govinfo:USCOURTS-ctd-3_22-cv-00630-10

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT 
STEFON MORANT, 
 Plaintiff, 
 
 v. 
 
CITY OF NEW HAVEN et al., 
 Defendants. 
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3:22-CV-630 (SVN) 
 
 
 
 
 
May 26, 2026 
 
 
 
CORRECTED FINAL POST-TRIAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
 
 

 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................. 4 
II. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS ......................................................................................... 5 
A. Role of the Court ............................................................................................................... 5 
B. Instructions to be Considered as a Whole ...................................................................... 5 
C. Both Sides Entitled to a Full and Fair Hearing .............................................................. 6 
D. Objections and Rulings..................................................................................................... 6 
E. Duties of the Jury .............................................................................................................. 7 
F. “Prove,” “Find,” and “Establish” ................................................................................... 8 
G. Burden of Proof—Preponderance of the Evidence ........................................................ 8 
H. Forms of Evidence ............................................................................................................. 9 
I. What is Not Evidence...................................................................................................... 10 
J. Direct and Circumstantial Evidence ............................................................................. 10 
K. Definition of “Inference” ................................................................................................ 11 
L. Witness Credibility—Generally .................................................................................... 12 
M. Impeachment of a Witness ............................................................................................. 13 
N. Law Enforcement Witnesses .......................................................................................... 13 
O. Expert Testimony ............................................................................................................ 14 
P. Uncontradicted Testimony ............................................................................................. 15 
Q. Presence of a Party.......................................................................................................... 15 
R. Multiple Defendants ........................................................................................................ 15 
S. Effect of a Pardon and Other Definitions ..................................................................... 15 
T. Invocation of a Person’s Fifth Amendment Right ....................................................... 16 
III. OVERVIEW OF CLAIMS IN THIS CASE ................................................................. 17 
IV. MR. MORANT’S FEDERAL SECTION 1983 CLAIMS ........................................... 19 
A. Count One: Malicious Prosecution against Mr. Raucci and Mr. Maher ................. 21 
1. Initiated or Continued the Criminal Proceeding ........................................................... 21 
2. The Criminal Proceedings Terminated in Mr. Morant’s Favor .................................... 22 
3. The Defendant(s) Acted without Probable Cause ......................................................... 22 
4. The Defendant(s) Acted With Malice ........................................................................... 22 
5. Post-Arraignment Deprivation of Liberty ..................................................................... 23 
6. Causation....................................................................................................................... 23 

 
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B. Count Three: Failure to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence Against Mr. Raucci, Mr. 
Maher, and Mr. Sweeney ....................................................................................................... 23 
C. Count Four: Fabrication of Evidence against Mr. Raucci and Mr. Maher ............. 25 
D. Count Five: Coercion of Statements against Mr. Raucci and Mr. Maher ............... 26 
E. Count Two: Conspiracy to Violate Mr. Morant’s Constitutional Rights Against Mr. 
Raucci & Mr. Maher .............................................................................................................. 27 
F. Count Six: Failure to Intercede against Mr. Maher ................................................... 28 
G. Count Seven: Municipal Liability Against the City of New Haven........................... 29 
1. Municipal Policy or Custom ......................................................................................... 31 
a. Option One: Widespread Practice or Custom ......................................................... 31 
b. Option Two: Deliberate Indifference to the Need to Supervise and Discipline ...... 32 
c. Option Three: Ratification ....................................................................................... 33 
2. Causation....................................................................................................................... 33 
V. MR. MORANT’S STATE LAW CLAIMS .................................................................. 34 
A. Count Eight: Negligence Against Gail Lawlor, as the Administratrix of the Estate of 
Robert Lawlor ......................................................................................................................... 34 
1. Defense to Mr. Morant’s Negligence Claim: Governmental Immunity ...................... 35 
B. Count Nine: Assumption of Liability ........................................................................... 37 
C. Count Ten: Direct Action Against the City ................................................................. 37 
VI. DAMAGES ...................................................................................................................... 38 
A. General Instructions ....................................................................................................... 38 
B. Compensatory Damages ................................................................................................. 38 
VII. CLOSING ARGUMENTS ............................................................................................. 41 
VIII. INSTRUCTIONS FOR DELIBERATIONS (AFTER CLOSING ARGUMENTS) . 41 
 
