govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-2_24-cv-10750-0

NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
 
AMANDA JONES, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
 v. 
 
DAN KLEINMAN, 
 
 Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
 
Case No. 2:24-cv-10750 (BRM) (JSA) 
 
 OPINION 
 
MARTINOTTI, DISTRICT JUDGE 
 Before the Court is Defendant Dan Kleinman’s (“Kleinman”) Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings (ECF No. 53) to dismiss with prejudice Plaintiff Amanda Jones ’s (“Jones”) Complaint 
(ECF No. 1) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ( “Rule”) 12(c). 1 This Court has 
 
1 Kleinman moves to dismiss the Complaint with prejudice under New Jersey’s anti-SLAPP 
statute, i.e., Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (“UPEPA”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-49, 
et seq. (See generally ECF No. 53.) Like other anti-SLAPP statutes, UPEPA provides a defendant 
with a streamlined and expedited motion process —often called a “special” motion or an “anti -
SLAPP” motion—to dismiss a cause of action asserting a defamation claim relating to “a matter 
of public concern.” N.J . Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A -50(b)(3); see also Paucek v. Shaulis , 349 F.R.D. 
498, 509–10 (D.N.J. 2025); Hackenberg v. Bozin, Civ. A. No. 25 -1024, 2026 WL 165478, at *1 
(M.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 2026). A “special” motion to dismiss “shoulder[s] the plaintiff with a heightened 
or inverted pre-trial burden to avoid dismissal.” See Paucek, 349 F.R.D. at 509–10; see also N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-55(a)(3)(a) (requiring the court to dismiss the cause of action with prejudice 
if the plaintiff “fails to establish a prima facie case as to each essential element”). Additionally, 
the UPEPA requires the reviewing court to award attorneys ’ fees and costs to the prevailing 
movant pursuant to a “special” motion, a motion to dismiss or a summary judgment motion. See 
Paucek, 349 F.R.D. at 516 –19 (holding provision mandating attorneys ’ fees and costs to a 
prevailing moving party substantive and applicable in the federal courts but provision mandating 
same to a prevailing responding party procedural and, as such, not applicable in the federal courts 
(citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-58)). 
 
Although Kleinman labels his motion as a “special” motion pursuant to UPEPA, Kleinman relies 
on neither the streamlined and expedited motion process nor the inverted pre-trial burden standard PageID:
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jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Jones filed an Opposition (ECF No. 54), and 
Kleinman filed a Reply (ECF No. 56). Having reviewed and considered the submissions filed in 
connection with the motion and having declined to hold oral argument pursuant to Rule 78(b), for 
the reasons set forth below and for good cause having been shown, Kleinman ’s Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED. 
I. BACKGROUND 
“The difference between a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(c) is 
only a matter of timing and the Court applies the same standard to a Rule 12(c) motion as it would 
to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Newton v. Greenwich Twp., Civ. A. No. 12-238, 2012 WL 3715947, 
at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 27, 2012) (citing Turbe v. Gov ’t of V.I. , 938 F.2d 427, 428 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
Therefore, for the purposes of this motion, the Court accepts the factual allegations in the 
Complaint as true and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to Jones. See Phillips v. 
Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). The Court also considers any “document 
integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint. ” In re Burlington Coat Factory Secs. Litig., 
 
in support of same. ( See generally ECF No. 53.) Nor could he in federal court. See Paucek, 349 
F.R.D. at 512–13 (holding these provisions of the UPEPA conflict with Rules 12 and 56 and, as 
such, cannot apply in federal court); see also Berk v. Choy, 146 S. Ct. 546, 552 (2026) (holding “a 
valid [Rule] displaces contrary state law”). It appears to the Court the sole purpose of labeling the 
motion as a “special” motion rather than a Rule 12 motion was to request a mandated award of 
attorney’s fees and costs as a prevailing party under the UPEPA. (See ECF No. 53 -1 at 38.) A 
prevailing party’s right to mandated attorney’s fees and costs under the UPEPA , however, is not 
restricted to a “special” motion but may also be available when a defendant secures dismissal in 
the federal court under either Rule 12 or 56. See Paucek, 349 F.R.D. at 519. Such a request should 
be filed in a distinct and separate motion after the defendant secures dismissal. See id. (“If [the 
defendant] prevails on a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings or on a Rule 56 motion 
for summary judgment, he may file an application for attorney's fees under UPEPA.”). 
Accordingly, the Court converts Kleinman’s “special” motion to dismiss under the UPEPA to a 
standard motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) and, as such, Kleinman’s request 
for attorneys’ fees and costs is DENIED AS MOOT. PageID:
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114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Shaw v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1220 (1st 
Cir. 1996)). 
 A. Factual Background 
Jones is employed as an elementary school librarian in the Live Oak Middle School 
Library. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 2 –3.) In 2021, she was named the School Library Journal National 
Librarian of the Year. Jones v. Citizens for a New Louisiana, 2023-0654 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/7/25), 
424 So. 3d 208, 213 n.1, writ denied , 2025 -01341 (La. 2/10/26), 425 So. 3d 1207 . Kleinman 
operates a blog titled “SafeLibraries.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 1.) He regularly promotes his blog on the 
social media platform X (f/k/a Twitter) under the handle “@SexHarrassed.” (Id.) 
On July 19, 2022, Jones attended a Livingston Parish Library Board meeting, during which 
she opposed a proposed policy to impose content-based book restrictions in the Livingston Parish 
Library. Jones, 424 So. 3d at 207. Michale Lunsford (“Lunsford”) and Ryan Thames (“Thames”) 
also attended the meeting. Id. at 213. Lunsford is the executive director of the non -profit 
organization Citizens for a New Louisiana. Id. Thames operates a Facebook blog titled “Bayou 
State of Mind.” Id. 
Following the meeting, Lunsford and Thames post ed online accusations that Jones had 
advocated for “providing erotic and pornographic material to children [] and teaching children to 
perform sexual acts.” Id. In support of same, Lunsford and Thames repeatedly referenced a book 
titled Let’s Talk About It: The Teen’s Guide to Sex, Relationships, and Being a Human, which had 
not been mentioned at the meeting. Id. As a result of these posts, Jones allegedly suffered harm to 
her personal and professional reputation and received death threats. Id. 
On August 9, 2022, Jones filed a complaint against Lunsford, Thames, and Citizens for a 
New Louisiana, alleging their false statements portrayed Jones as both a criminal and a pedophile PageID:
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and seeking injunctive relief to enjoin further harassment and defamation in the District Court of 
Louisiana captioned Jones v. Citizens for a New Louisiana (the “Citizens Action”). Id. Due to the 
Citizens Action, Jones received national attention.2 (See ECF No. 54 at 7, 9.) 
Following the initiation of the Citizens Action, Kleinman began publishing statements 
concerning Jones on both X and SafeLibraries. ( See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 20, 22 –66, 68 –72.) These 
statements can be effectively distilled into the following related categories: Jones shares age -
inappropriate, sexual materials with school children ( id. ¶ 27, 42, 72); Jones “grooms” school 
children (id. ¶¶ 26, 30, 32–34, 36, 38–40, 43–48, 50, 54, 56–62, 69–71); Jones “sexualizes” school 
children (id. ¶¶ 25, 28–29, 31, 36, 38, 49, 51 –52, 54–55, 57, 65, 68); and Jones assists others in 
“grooming” and “sexualizing” school children ( id. ¶¶ 24, 37). ( See also id. ¶ 23 (stating Jones 
“trains students to use [Grindr] to meet men for a night ”); id. ¶ 33 (stating Jones “preys” on 
children); id. ¶ 68 (stating Jones “targets” school children); id. ¶¶ 63, 66 (stating Jones and Live 
Oak Middle School are colluding “to violate state law pertaining to open public records ”); id. 
¶¶ 64–65 (claiming Jones “packs heat” to murder parents); id. ¶ 53 (implying Jones is a “child sex 
offender”).) The statements often refer to Jones as a middle school librarian and the allegedly 
“groomed” and “sexualized” children as middle school children. (See id. ¶¶ 28, 33, 36, 38, 39, 43, 
46, 54, 67–68.) Based on these allegations, Kleinman advocated for her termination as a middle 
school librarian. (See id. ¶¶ 41, 46, 67–68.) In 2024, Kleinman published similar accusations in an 
email issued to Live Oak Middle School Library. (See id. ¶ 67.) Due to these statements, Kleinman 
 
