govinfo:USCOURTS-ohsd-1_24-cv-00342-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION - CINCINNATI
MICHAEL REDDEN,
Plaintiff/
Case No. l:24-cv-342
Judge Matthew W. McFarland
V.
TIM BAIRD/ et al./
Defendants.
ORDER AND OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. 19). Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition (Doc. 22), to which Defendants filed a
Reply in Support (Doc. 23). Thus, this matter is ripe for review. For the following reasons,
Defendants' Motion (Doc. 19) is GRANTED.
FACTS
This case centers on Plaintiff Michael Redden's encounter with Defendant Tim
Baird, a police officer for Defendant Ross Township. (Baird Dep., Doc. 16, Pg. ID 93. ) On
July 7, 2023, Bridget Langen/ who shares a child with Plaintiff, met with Defendant Baird
at the Ross Township Police Department to report a domestic violence incident. (Id. at Pg.
ID 94. ) Langen reported to Defendant Baird that she went to Plaintiff's home on Wagon
Wheel Drive earlier that day to pick up the juvenile daughter they share. (Id.) She then
stated to Defendant Baird that she was placing the child in her car when Plaintiff reached
inside her car and took her cell phone. (Id. at Pg. ID 95.) Langen then chased after Plaintiff
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to retrieve her phone while Plaintiff made derogatory comments and also claimed the
phone was his. (Id.) Langen told Defendant Baird that she chased Plaintiff as he ran into
his residence/ pushing her out of the doorway as he slammed the door on her; she
sustained injuries to her forearm and knee when he pushed her. (Id.) While Langen
completed her written statement/ Officer Baird contacted Plaintiff on the phone. (Id. at
Pg. ID 89.) He then drove to Plaintiffs residence to continue his investigation. (Id.)
When Officer Baird arrived at Plaintiff's residence. Plaintiff informed Officer Baird
that there was video footage of the incident/ which he then provided to Officer Baird.
(Baird Dep. / Doc. 16, Pg. ID 105. ) The video clips are all quite short and depict Langen
chasing Plaintiff/ Langen and Plaintiff shouting, Langen knocking on a neighbor's door
to seek assistance, and Langen trying to force her way through the doorway and retrieve
her phone while Plaintiff pushes her out. (See Baird Dep. Exs. 16-21; see also 9/12/2025
Notation Order; 9/16/2025 Notice of USB Received. ) At one point during the videos/
Plaintiff directs a derogatory comment at Langen. {See Baird Dep. Ex. 19. ) During the
investigation. Plaintiff informed Officer Baird that he owned Langen's phone. (Baird
Dep. / Doc. 16, Pg. ID 110. ) Plaintiff also stated that Langen punched him and broke his
television. (Plaintiff Dep. / Doc. 18, Pg. ID 445. ) Officer Baird testified that he did not recall
asking Langen about this but did witness part of a television screen on the ground at
Plaintiffs residence. (Baird Dep., Doc. 16/ Pg. ID 97-98. ) Officer Baird did, however,
examine Plaintiff for visible injuries, but claims he found none. (Id. at Pg. ID 99-100. ) After
reviewing the footage and concluding his investigation/ Officer Baird arrested Plaintiff
and took him into custody. (Id. at Pg. ID 132.)
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Plaintiff then spent four days in jail before his bench trial. (Plaintiff Dep., Doc. 18,
Pg. ID 486. ) While Plaintiff was convicted of domestic violence at trial/ he appealed his
conviction and the Twelfth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision,
holding that his conviction at trial was not supported by sufficient evidence. State v.
Redden, 238 N.E.3d 277, 280 (Ohio App. 12th Dist. 2024).
PROCEDURAL POSTURE
Following his successful appeal. Plaintiff brought this present lawsuit against
Defendants Ross Township and Officer Tim Baird. (Compl. / Doc. 1. ) Plaintiff brings two
claims under 42 U. S.C. § 1983: a claim for false arrest and malicious prosecution against
Officer Baird in violation of the Fourth Amendment and a claim for failure to train and
supervise against Defendant Ross Township. {Id. at ^ 29-46. ) The parties engaged in a
settlement conference with Chief Magistrate Judge Stephanie K. Bowman, but the matter
remained at an impasse. (See 10/16/2025 Minutes. ) Defendants filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 19), which has been fully briefed. {See Docs. 22, 23.)
