govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-1_25-cv-14582-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
 
PATRICK DUFF, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
AARON CRESS, et al., 
 
Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 25-cv-14582 
 
 
OPINION 
 
 
 
APPEARANCES: 
 
Arun Lavine 
3131 Princeton Pike 
Building 2B, Suite 105 
Lawrenceville, NJ 08648 
 
On behalf of Plaintiff 
 
Ronald D. Coleman 
C
OLEMAN LAW FIRM, P.C. 
50 Park Place 
Suite 1105 
Newark, NJ 07102 
 
On behalf of Defendant Aaron Cress 
Rebekah R. Conroy 
S
TONE CONROY LLC 
25A Hanover Road 
Suite 301 
Florham Park, NJ 07932 
 
On behalf of Defendant Albuquerque Police Department PageID:
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O’HEARN, District Judge. 
INTRODUCTION 
 This matter comes before the Court on the motions to dismiss filed by Defendants Aaron 
Cress (“Cress”) and the Albuquerque Police Department (“APD ,” and jointly with Cress, 
“Defendants”). (ECF Nos. 21, 32). The Court did not hear oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 
78.1. For the reasons that follow, both motions are GRANTED without prejudice. 
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Plaintiff Patrick Duff (“Duff”) is a small-business owner in New Jersey. (Am. Compl., ECF 
No. 18 at ¶¶ 2, 13). His relationship with Cress began in 2022, when Duff retained attorney Corinne 
Mullen (“Mullen”), Cress’ boss, to prosecute a defamation action in New Jersey. (See id. ¶ 3). Duff 
alleges that, after Mullen and Cress dismissed that case without his authorization, Cress gave 
inconsistent explanations for the dismissal and misrepresented himself as a New Jersey attorney . 
(Id. ¶¶ 4–5). Duff thereafter confronted Cress about the dismissal and his lack of appropriate 
licensure. (Id. ¶ 5). This sparked, Duff claims, “a two-year campaign of retaliation” by Cress, in 
which Cress “use[d] false police reports and exaggerated narratives to criminalize Duff’s lawful 
speech.” (Id. ¶¶ 6–7). 
The Amended Complaint sets forth several incidents in Cress’ alleged pattern of retaliatory 
conduct, all primarily arising from Cress’ efforts to enforce a New Mexico protective order against 
Duff. On August 2 and October 7, 2024, Cress allegedly told APD in New Mexico that Duff had 
violated the protective order by making “extortionate threats” and publishing Cress’ children’s 
address, allegedly to “silence [Duff’s] speech.” ( Id. ¶¶ 16 –17). On January 14, 2025, Cress 
allegedly contacted the Haddon Heights Police Department (“HHPD”) in New Jersey to persuade 
officers there to charge Duff with violating the New Mexico protective order. (Id. ¶ 18). Five days PageID:
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later, Cress allegedly contacted APD again to report that Duff had violated the order by serving an 
“Order to Show Cause” upon Cress; according to Duff, APD officers discussed bringing charges 
against him and “coach[ed]” Cress to characterize future incidents as involving a “household 
member” to support more serious charges. ( Id. ¶¶ 19–20). Three days after that, Cress allegedly 
returned to APD and portrayed Duff as dangerous and mentally unstable. ( Id. ¶ 20). Finally, on 
July 29, 2025, Cress reported another violation of the New Mexico protective order to APD, which 
Duff alleges was fabricated; the local district attorney in New Mexico ultimately declined to 
prosecute because the communication occurred before the protective order took effect. (See id. ¶¶ 
8, 21–22, 28). F rom all of this, Duff claims that he had to “endure repeated arrests, public 
humiliation, and economic loss” due to Cress and APD’s “continuous course of retaliatory and 
defamatory conduct designed to silence [his] protected speech.” (Id. ¶ 23). 
The Amended Complaint alleges the following claims: Count I asserts a First Amendment 
retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Count II asserts a § 1983 due -process claim for 
fabrication of evidence; Count III asserts a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); Count IV 
asserts a state-law defamation per se claim;1 Count V asserts a state-law abuse-of-process claim; 
Count VI asserts an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim; and Count VII seeks 
declaratory and injunctive relief, including a declaration that the New Mexico protective order is 
unconstitutional as applied and an injunction barring further alleged retaliatory or fabricated 
enforcement activity. 
On October 20, 2025, Cress moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), and (b)(6). (ECF No. 21 at 13). On November 6, 
 