2 On October 7, 2025, the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit held Jones has established a 
probability of success as to the elements of her defamation claim as Lunsford and Thames’ s 
statements were, if not defamatory per se, clearly susceptible of a defamatory meaning. Jones, 424 
So. 3d at 221. PageID:
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has received national attention and has been featured as a guest for a ticketed event and a radio 
talk show. (See id. ¶¶ 3, 14–15.) 
 B. Procedural History 
On November 26, 2024, Jones filed the Complaint. (ECF No. 1.) The Complaint alleges 
two common-law causes of action: defamation (Count One) (id. ¶¶ 73–98); and false light (Count 
Two) (id. ¶¶ 99–102).3 Kleinman filed an Answer on January 21, 2025 (ECF No. 6), which he 
promptly amended on January 22, 2025 (ECF No. 7). 
 On October 10, 2025, Kleinman filed the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant 
to Rule 12(c). (ECF No. 53.) Jones filed an Opposition on October 20, 2025 (ECF No. 54), and 
Kleinman filed a Reply on October 27, 2025 (ECF No. 56). Kleinman subsequently filed multiple 
notices of supplemental authority (ECF Nos. 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 65, 66), to which Jones responded 
on January 9, 2026 (ECF No. 62). On February 26, 2026, Jones filed a correspondence updating 
the Court on the status of the Citizen Action. (ECF No. 63; see also ECF No. 64 (amending the 
correspondence to include a proper electronic signature).) 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
Rule 12(c) provides: “After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—
a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Pursuant to Rule 12(c), the movant for judgment 
on the pleadings must establish: (1) no material issue of fact remains to be resolved; and (2) the 
entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Rosenau v. Unifund Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 221 (3d 
 