 

 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Members of the jury, you now have heard all of the evidence. At this point, I am going to 
instruct you about the law that applies to this case. At the outset, I want to express my gratitude 
to you for the time and energy you have devoted to this trial. Jury service is rarely convenient, 
especially so in a multi -week trial such as this, but without you, justice could not be done in this 
case. 
It will take some time for me to read these instructions to you, but it is important that you 
listen carefully. You have been provided with a copy of these instructions so that you can read 
along as we go. Please feel free to write on these copies. You will also be permitted to take them 
into the jury room with you during your deliberations. 
My instructions will be in three parts. First, I will discuss general rules concerning the role 
of the Court, the duty of the jury, and the different types of evidence and inferences that you may 
rely on in reaching a verdict. Second, I will go over the counts in this case, identify the questions 
of fact that you must answer based on the evidence presented at trial, and discuss the applicable 
law of damages. Finally, after the parties have presented their closing arguments, I will give you 
some rules and guidelines for your deliberations. 
Before we begin, I ask you to look over the other document that was placed on your seats—
namely, the verdict form. After I have given these instructions and you hear the closing arguments 
of counsel, you will go back into the jury room to deliberate. You will have with you the following: 
the original of the verdict form, digital versions and hard copies of the original exhibits along with 
any limiting instructions applicable to each exhibit , your copies of these instructions, and any 
personal notes that you may have taken. At the conclusion of your deliberations, you will use the 
verdict form to report your verdict to the Court and the parties. 

 
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II. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
A. Role of the Court 
As Judge, I perform basically two functions during the trial. First, I decide what evidence 
you may consider. You have heard me doing that throughout the trial. Second, I instruct you on 
the law that you are to apply to the facts. I gave you some preliminary instructions before the trial 
began, and some during the course of the trial, but it is now—at the close of evidence—that most 
of the instructions are given, so please be patient and listen closely. If any of the lawyers state the 
law differently from the way I am explaining it to you, you are to follow my instructions. I believe 
that everything I am going to tell you is consistent with the preliminary instructions I delivered at 
the start of the trial , but if you have any doubt, you should rely on these instructions, and not 
anything different I may have said in the preliminary instructions. 
B. Instructions to be Considered as a Whole 
These instructions are long, and I may repeat certain parts. That does not mean that those 
parts should be emphasized. You should not single out any one part of my instructions and ignore 
the rest. Instead, you should consider all of the instructions as a whole and consider each 
instruction in light of all the others. The order in which I give these instructions does not indicate 
their relative importance. Do not read into these instructions, or into anything I have said or done, 
any suggestion about w hat verdict you should return —that is a matter for you alone to decide. 
During these instructions, I may, by the level of my voice or by my inflections, seem to emphasize 
certain matters. That is simply to help you understand the important principles of law. It is not 
intended to communicate any opinion about the facts. 
I should also point out that, although you have been given a copy of the instructions to 
follow as I deliver them, if I say aloud anything at all different from what is written, you must 
follow what I say here in Court. 