1 Count IV is the only claim alleged against Cress alone. PageID:
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2025, APD moved to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(2) and (b)(6). (ECF No. 32- 1 at 5). Duff 
opposed both motions. (ECF Nos. 45–46). 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
On a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff “bears 
the burden of demonstrating the facts that establish personal jurisdiction[.]” Pinker v. Roche 
Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 368 (3d Cir. 2002). The Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction must 
comport with both the forum state’s long- arm statute and the Due Process Clause of the federal 
Constitution. IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert, AG, 155 F.3d 254, 259 (3d Cir. 1998). In New Jersey, the 
statutory and constitutional analyses collapse into one because “New Jersey’s long- arm statute 
provides for jurisdiction coextensive with the due process requirements of the United States 
Constitution.” Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 96 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing N.J.
 CT. R. 
4:4-4(c)). 
When a court “resolves the jurisdictional issue in the absence of an evidentiary hearing and 
without the benefit of discovery, the plaintiff need only establish a prima facie case of personal 
jurisdiction.” Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Mylan Inc., 106 F. Supp. 3d 456, 461 (D.N.J. 2015). In 
such cases, a court takes “the uncontroverted allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as true and 
resolve[s] any factual conflicts in the affidavits and other written materials in the plaintiff’s favor.” 
Id. (internal punctuation and quotations omitted). 
Still, the plaintiff “‘bears the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,’ that 
personal jurisdiction is proper.” Cerciello v. Canale , 563 F. App’x 924, 925 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(quoting Carteret Sav. Bank, F A v. Shushan, 954 F.2d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 1992)). In assessing 
personal jurisdiction, “[w]hile disputed issues are construed in favor of the plaintiff, allegations 
may be contradicted by the defendant through opposing affidavits or other evidence, at which point PageID:
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the plaintiff must respond with ‘actual proofs, not mere allegations.’” Am. Bd. of Internal Med. v. 
Rushford, No. 14-06428, 2015 WL 5164791, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 2, 2015) (quoting Patterson v. 
FBI, 893 F.2d 595, 603 (3d Cir. 1990)). 
III. ANALYSIS 
Cress and APD each assert multiple grounds to dismiss the Amended Complaint. However, 
the Court will resolve both of their motions solely on the threshold issue of personal jurisdiction. 
See Sinochem Int’l Co., Ltd. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007) (quotations 
omitted) (noting that where several non-merits grounds for dismissal are raised, a court “has 
leeway to choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits”). For the 
following reasons, Defendants’ respective motions to dismiss are granted for lack of personal 
jurisdiction. 
Personal jurisdiction may be general or specific. General jurisdiction exists only when the 
defendant’s “affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them 
essentially at home in the forum State.” Goodye ar Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 
U.S. 915, 919 (2011). “ In contrast to general, all -purpose jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction is 
confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that 
establishes jurisdiction.” Id. (quotations omitted). For specific personal jurisdiction, t he inquiry 
has three parts: first, the defendant must have “purposefully directed [their] activities” at the forum; 
second, the litigation must “arise out of or relate to” at least one of those activities ; and third, if 
those requirements are satisfied, the court must consider whether exercising jurisdiction would 
“comport with fair play and substantial justice[.]” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 
472, 476 (1985) (quotations and citations omitted). PageID:
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Here, Duff asserts that this Court has specific personal jurisdiction over Cress and APD. 
For both Defendants, the Amended Complaint fails on its face because it does not adequately allege 
claims arising out of any specific minimum contacts that Cress or APD had with New Jersey. 
Beginning with Cress, a ll but one of the alleged instances of “retaliatory and defamatory 
conduct” occurred in New Mexico, where Cress reported alleged violations of the protective order 
to APD. Cress allegedly called APD in August and October 2024; he called APD again on January 
19 and 22, 2025; and, in July 2025, “Cress called APD again.” (Am. Compl., ECF No. 18 at ¶¶ 
16–17, 19–21). Each time, APD was obviously located in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Thus, 
missing from these allegations is the essential jurisdictional ingredient: any meaningful tie to New 
Jersey. These allegations therefore do not support specific personal jurisdiction over Cress in New 
Jersey. 
Indeed, the only allegation that Cress directed conduct toward New Jersey is a single call 
to HHPD in New Jersey on January 14, 2025, where Cress reported a violation of the New Mexico 
protective order and allegedly “pressure[d] local officers to criminally charge [Duff] despite 
[HHPD] having no jurisdiction.” (Am. Compl., ECF No. 18 at ¶ 18). Duff argues that this 
“deliberate contact with New Jersey law enforcement demonstrates purposeful direction of 
activities at the forum state.” (Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 45 at 12). The Court disagrees. 
Duff relies on Lillie v. Guerra , a North Carolina case, for the proposition that a police 
report filed with forum -state law enforcement may support specific personal jurisdiction. (Pl.’s 
Br., ECF No. 45 at 12 (citing 559 F. Supp. 3d 464 (M.D.N.C. 2021)). In Lillie, the court concluded 
that the non- resident defendants’ report to North Carolina police “support[ed]” purposeful 