3 Jones filed an identical complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Louisiana. (Civ. A. Nos. 24 -972, 25-15342, ECF No. 1.) On September 5, 2025, the Honorable 
Brian A. Jackson, U.S.D.J., transferred the matter to the District of New Jersey pursuant to the 
“first-to-file rule.” (Civ. A. Nos. 24 -972, 25-15342, ECF Nos. 19, 20.) On September 23, 2025, 
Jones requested to withdraw the transferred matter (ECF No. 51), which the Court promptly 
granted (ECF No. 52; accord Civ. A. Nos. 24-972, 25-15342, ECF No. 23.) PageID:
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Cir. 2008) (citing Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 290–91 (3d Cir. 1988)). 
In resolving a motion made pursuant to Rule 12(c), the Court must view the facts in the pleadings 
and the inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-movant. See id. 
Furthermore, although a motion for judgment on the pleadings is appropriate after the 
pleadings have been closed, such a motion is reviewed under the same standards that apply to a 
motion to dismiss made under Rule 12(b)(6). See Szczurek v. Pro. Mgmt. Inc. , 627 F. App’x 57, 
60 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Revell v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. , 598 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 2010)); 
see also Muhammad v. Sarkos , Civ. A. No. 12 -7206, 2014 WL 4418059, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 8, 
2014) (citing Turbe, 938 F.2d at 428) ( “Where a defendant’s motion is one for judgment on the 
pleadings pursuant to [Rule] 12(c), it is treated under the same standards as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 
where it alleges that a plaintiff has failed to state a claim.”); Gebhart v. Steffen, 574 F. App’x 156, 
157 (3d Cir. 2014). “The difference between Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c) is purely procedural as 
[Rule] 12(c) requests for dismissal are governed by the same standards as [Rule] 12(b)(6) 
motions.” Glob. Naps, Inc. v. Bell Atl. -N.J., Inc., 287 F. Supp. 2d 532, 539 (D.N.J. 2003) (citing 
Turbe, 938 F.2d at 428). As with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, in deciding a Rule 12(c) motion, the 
court must “view[] the facts alleged in the pleadings and the inferences to be drawn from those 
facts in the light most favorable to the” nonmovant. Barnard v. Lackawanna Cnty., 696 F. App’x 
59, 61 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). A court may only grant a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings if the moving part y “clearly establishes that no material issue of fact 
remains to be resolved and that [the movant] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rosenau, 
539 F.3d at 221 (quoting Jablonski, 863 F.2d at 290–91). PageID:
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III. DECISION 
Kleinman moves to dismiss the Complaint with prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(c). See supra 
n.1. Specifically, Kleinman argues Jones fails to allege sufficient facts in support of the necessary 
elements of a common -law defamation claim and a false light claim. (Id. at 24–37.) The Court 
begins with a choice of law analysis, then addresses each argument in turn. 
 A. Choice of Law Analysis 
A federal court sitting in diversity “must apply the choice of law rules of the forum state to 
determine what law will govern the substantive issues of a case. ” Mills v. Ethicon, Inc. , 406 F. 
Supp. 3d 363, 373 (D.N.J. 2019) (quoting Warriner v. Stanton, 475 F.3d 497, 499 –500 (3d Cir. 
2007)); accord Zanetich v. Wal-Mart Stores E., Inc., 123 F.4th 128, 140 (3d Cir. 2024). New Jersey 
utilizes “the most-significant-relationship test, which consists of two prongs.” Mills, 406 F. Supp. 
3d at 373; see also Calabotta v. Phibro Animal Health Corp., 213 A.3d 210, 219 (N.J. Super. App. 
Div. 2019) ( “[O]ur courts apply the most -significant-relationship test in tort matters to resolve 
choice-of-law questions. ”). First, the court is required to determine whether a conflict exists 
between the potentially applicable state laws. Mills, 406 F. Supp. 3d at 373. If a conflict exists, the 
court is then required to “determine which state has the ‘most significant relationship’ to the claims 
asserted.” Paucek v. Shaulis, 349 F.R.D. 498, 520 (D.N.J. 2025) (quoting P.V. ex rel. T.V. v. Camp 
Jaycee, 962 A.2d 453, 455 (N.J. 2008)). 
 1. New Jersey & Louisiana Law Conflict 
“A conflict of law arises when the application of one or another state ’s law may alter the 
outcome of the case or when the law of one interested state is ‘offensive or repugnant’ to the public 
policy of the other. ” In re Accutane Litig. , 194 A.3d 503, 517 (N.J. 2018) (citation omitted) PageID:
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(quoting Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Honeywell Int ’l, Inc., 188 A.3d 297, 311 (N.J. 2018)). If no conflict 
exists, the analysis ends, and New Jersey law applies. See Mills, 406 F. Supp. 3d at 373. 
Here, Kleinman argues New Jersey law governs the substantive issues of this matter. (See 
ECF No. 53.) In contrast, Jones argues Louisiana law governs. ( See ECF No. 54 at 19 –28.) 
Although the parties agree the necessary elements required to sufficiently plead a common -law 
defamation claim and a false light claim under New Jersey and Louisiana law do not create an 
actual conflict ( see id. at 20 –24; ECF No. 56 at 5 –6), the parties recognize the specific 
requirements and language of the state’s respective anti-SLAPP statutes conflict (see ECF No. 54 
at 24–26; ECF No. 56 at 6). 
SLAPPs—strategic lawsuits against public participation —are lawsuits filed to silence a 
defendant exercising his First Amendment rights by forcing the defendant to either “abandon his 
speech or suffer through years of costly litigation. ” Paucek, 349 F.R.D. at 509. In response, an 
anti-SLAPP statute typically provides a defendant with “an expedited and streamlined process to 
dismiss claims implicating [the] defendant ’s speech to reduc[e] the burden in terms of time and 
costs.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks om itted). The strongest anti -SLAPP 
statutes apply broadly and commonly include the following features: a heightened burden on the 
plaintiff to show a likelihood of success on the merits at the pre -trial stage; a mandated stay of 
discovery pending the outcome of a motion to dismiss or summary judgment; if the motion to 
dismiss or summary judgment is denied, an entitlement to an immediate interlocutory appeal; and 
if the motion is granted, mandated attorney fees and costs. See Paucek, 349 F.R.D. at 509 (citing 
Nicole J. Ligon, Solving SLAPP Slop , 57 U. RICH. L. REV. 459, 466 (2023); Benjamin Ernst, 
Fighting SLAPPS in Federal Court: Erie, The Rules Enabling Act, and the Application of State 
Anti-SLAPP Laws in Federal Diversity Actions, 56 BOSTON COLL. L. REV. 1181, 1188 (2015)). It PageID:
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is well-established, “[m]andatory anti-SLAPP fee-shifting is one of the most important features of 
an anti-SLAPP statute.” Paucek, 349 F.R.D. at 509. 
Differences between anti -SLAPP statutes are sufficient to demonstrate a conflict of law 
requiring the Court to proceed “to the next step of the conflict of laws analysis.” See Paucek, 349 
F.R.D. at 520; Diamond Ranch Acad., Inc. v. Filer , 117 F. Supp. 3d 1313, 1320 (D. Utah 2015); 
see also Donovan v. W. R. Berkley Corp., 566 F. Supp. 3d 224, 234 (D.N.J. 2021) (holding where 
state statutes provide for different remedies, such as attorney ’s fees and costs, “a conflict of law 
exists”). 
 2. Most Significant Relationship Test 
To determine which state has the most significant relationship, the court must first identify 
the presumptive rule of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971) ( “Second 
Restatement”) “for the specific kind of tort claims asserted. ” Paucek, 349 F.R.D. at 520 (citing 
Camp Jaycee, 962 A.2d at 455). “That presumptive rule determines the choice of law outcome 
unless the general tort principles outlined in Section 145 of the Second Restatement or the general 
principles regarding competing state interests outlined in Section 6 demand a different result.” Id. 
at 520–21 (citing Camp Jaycee, 962 A.2d at 455; Sarver v. Chartier, 813 F.3d 891, 897 (9th Cir. 
2016)). 
Section 150 supplies the presumptive rule for multistate defamation claims “involving 
aggregate communications made over the internet.” Paucek, 349 F.R.D. at 521 (citing Fairfax Fin. 
Holdings Ltd. v. S.A.C. Cap. Mgmt., L.L.C. , 160 A.3d 44, 75 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2017)); see 
also Monarch v. Gorman, Civ. A. No. 14-5980, 2015 WL 5584555, at *3 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 
2015) (similarly utilizing Section 150 as the presumptive rule for multistate false light claims). 
The rule provides such a claim should be de termined by the law of the state that “has the most PageID:
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significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties, ” which “will usually be the state where 
the [plaintiff] was domiciled at the time.” Restatement §§ 150(1), (2); see also Restatement § 150 
cmt. e (stating the state of the plaintiff ’s domicile is assumed to be “the state where the plaintiff 
has suffered the greatest injury by reason of [her] loss of reputation”); accord Paucek, 349 F.R.D. 
at 521. 
Here, the Complaint alleges Plaintiff is domiciled in Louisiana. ( ECF No. 1 ¶ 8.) 
Furthermore, the Complaint alleges she has suffered the greatest injury to her reputation in 
Louisiana. (See id. ¶¶ 13, 17–18.) Kleinman denies neither allegation. (See generally ECF No. 53.) 
Accordingly, the presumptive rule provides the claims in this matter should be determined under 
Louisiana law , unless the rule is outweighed by the general tort principles under Restatement 
Section 145 or the state interest factors under Section 6. 
 a. General Tort Principles – Restatement Section 145 
Section 145 supplies the general choice of law factors involving all torts. Paucek, 349 
F.R.D. at 523 (citing Camp Jaycee, 962 A.2d at 458, 461 –63). These factors are: “(1) the place 
where the injury occurred; (2) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (3) the 
domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties; and 
(4) the place where the relationship, if any, b etween the parties is centered. ” Id. (quoting Camp 
Jaycee, 962 A.2d at 458). However, i n matters alleging multistate defamation claims involving 
aggregate communications made over the internet, the first and second factors, i.e., the place where 
the injury and the conduct causing the injury occurred, “will not play an important role in the 
selection of the state of the applicable law. ” Id. § 145 cmt. e. In such matters, “the place of the 
plaintiff’s domicil . . . is the single most important contact for determining the state of the 
applicable law. ” Id.; accord id. § 145 cmt. f. Accordingly, t he general choice of law factors PageID:
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strongly weigh in favor of an application of Louisiana law and, as such, do not outweigh the 
presumptive rule that the state with the most significant relationship to the claims is the state where 
the plaintiff was domiciled at the time. 
 b. The State Interest Factors—Restatement Section 6 
Section 6 supplies the state interest factors. Paucek, 349 F.R.D. at 524. The New Jersey 
Supreme Court has reduced these factors to the following: “(1) the interests of interstate comity; 
(2) the interests of the parties; (3) the interests underlying the field of tort law; (4) the interests of 
judicial administration; and (5) the competing interests of the states. ” Camp Jaycee, 962 A.2d at 
463 (quoting Erny v. Est. of Merola, 792 A.2d 1208, 1217 (N.J. 2002)). However, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court has emphasized these factors are not of equal weight. The most important factor is 
the fifth factor (the competing interests of the states); then the first and third factors (the interests 
of interstate comity and underlying the field of tort law ); and the least important factors are the 
second and fourth (the interests of the parties and judicial administration). Erny, 792 A.2d at 1217 
(citing Fu v. Fu, 733 A.2d 1133, 1142 (N.J. 1999)); see also Paucek, 349 F.R.D. at 524 (stating 
the federal court primarily focuses on first and fifth factors, i.e., the competing interests of the 
states and the interests of interstate comity). 
It is well -established, substantial differences between anti -SLAPP statutes may be 
sufficient to defeat the presumptive rule that the state with the most significant relationship to the 
claims is the state where the plaintiff was domiciled at the time. See Paucek, 349 F.R.D. at 524 
(citing Sarver, 813 F.3d at 897 –900; Woods Servs., Inc. v. Disability Advocs., Inc. , 342 F. Supp. 
3d 592, 607–08 (E.D. Pa. 2018); Evans v. TheHuffingtonPost.com, Inc., C.A., Civ. A. No. 22-1180, 
2023 WL 5275383, at *3–5 (D. Del. Aug. 16, 2023)). Under such circumstances, the court should 
apply the law of the state with the clearly broader and stronger anti-SLAPP relief. See id. at 524– PageID:
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25. This is especially so if the allegedly defamatory speech originated in the state with the broader 
and strong anti-SLAPP relief. See Paucek, 349 F.R.D. at 525. Absent substantial differences in the 
strength between anti-SLAPP statutes, however, “there is no reason to favor [one state] ’s policy 
over that of [another].” See Ayyadurai v. Floor64, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 3d 343, 354 (D. Mass. 2017) 
(holding California ’s interest in protecting its citizens against SLAPPs does not inherently 
outweigh Massachusetts ’s “interest in protecting its citizens from tortious conduct ”); see also 
Evans, 2024 WL 3949070, at *3 (holding the court may not assume one state ’s interest in 
protecting its citizen’s right to his free speech inherently outweighs another state ’s interest in 
protecting its citizen’s right to an uninterrupted enjoyment of her reputation). 
Here, New Jersey’s anti-SLAPP statute—UPEPA—and Louisiana’s statute—Article 971 
of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure ( “Article 971”)—are strong anti-SLAPP statutes. Both 
apply broadly to statements made in connection with a “public concern” or “issue” and permit a 
defendant to file a “special” motion to dismiss a defamation claim relating to same. See generally 
N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:53A-50 to -56; La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 971. However, neither statute 
includes all of the common features of the strongest anti-SLAPP statutes. See Paucek, 349 F.R.D. 
at 509; see, e.g., La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 971 (failing to provide the right to file an immediate 
interlocutory appeal); see also, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A -52 (failing to mandate a stay of 
discovery). Furthermore, the comparative strength of each feature varies between statute s. For 
example, the UPEPA imposes a higher burden on the plaintiff to sufficiently state a defamation 
claim at the pre-trial stage. Compare N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-55(a)(3)(a), -57, with La. Code Civ. 
Proc. Ann. art. 971. In contrast, although both Article 971 and the UPEPA require the court to 
award attorneys’ fees and costs to a prevailing moving party, only Article 971 requires the court PageID:
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to award same to a prevailing responding party. Compare La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 971(B), 
with N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-58. 
Under these circumstances, there is no reason to favor New Jersey ’s anti-SLAPP statute 
over Louisiana ’s statute. Both statutes equally apply to includ e the allegedly defamatory 
statements in this matter. See N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:53A -50(b)(3); La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 
971(A)(1). Furthermore, both include the common features of the strongest anti -SLAPP statutes, 
including a heighted burden on the plaintiff to show a likelihood of success on the merits at t he 
pre-trial stage, see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-55(a)(3)(a); La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 971(A)(1); 
see also Diamond Ranch Acad. , 117 F. Supp. 3d at 1320 (holding California law should apply 
where the California anti-SLAPP statute included a heightened burden feature and the Utah anti -
SLAPP statute did not), and a mandatory award of attorneys’ fees and costs to a prevailing moving 
party, see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A-58(1); La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 971(B); see also Paucek, 
349 F.R.D. at 524 (holding New Jersey law should a pply where the UPEPEA mandated attorney 
fees and cost to the prevailing moving party and Maryland’s anti-SLAPP statute did not). Finally, 
although the strength of each statute ’s features varies, neither statute ’s features are consistently 
stronger than the others. See, e.g. , N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A -55(a)(3)(a) (imposing a stronger 
heighted burden on the plaintiff); La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 971(D) (imposing a mandatory 
award of attorneys’ fees and costs to a prevailing responding party). Therefore, as neither statute 
is clearly stronger than the other, there is no reason to favor New Jersey’s policy over that of 
Louisiana. See Evans, 2024 WL 3949070, at *3. 
Accordingly, New Jersey ’s interest in applying its own anti -SLAPP statute does not 
outweigh Louisiana’s interest in protecting its citizens from tortious conduct. As such, the state 
interest factors are neutral and do not outweigh the presumptive rule that the state with the most PageID:
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significant relationship to the claims is the state where the plaintiff was domiciled at the time —
Louisiana. 
B. Rule 12(c)4 
 1. Defamation Claim 
“[A]lthough a defamation suit has profound First Amendment implications, it is 
fundamentally a state cause of action. Accordingly, adjudicating such claims requires inquiries 
under both state and federal law. ” McDowell v. Paiewonsky , 769 F.2d 942, 945 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(citing Marcone v. Penthouse International Magazine for Men , 754 F.2d 1072, 1077 (3d 
Cir.1985)); accord Hill v. Cosby, 665 F. App’x 169, 174 (3d Cir. 2016). “In the first instance, the 
Court must determine whether the defendant has injured the plaintiff ’s reputation under the 
applicable state law. If so, then the Court must ascertain whether the First Amendment nevertheless 
prohibits the imposition of liability.” McDowell, 769 F.2d at 945; accord DeGroat v. Cooper, Civ. 
A. No. 13-7779, 2014 WL 1922831, at *3 (D.N.J. May 14, 2014). 
To sufficiently state a defamation claim under Louisiana law, a plaintiff must allege the 
following four elements: “(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) an 
unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault (negligence or greater) on the part of the 
publisher; and (4) resulting injury.” Watson v. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr., 93 So. 3d 855, 858 (La. 
App. 2 Cir. 2012) (quoting Kennedy v. Sheriff of E. Baton Rouge , 2005-1418 (La. 7/10/06), 935 
So. 2d 669, 674; Costello v. Hardy, 03–1146 (La.1/21/04), 864 So. 2d 129, 139). Accordingly, “to 
 