 
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C. Both Sides Entitled to a Full and Fair Hearing 
Regardless of your ultimate decision about the parties’ claims and defenses, the parties in 
this case are entitled to a full and fair hearing. You must remember that one of the most important 
functions of our system is to give the parties to a dispute a f ull and fair hearing, regardless of the 
final outcome of the case. It is your duty, therefore, to give careful thought to every issue set forth 
by these instructions, regardless of any feeling that you may have about which party is right. Mr. 
Morant made the decision to bring this lawsuit, and the Defendants have the right to defend the 
lawsuit until a verdict is reached. You should draw no inference against any Defendant simply for 
their decision to defend against Mr. Morant’s claims. 
You have been chosen and sworn as jurors in this case to decide the issues of fact and to 
apply the law to those facts as the Court gives the law to you in these instructions. You are to 
perform this duty without bias or prejudice as to any party. Nor may you permit sympathy or 
emotion to influence your verdict. Your decision must be based solely upon the evidence admitted 
at trial and the law as I instruct you. Your verdict must reflect your collective, reasoned judgment 
as to what the evidence proves and what the law requires. 
D. Objections and Rulings 
It is the duty of an attorney to object to testimony or other evidence that the attorney 
believes is not properly admissible. These objections are not evidence you may consider in your 
deliberations. You should not prefer or dislike an attorney or a party because an attorney made 
objections, failed to make objections, or made his or her objections in a particular manner during 
the trial. The application of the rules of evidence is not always clear, and lawyers and parties often 
disagree about them. It h as been my job as the judge to resolve these disputes during the course 
of the trial. You need not concern yourself with why a lawyer or party made an objection or why 
I ruled on it in the manner that I did. If I have allowed testimony or evidence that a n attorney 

 
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objected to, you should not give that evidence any more or less weight than evidence that was not 
objected to. My rulings on objections have nothing to do with the credibility of the witnesses. 
If I have sustained an objection to a question asked of a witness, you must disregard the 
question entirely, and may draw no inference from the question, nor speculate about what the 
witness would have said if he or she had been permitted to answer the question. If a witness started 
to answer or answered before I had an opportunity to sustain the objection, you must disregard the 
answer and draw no inference from any answer that witness started to give or gave.1 You must 
also disregard any testimony that I have stricken, because it is not evidence. 
During the course of a trial, one cannot help but recognize the various personalities and 
styles of the attorneys . Every attorney representing a party here has worked diligently over the 
course of this trial in support of their clients. Whatever you may think about the conduct of the 
individuals who presented the case during this trial, you must decide this case solely on the basis 
of the evidence. 
E. Duties of the Jury 
The jury is the finder of fact in a trial . It is your duty to find the facts from all of the 
evidence in the case. In reaching a verdict you must carefully and impartially consider all of the 
evidence in the case and then apply the law to that evidence as I have explained it to you. 
Regardless of any opinion you may have about what the law is or ought to be, it would be a 
violation of your sworn duty to base a verdict upon any understanding or interpretation of the law 
other than the one I give you. Yo u must do your duty as jurors regardless of any personal likes, 
dislikes, opinions, prejudices, or sympathies that you may have. In other words, you must decide 
the case solely on the evidence before you, and you must do so fairly and impartially. 
 
1 In delivering these jury instructions, the Court modified this sentence to use the word “witness”, rather than the word 
“party”. 

 
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The verdict you reach must be unanimous; that is, agreed upon by each of you. You must 
each decide the case for yourself, but do so only after impartial consideration of the evidence in 
the case with your fellow jurors. 
F. “Prove,” “Find,” and “Establish” 
Throughout the remainder of my instructions to you, I will use the word “prove” when 
talking about what Mr. Morant must do in order to win this case. My use of the word “prove” 
means “prove by the preponderance of the evidence,” even if I do not always repeat those words. 
Similarly, when I speak of your “finding” various facts or the parties “establishing” various facts, 
you must determine whether those facts have been proven by the preponderance of the evidence, 
even if I simply use the word “find” or “establish.” 
G. Burden of Proof—Preponderance of the Evidence 
As you know, the plaintiff in this case is Mr. Morant. Because this is a civil case, Mr. 
Morant has the burden of proving every element of his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. 
The Defendants in this case, as you know, are the City of New Haven (which I will call the “City,” 
for short), Vincent Raucci, Michael Sweeney, Vaughn Maher, and Gail Lawlor, as Administratrix 
of the Estate of Robert Lawlor. 
To establish a fact by a preponderance of the evidence, Mr. Morant must prove that the fact 
is more likely true than not true. Picture in your head the scales of justice, as I discussed with you 
at the beginning of this case. If you find that the credible evidence on a given issue is evenly 
divided between Mr. Morant and any Defendant, or tips in favor of any Defendant, then you must 
decide that issue in favor of the relevant Defendant or Defendants. However, if Mr. Morant proves 
that a fact is more like ly true than not, even slightly, then you are to find that Mr. Morant has 
proven that fact by a preponderance of the evidence. 