LAW
When there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law/ the district court shall grant summary judgment.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party has the burden to conclusively show that no
genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986); Lansing Dairy, Inc. v. Espy, 39 F.3d 1339/1347 (6th Cir. 1994). If the moving party
meets that burden, then it becomes the nonmoving party's responsibility to point to
specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
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250 (1986). A court is under no obligation to search the record for genuine issues of
material fact. Betkerur v. Aultman Hosp. Ass'n, 78 F. 3d 1079, 1087 (6th Cir. 1996).
Moreover/ a "mere scintilla" of evidence in support of the nonmoving party's
position is not enough to avoid summary judgment. Daniels v. Woodside, 396 F.3d 730, 734
(6th Cir. 2005). Rather, to preclude summary judgment/ the nonmoving party must put
forth probative evidence on which a jury could reasonably reach a verdict in that party s
favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52; Lansing Dcnry, 39 F.3d at 1347. If the nonmoving party
fails to make the necessary showing for an element on which it has the burden of proof,
then the moving party is entitled to summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323
ANALYSIS
Defendants assert that they are entitled to summary judgment on both of Plaintiff's
claims because no genuine dispute of material fact exists on either of Plaintiffs claims.
(Motion/ Doc. 19, Pg. ID 542. ) The Court addresses each claim in turn.
I. Count 1: False Arrest and Malicious Prosecution
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs first claim fails because Officer Baird established
probable cause prior to Plaintiff's arrest. (Motion, Doc. 19, Pg. ID 543. ) As Defendants
point out, to prevail on a § 1983 false arrest claim/ "a plaintiff must prove that the
arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest the plaintiff. " (Id. (quoting Tlapanco v.
Elges, 969 F.3d 638, 652 (6th Cir. 2020)) (cleaned up). ) But, "[p]robable cause is not a high
bar." (Id. (citing LJnz'teri Stofes v. Moore, 999 F.3d 993, 996 (6th Cir. 2021)). ) Importantly,
Defendants note that //[c]ause to arrest does not require the same type of specific evidence
of each element of the offense as would be needed to support a conviction. " (Id. (quoting
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Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 149 (1972)). ) And, a showing of probable cause "provides
a complete defense to a claim of false arrest, even if the officer's belief of probable cause
was erroneous. " (Id. (quoting Wood v. Eubanks, 25 F.4th 414, 421 (6th Cir. 2022)).)
Defendants state that an officer is not liable for false arrest so long as there was
probable cause for any offense, "even if not on the offense charged by the officer.'
(Motion, Doc. 19, Pg. ID 543 (collecting cases). ) And, if an individual is later found
innocent, this finding "does not preclude a finding of probable cause (Id. (citing Fisher v.
Jordan, 91 F.4th 419, 425 (6th Cir. 2024)). ) To this end/ Defendants declare that Plaintiff
erroneously works "backward from the time of his conviction was reversed" to show that
Officer Baird lacked probable cause. Meanwhile, the facts of the case, as Defendants
argue/ show that/ leading up to Plaintiffs arrest. Officer Baird: received a signed, written
statement from Langen, observed injuries to her arm and knee, and reviewed videos
showing them in an altercation, where Langen was on the ground, and where Langen
sought assistance from a neighbor to call the police since Plaintiff had her phone. (Id. at
Pg. ID 544. ) Accordingly, Defendants contend that Baird correctly found "a probability
or substantial chance of criminal activity/' (Id. at Pg. ID 545 (quodng District of Columbia
v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018)). ) To add to this point/ Defendants note that Ohio Revised
Code § 2935. 03(B)(3)(a)(i) states that an officer "has reasonable grounds to believe that
the offense of domestic violence has been committed [... ] if [... ] a person executes a
written statement alleging that the person in question has committed the offense of
domestic violence. " (Id. (quoting Ohio Rev. Code § 2935. 03(B)(3)(a)(i)). ) And, "reasonable
grounds" under that statute "equate[s] to probable cause. " {Id. (quoting State v. Gipp, No.
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29983, 2024 WL 1235456/ at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2024)). ) Accordingly, to require
further investigation would "ignore the preferred course of action" under the statute. (Id.
(collecting cases). ) Finally, Defendants point out that the Twelfth District overturned
Plaintiffs conviction because of evidence presented at trial, not due to lack of probable
cause at the time of arrest. {Id. at Pg. ID 546.)