4 Although Kleinman did not specifically address the elements of a defamation claim under 
Louisiana law in his moving papers ( see generally ECF Nos. 53, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61 , 65, 66), 
the Court finds it appropriate to review Kleinman’s argument under Louisiana law as both parties 
agree the necessary elements required to sufficiently plead a common-law defamation claim and a 
false light claim under New Jersey and Louisiana law do not conflict (see ECF No. 54 at 20–24; 
ECF No. 56 at 5–6). PageID:
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prevail on a defamation claim, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant, with actual malice or other 
fault, published a false statement with defamatory words that caused plaintiff damages. ” Jones, 
424 So. 3d at 218 (quoting Costello, 864 So. 2d at 139–40). 
Here, Kleinman argues the Complaint fails to sufficiently allege the following elements: a 
false and defamatory statement (see ECF No. 53-1 at 24–32), and fault (see id. at 33–37). Kleinman 
does not claim the Complaint fails to allege the elements of unprivileged publication to a third -
party or resulting injury. (See generally id.) 
 a. Defamatory & False Statement 
The threshold issue in a defamation claim is whether the statement complained of is 
defamatory, i.e., capable of defamatory meaning, which is an issue of law to be decided by the 
court. See Johnson v. Purpera, 2020-01175 (La. 5/13/21), 320 So. 3d 374, 390; Costello, 864 So. 
2d at 140 “In evaluating whether a statement is capable of defamatory meaning, a court asks 
‘whether a listener could have reasonably understood the communication, taken in context, to have 
been intended in a defamatory sense. ’” Block v. Tanenhaus, 867 F.3d 585, 592 (5th Cir. 2017) 
(quoting Sassone, 626 So. 3d at 352). In other words, the issue to be decided is whether the 
statement is objectively capable of a defamatory meaning or innuendo “considering the statement 
as a whole, the context in which it was made, and the effect it is reasonably intended to produce in 
the mind of the average listener, ” Lewis v. M7 Prods., LLC , 427 F. Supp. 3d 705, 724 (M.D. La. 
2019) (quoting Bell v. Rogers , 698 So. 2d 749, 754 (La. Ct. App. 2nd Cir. 08/20/9 7)); see also 
Johnson, 320 So. 3d at 388 (“[W]hether a communication is capable of a particular meaning and 
whether that meaning is defamatory is a question for the court; whether a communication, which 
is capable of a defamatory meaning, was so understood by its recipient is a question for the tri er 
of fact or the jury.”). PageID:
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“In Louisiana, defamatory words have traditionally been divided into two categories: those 
that are defamatory per se and those that are susceptible of a defamatory meaning. ” Schmidt v. 
Cal-Dive Int’l, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d 532, 542 (W.D. La. 2017) (quoting Kennedy, 935 So. 2d at 
674). If the plaintiff establishes the statement complained of is defamatory per se , then the 
remaining elements of falsity, malice, and injury are presumed and “the burden shifts to the 
defendant to rebut the presumed elements.” Hoffman v. Bailey, 257 F. Supp. 3d 801, 819–21 (E.D. 
La. 2017). In contrast, if the plaintiff fails to establish the statement is defamatory per se, then the 
plaintiff bears the burden to prove all five elements. See id. However, in matters involving 
statements made about a public figure, the plaintiff bears the burden to prove all five elements 
regardless of whether the statement is defamatory per se. See Starr v. Boudreaux, 2007-0652 (La. 
App. 1 Cir. 12/21/07), 978 So. 2d 384, 390. 
A statement is defamatory per se if it either “expressly or implicitly accuse[s] another of 
criminal conduct ” or “by [its] very nature tend[s] to injure one ’s personal or professional 
reputation.” Schmidt, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 542 (quoting Kennedy, 935 So. 2d at 674). Examples of 
statements commonly found to constitute defamatory per se include accusations of business 
misfeasance, being infected with a “loathsome disease,” or engaging in “sexual misconduct.” See 
Spears v. Louisiana Coll., Civ. A. No. 20-30522, 2023 WL 2810057, at *7 (5th Cir. Apr. 6, 2023); 
see also Klocke v. Watson , Civ. A. No. 20 -10103, 2021 WL 5871884, at *7 (5th Cir. Dec. 10, 
2021). Otherwise, a statement is defamatory if it “tend[s] to harm the reputation of another so as 
to lower the person in the estimation of the community, to deter others from associating or dealing 
with the person[,] or otherwise expose [the] person to contempt and ridicule.” Lewis, 427 F. Supp. 
3d at 724 (quoting Kennedy, 935 So. 2d at 674); see also Jones, 424 So. 3d at 217–19 (“Words PageID:
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which convey an element of personal disgrace, dishonesty, or disrepute are defamatory.” (quoting 
Costello, 864 So. 2d at 140)). 
However, “[a] pure statement of opinion, which is based totally on the speaker’s subjective 
view and which does not expressly state or imply the existence of underlying facts, usually will 
not be actionable in defamation. ” Zelenak v. Beauregard Elec. Coop. Inc. , Civ. A. No. 24 -1803, 
2025 WL 2025177, at *3 (W.D. La. July 18, 2025) (quoting Bussie v. Lowenthal, 535 So. 2d 378, 
381 (La. 1988)). That is “because without an assertion of fact there can be no falsity.” Wartelle v. 
Mintz, 2021 -769 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/8/22) (quoting Bussie, 535 So. 2d at 380). Therefore, “an 
expression of opinion is actionable only if it implies the existence of underlying facts ascertainable 
by a reasonable person with some degree of certainty.” Zelenak, 2025 WL 2025177, at *3 (quoting 
Fitzgerald v. Tucker , 737 So. 2d 706, 717 (La. 1999). “[A] purely subjective statement can be 
neither true nor false.” Wartelle, 2021-769 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/8/22) (quoting Bussie, 535 So. 2d at 
380). 
Here, the Complaint provides a sample of forty -nine statements Kleinman posted on X, 
published on his blog, or emailed to Live Oak Middle School in 2024. ( See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 23–72; 
see also id. ¶ 22 (claiming “Kleinman’s false statements are too numerous to reproduce here ”).) 
As noted above, t he statements can be effectively distilled into the following related categories: 
Jones shares age -inappropriate, sexual materials with school children ( id. ¶¶ 27, 42, 72); Jones 
“grooms” school children ( id. ¶¶ 26, 30, 32 –34, 36, 38 –40, 43–48, 50, 54, 56 –62, 67, 69 –71); 
Jones “sexualizes” school children (id. ¶¶ 25, 28–29, 31, 36, 38, 49, 51–52, 54–55, 57, 65, 67–68); 
and Jones assists others in “grooming” and “sexualizing” school children ( id. ¶¶ 24, 37). The 
statements often refer to Jones as a middle school librarian, and the allegedly “groomed” and 
“sexualized” children as middle school children. (See id. ¶¶ 28, 33, 36, 38, 39, 43, 46, 54, 67–68.) PageID:
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Based on these allegations, Kleinman advocated for her termination as a middle school librarian. 
(See id. ¶¶ 41, 46, 67–68.) 
The statement Jones “grooms” school children is capable of a defamatory meaning. 
Although the term “grooming” is capable of multiple meanings, 5 within this context the term is 
better understood as “sexual grooming. ” The term is perhaps best defined by Kleinman, who 
claims in his moving papers the term refers to the “process by which a person prepares a child, 
significantly adults and the environment for the abuse of the child.” (See ECF No. 56 at 8 (quoting 
Susan Raine & Stephen A. Kent, The Grooming Of Children For Sexual Abuse In Religious 
Settings: Unique Characteristics & Select Case Studies, AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAVIOR, 181 
(2019); see also ECF No. 53-1 at 26–29 (describing the term as exposing “young children to books 
with sexual content”).) This definition is consistent with both the ordinary definition of the term, 
see, e.g., Grooming, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, https://perma.cc/2F2R-
T2Y2 (last visited May 26, 2026) (defining the term as “to build a trusting relationship with (a 
minor) in order to exploit them especially for nonconsensual sexual activity ”), and the legal 
definition as evidenced by legal dictionaries, see, e.g., Sexual Grooming , BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024) (defining the term as “[a] sexual predator’s attempt, usu. over time, 
to establish an emotional connection with a minor or members of a minor ’s family to lessen the 
child’s inhibitions to sexual activity with the predator”), caselaw, see, e.g., United States v. Batton, 
602 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. 2010) (defining the term as “the process whereby a sex offender earns 
the trust and confidence of a victim before engaging in a sexual act ” (internal quotation marks 
 
