate that 
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Thomas spent roughly 35–40 hours on this matter in general as well as traveled from 
Cincinnati, Ohio, to Nashville, Tennessee, for the mediation. (Doc. 32, #449). 
Additionally, Horner was crucial to the incl usion of the Maysville, Kentucky, plant. 
(Id. at #449–50). While he spent less time on the case, without his participation, it is 
likely the Kentucky plant would not have recovered at all. 
Considering that the average payout is around $1,000, the Court finds that 
awards of $10,000 for Thomas and $2,500 for Horner would not represent a windfall 
for the class representatives as compared to the other class members, and instead 
adequately compensates them for their efforts on behalf of the class.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Unopposed 
Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement (Doc. 31), and ACCEPTS the 
proposed settlement agreement. Finally, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Unopposed
Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Expenses, and Class Representative Service Awards (Doc. 
32). Specifically, the Court AWARDS class counsel attorneys’ fees of $171,666.67 and 
$9,218.81 in costs and expenses, and AWARDS $10,000 to Jason Thomas and $2,500 
to Joseph Horner as service awards. Finally, the Court DIRECTS the Clerk to enter 
judgment and to TERMINATE this case on its docket. 
SO ORDERED. 
May 26, 2026
DATE DOUGLAS R. COLE
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
ocket.
 
GLAS R. COLE
ED STATES DISTRICT JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU
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