 
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In determining whether a claim has been proven by a preponderance of the evidence, you 
should consider the testimony of all witnesses, regardless of who may have called them, and all 
the exhibits received in evidence, regardless of who may have presented t hem. A preponderance 
of the evidence means the greater weight of the evidence; it refers to the quality and persuasiveness 
of the evidence, not to the number of witnesses or documents presented. 
Some of you may have heard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which is a higher 
standard of proof that applies in a criminal trial. That higher standard of proof applied to Mr. 
Morant’s underlying 1994 criminal trial; it does not apply to this civil case. 
H. Forms of Evidence 
Next, I want to discuss with you generally what we mean by evidence and how you should 
consider it. The evidence from which you are to decide what the facts are comes in four2 forms: 
First, there is the sworn testimony of witnesses, both on direct examination and cross -
examination, and regardless of who called the witness. 
Second, there is the sworn testimony of unavailable witnesses from previous proceedings, 
which was read to you by the parties over the course of the trial or played on video. 
Third, there are the exhibits that have been received into the trial record. Exhibits were 
received into evidence when I said that an exhibit was admitted as a “full” exhibit. All of the 
exhibits that have been admitted into evidence will be with you in the jury room. If an exhibit has 
been admitted into evidence, it is evidence that can be considered by you regardless of whether 
any witness referred to the exhibit or testified about it during trial. If I instructed you to consider 
an item of evidence for a limited purpose only, you must follow that instruction. This instruction 
 
2 In delivering these jury instructions, the Court modified this sentence to state that there are “four” forms of evidence, 
rather than “three forms”. 
 

 
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is called a “limiting instruction.” Any limiting instructions that I have given with respect to an 
exhibit will be attached to that exhibit for your reference while you deliberate. 
Fourth, there are facts to which all the lawyers have agreed or stipulated to or of which I 
have taken judicial notice , which I have read for you and of which you will have a copy during 
deliberations. 
I. What is Not Evidence 
Questions are not evidence; answers are. At times, a lawyer may have incorporated into a 
question a statement that assumed certain facts to be true, and asked the witness if the statement 
was true. If the witness denied the truth of a statement, and if t here is no evidence in the record 
proving that assumed fact to be true, then you may not consider it to be true simply because it was 
contained in the lawyer’s question. 
Testimony that has been stricken or excluded by the Court also is not evidence and may 
not be considered by you in rendering your verdict. 
What the lawyers say in their opening statements, closing arguments, comments, 
objections, and questions is not evidence. What they say in their closing arguments is intended to 
help you understand the evidence and to reach your verdict. If your recollection of the facts differs 
from the lawyers’ statements, however, you should rely on your memory. 
Moreover, what I may have said during the trial or what I may say in these instructions is 
not evidence, and my rulings on the admissibility of evidence do not indicate any opinion about 
the weight or effect of such evidence. 
It is for you alone to decide the weight, if any, to be given to the testimony you have heard 
and to the exhibits you have seen. 
J. Direct and Circumstantial Evidence 
There are two types of evidence that you may properly consider in reaching your verdict. 