5 Other definitions of the term “grooming” include “to clean and maintain the appearance of (an 
animal),” “to make neat or attractive,” and “to make (someone) ready for a specific objective.” 
Grooming, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, https://perma.cc/2F2R-T2Y2 (last 
visited May 26, 2026). PageID:
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omitted)); Feitosa v. Keem, Civ. A. No. 22 -377S, 2023 WL 2267055, at *1 n.2 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 
28, 2023) (defining term as “methodically build[ing] a trusting relationship with a child or young 
adult, their family, and community to manipulate, coerce, or force the child or young adult to 
engage in sexual activities ” (internal quotation marks omitted)), and state criminal statutes, see, 
e.g., La. Stat. Ann. § 14:81(C)(1) 6 (defining “grooming” to mean “the pursuit of an intimate 
relationship with a child under the age of seventeen by means of seduction, emotional 
manipulation, threats, promises, coercion, enticement, isolation, or extortion with the specific 
intent to commit a sex offense . . . against the minor, whether aggravated or not”). 
The statements Jones is a “sexual groomer” or was “sexually grooming” school children 
are neither mere insults nor rhetorical hyperbole. An allegation an individual is “sexually 
grooming” a minor implicates criminal conduct. At this time, multiple states have passed criminal 
statutes specifically criminalizing “sexual grooming.” See, e.g., Wis. Stat. Ann. § 948.098 (Mar. 
8, 2026); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6 -2-321 (Mar. 5, 2026); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11 -25 (Jan. 1, 
2026); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 15.032 (Sept. 1, 2025); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-27-307 (Aug. 5, 2025); 
Ind. Code Ann. § 20-26-5-11.2 (July 1, 2025); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 45 -5-629, 97-5-32 (July 1, 
2025); Mont. Code Ann. § 45 -5-629 (July 1, 2025); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.071 (Apr. 9, 
2025); Iowa Code Ann. § 709.8A (July 1, 2024); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 3258 (July 1, 2024); Neb. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 79 -879 (Nov. 14, 2020). In contrast, other states have held such conduct to be 
sufficient to support a criminal conviction under pre-existing statutes. See, e.g., State v. Perilloux, 
21-448 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/20/23), 378 So. 3d 280, 305 (holding pattern of grooming behavior to 
be sufficient to support indecent behavior with a juvenile conviction); State v. Davis , 916 A.2d 
 
6 On August 1, 2025, Louisiana amended its criminal statute criminalizing “Indecent Behavior 
with Juveniles” to specifically address allegations of “sexual grooming.” Compare La. Stat. Ann. 
§ 14:81 (eff. Aug. 1, 2025), with La. Stat. Ann. § 14:81 (eff. Aug. 1, 2020). PageID:
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493, 502 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (holding a defendant need not physically attempt to 
sexually assault a minor “for preliminary ‘grooming’ actions to ripen into an attempted sexual 
assault”); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:34-3(b); La. R.S. § 14:81(A)(2) (criminalizing the sharing of age -
inappropriate, sexual materials with school children). However, even assuming a reasonable 
individual could not have understood the statements Jones is “sexually grooming” school children 
to be an allegation of criminal condu ct, there is no question the statements are an accusation of 
sexual misconduct with a minor.7 
Nor are the statements pure statements of opinion. A substantial number of statements are 
presented as true or false statements. (See, e.g., ECF No. 1 ¶ 60 (“She’s a gr—mer.”). Furthermore, 
a few claim the accusations of “sexual grooming” are “actual,” “fact,” and “truth,” (id. ¶¶ 32–33, 
36), whereas others state Kleinman had evidence of Jones’s “sexual grooming” (see id. ¶¶ 30, 34, 
39, 41, 63, 68). Based on this alleged evidence of “sexual grooming,” Kleinman has advocated for 
Jones’s termination as a middle-school librarian through multiple mediums.8 (Id. ¶¶ 14–15, 41, 46, 
 
7 Kleinman claims “allegations like ‘grooming’ and ‘sexualizing children’ had been bandied about 
for years by others before any of Kleinman’s complained -of statements” (ECF No. 53 -1 at 32), 
i.e., the “all the other kids are doing it” defense. At this step, the issue before the Court, however, 
is not whether the statement an individual is a “sexual groomer” or is “sexually grooming” children 
is defamatory under all sets of circumstances. Nor is the issue whether these statements are 
objectively capable of a non-defamatory meaning. See Johnson, 320 So. 3d at 388 (reserving such 
issues of fact for the jury). Rather, the sole issue before the Court is whether the statement is 
objectively capable of a defamatory meaning under these circumstances, and the Court finds it is. 
See Block, 857 F.3d at 592; Lewis, 427 F. Supp. 3d at 724. 
 
8 In support of his argument that the statements Jones is “sexually grooming” school children were 
pure statements of opinion, Kleinman argues the social media platform X “is a public forum where 
a reasonable reader will expect to find many more opinions than facts.” (ECF No. 53 -1 at 31 
(quoting Broughty v. Bouzy, Civ. A. No. 22-6458, 2023 WL 5013654, at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 7, 2023).) 
Kleinman, however, does not cite, nor has this Court found, any federal or state court decision 
holding a statement posted on X cannot be defamatory. See, e.g., Feitosa, 2023 WL 2267055, at 
*6 (holding allegation the defendant posted on X the statement the plaintiff was a “groomer” of 
12–15-year-old girls sufficient to state a defamation claim). Rather, the medium in which a 
statement is published is only a single factor the Court considers in determining whether the PageID:
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62, 67 –68; see also id. ¶ 53 (insinuating Jones should be surgically castrated as a child sex 
offender).) 
Therefore, viewing the facts in the Complaint in the light most favorable to Jones, the Court 
finds the statements Jones is a “sexual groomer” or was “sexually grooming” school children to 
be objectively capable of a defamatory meaning, i.e., Jones as a middle -school librarian was 
“sexually grooming” school children with the intent of sexually abusing the children. See Lewis, 
427 F. Supp. 3d at 724. These statements are assertions of fact accusing Jones with , at worst, 
criminal conduct and, at best, sexual misconduct. As such, these statements are defamatory per se. 
See Spears, 2023 WL 2810057, at *7; see also, e.g., Jones, 424 So. 3d at 221 (holding the statement 
posted on X that Jones was advocating for sharing erotica with and instructing children on how to 
perform sex acts were clearly capable of a defamatory meaning); Feitosa, 2023 WL 2267055, at 
*6 (holding the statement posted on X the plaintiff was a “groomer” of 12 –15-year-old girls 
sufficient to state a defamation claim); Miles v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 38 F.Supp.2d 1226, 1228–29 
(D. Colo. 1999) (holding accusation the plaintiff was a “pedophile” and “sex offender” constituted 
defamation per se); Beu v. City of Vineland, Civ. A. No. 20-2510, 2021 WL 856882, at *5 (D.N.J. 
Mar. 8, 2021) (holding accusation the plaintiff was a “pedophile” and a “rapist” constituted 
defamation per se ). There is no question the allegation a middle -school librarian is “sexually 
grooming” school children would lower Jones’s personal and professional reputation in the eyes 
of her community and cause others to avoid associating with her. 
 