In his Response/ Plaintiff argues that probable cause did not exist when
considering the totality of the information in Officer Baird's possession at the time of the
arrest. (Response, Doc. 22/ Pg. ID 808. ) While Defendants note that an officer has no duty
to conduct a further investigation after probable cause is established/ Plaintiff points out
that "police officers cannot cherry-pick facts in determining that probable cause exists.'
(Id. (quoting Franklin v. Miami Univ., 214 F. App'x 509, 514 (6th Cir. 2007) (Clay, J.
dissenting)). ) In the Sixth Circuit/ for instance/ the court affirmed denial of summary
judgment in a § 1983 case where the officers "possessed inculpatory and exculpatory
evidence" during the investigation. (Id. (citing Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 318
(6th Cir. 2000)). ) In fact, as Plaintiffs state/ in Gardenhire, the officer initially had probable
cause but then obtained exculpatory evidence that changed the totality of the
circumstances. (Id. (citing Gardenhire, 205 F.3d at 318; Hflm's u. City ofSaginaw, 62 F.4th
1028 (6th Cir. 2023); Logsdon v. Mains, 492 F.3d 334/ 343 (6th Cir. 2007)).)
Plaintiff compares Gardenhire to Officer Baird's investigation here. (Response/ Doc.
22, Pg. ID 808.) Specifically, Plaintiff agrees that Langen's statement alone "may have
been sufficient to establish probable cause"; however. Officer Baird then continued with
the investigation by visiting Plaintiff and reviewing the videos. (Id. at Pg. ID 809-10/ n.5.)
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Importantly, Plaintiff states that Officer Baird never questioned Langen about Plaintiff's
allegations that she hurt him/ even though she mentioned it in her statement. (Id. at Pg.
ID 811.) Thus/ Plaintiff contends that a reasonable jury could look at the circumstances
and conclude that Officer Baird only considered Plaintiff and not Langen as the primary
aggressor. (Id. at Pg. ID 812.) In reality. Plaintiff argues/ the video footage shows Langen
as the primary aggressor/ as she attempted to push her way into Plaintiffs home. (Id. at
Pg. ID 813. ) In their Reply, though/ Defendants reiterate that probable cause is not a high
bar, and courts should view the totality of the circumstances from the officer's perspective
at the time of arrest/ not in hindsight. (Reply, Doc. 23, Pg. ID 824-25 (collecting cases).)
Furthermore, an officer can arrest an individual "so long as there is probable cause to
arrest him for some crime/' even if that crime is different than the stated crime of arrest.
{Id. at Pg. ID 825 (quoting Amis v. Tiuardesky, 637 F. App'x 859, 861 (6th Cir. 2015)).)
According to Defendants, the totality of circumstances known to Officer Baird
supports probable cause for a "litany of crimes. " (Reply/ Doc. 23, Pg. ID 826. ) Specifically,
Defendants note that Plaintiff admitted to taking Langen's phone/ which is a crime under
Ohio Revised Code § 2913. 02(A)(1); although Plaintiff claimed it was his phone/ he
referred to the phone as "her phone" twice and stated that he gave her the phone. (Id.)
Thus, Officer Baird knew of the theft when he arrived to the residence, and his interview
of Plaintiff confirmed the theft. (Id.) Defendants also point out that Ohio law prohibits
any person from tampering with the property of another; to this end/ Defendants reiterate
that Plaintiff reached into Langen's car to take her phone from its charger. (Id. at Pg. ID
827 (citing Ohio Rev. Code § 2909. 07(A)(1)). ) Again, Officer Baird knew of the phone's
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removal when he responded to the residence/ and Plaintiff confirmed that he took the
phone from Langen's car. (Id.) Finally/ Defendants point out that Ohio law prohibits
domestic violence and Officer Baird observed/ arrested/ and charged Plaintiff for this
offense. (Id.) Probable cause for this arrest was based on multiple factors: (1) Langen
arrived to the police station to report the crime and appeared emotional and injured; (2)
Langen completed a written statement describing the incident; (3) Officer Baird then went
to Plaintiffs residence and observed video footage showing the dispute, which did not
show the entirety of the dispute. (Id. at Pg. ID 827-28. ) Defendants disagree that Officer
Baird "cherry-picked" facts in making the arrest; rather, all of these facts are indeed the
totality of the circumstances that/ from Officer Baird's perception/ created probable cause
for the arrest. (Id. at Pg. ID 828-29.)