 
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One type of evidence is direct evidence. Direct evidence includes a witness’s testimony 
about something the witness knows by virtue of his or her own senses —something he or she has 
seen, felt, touched, heard, or done. 
Circumstantial evidence is evidence that tends to prove a disputed fact by proof of other 
facts. For example, as I noted before trial, assume that when you came into the courthouse this 
morning the sun was shining and it was a nice day. Assume that, because there are no windows in 
this courtroom, you could not look outside. As you were sitting here, someone walked in with an 
umbrella that was dripping wet. Then a few minutes later, another person also entered with a wet 
umbrella. Now, you cannot look outside of the courtroom, and you cannot see or hear whether it 
is raining. So, you have no direct evidence of that fact. But on the combination of facts that I have 
asked you to assume, it would be reasonable and logical for you to conclude that it had b een 
raining. 
That is all there is to circumstantial evidence. On the basis of your reason, experience, and 
common sense, you infer from one established fact the existence or non -existence of some other 
fact. Circumstantial evidence is of no less value than direct evidence. It is a general rule that the 
law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence, but simply requires that your 
verdict must be based on a preponderance of all of the evidence presented. Circumstantial 
evidence, however, does not include guesswork or conjecture. Circumstantial evidence consists 
only of the reasonable and logical inferences that you draw from other evidence in the record. 
K. Definition of “Inference” 
During the trial you may have heard the attorneys use the term “inference” and in their 
arguments they may ask you to infer, on the basis of your reason, experience, and common sense, 
from one or more established facts, the existence of some other fact. 

 
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An inference is not a suspicion or a guess. It is a reasoned, logical conclusion that a 
disputed fact exists because another fact has been shown to exist. 
There are times when different inferences may be drawn from the same facts, whether 
proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. Mr. Morant may ask you to draw one set of 
inferences, while the City, Mr. Sweeney, Mr. Raucci, Mr. Maher, and Mr. Lawlor may ask you to 
draw another. It is for you, and you alone, to decide what inferences you will draw. 
The process of drawing inferences from facts in evidence is not a matter of guesswork or 
speculation. An inference is a conclusion that you are permitted, but not required, to draw from 
the facts that have been established by either direct or circumstanti al evidence. In drawing 
inferences, you should exercise your common sense. Finally, you may not draw any inferences 
from the mere fact that this lawsuit was filed. 
L. Witness Credibility—Generally 
You have had the opportunity to observe all of the witnesses. It is now your job to decide 
how believable each witness was in their testimony. You are the sole judges of the credibility of 
each witness and of the importance of their testimony. 
In making these judgments, you should carefully scrutinize all of the testimony of each 
witness, the circumstances under which each witness testified, and any other matter in evidence 
that may help you decide the truth and the importance of each witness’s testimony. 
How do you determine truthfulness? You base it on what you have seen and heard. You 
watched the witness testify. Everything a witness said or did on the witness stand counts in your 
determination. How did the witness appear to you? Was the witness frank, forthright, and candid, 
or evasive and edgy as if hiding something? How did the witness appear? What was the witness’s 
demeanor—that is, their behavior, manner, and appearance—while testifying? Often it is not what 
a person says but how they say it that convinces us. 

 
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You should use all the tests for truthfulness that you would use in determining matters of 
credibility in your everyday lives. You should consider any bias or hostility the witness may have 
shown for or against any party as well as any interest the witnes s has in the outcome of the case. 
You should consider the opportunity the witness had to see, hear, and know the things about which 
they testified; the accuracy of the witness’s memory; the witness’s candor or lack of candor; the 
witness’s intelligence; a nd the reasonableness and probability of the witness’s testimony, its 
consistency or lack of consistency, and its corroboration or lack of corroboration with other 
credible testimony. 
Always remember that in assessing a witness’s testimony, you should use your common 
sense, your good judgment, and your own life experiences. 
M. Impeachment of a Witness 
A witness may be discredited or “impeached” by contradictory evidence, by a showing that 
the witness testified falsely concerning a material matter, or by evidence that at some other time 
the witness said or did something inconsistent with the witness’s pr esent testimony. It is your 
exclusive province to give the testimony of each witness such credibility or weight, if any, as you 
think it deserves. 
If you believe a witness testified untruthfully in some respect, you may consider that fact 
in deciding the weight you will give to that witness’s testimony. Considering that fact and all other 
relevant evidence, you may accept or reject the testimony of each witness either in whole or in 
part. 
N. Law Enforcement Witnesses 
You have heard the testimony of people who work or have worked in law enforcement. 
The testimony of a person who works in law enforcement should be considered by you just as any 
other evidence in this case, and in evaluating his or her credibility you sho uld use the same 

