govinfo:USCOURTS-ctd-3_22-cv-00630-8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT 
STEFON MORANT, 
 Plaintiff, 
 
 v. 
 
CITY OF NEW HAVEN et al., 
 Defendants. 
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3:22-CV-630 (SVN) 
 
 
 
 
 
May 24, 2026 
ORDER ON DISPUTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
 The Court held a charge conference with counsel on May 21, 2026, concerning the final 
jury instructions in this case to be delivered on May 26, 2026. Following that charge conference, 
the Court solicited supplemental briefing from the parties on various remaining disputes. The 
Court then held a supplemental charge conference on May 22, 2026, after considering the parties’ 
supplemental briefing. The Court hereby memorializes its reasons for deciding the remaining 
disputes between the parties. 
I. CAUSATION STANDARD FOR SECTION 1983 CLAIMS 
First, there has been a significant dispute between Plaintiff and Defendants the City of New 
Haven and Michael Sweeney concerning the causation requirement for Plaintiff’s Brady claim in 
Count Three. The City and Sweeney have argued that the First Circuit’s decision in Drumgold v. 
Callahan, 707 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2013) sets forth the accurate standard for causation that must be 
proven by a civil plaintiff to recover damages for a Brady violation. Drumgold described the two-
step causation inquiry from tort causation principles—“factual cause” and reasonably foreseeable 
harm (often phrased as proximate cause)—and held that the “factual causation inquiry [for a civil 
Brady claim] essentially replicates the materiality inquiry with a heightened burden of proof” of 
preponderance of the evidence. Drumgold, 707 F.3d at 49 . Drumgold went on to hold that the 
second element of traditional tort causation, foreseeability, is necessarily present when a plaintiff 

has demonstrated that material , exculpatory evidence is withheld, because “the obvious risk is a 
tainted conviction.” Id. at 49–50. Thus, in the First Circuit’s view, “[o]nce a Brady violation has 
been shown, the causation inquiry in a § 1983 damages suit is only a ‘but for’ inquiry pursuant to 
the preponderance of the evidence standard.” 
In line with Drumgold, the City and Sweeney requested the following jury instruction 
regarding the causation element of Plaintiff’s Brady claim: 
Even if plaintiff can demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that 
he would not have been convicted but for the withholding of certain 
evidence, he must then make the same showing by a preponderance of the 
evidence which is a higher burden of proof than reasonable probability. To 
state differently, plaintiff cannot recover any damages unless he 
demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that he would not have 
been convicted but for the withholding of exculpatory evidence. 
 
 See City’s Proposed Jury Instr., ECF No. 293 at 227; Sweeney’s Not. of Joinder, ECF No. 
293 at 255. 
 Until submitting his supplemental briefing after the initial charge conference, Plaintiff had 
firmly resisted an instruction requiring but for causation for his Brady claim. See Pl.’s Proposed 
Jury Instructions, ECF No. 364 at 14. Plaintiff correctly pointed out that Drumgold’s holding has 
never been adopted by the Second Circuit, having only been cited within the circuit in a dissenting 
opinion in Poventud v. City of New York , 750 F.3d 121, 158 –59 (2d Cir. 2014) (Jacobs, J., 
dissenting). 
 But in its May 22, 2026, supplemental briefing, the City made a compelling argument that, 
since tort causation principles are applied to Section 1983, Section 1983 must incorporate a but for 
causation standard. See City’s Supp. Br., ECF No. 539 at 1–7. The City is correct that, in Comcast 
Corporation v. National Association of African American -Owned Media , 589 U.S. 327, 331 
(2020), the U.S. Supreme Court noted that it is “‘textbook tort law’ that a plaintiff seeking redress 

for a defendant’s legal wrong typically must prove but-for causation.” While Comcast addressed 
42 U.S.C. § 1981, it also noted that the “‘but for’ common law causation test . . . supplies the 
‘default’ or ‘background’ rule against which Congress is normally presumed to have legislated 
when creating its own new causes of action,” including federal antidiscrimination laws. 589 U.S. 
at 332. 
 In his own May 22 supplemental briefing , Plaintiff now “consents to the jury in this case 
being instructed on ‘but for’ and proximate causation” despite that the Second Circuit has not held 
that but for causation is the standard for a Section 1983 claim, “out of an abundance of caution.” 
Pl.’s Supp. Br., ECF No. 541 at 1. Plaintiff proposed, however, that if the Court instructs the jury 
that but for causation is required, the Court instruct the jury using the following language from the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644, 656 (2020): 
[“But for”] causation is established whenever a particular outcome would 
not have happened “but for” the purported cause. In other words, a but-for 
test directs us to change one thing at a time and see if the outcome changes. 
If it does, we have found a but-for cause. . . . Often, events have multiple 
but-for causes. So, for example, if a car accident occurred both because the 
defendant ran a red light and because the plaintiff failed to signal his turn at 
the intersection, we might call each a but -for cause of the collision. . . [In 
this case], so long as the [relevant Defendant’s] violation was one but-for 
cause of [Mr. Morant’s deprivation of liberty], that is enough[.] 
 