Additionally, Plaintiff argues that Defendants' reliance on the prosecutor finding
probable cause is improper. (Response, Doc. 22, Pg. ID 813.) As Plaintiff notes/ the
prosecutor was not involved in the decision to arrest, and the "question of probable cause
at the time of arrest is distinct temporally and legally from the sufficiency of evidence
presented at trial. " (Id. at Pg. ID 814, n.ll.) Plaintiff next takes issue with Defendants'
contention that Ohio's "preferred arrest" law inherently gave Officer Baird probable
cause for arrest. (Id.) Plaintiff suggests that the law does nothing more than codify the
constitutional requirement for probable cause for an arrest, applying those standards to
the offense of domestic violence. (Jd. (citing Ohio Rev. Code § 2935. 03(B)(3)(b)). ) In
Plaintiffs view, the statute does not automatically render an arrest based on the
statement constitutional/ and since "actions under § 1983 concern violations of federal
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rights, an officer's compliance with a state statute does not defeat a § 1983 action. " {Id.
(quoting Denton v. Rievley, No. 1:07-CV-211, 2008 WL 2857016, at *2 (E.D. Term. July 21,
2008), affd, 353 F. App/x 1 (6th Cir. 2009)). ) Defendants refute this by pointing out that
"courts normally look to state law defining the offense" when determining whether an
officer had probable cause to make an arrest. (Reply/ Doc. 23, Pg. ID 829 (collecting
cases). ) The statute in question, Ohio Revised Code § 2935. 03(B)(3)(a)/ states that an
officer has probable cause to arrest for domestic violence if a person executes a written
statement alleging it. (Id.) Plaintiff continues by indicating that Defendants cases are
inapposite because none of them involved an officer who ignored exculpatory evidence
or admissions from the accused. (Response, Doc. 22/ Pg. ID 816, n. l4. ) But/ Defendants
retort that Plaintiff fails to point to any exculpatory evidence Officer Baird had at the time
of the arrest, despite referring to it numerous times in his Response. (Reply, Doc. 23, Pg.
ID 830.) And/ Plaintiff has failed to challenge the validity of the statute itself; a written
statement provides officers with probable cause in this context. {Id. at Pg. ID 831 (citing
White v. Roch, No. 22239, 2005 WL 602684, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2005)).)
Lastly, while Defendants state that Plaintiff's assertion of self-defense at the scene
shows an admission to the crime and thus established probable cause/ Plaintiff notes that
they fail to cite any authority in support of this contention. (Response, Doc. 22, Pg. ID
817. ) Furthermore, the record does not show that Plaintiff claimed he acted in self-
defense, except for the Complaint. (Id.) The Court agrees with Plaintiff that Defendants7
self-defense argument is unavailing for this reason.
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Nevertheless, the Court agrees with Defendants7 contention that Officer Baird
considered all evidence before him, and/ given the totality of the circumstances, perceived
that probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff. As neither party disputes/ Officer Baird
could have arrested Plaintiff based on the written statement alone. See Ohio Rev. Code §
2935. 03(B)(3)(a); see also Thacker v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 257 (6th Cir. 2003). But
the investigation did not stop there. Officer Baird's Investigation Report speaks better to
his perception at the time of the arrest. First/ Officer Baird reported that Langen came into
the police station, "visibly distraught/" and stated that Plaintiff "slammed the door on
her/' causing injuries to her forearm and knee. (Investigative Report, Doc. 18-2/ Ex. 1.)
Langen provided the written statement at this time. {Id.) Officer Baird then went to
Plaintiffs residence to continue the investigation; there/ Plaintiff did not dispute that he
took Langen's phone or that they were in an argument. (Id. ; see also Plaintiff Dep., Doc.
18, Pg. ID 513-14. ) Plaintiff showed Officer Baird the video footage, which was
incomplete, but portrayed: Plaintiff running into the street after taking the phone from
Langen; Langen asking to call the police and seeking assistance from neighbors to do so;
a heated verbal exchange between Langen and Plaintiff, where Langen asks Plaintiff and
Plaintiffs other minor child to call the police; and Plaintiff pushing Langen out of his
doorway while she was on the ground. {Id.) The Report goes on to state that Plaintiff
admitted to taking Langen's phone, noting that he did buy it for her but had been letting
her use it even after she moved out. (Id.) The Report notes that Mr. Redden had a scratch
on his elbow and a "defensive bite mark" on his arm. (Id.)