statement is defamatory. See, e.g., Jinni Tech Ltd. v. Red.com, Inc. , Civ. A. No. 21 -35967, 2022 
WL 4093737, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 7, 2022) (applying Washington law). Kleinman’s argument is 
further frustrated by the fact he published his statements on mediums other than X, including on 
his blog and through emails. (See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 41, 63, 67 –68; see also id. ¶¶ 14–15 (noting 
Kleinman has also been featured on the radio and as a speaker at a ticketed event.).) PageID:
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Accordingly, the Complaint sufficiently alleges Kleinman published false and defamatory 
statements concerning Jones in support of the defamation claim. Having determined same, the 
Court must now determine the requisite level of fault Jones is required to allege under the First 
Amendment. See McDowell, 769 F.2d at 945. 
 b. Fault 
“As a constitutional matter, the Supreme Court requires some showing of fault for a 
defamation claim.” Mangan v. Corp. Synergies Grp., Inc., 834 F. Supp. 2d 199, 206 (D.N.J. 2011) 
(citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974)); see also Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. 
Deaner, 623 F.2d 264, 272 (3d Cir. 1980) ( “[T]he First Amendment forbids states to impose 
liability without fault . . . .”). The appropriate level of fault a plaintiff must show, however, differs 
depending on whether the plaintiff is a private or public figure. See id. at 206–07; see also Starr, 
978 So. 2d at 390 (noting a public figure plaintiff “may not rely on any presumption based on the 
fact that the words are defamatory per se”). 
Under Louisiana law, a private figure plaintiff is merely required to allege facts 
demonstrating the defendant published the defamatory statement with negligent disregard for the 
truth. See Costello, 864 So. 2d at 143–44; see also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347 ( “[S]o long as they do 
not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of 
liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.”). 
In contrast, a public figure pl aintiff is required to demonstrate the defendant published the 
statement with malice, i.e., “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether 
it was false or not. ” Costello, 864 So. 2d at 14 3 n.14 (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan , 376 
U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964)); accord Berkery v. Gudknecht, 763 F. App ’x 288, 289 (3d Cir. 2019); 
LaRavia v. Cerise , 462 F. App ’x 459, 463 (5th Cir. 2012) . Therefore, to determine whether a PageID:
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complaint sufficiently alleges facts showing the appropriate level of fault, the court must first 
determine the plaintiff’s status as a private or public figure in the matter. See U.S. Healthcare, Inc. 
v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia , 898 F.2d 914, 938 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting such a 
determination is a matter of law, which must be decided by the court). On a motion to dismiss, the 
defendant bears the burden of showing the plaintiff is a public figure. See Medure v. Vindicator 
Printing Co., 273 F. Supp. 2d 588, 612 (W.D. Pa. 2002). 
The Supreme Court has recognized two alternative classes of public figures—“all-purpose” 
and “limited-purpose.” Farina v. Omari, Civ. A. No. 24-11098, 2025 WL 2754030, at *2 (D.N.J. 
Sept. 29, 2025) (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351). An “all-purpose” public figure is an individual who 
has “achieve[d] such pervasive fame or notoriety that [s]he becomes a public figure for all purposes 
and in all contexts. ” Id. (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351). An all -purpose public figure is best 
understood as an individual with such a level of renown as to be considered a household name. 
See Schiavone Const. Co. v. Time, Inc. (“Schiavone II”), 847 F.2d 1069, 1077 (3d Cir. 1988); see 
also Mzamane v. Winfrey , 693 F. Supp. 2d 442, 498 (E.D. Pa. 2010) ( providing the following 
examples of all -purpose public figures: President Barack Obama, Tiger Woods, and Oprah 
Winfrey). 
A “limited-purpose” public figure is an individual who either “voluntarily injects [her]self 
or is [involuntarily] drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure 
for a limited range of issues .”9 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added). “For example, a meat 
producer that aggressively advertised its product in the media becomes a limited[-]purpose public 
 
9 Although both the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit has recognized an individual may qualify 
as an involuntary public figure, this class of public figure is “exceedingly rare.” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 
345; see also Marcone, 754 F.2d at 1084 n.9 (“The one group of individuals that might truly be 
considered involuntary public figures are relatives of famous people.”); accord Schiavone I, 619 
F. Supp. at 704. PageID:
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figure for comment on the quality of its product.” Marcone, 754 F.2d at 1083; see also McDowell, 
769 F.2d at 950 ( “The actions of the plaintiff are sufficient to transform him into a public figure 
for the limited [-]purpose of his work on publicly financed building projects —the subject of the 
alleged defamatory remarks.”). 
The Third Circuit has articulated a two-step test to determine whether a plaintiff qualifies 
as a limited-purpose public figure.10 McDowell, 769 F.2d at 948; accord Amor v. Conover, 635 F. 
Supp. 3d 363, 368 (E.D. Pa. 2022); Nanavati v. Burdette Tomlin Mem’l Hosp., 645 F. Supp. 1217, 
1251 (D.N.J. 1986). “[W]hether a defamation plaintiff is a limited [-]purpose public figure, ” 
however, is a fact-specific question. Amor, 635 F. Supp. 3d at 368 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Goldfarb v. Kalodimos , 539 F. Supp. 3d 435, 455 (E.D. Pa. 2021)). Therefore, the courts have 
typically differed determining a plaintiff’s status as either a private or public figure until “the later 
stages of litigation[] after a full factual record can be d eveloped.” Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Goldfarb, 539 F. Supp. 3d at 455); see also Gillon v. Bernstein, Civ. A. No. 12-
4891, 2013 WL 5159625, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2013). 
 
10 As the Supreme Court has not provided a bright -line test to determine whether an individual is 
a limited-purpose public figure, the circuit courts have employed various tests to determine same. 
See e.g., Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co. , 633 F.2d 583, 591 (1st Cir. 1980) 
(employing two-prong test); Lerman v. Flynt Distributing Co. , 745 F.2d 123 , 136–37 (2d Cir. 
1984) (employing four-factor test); Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 691 F.2d 666, 668 (4th Cir. 
1982) (employing five -factor test); Clark v. American Broadcasting Cos. , 684 F.2d 1208 , 1218 
(6th Cir. 1982) (employing two-prong test); Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 266 (9th 
Cir. 2013) (employing three-prong test); Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 
1296–98 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (emp loying three -prong test); see also Silvester v. Am. Broad. 
Companies, Inc., 839 F.2d 1491, 1494 (11th Cir. 1988) ; Trotter v. Jack Anderson Enters., Inc. , 
818 F.2d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 1987) (endorsing Waldbaum’s three-prong test); Boismier v. Walters, 
777 F. Supp. 3d 1300, 1310 (W.D. Okla. 2025) (noting the Tenth Circuit has not employed a test 
but rather defers to state tests). Although the specific language of these tests differ, the tests share 
common elements , i.e., the existence of a prior, proper public controversy and the plaintiff’s 
voluntary and prominent participation in same. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351–52; accord McDowell, 
769 F.2d at 948; Lerman, 745 F.2d at 136–37; Fitzgerald, 691 F.2d at 668 ; Clark, 684 F.2d at 
1218; Makaeff, 715 F.3d at 266; Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1296–98. PageID:
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Here, Kleinman argues Jones is a limited-purpose public figure and, as such, a heightened 
level of fault is required, i.e., actual malice, which the Complaint fails to sufficiently allege. (ECF 
No. 53-1 at 33–37.) Kleinman does not argue the Complaint fails to sufficiently allege the lower 
level of fault reserved for private individuals , i.e., negligence. ( See generally ECF No. 53, 56.) 
Specifically, Kleinman claims the statements relate to a public controversy regarding the access of 
minors to age -inappropriate LGBTQ and sexual health materials in public libraries. 11 (See ECF 
No. 53-1 at 17, 27, 32). 
 