availment because the defendants had sought the involvement of forum law enforcement in their 
dispute with North Carolina plaintiffs. 559 F. Supp. 3d at 473–74. But aside from being nonbinding PageID:
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precedent, Lillie does not bear the weight Duff places on it. Duff suggests that Lillie stands for the 
broader proposition that any police report to forum -state authorities, standing alone, creates 
specific jurisdiction for claims that may, in fact, arise from the report itself. However, the Lillie 
court’s analysis rested on a broader course of forum -directed conduct by the non -resident 
defendants, including that defendants “publish[ed] defamatory statements about [p]laintiffs and 
their [North Carolina] businesses” on various websites, “sent [p]laintiffs emails . . . wherein 
Defendants accused [p]laintiffs of fraudulent business practices,” and sent pictures and threatening 
text messages to plaintiffs “ implying [d]efendants were on their way to [p]laintiffs” in North 
Carolina. Id. at 469–70. Indeed, Lillie expressly recognized that, “even if the police report on its 
own” did not establish jurisdiction, “the combination of the police report with [d]efendants’ other 
actions” supported purposeful availment. Id. at 474. That factual distinction is dispositive here. 
Cress’ report to HHPD in New Jersey is the only conduct he directed at New Jersey. Unlike Lillie, 
the HHPD report was not one act in a larger course of New Jersey-directed actions. Rather, all of 
the remaining allegations here concern a New Mexico protective order and reports to New Mexico 
police. 
Moreover, though it is true that even a single act may be sufficient to assert specific 
jurisdiction in certain circumstances, exercising personal jurisdiction over Cress here would not 
comport with “fair play and substantial justice.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477–78; see Eaton Corp. 
v. Maslym Holding Co., 929 F. Supp. 792, 798 (D.N.J. 1996) (listing factors in the due process 
analysis, including “the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum state, plaintiff’s interest 
in obtaining relief, the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining efficient resolution of 
controversies, and, if relevant, the shared interest of the several states in furthering substantive 
social policies”). Cress is a New Mexico resident being asked to defend, in New Je rsey, claims PageID:
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arising from conduct occurring almost entirely within the New Mexico court system. New Jersey’s 
interest in this suit is comparatively limited, while New Mexico has a strong interest in adjudicating 
disputes concerning enforcement of a protective order entered within its jurisdiction. Duff’s 
preference for a New Jersey forum does not overcome these considerations, especially where he 
appears to ask this Court to adjudicate the legitimacy of the New Mexico protective order itself. 
Nor would the interstate system’s interest in efficient resolution be served by relitigating in this 
Court a controversy centered on New Mexico conduct and already address ed and adjudicated in 
prior state proceedings there. Accordingly, even assuming Cress’ HHPD report constitutes a forum 
contact, the exercise of specific jurisdiction would violate due process. The Court therefore lacks 
personal jurisdiction over Cress, and his motion to dismiss on that basis is granted. 
Turning to APD, the Court has little difficulty finding that personal jurisdiction is lacking. 
The entirety of the allegations against APD concern conduct occurring in New Mexico. Duff does 
not allege that APD officers traveled to New Jersey, communicated with New Jersey officials, 
invoked New Jersey law, served process in New Jersey, or otherwise directed any activity into this 
forum. 
Duff’s invocation of the “effects test” for personal jurisdiction, as set forth in Calder v. 
Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 784 (1984), does not save his claims against APD. (Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 46 at 
4–5). The effects test requires that tortious conduct be “expressly aimed” at the forum. Calder, 465 
U.S. at 789. “[M]ere injury to a forum resident is not a sufficient connection,” and neither is the 
defendant’s knowledge that the injury would be felt in the forum. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 
289–90 (2014). Here, Duff’s allegations that “APD officers knew [he] was a New Jersey resident” 
and “coached Cress on how to enhance charges against” him plainly do not meet the standard for PageID:
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“effects” personal jurisdiction. (Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 46 a t 9). The Court therefore lacks specific 
personal jurisdiction over Duff’s claims against APD. 
In sum, Duff’s allegations against Defendants are insufficient to establish personal 
jurisdiction.2 Both Cress and APD are therefore entitled to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(2). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Cress’ motion to dismiss, (ECF No. 21), and APD’s motion to 
dismiss, (ECF No. 32), are GRANTED without prejudice. An appropriate Order accompanies this 
Opinion. 
 
 
 
Date: May 26, 2026 ________________________ 
 CHRISTINE P. O’HEARN 
 United States District Judge 
 
 
 
2 Duff requests jurisdictional discovery in his opposition to APD’s motion, (Pl.’s Br., ECF No. 
46 at 9–10), but makes no comparable request in opposing Cress’ motion. In any event, 
jurisdictional discovery is not warranted because Duff has not “present[ed] factual allegations that 
suggest with reasonable particularity the possible existence of the requisite contacts between” 
Defendants and New Jersey. Aldossari ex rel. Aldossari v. Ripp, 49 F.4th 236, 259 (3d Cir. 2022) 
(quotations omitted) (“A plaintiff cannot show up in court with bare allegations and force 
defendants to start handing over evidence.”). Accordingly, to the extent Duff seeks jurisdictional 
discovery from either of the Defendants, that request is denied. PageID:
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