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In Thacker, the Sixth Circuit upheld summary judgment based on similar facts,
finding that/ while the victim's statement alone was sufficient for probable cause,
assuming there was no statement/ the totality of the circumstances still supported a
finding of probable cause. Thacker, 328 F.3d at 247. Those circumstances included: the
behavior of those involved/ the state of disarray of the residence, the victim's visible
injuries/ and Ohio's preferred arrest policy. Id. Here/ Officer Baird had the written
statement, but he also had video footage corroborating Langen's story, admissions from
Plaintiff that he did take her phone and they were in a fight/ visible injuries on Langen
along with a distraught demeanor, "defensive" injuries on Plaintiff, and, importantly,
Ohio's preferred arrest policy. Accordingly/ the Court finds no dispute of material fact
exists here; Officer Baird had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff.
For similar reasons/ Defendants contend that Plaintiffs malicious prosecution
claim fails. (Motion, Doc. 19, Pg. ID 548. ) For a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim/ a
plaintiff must prove: (1) that a criminal prosecution was initiated against the plaintiff and
that the defendant made, influenced/ or participated in the decision to prosecute; (2) that
there was a lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution; (3) that, as a consequence
of a legal proceeding/ the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty, aside from the initial
seizure; and (4) that the criminal proceeding was resolved in the plaintiff's favor. Sykes v.
Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 308-09 (6th Cir. 2010). Defendants first argue that Plaintiffs claim
fails on the first prong, as Officer Baird did nothing more than send a report to the
prosecutor's office for misdemeanor charges. (Motion, Doc. 19, Pg. ID 549.) In other
words, his initial investigation and paperwork do not constitute active involvement in
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the prosecution. (Id.) Nevertheless/ Defendants argue that Plaintiffs claim fails on the
second prong as well/ as Defendants established that Officer Baird had probable cause to
arrest Plaintiff. (Motion, Doc. 19, Pg. ID 549. ) Defendants therefore argue that they are
entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs § 1983 malicious prosecution claim as well.
m
Plaintiff/ however, finds fault with this argument. (Response, Doc. 22, Pg. ID 818.)
Plaintiff points out that a "malicious prosecution claim is viable where the charges were
initiated by a defendant who made/ influenced/ or participated in the decision to
prosecute, " and here. Officer Baird "himself signed the criminal complaint that initiated
the prosecution. " (Id. (quoting Sytes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 316 (6th Cir. 2010)). ) But,
Defendants are correct to point out that "malicious prosecution rises or falls with the
existence of probable cause. " (Reply, Doc. 23, Pg. ID 833.) As the Court has established,
Officer Baird had probable cause here. Furthermore, Defendants point out that" [filing a
report and signing a complaint does not overcome passive and neutral participation,
when a malicious prosecution claim requires more than mere passive participation. (Id.
at Pg. ID 833-34 (citing Day v. DeLong, 358 F. Supp. 3d 687, 706 (S.D. Ohio 2019)). ) And,
testifying at trial can never be the basis of a malicious prosecution claim. (Id. at Pg. ID 834
(citing Day, 358 F. Supp. 3d at 706). ) Defendants admit that Officer Baird filed a report,
signed the complaint, and testified at trial/ but none of this is enough to amount to
malicious prosecution. (Id.) Plaintiff does not argue that Officer Baird did anything more
than this/ nor that he knowingly furnished false information to the prosecutor. The Court
thus finds that a body of case law supports Defendants' argument. See Kinkus v. Vill. of
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Yorkville, Ohio, 289 F. App'x 86, 91 (6th Cir. 2008); Sykes, 625 F.3d at 314 (an officer "will
not be deemed to have commenced a criminal proceeding against a person when the
claim is predicated on the mere fact that the officer turned over to the prosecution the
officer's truthful materials"); Wilson v. City of Shaker Heights, 741 F. App'x 312, 317 (6th
Cir. 2018). Thus, for both a lack of active participation and the existence of probable cause/
summary judgment is appropriate for Plaintiffs malicious prosecution claim.
In sum, the Court finds that no dispute of material fact exists for either Plaintiffs
false arrest or malicious prosecution claims. Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on Count 1 against Officer Baird.