 
11 Jones concedes she is a limited -purpose public figure for purposes of the proper public 
controversy regarding the access of minors to LGBTQ and sexual health materials in public 
libraries. (See ECF No. 54 at 18.) She also concedes the statements she is “sexually grooming” 
school children are capable of an understanding relating to this public controversy. (See id. at 18; 
see also ECF No. 53-1 at 26–29 (claiming the term “grooming” has been utilized and would be 
understood by the recipients of these statements to describe an individual who has allegedly 
advocated for “making books like these available to a minor” ).) Both Kleinman and Jones , 
however, misconstrue the limited-purpose public figure test at this stage. Having determined the 
statements Jones was “sexually grooming” school children are objectively capable of a defamatory 
meaning or innuendo, the Court lacks the authority to consider and determine the subjective 
understanding or perception of the recipients of the statements . Bell, 698 So. 2d at 754; see also 
Johnson, 320 So. 3d at 388 (“[W]hether a communication is capable of a particular meaning and 
whether that meaning is defamatory is a question for the court; whether a communication, which 
is capable of a defamatory meaning, was so understood by its recipient is a question for the trier 
of fact or the jury.”). It is well -established, such a determination is an issue of fact, which is 
reserved for the jury. See Johnson, 320 So. 3d at 388; Hoffman, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 821 (citing 
Kosmitis v. Bailey, 28,585 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/20/96), 685 So. 2d 1177, 1180). Although the Court 
recognizes both a proper public controversy may exist regarding the access of minors to LGBTQ 
and sexual health materials in public libraries and these statements may be objectively capable of 
an understanding relating to same, the Court cannot hold these statements relate to that controversy 
as a matter of law at this time. At this stage, the Court is merely required to determine whether a 
statement is objectively capable of a defamatory meaning or innuendo and, if so, whether there 
exists a public controversy relating to that meaning only. Nor does the Court have the authority to 
define the relevant public controversy so broadly as to include each capable understanding of a 
statement so as to find the plaintiff a limited-purpose public figure within every understanding of 
the statement. A limited-purpose public figure is “a public figure for a limited range of issues .” 
Mzamane, 693 F. Supp. 2d at 498 (emphasis added) (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351). PageID:
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 i. A Public Controversy Exists 
First, the court is required to identify the specific public controversy that existed prior to 
the publication of the allegedly defamatory statements, if any, which relate to the statements. See 
Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc. , 627 F.2d 1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also 
Marcone, 754 F.2d at 1083; McDowell, 769 F.2d at 948 (adopting Waldbaum definition of “public 
controversy”); accord Schiavone Const. Co. v. Time, Inc. (“Schiavone I”), 619 F. Supp. 684, 705 
(D.N.J. 1985). The public controversy must be more than a mere “cause célèbre,” Time, Inc. v. 
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976), or “matter that attracts public attention,” Wolston v. Reader’s 
Digest Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979). See also Hutchinson v. Proxmire , 443 U.S. 111, 135 
(1979) (“[T]hose charged with defamation cannot, by their own conduct, create their own defense 
by making the claimant a public figure. ”). Rather, the controversy must be “a real dispute, the 
outcome of which affects the general public or some segment of it.” McDowell, 769 F.2d at 948–
49 (quoting Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1296); see also Marcone, 754 F.2d at 1082–83 (declining to 
define the term more broadly to include “all disputes of interest to the public ”). Whether a 
defamatory statement can be fairly characterized as relating to a “real dispute” is to be determined 
by the statement’s “content, form, and context.” McDowell, 769 F.2d at 948 n.6 (quoting Dunn & 
Bradstreet, Inc., v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985)). 
“Identification of the implicated public controversy is not a mere formality.” In re SoClean, 
Inc., Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab. Litig. , Civ. A. No. 22 -152, 2023 WL 8006602, at *61 
(W.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2023) ; see also Hutchinson , 443 U.S. at 135 (noting the identification of a 
proper “public controversy” is crucial to the fair balancing of the competing interests of free speech 
and reputation). The court must exercise care in identifying the public controversy, as the scope of 
the controversy will outline the limited range of issues for which a plaintiff will qualify as a PageID:
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limited-purpose public figure. “For example, a meat producer that aggressively advertised its 
product in the media becomes a limited[-]purpose public figure for comment on the quality of its 
product.” Marcone, 754 F.2d at 1083; see also, e.g., McDowell, 769 F.2d 942 (finding the civil -
engineer plaintiff who had participated in prior public building projects was a limited -purpose 
public figure within a public controversy relating to the construction of public building projects 
for statements on whether the plaintiff lacked the professional competence to complete the projects 
within the allotted time); Amor, 635 F. Supp. 3d at 368 –70 (finding the dentist plaintiff who was 
a performance director as the Pittsburgh Renaissance Festival was a limited-purpose public figure 
within a public controversy relating to allegations of sexual misconduct against minors for 
statements the plaintiff had ignored complaints of sexual misconduct between the renaissance 
festival cast members, including members whom were under the a ge of eighteen at the time); 
Mzamane, 693 F. Supp. 2d at 500 (finding the headmistress plaintiff who was responsible for the 
health and safety of the students living at the private academy was a limited-purpose public figure 
within a public controversy relating to the safety and well-being of the students for statements the 
plaintiff had ignored complaints of abusive treatment between the dorm parents and the students); 
Farina, 2025 WL 2754030, at *1, 3 (finding the consultant plaintiff who had a significan t social 
media following and had made several appearances discussing surgeon compensation and medical 
ethics was a limited -purpose public figure within a public controversy relating to privacy in 
healthcare and the ethical implications of leaking celebrity surgery information for statements the 
plaintiff lacked the qualifications to opine on these issues and was receiving kickbacks from 
surgeons); Konowicz v. Carr , Civ. A. No. 15 -6913, 2019 WL 13402853, at *1 (D.N.J. July 31, 
2019) (finding the content creator plaintiff who operated a website dedicated to weather reporting, 
had a significant social media following, and made appearances was a limited -purpose public PageID:
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figure within a public controversy relating to weather reporting for statements the plaintiff was an 
amateur weather enthusiast). 
A plaintiff may be held to be a limited -purpose public figure for purposes of one public 
controversy but be held to be a private figure for purposes of a nother related controversy. See 
Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1297 n.27. For example, the courts have generally held a plaintiff “well 
known in some circles” is not a limited -purpose public figure relating to allegations of criminal 
conduct or sexual misconduct absent the existence of a prior, proper public controversy relating to 
same. See Gertz , 418 U.S. at 351 ( holding an individual’s participation in community or 
professional affairs does not render her a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts); see 
also, e.g., Ralston v. Garabedian, 676 F. Supp. 3d 325, 357 (E.D. Pa. 2021) (finding the teacher 
plaintiff was not a limited -purpose public figure within a public controversy relating to a history 
of sexual abuse at the school for allegations of sexual abuse against the plaintiff by a former student 
who “did nothing to voluntarily inject himself into this public controversy before it arose”); 
Coleman v. Grand, 523 F. Supp. 3d 244, 256–57 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (finding the prominent musician 
plaintiff was not a limited-purpose public figure within a public controversy relating to allegations 
of sexual impropriety and pressure within the music industry for allegations of sexual misconduct 
who had not previously sought public attention and influence pertaining to his relationships, 
relationships generally, or sexual harassment allegations), aff’d, 158 F.4th 132 (2d Cir. 2025); 
Steep Hill Lab’ys, Inc. v. Moore, Civ. A. No. 18-373, 2018 WL 1242182, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 
8, 2018) (finding the marijuana trafficking plaintiff was not a limited-purpose public figure within 
a public controversy relating to allegations of sexual misconduct and theft who had not previously 
sought public attention and influence pertaining to sexual assault, sexual harassment, or consent 
in the workplace), aff’d, 744 F. App’x 443 (9th Cir. 2018); Elliott v. Donegan, 469 F. Supp. 3d 40, PageID:
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51 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (finding the author and content creator plaintiff was not a limited -purpose 
public figure within a public controversy relating to allegations of physical sexual violence who 
had not previously sought public attention and influence pertai ning to sexual assault, sexual 
harassment, or consent in the workplace); Armstrong v. Shirvell, 596 F. App’x 433, 444 –46 (6th 
Cir. 2015) (finding the student council president plaintiff was not a limited -purpose public figure 
within a public controversy re lating to allegations the plaintiff was “dangerous,” a “radical 
homosexual activist,” and a “major -league fanatic who is obsessed with imposing the radical 
homosexual agenda on the student body” who had not previously sought public attention and 
influence pertaining to his reputation or sexual behavior). 
Reviewing the statements’ content, form, and context, the relevant defamatory statements 
are that Jones as a middle -school librarian was “sexually grooming” school children. See supra 
Section III.A.1.a. These statements are best characterized either narrowly, as allegations Jones as 
a middle school librarian was “sexual grooming” school children specifically with the intent of 
sexually abusing the children , or broadly, as allegations middle school librarians are “sexual 
grooming” school children generally. See Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1297 n.27 (providing the court 
