govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_23-cv-03189-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
 
CESAR TERAN-SANCHEZ, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
 v. 
 
STREAM REALTY PARTNERS, 
 
 Defendant. 
 
Civil Action No. 23-03189 (AHA) 
 
 
 
Memorandum Opinion 
 Cesar Teran-Sanchez sues his former employer, Stream Realty Partners, and appears to 
assert claims of race and sexual orientation discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation, 
and breach of confidentiality. Teran-Sanchez asks for damages and reinstatement. Stream Realty 
moves to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing the claims are untimely and that Teran-Sanchez 
fails to state a claim. For the reasons below, the court grants the motion. 
I. Background1 
Teran-Sanchez worked at Stream Realty from December 2018 until October 2022. ECF 
No. 22 at 9. The amended complaint appears to focus on two incidents at the company . First, in 
February 2022, Teran-Sanchez asked a human resources manager about the company’s policy on 
payouts for vacation days upon resignation, and the manager forwarded the question to a company 
director, who then asked Teran-Sanchez about his career plans. See id. at 10, 15. Second, in April 
2022, Teran-Sanchez expressed interest in relocating from Dallas to Chicago, but was convinced 
 
1 As required at this stage, the court accepts the amended complaint’s well -pled factual 
allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in Teran-Sanchez’s favor. Banneker 
Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 

2 
to transfer to Washington, D.C. instead, partly due to promises of financial assistance for the 
relocation. Id. at 9–11. Teran-Sanchez signed an official transfer agreement, which scheduled him 
to start in D.C. in May 2022. Id. at 11. He traveled to D.C. around that time but never received any 
reimbursements for travel or temporary housing. Id. Teran-Sanchez also alleges he was excluded 
from work events, that he was not provided the necessary resources for his job, and that when he 
raised concerns, he was ignored. Id. at 6, 16–18. 
Teran-Sanchez sued Stream Realty, asserting race and sex discrimination , and retaliation 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . ECF No. 1. Stream Realty moved to dismiss the 
complaint, and the court dismissed the complaint without prejudice. ECF No. 12.2 Teran-Sanchez 
amended his complaint, reasserting his discrimination and retaliation claims, and adding claims 
for hostile work environment and breach of confidentiality. ECF No. 22. Stream Realty moves to 
dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6). ECF No. 24. 
II. Discussion 
The court concludes the amended complaint fails to plausibly allege any claim. To survive 
dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on 
its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The court “must take all the factual allegations in 
 
2 This case was initially assigned to the Honorable Dabney L. Friedrich, who granted Stream 
Realty’s motion to dismiss, and was reassigned to the Honorable Amir H. Ali on November 27, 
2024. 

3 
the complaint as true,” though it is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a 
factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). 
In cases like this involving an unrepresented or “pro se” litigant, the court is careful to give 
extra leeway. The court evaluates the complaint “in light of all filings, including filings responsive 
to a motion to dismiss.” Ho v. Garland , 106 F.4th 47, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). Of 
course, an unrepresented plaintiff still “must plead factual matter that permits the court to infer 
more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Jones v. Horne, 634 F.3d 588, 596 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(quotation marks omitted) (quoting Atherton v. District of Columbia, 567 F.3d 672, 681–82 (D.C. 
Cir. 2009)). While “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary, the plaintiff must furnish “more 
than labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 
The amended complaint does not plausibly allege claims of discrimination, hostile work 
environment, or retaliation under Title VII . To state a claim of discrimination under Title VII, a 
plaintiff must plausibly allege he suffered an adverse employment action because of a protected 
trait. Baloch v. Kempthorne , 550 F.3d 1191, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Although Teran -Sanchez 
describes general workplace difficulties like an uncompensated location transfer, being excluded 
from work events, not being provided necessary resources, and having his concerns ignored, he 
does not allege facts suggesting that these actions were taken because of his protected trait s, 
namely his race or sexual orientation. See ECF No. 22 at 9–11, 16–18. At most, he alleges that one 
co-worker made “[r]acial & homophobic remarks,” but this single, vague allegation is insufficient 
to support a reasonable inference of discrimination. Id. at 6; see King v. Pierce Assocs., Inc., 601 
F. Supp. 2d 245, 249 (D.D.C. 2009) (“[S]parse and vague allegations are insufficient to state a 

4 
claim for discrimination under Title VII.”) . Similarly, because he does not allege his workplace 
difficulties were due to his protected traits and does not allege “discriminatory intimidation, 
ridicule, and insult” that is “severe or pervasive ,” Teran-Sanchez does not state a hostile work 
environment claim. Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1201 (citation omitted); see also King, 601 F. Supp. 2d at 
248 (concluding that a single instance of discrimination does not state a claim of hostile work 
environment). Additionally, the amended complaint does not allege any of the elements of a 
retaliation claim, which requires that the plaintiff “opposed a practice made unlawful by Title VII,” 
and suffered a “materially adverse action” as a result. McGrath v. Clinton, 666 F.3d 1377, 1380 
(D.C. Cir. 2012). Thus, the amended complaint does not plausibly allege any claim under Title 
VII.3 
Teran-Sanchez’s “breach of confidentiality” claim must also be dismissed . According to 
Teran-Sanchez, Stream Realty’s human resources manager breached a duty of confidentiality by 
revealing that Teran-Sanchez had asked about the company’s vacation payout policy. ECF No. 22 
at 10, 12. But Teran -Sanchez does not identify any legal duty of confidentiality in that context, 
and he does not identify a cause of action for breach of such a duty.4 
 
3 To the extent Teran -Sanchez asserts his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or the D.C. Human 
Rights Act, he fails to state a claim for the same reasons. See Ruifang Hu v. K4 Solutions, Inc., No. 
18-cv-1240, 2020 WL 1189297, at *5 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2020) (“Title VII, DCHRA, and § 1981 
discrimination and retaliation claims are analyzed under the same legal standard.”). 
4 It is not clear whether Teran-Sanchez also asserts a promissory estoppel claim, but, if he does, 
the court must dismiss it too. Teran-Sanchez alleges that Stream Realty broke a promise to provide 
relocation assistance for his transfer to D.C., but also that he signed an “official transfer agreement 
on April 19, 2022.” ECF No. 22 at 11. The existence of an express contract generally forecloses a 
theory of promissory estoppel. See Plesha v. Ferguson, 725 F. Supp. 2d 106, 112 (D.D.C. 2010) 
(recognizing that because promissory estoppel assumes “an express, enforceable contract is absent, 
District of Columbia courts generally prohibit litigants from asserting these claims when there is 
an express contract that governs the parties ’ conduct” (citing Vila v. Inter -Am. Inv., Corp., 570 
F.3d 274, 279 (D.C. Cir. 2009))). 
 

5 
III. Conclusion 
For the se reasons, the court grants the motion to dismiss and this action is dismissed 
without prejudice. A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion. 
 
 
 
AMIR H. ALI 
United States District Judge 
 
Date: May 26, 2026 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Although the amended complaint mentions the Texas Labor Code, Teran -Sanchez does not 
assert any basis for relief under it. 

Passage view · GavelSight