See ECF No. 541 at 2. At the supplemental charge conference, the City agreed to th is proposed 
language from Bostock, but Sweeney objected, offering instead the following definition of “legal 
causation” from the Connecticut Judicial Branch’s model Civil Jury Instructions: “The test for 
causation in fact is, simply, would the injury have occurred were it not for the defendant’s breach 
of a duty of care, assuming you find such a breach. If the injury would have occurred even if there 
had not been a breach of the duty of care, then the breach is not the legal cause of the injury.” 

 The Court accepts Plaintiff’s proposal to instruct the jury that but for causation is required 
for each of his Section 1983 claims. The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the Second Circuit has 
not specifically held that the Section 1983 causation inquiry in the context of fair trial -related 
constitutional violations includes a but for causation requirement, even if it has suggested it 
applies. See Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 349–51, n.7 & 8 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing that “[t]ort 
law recognizes that a person whose initial act is the ‘but for’ cause of some ultimate harm . . . is 
not legally liable for the harm ” if something “ breaks the legal chain of proximate cause ,” and 
proceeding to discuss whether plaintiff’s deprivation of liberty was a “legally cognizable result” 
(the proximate cause) of a n prosecutor’s misconduct/constitutional violation in fabricating 
evidence (the but for cause)); Naumovski v. Norris, 934 F.3d 200, 213 (2d Cir. 2019) (noting in 
employment discrimination context that “‘but-for’ causation has long been a standard prerequisite 
in § 1983 claims generally (emphasis added)); Arnold v. Geary, 582 F. App’x 42, 43 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(summary order) (“A Section 1983 plaintiff must also demonstrate that the defendant’s alle ged 
misconduct was both the ‘but for’ cause and the proximate cause of his injury.”) . But given that 
the parties all agree to instructing the jury on this concept, the Court need not decide the question 
of whether doing so is required under Second Circuit law. In light of the cases the Court has 
reviewed and Plaintiff’s agreement to include a but for causation instruction applicable to all of 
his Section 1983 claims, the Court cannot find that it would be erroneous to do so.1 
 
1 A majority of the circuits endorse the idea that both causation in fact (or but for causation) and proximate causation 
are required to prove a Section 1983 violation. See Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir 1994) (requiring cause 
in fact and proximate cause to show supervisory liability under Section 1983); Powers v. Hamilton Cnty. Public 
Defender Com’n, 501 F.3d 592, 608–09 (6th Cir. 2007) (requiring cause in fact and proximate cause in the context of 
a Monell claim); Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567, 582 (7th Cir. 2012); Harper v. City of L.A., 533 F.3d 1010, 
1026 (9th Cir. 2008); Furber v. Taylor, 685 F. App’x 674, 678 (10th Cir. 2017) (unpublished); Jackson v. Sauls, 206 
F.3d 1156, 1168 n.16 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Smith v. Dist. of Columbia, 413 F.3d 86, 102 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (equating 
“moving force” for purposes of a Monell claim as requiring proximate cause, and in turn describing proximate cause 
as “includ[ing] the notion of cause in fact” and an “element of foreseeability”). 

The Court further finds that utilizing Plaintiff’s suggested language from Bostock, rather 
than the Connecticut model jury instructions, is appropriate. First, Bostock is a recent U.S. 
Supreme Court opinion describing the but for causation concept with a simple and relatable 
example. Utilizing a U.S. Supreme Court case’s language is preferable to using a state court 
pattern jury instruction. Second, the Connecticut jury instruction does not include the concept that 
a harm may have multiple but for causes, which the Court believes is an important proposition for 
the jury to understand, given that this case involves multiple Defendants who committed different 
alleged constitutional violations.2 Third, use of the quoted language from Bostock is endorsed by 
at least one other circuit’s pattern jury instructions for but for causation. See Manual of Model 
Civil Jury Instructions for the District Courts of the Ninth Circuit, 2025 ed., Civil Instruction 10.3. 
For these reasons, the Court will instruct the jury that Plaintiff must prove but for and 
proximate causation for each of Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims, including his Monell claim, with 
the language from Bostock. 
II. MONELL INSTRUCTIONS 
The Court opts to utilize the following instruction proposed by Plaintiff for the deliberate 
indifference Monell theory: “In other words, Plaintiff must show that based on the facts available 
to Chief Pastore, he knew or should have known that the particular omission is substantially certain 
to result in a constitutional violation.” This proposal paraphrases a line from Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part from the majority’s opinion in City of Canton, 
Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 396 (1989). See id. (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
 
2 Defendant Sweeney initially also appeared to object to the inclusion of language clarifying that there can be multiple 
but for causes of a harm. To the extent he maintains this objection, the permissibility of multiple but for causes in the 
context of Section 1983 claims is clearly established in the Second Circuit. Garnett v. Undercover Officer C0039 , 
838 F.3d 265, 277 (2d Cir. 2016) (interpreting the “as a result” language in a due process deprivation of liberty-based 
Section 1983 claim “to mean that the falsified information must be the only reason the plaintiff suffered a deprivation 
of his liberty . . . places more weight on the ‘as a result’ language than it can bear.” (emphasis in original)). 