 
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guidelines that you apply to the testimony of any witness. You should not give either more or less 
weight to the testimony of a witness merely because he or she works or has worked in law 
enforcement. 
O. Expert Testimony 
In this case, I have permitted certain witnesses to express their opinions about matters that 
are in issue. A witness may be permitted to testify to an opinion on those matters about which he 
or she has special knowledge, skill, experience, and training. Such expert testimony is presented 
to you on the theory that someone who is experienced and knowledgeable in the field can assist 
you in understanding the evidence or in reaching an independent decision on the facts. 
In weighing this testimony, you may consider the witness’s qualifications, his or her 
opinions, the reasons for testifying, as well as all of the other considerations that ordinarily apply 
when you are deciding whether or not to believe a witness’s testimo ny. In weighing the expert’s 
testimony, you also should consider any bias, motive, or interest in the outcome of this case you 
may find such expert may have. You may give the opinion testimony whatever weight, if any, you 
find it deserves, in light of al l the evidence in this case. You should not, however, accept expert 
testimony merely because I allowed the witness to testify concerning his or her opinion. 
Nor should you substitute it for your own reason, judgment, and common sense . The 
determination of the facts in this case rests solely with you. As with the testimony of any other 
witness, you, the jury, may decide to accept all, some, or none of the testimony of any expert 
witness. If you decide that an opinion of an expert witness is not based upon sufficient education 
and experience, or if you should conclude that the reasons given in support of the opinion are not 
convincing to you, or if you feel th at the opinion is outweighed by other evidence, you may 
disregard the opinion entirely. 

 
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P. Uncontradicted Testimony 
You are not required to accept testimony simply because the testimony is uncontradicted 
and the witness is not discredited or impeached. You may decide, because of the witness’s manner 
and demeanor, the improbability of his or her testimony, or other reas ons, that such testimony is 
not worthy of belief. 
On the other hand, the testimony of a single witness may be enough to convince you of a 
fact in dispute, if you believe that the witness has truthfully and accurately related what in fact 
occurred. 
Q. Presence of a Party 
During trial, you have seen various parties come and go from day to day over the course 
of the trial. Mr. Morant, Mr. Sweeney, Mr. Raucci, and Mr. Maher each have had a right to be 
present for the duration of trial, but they have had no legal obligation to be present each day of 
trial. 
R. Multiple Defendants 
Although there are several Defendants in this action, it does not follow from that fact alone 
that if one is liable, all are liable. Each Defendant is entitled to a fair consideration of Mr. Morant’s 
claims against him or it, and of each Defendant’s own defenses to those claims, and is not to be 
prejudiced by any fact that you may find against another Defendant. Remember that the claims as 
to each of the Defendants must be considered separately by you. The fact that you may find one 
of the Defendants is or is not liable does not determine your verdict as to any other Defendant. 
This applies both when there are multiple Defendants in a claim, and across the various claims. 
S. Effect of a Pardon and Other Definitions 
Mr. Morant was granted an absolute and unconditional pardon, which has the legal effect 
of invalidating and erasing his conviction. A pardon is not a finding made by a judge or a court of 