II. Count 2: Failure to Train and Supervise
Plaintiff's claim against Ross Township argues that the township is liable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for the actions of Officer Baird. (Compl., Doc. 1, ^ 38-46. ) In their Motion,
however. Defendants contend that this claim must fail because there is no underlying
constitutional violation. (Motion/ Doc. 19, Pg. ID 549. ) The Court first notes that, to prevail
on a failure to train or supervise claim, the plaintiff must show that the municipality had
a "policy or custom" that caused the violation of his rights. Monell v. Dept. ofSoc. Servs.,
435 U.S. 658/ 691 (1978). A plaintiff can prove a Monell claim/ as it's called, in four ways:
//(1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an official
with final decision-making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy
of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom of tolerance or
acquiescence of federal rights violations. " Jackson v. City of Cleveland, 925 F.3d 793, 828
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(6th Cir. 2019) (citing Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013)). Moreover, the
plaintiff must show "a direct causal link between the custom and the constihitional
deprivation; that is/ [he] must show that the particular injury was incurred because of the
execution of that policy. " Buehner v. City of Cleveland, 788 F. Supp. 3d 827, 879 (N. D. Ohio
2025). Plaintiff supports his Monell claim with methods (1), (3) and (4) outlined above.
(Compl. / Doc. 1, Pg. ID 6-7. ) The Court addresses each theory in turn.
Under the first theory. Plaintiff must show that "there were formal rules or
understandings - often but not always committed to writing- that were intended to and
did, establish fixed plans of action to be followed under similar circumstances
consistently and over time/' Jackson, 925 F.3d at 829 (quoting Pembauerv. City of Cincinnati,
475 U.S. 469, 480-81 (1986)) (cleaned up). Defendants argue, though, that Plaintiff has
failed to point "to a single policy that caused a violation of his rights. " (Motion/ Doc. 19,
Pg. ID 550.) In fact/ Defendants contend that the record speaks to the contrary: Officer
Baird conducted his investigation pursuant to the police department's policy, which
"exceeded that required by Ohio law to establish probable cause. " (Id.) Plaintiff does not
address this specific argument, nor attempt to point to a specific departmental policy that
led to Plaintiff's alleged injury. (See generally Response, Doc. 22. ) Accordingly, the Court
agrees that Plaintiffs Monell claim fails under this theory.
Nevertheless/ Plaintiff alleges that Ross Township's police department maintained
a policy that failed to adequately train its officers. (Compl., Doc. I/ Pg. ID 6-7.)
Importantly, a failure-to-train claim requires a showing of "prior instances of
unconstitutional conduct demonstrating that the municipality had ignored a history of
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abuse and was clearly on notice that the training in this particular area was deficient and
likely to cause injury. " Miller v. Sanilac Cnty., 606 F.3d 240, 255 (6th Cir. 2010) (cleaned
up). According to Defendants, Plaintiff can only point to one such instance-"his arrest
and subsequent prosecution, which is not indicative of a history of abuse. " (Motion, Doc.
19, Pg. ID 551. ) As Plaintiff points out, though, he "can rely on a single incident to
establish liability in a narrow range of circumstances if the risk of the constihitional
violation is so obvious or foreseeable that it amounts to deliberate indifference for the
municipality to fail to prepare its officers for it. " (Response, Doc. 22/ Pg. ID 819-20
(quoting Hozwll v. NaphCare, Inc., 67 F.4th 302, 319 (6th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up)). ) In one
such case. Plaintiff argues, the city "failed to put on any evidence that it does in fact
evaluate, review, or monitor the conduct its officers. " {Id. at Pg. ID 820 (citing Ouza v. City
of Dearborn Hts., 969 F. 3d 265, 287 (6th Cir. 2020)). ) The court in Ouza found that "there
was a factual dispute as to the municipality's deliberate indifference to its citizens
constitutional rights. " (Id. (citing Ouza, 969 F.3d at 287). ) Plaintiff argues that, here,
"deliberate indifference can be shown by the fact that Baird operated with no supervision
whatsoever, " having "no idea" if his report was reviewed and never discussing the arrest
decision with his supervisor. (Id.) The supervisor listed on the Investigation Report,
Officer Rogers/ testified that he was not involved in the case and never reviewed the
reports or evidence. {Id. ; see also Investigative Report, Doc. 16-5; Rogers Dep., Doc. 17, Pg.
ID 248.)