in part) (“Where a § 1983 plaintiff can establish that the facts available to city policymakers put 
them on actual or constructive notice that the particular omission is substantially certain to result 
in the violation of the constitutional rights of their citizens, the dictates of Monell are satisfied.”). 
Justice O’Connor’s line has since been adopted by the majority in Supreme Court Monell 
deliberate indifference theory precedent, and has been cited by the Second Circuit in the same 
context. See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 –62 (2011); Chislett v. New York City 
Dep’t of Educ., 157 F.4th 172, 191 (2d Cir. 2025); Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 81–
82 (2d Cir. 2012) . Thus, the Court will include this proposed instruction from Plaintiff , while 
retaining the instruction that “[d]eliberate indifferences requires more than mere negligence by the 
City; it requires a conscious choice not to act.” 
III. ASSUMPTION OF LIABILITY UNDER CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-465 
As discussed at the charge conference on May 21, 2026, the Court will not instruct the jury 
on the requirements of (nor require it to make any findings related to) Connecticut General Statutes 
Section 7-465. That statute requires a municipality to assume the liability of a municipal employee 
who is liable for actions within the scope of their employment that are not willful and wanton. See 
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-465 (“Any town, city, or borough . . . shall pay on behalf of any employee of 
such municipality . . . all sums which such employee becomes obligated to pay by reason of the 
liability imposed upon such employee by law for damages awarded for infringement of any 
person’s civil rights . . . if the employee, at the time of the occurrence, accident, physical injury or 
damages complained of, was acting in the performance of his duties and within the scope of his 
employment, and if such occurrence, accident, physical injury or damage was not the result of any 
wilful or wanton act of such employee in the discharge of such duty.”) . The City correctly notes 
that this statute is titled “Assumption of liability for damages caused by employee. . .,” and does 

not, by its terms, reference “indemnification ,” though it is often colloquially referred to as an 
indemnification statute. 
As Judge Bolden held in Birch v. City of New Milford , 3:20-CV-1790 (VAB), ECF No. 
267 at 23, there is significant risk that informing the jury about the City’s potential obligation to 
pay for liability incurred by the individual Defendants may unfairly prejudice the City , by 
encouraging a higher damages award against the individual Defendants on the assumption that the 
City will ultimately pay the award. See also Nunez v. Diedrick, No. 14-CV-4182 (RJS), 2017 WL 
4350572, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2017). 
During the May 21, 2026, charge conference, the Court had a spirited discussion with the 
parties concerning whether a jury finding about whether Defendant Sweeney’s and Maher’s 
conduct was willful or wanton is necessary. The jury will already be tasked wi th making such a 
finding as to Defendant Raucci, given that Plaintiff seeks punitive damages against him. 
Ultimately, all parties but Sweeney consented to the Court deciding whether the individual 
Defendants’ conduct was willful or wanton (should the jury find them liable ), and thus not 
instructing the jury as to Count Nine. See City of Hartford v. Edwards, 946 F.3d 631, 633–35 (2d 
Cir. 2020) (taking no issue with district court’s determination of whether § 7-465 applied on a 
motion for judgment as a matter of law after jury had determined that the plaintiff was entitled to 
punitive damages). 
With respect to Sweeney, the Court overrules his objection to proceeding in this manner , 
to the extent he can raise such an objection given the procedural posture of the action against him. 
As the Court has already awarded Plaintiff partial summary judgment against Sweeney, the jury is 
tasked only with deciding the issue of causation and damages as to him. To require the jury to 

decide facts related to his conduct—and whether his actions were willful or wanton for purposes 
of § 7-465—would reopen a factual inquiry into his conduct that is already closed. 
IV. DAMAGES INSTRUCTIONS 
Finally, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that instruction on nominal damages, and a 
corresponding question in the verdict form on nominal damages, would be inappropriate, in light 
of the Second Circuit’s decision in Kerman v. City of New York, 374 F.3d 93, 124 (2d Cir. 2004). 
Kerman makes clear that, “where the plaintiff was indisputably deprived of his liberty,” if the 
“conduct of the defendant responsible for the deprivation” is found to be unlawful, the plaintiff is 
“entitled to compensatory, not merely nominal, damages.” Id.; see also Pl.’s Supp. Requests to 
Charge, ECF No. 525 at 3 –6 (citing additional cases). Likewise, the Court finds that the verdict 
form should include only one line for compensatory damages, as opposed to separate lines for each 
Defendant, given that any Defendant who is found liable will be jointly and severally liable for the 
compensatory damages award . See Rodick v. City of Sch enectady, 1 F.3d 1341, 1348 (2d Cir. 
1993). 
 
SO ORDERED at Hartford, Connecticut, this 24th day of May, 2026. 
 /s/ Sarala V. Nagala 
SARALA V. NAGALA 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 

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