with discretion as to whether to define the controversy “narrowly” or “broadly” as “[a] narrow 
controversy will have fewer participants overall and thus fewer who meet the required level of 
involvement,” whereas “[a] broad controversy will have more participants, but few can have the 
necessary impact ”); see also McDowell, 769 F.2d at 948 (adopting Waldbaum’s definition of 
“public controversy”). Kleinman does not claim specific allegations of “sexual grooming” against 
Jones existed prior to the publication of his statements. (See ECF No. 53-1 at 17 (stating he does 
not claim “Jones is engaging in sexual intercourse with children or is ‘grooming’ or ‘sexualizing’ 
anyone in particular”); id. at 25–26 (stating he does “not accuse Jones of any specific instances of PageID:
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conduct that would fit accusations of an actual crime or sexual activity ”); id. at 31 ( stating his 
statements were not intended to be viewed “as sober news reporting on Jones sexually molesting 
children.”).) The courts, however, have consistently recognized the verbal, physical, and sexual 
abuse of school children to be a matter of public concern, “which affects the general public or 
some segment of it.” See Mzamane, 693 F. Supp. 2d at 499–500 (quoting McDowell, 769 F.2d at 
948–49). Furthermore, the Court r ecognizes the growing public concern regarding the “sexual 
grooming” of school children generally as evidenced by the multiple recent amendments to 
criminal statutes to specifically address this concern, which preceded the publication of the 
allegedly defamatory statements. See supra Section III.B.1.a . Therefore, the allegations that 
middle school librarians are “sexually grooming ” school children relate to a proper public 
controversy, which existed prior to the publication of the allegedly defamatory statements. Having 
determined same, the Court must now consider whether Jones voluntarily injected herself into that 
controversy and assumed a position of prominence within it. 
 ii. The Nature & Extent of Jones’s Participation 
If the court identifies a specific public controversy that predated the publication of the 
allegedly defamatory statements, then the court must “consider[] the nature and extent of [the] 
plaintiff’s participation in the controversy.” Nanavati, 645 F. Supp. 1217, 1251 (citing Marcone, 
754 F.2d at 1082). “Trivial or tangential participation is not enough. ” Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 
1297–98. A limited -purpose public figure is “one who has thrust [herself] to the forefront of 
particular public controversies in orde r to influence the resolution of the issues involved. ” U.S. 
Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 939 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345). 
The Third Circuit has held two factors will inform this determination, i.e., “the ‘rationale of self- PageID:
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help’ and, more importantly, ‘the notion of assumption of the risk.’” Amor, 635 F. Supp. 3d at 369 
(quoting McDowell, 769 F.2d at 947–48); accord U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 938. 
Jones’s degree of involvement in the controversy surrounding the issue of whether middle 
school librarians were “sexually grooming” school children, if any, is de minimis. Although the 
record demonstrates Jones has voluntarily injected herself into the separate, but allegedly related, 
controversy regarding the access of minors to sexual health materials in public libraries, the record 
does not show Jones has advocated for the access of school children to such materials in middle 
school libraries. Jones’s fame and notoriety relating to the former controversy alone cannot make 
her a public figure relating to the latter. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351; see also Ralston, 676 F. Supp. 
3d 325. Rather, Jones can only be held to be a limited -purpose public figure as to the lat ter if the 
record establishes she has thrust herself to the forefront of that particular controversy in order to 
influence the resolution of same. See U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 898 F.2d at 939; see also McDowell, 
769 F.2d at 948 (stating a plaintiff ’s voluntary participation to be of greater importance in the 
determination than the plaintiff ’s access to channels of effective communication); see also, e.g., 
Elliott, 469 F. Supp. 3d at 54 (holding the plaintiff’s “extensive writings and interviews about sex, 
BDSM, and sexual assault—unrelated to workplace issues—[did not] transform[] him into a public 
figure with respect to the [#MeToo movement]”). 
Kleinman has not presented sufficient evidence by which to establish Jones has voluntarily 
injected herself into the public controversy regarding whether middle school librarians are 
“sexually grooming” school children so as to influence the resolution of same. (See generally ECF 
Nos. 53, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61 , 65, 66.) In response to Jones’s claim she has never advocated for 
sharing age -inappropriate LGBTQ or sexual health materials with “elementary school -age 
children” (see ECF No. 54 at 6), Kleinman cites to an interview wherein Jones states she PageID:
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encourages her students to read the books New Kid and Maybe He Just Likes You , which Jones 
claims are age-appropriate materials teaching children about the concepts of microaggressions and 
consent respectively ( see ECF No. 56 at 16 (citing see 118 Modern School Library Programs , 
SCHOOL LIBRARIANS UNITED (Mar. 20, 2021 ), available at https://perma.cc/J62W-ERRL)). 
Kleinman claims the interview is evidence Jones was “sexually grooming” her students. (See id. 
at 16.) Kleinman , however, fails to demonstrate a proper public controversy existed at the time 
relating to whether these materials, or other materials similarly teaching middle school children 
about the concepts of microaggressions and consent, are inappropriate for middle school students 
or whether encouraging a middle school student to read such mate rials constitutes as “sexual 
grooming,” which Jones was either directly or indirectly responding to in order to influence the 
resolution of that controversy. (See generally id.) Therefore, the Court cannot find this interview 
alone establishes Jones has thrust herself to the forefront of that particular controversy so as to be 
a limited-purpose public figure relating to same. 
Accordingly, Kleinman has failed to demonstrate Jones was a limited-purpose public figure 
within the scope of the broader proper public controversy as to whether middle school librarians 
were “sexually grooming” school children and, as such, the statements Jones is a “sexual groomer” 
or was “sexually grooming” school children do not trigger a heightened level of fault at this time. 
See Schiavone I, 619 F. Supp. at 705. Therefore, the Complaint sufficiently alleges Kleinman 
negligently published the allegedly defamatory statements in support of the defamation claim. 
Having determined same based on the record before the Court , the Court need not determine 
whether Jones is a private or public figure for purposes of the remaining statements at this time. 
Based on the foregoing, Kleinman’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Count 
One of the Complaint (ECF No. 53) is DENIED. PageID:
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 2. False Light 
A false light claim “arises from publicity[,] which unreasonably places the plaintiff in a 
false light before the public.” Cook v. Warrier Energy Servs., Corp. , Civ. A. No. 15 -2195, 2017 
WL 1356333, at *6 (W.D. La. Apr. 11, 2017). To sufficiently state a false light claim, a plaintiff 
must allege the following elements: (1) the defendant published a false statement concerning the 
plaintiff; (2) the publication was unreasonable; and (3) the publication “seriously interfere[d] with 
the plaintiff’s privacy interest.” See Davenport v. Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P., 891 F.3d 162, 172 
(5th Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) ( quoting Jaubert v. Crowley Post -Signal, Inc., 375 So. 3d 
1386, 1389 (La. 1979)); accord Farina, 2025 WL 2709720, at *3 –4; Perere v. Louisiana 
Television Broad. Corp., 812 So. 2d 673, 676 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2001). 
Although there are similarities between a defamation and false light claim, there are 
significant differences between the two torts. First, the allegedly false light publication “need not 
be defamatory in nature. ” Farina, 2025 WL 2709720, at *3. Rather, the publication “must be 
objectionable to a reasonable person under the circumstances and must contain either falsity or 
fiction.” Id. Second, “[u]nlike a defamation action, it is not necessary that there be malicious intent 
on the part of the defendant.” Cook, 2017 WL 1356333, at *6 (quoting Perere, 812 So. 2d at 1078). 
Third, a defamation claim protects an individual’s reputation, whereas a false light claim protects 
personal dignity, i.e., “the right to be let alone” and “the right to an inviolate personality.” Easter 
Seal Soc. v. Playboy Enters., Inc. , 530 So. 2d 643, 646 –47 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1988) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); see also Wood v. Hustler Mag., Inc. , 736 F.2d 1084, 1088 (5th Cir. 
1984) (stating a false light claim is founded on “mental anguish”) (applying Texas law). 
Here, Kleinman argues the Complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to allege a false light 
claim. ( See ECF No. 53 -1 at 37 –38.) Having determined the Complaint sufficiently alleges PageID:
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Kleinman negligently published allegedly “defamatory” statements in support of the defamation 
claim, see supra Section III. B.1.a, the Complaint sufficiently alleges Kleinman negligently 
published allegedly “objectionable” statements in support of the false light claim, see Farina, 2025 
WL 2709720, at *3. Furthermore, the Complaint alleges the statements have exposed Jones to 
contempt and ridicule, which has injured both her professional and personal reputation. (See ECF 
No. 1 ¶¶ 79, 81, 96, 98.) Accepting the factual allegations in the Complaint as true and drawing all 
inferences in the light most favorable to Jones , the Complaint sufficiently alleges Kleinman 
negligently published the allegedly objectionable statements in support of the false light claim. See 
Sharrif v. Am. Broad. Co., 613 So. 2d 768, 771 (La. Ct. App. 1993). 
Based on the foregoing , Kleinman’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Count 
Two of the Complaint (ECF No. 53) is DENIED. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons set forth above, Kleinman’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF 
No. 53) is DENIED. An appropriate order follows. 
 
 
Date: May 26, 2026 /s/ Brian R. Martinotti 
HON. BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE PageID:
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