govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_92-cr-00405-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
 
LYNDON ANTHONY DURANT, 
 
 Petitioner, 
 
 v. 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
 Respondent. 
 
Criminal Action No. 92-00405 (AHA) 
Civil Action No. 25-03217 (AHA) 
 
 
 
Memorandum Opinion 
Lyndon Anthony Durant moves to vacate his conviction for conspiring to distribute cocaine 
on the ground that his lawyer failed to advise him of the immigration consequences of pleading 
guilty. The government responds that Durant’s motion is untimely, that Durant cannot obtain relief 
because he is not in custody, and that Durant has not shown his lawyer was ineffective. The court 
agrees that Durant cannot succeed on his claim and therefore denies the motion to vacate. 
I. Background 
According to Durant’s motion, in March 1993, he was charged with conspiracy to distribute 
cocaine base. ECF No. 499 at 1. He pled guilty and the court sentenced him to probation, which 
Durant completed. Id. 
Durant, who is not a U.S. citizen, says that his defense lawyer did not advise him about the 
immigration consequences of pleading guilty , including that the conviction would make him 
subject to removal proceedings and ineligible for naturalization. Id. at 2. In January 2011, the 
Department of Homeland Security referred Durant for removal because of his conviction. Id. 

2 
Durant later applied for citizenship, and the government denied his application because of the 
conviction. Id. 
Durant moves to vacate his conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. ECF No. 499.1 
II. Discussion 
The court denies Durant’s § 2255 motion because, under binding precedent, he did not 
have a constitutional right to be advised of the immigration consequences of his plea at the time 
of his criminal proceedings. 
Section 2255 authorizes the court to “vacate, set aside or correct” a sentence “imposed in 
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). “The petitioner 
bears the burden of proof and must demonstrate his right to relief by a preponderance of the 
evidence.” United States v. Moore, 75 F. Supp. 3d 568, 571 (D.D.C. 2014) (citing United States v. 
Simpson, 475 F.2d 934, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1973)). The motion may be denied without a hearing if “the 
motion and the files and records of the case co nclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no 
relief.” United States v. Morrison, 98 F.3d 619, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255). 
There can be no dispute that Durant had a Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance 
of counsel during his criminal proceedings and can assert such a claim under § 2255. See United 
States v. Toms , 396 F.3d 427, 432 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ( “It is well -established that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel comprehends ‘the right to effective assistance of counsel,’ and that 
Sixth Amendment claims may be raised in section 2255 proceedings .” (quoting Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984))). To succeed on such a claim, a movant must generally 
 
1 In his reply, Durant asks the court to alternatively construe his motion as a “petition for writ 
of error coram nobis” if it finds he does not satisfy § 2255’s requirements. ECF No. 502 at 5. But 
the court need not decide how to construe his motion, because it concludes Durant has not 
demonstrated deficient performance by his counsel, and regardless of how his motion is construed, 
his Sixth Amendment claim requires this showing. 

3 
show his counsel’s performance was deficient and caused prejudice. Id. (citing Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687). Many years after Durant’s conviction, the Supreme Court recognized that a lawyer 
who fails to “inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation” is constitutionally 
deficient. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010). But the court has also since held that this 
guarantee “does not have retroactive effect” and does not apply to “defendants whose convictions 
became final prior to Padilla.” Chaidez v. United States , 568 U.S. 342, 344, 358 (2013). This 
precedent forecloses Durant’s motion. 
Durant argues he can still show his lawyer was deficient because, before the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Padilla, professional norms and precedent in multiple circuits had already 
recognized the duty to advise noncitizen clients of the immigration consequences of a conviction. 
ECF No. 502 at 4. But the Supreme Court rejected similar arguments in Chaidez. 568 U.S. at 356 
(reasoning that although “a minority of courts recognized a separate rule for material 
misrepresentations,” the rule did not apply to claim s based on counsel’s silence, which was not 
considered to violate the Sixth Amendment). And the Supreme Court included the D.C. Circuit 
among the jurisdictions that had foreclosed a Sixth Amendment claim based on failure to inform 
the defendant of immigration consequences. Id. at 350 n.7 (citing United States v. Del Rosario , 
902 F.2d 55, 58 –59 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ); see also United States v. Newman , 805 F.3d 1143, 1147 
(D.C. Cir. 2015) (stating that before Padilla, “defense attorneys had no duty to advise their clients 
about the immigration consequences of pleading guilty”); United States v. Willi ams, No. 02 -cr-
0273, 2022 WL 3211805, at *4 –6 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 2022) (concluding there was no deficient 
performance because movant had no right to be informed of immigration consequences of 
conviction before Padilla). 

4 
The record therefore shows Durant is “entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255.2 
III. Conclusion 
For these reasons, Durant’s motion to vacate his conviction is denied . A separate order 
accompanies this memorandum opinion. 
 
 
 
AMIR H. ALI 
United States District Judge 
 
Date: May 26, 2026 
 
2 The court need not reach the government’s arguments that Durant’s motion is untimely and 
that Durant was not “in custody” within the meaning of § 2255. See ECF No. 501 at 5–6 (quoting 
28 U.S.C. § 2255). 

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