Defendants dispute this argument by first pointing out that Chief Burton Roberts
approved Officer Baird's report. (Reply, Doc. 23, Pg. ID 837; see also Rogers Dep., Doc. 17,
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Pg. ID 248, 255. ) Additionally, Officer Rogers testified that he "makes sure the officers are
doing what they have been fa-ained to do, " including "speaking to the appropriate people
involved" when there is a complaint of officer misconduct. (Id. (quoting Rogers Dep./
Doc. 17, Pg. ID 243, 251-52) (cleaned up). ) Defendants thus distinguish the circumstances
here with those in Ouza, where such review and monitoring did not occur. (Id. (citing
Ouza, 969 F.3d at 274). ) Furthermore, Defendants note that, in Ouza, the arrested plaintiff
was the victim of police misconduct twice in one night/ the conduct in question was
corroborated by a witness and the aggressor, and the prosecutor in that case declined to
prosecute. {Id. (citmg generally Ouza 969 F.3d 265). ) Meanwhile, here. Defendants reiterate
there was no formal complaint, the prosecutor pressed charges, and Officer Baird
followed policy and Ohio law, so there was no reason for further review of his actions.
(Id.) And/ the Court agrees. The circumstances here do not fall within that "narrow range
of circumstances" where the risk of a constitutional violation is so obvious that it renders
the township recklessly indifferent. See Hoioell, 67 F.4th at 319. While Plaintiff claims that
Officer Baird had "no idea" if his report was reviewed (see Response, Doc. 22, Pg. ID 287),
Officer Rogers testified that it was reviewed by a supervisor. (Rogers Dep./ Doc. 17, Pg.
ID 248, 255. ) This review included the supervisor examining the same evidence Officer
Baird had before him when making the report, like the video footage. (Id. at Pg. ID 255.)
Plaintiff has put forth no evidence that Ross Township was recklessly indifferent to the
conduct of Officer Baird.
Finally, Defendants address Plaintiffs Monell theory of a custom of tolerance/
which "requires a showing that there was a pattern of inadequately investigating similar
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claims. " (Motion, Doc. 19, Pg. ID 551 (citing Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426,
429 (6th Cir. 2005); Leach v. Shelby Cnty. Sheriff, 891 F. 2d 1241, 1248 (6th Cir. 1989)).)
Defendants point out that Plaintiff cites only his own case as a pattern, "which is no
pattern at all/' and does not put forth any similar claims for a custom-of-tolerance in the
township. (Id.) Plaintiff fails to counter this argument. [See generally Response, Doc. 22.)
Regardless, the Court finds that Defendants' reasoning is persuasive. The record is void
of any evidence as to a pattern of tolerating inadequate investigations. Thus, even if a
violation of law occurred here, "[o]ne alleged violation will not suffice; [Plaintiff] at a
minimum must show multiple previous incidents of similar misconduct. " Ciinninglwm v.
Shelby Cnty., No. 24-5241, 2024 U. S. App. LEXIS 29430, at *4 (6th Cir. Nov. 19, 2024)
(cleaned up). In sum, there is no dispute of material fact as to a failure-to-train or failure-
to-supervise; the Court agrees that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on
Plaintiffs Monell claim against Ross Township.
III. Qualified Immunity
As an additional ground for their Motion/ Defendants argue that Officer Baird is
protected by qualified immunity. (Motion/ Doc. 19, Pg. ID 552. ) Qualified immunity is an
affirmative defense that protects police officers from both liability and the lawsuit itself.
Greco v. Livingston, 774 F.3d 1061, 1063 (6th Cir. 2014); Smith v. City of Wyoming, 821 F.3d
697/ 708 (6th Cir. 2016). However/ as no claims remain against Officer Baird/ the Court
finds it unnecessary to analyze this argument. Nevertheless, the Court briefly notes that
a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on summary judgment/ "unless the fact,
when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff/ would permit a reasonable juror
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to find that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right; and (2) the right was clearly
established/' Quigley v. Tuong Vinh Thai, 707 F.3d 675, 680 (6th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up). To
this end, as the Court has established that Officer Baird had probable cause to make the
arrest. Plaintiff cannot show that Officer Baird violated a constitutional right. Officer
Baird is thus entitled to qualified immunity at this stage. See id.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing/ the Court ORDERS the following:
1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 19) is GRANTED;
2. Summary judgment is ENTERED in favor of Defendants on all claims;
and
3. This case is hereby TERMINATED from the Court's docket.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
^A^^^AP
JUDGE MATTHEW W. McFARLAND
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