 
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law; it is issued by the Connecticut Board of Pardons within the state executive branch. Under 
Connecticut law, a pardon is not a finding of innocence. There is no statutory provision under 
Connecticut law to obtain a pardon that includes a finding of innocence. 
You have also heard evidence that Mr. Morant’s sentence was modified in 2015, before he 
received a pardon. A judge may reduce a sentence under Connecticut law. A sentence 
modification does not overturn a conviction or establish that a person is innocent. 
Within the judicially noticed facts that I have read at trial —and of which you will have a 
copy during your deliberations—there has also been reference to the convictions of other people 
being “vacated” and their sentences being “commuted.” To vacate a conviction means to overturn 
a conviction. A conviction may be vacated due to a defect in the legal proceeding. A sentence 
commutation is an act of the Connecticut Board of Pardons to reduce or modify a criminal 
sentence. Like a sentence modification orde red by a judge, a commutation does not overturn a 
conviction or establish that a person is innocent. 
T. Invocation of a Person’s Fifth Amendment Right 
During the testimony presented at trial, both Mr. Raucci and Jose Roque chose to invoke 
their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. I will now repeat the same instructions I 
previously gave you about a person’s invocation of their Fifth Amendm ent right against self -
incrimination. 
 Mr. Raucci has a right under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution to 
decline to answer questions on the ground that doing so may tend to incriminate him. He has 
chosen to invoke this right. You may, but are not required to, infer from such refusal that the 
answer would have been adverse to Mr. Raucci’s interest. You should consider any inference you 
may or may not choose to draw from Mr. Raucci’s refusal to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds 
together with all other evidence in the case. 

 
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 Witness Jose Roque also has a right under the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution to decline to answer questions on the ground that doing so may tend to incriminate 
him. You may, but are not required to, infer from Mr. Roque’s refusal to answer that the answer 
would have been adverse to his own interests. But you may not infer from Mr. Roque’s refusal to 
answer certain questions that the answers would have been adverse to Mr. Morant’s interests. That 
is, you may not draw any adverse infere nce against Mr. Morant based on Mr. Roque ’s refusal to 
answer questions. You should consider any inference against Mr. Roque that you may or may not 
choose to draw from his refusal to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds together with all other 
evidence in the case. 
III. OVERVIEW OF CLAIMS IN THIS CASE 
I am now going to discuss the issues in this case relating to liability and damages. Before 
I begin, it is important to distinguish between liability and damages. When I use the word 
“liability,” I mean the legal obligation that any particular Defendant has allegedly violated with 
respect to the specific claims Mr. Morant has made. This is different from “damages,” which are 
an award of money to compensate Mr. Morant if you find any Defendant liable for the harm Mr. 
Morant alleges any such Defendant caused. Liability may be premised on the different claims or 
counts that Mr. Morant has brought. I will use the words “claims” and “counts” interchangeably, 
and they have the same meaning. 
If you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Morant has proven a count against 
the applicable Defendant or Defendants, then that Defendant or those Defendants are liable as to 
that count. If one or more Defendant is liable on a count, you may then proceed to consider whether 
to award Mr. Morant damages as compensation for such liability. You may not consider the 

 
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question of damages unless you first determine that one or more Defendant s is liable on at least 
one count. 
I will instruct you on damages later. For now, please focus your attention only on Mr. 
Morant’s claims of liability, a list of which was provided to you over the course of the trial. Mr. 
Morant’s claims are split into two broad categories: his federal law claims that all arise under Title 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, which I will call “Section 1983,” and his state law claims. I will now read that 
list of claims that I provided to you during the trial to you again: 
Mr. Morant’s Federal Section 1983 Claims: 
• Count One: Malicious Prosecution against Mr. Raucci and Mr. Maher. 
• Count Three: Failure to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence against Mr. Raucci, Mr. Maher, 
and Mr. Sweeney. 
• Count Four: Fabrication of Evidence against Mr. Raucci and Mr. Maher. 
• Count Five: Coercion of Statements against Mr. Raucci and Mr. Maher. 
• Count Two: Civil Rights Conspiracy against Mr. Raucci and Mr. Maher. You may only 
reach this Count if you find that one of the Individual Defendants committed the 
constitutional violations described in Counts One, Three, Four, or Five. 
• Count Six: Failure to Intercede against Mr. Maher. You may only reach this Count if 
you find that one of the individual Defendants committed the constitutional violations 
described in Counts One, Three, Four, or Five. 
• Count Seven: Municipal Liability against the City of New Haven. 
Mr. Morant’s State Law Claims 
• Count Eight: Negligence against Gail Lawlor as Administratrix of the Estate of Robert 
Lawlor. 

 
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• Count Nine: Assumption of Liability against the City of New Haven. 
• Count Ten: Direct Action against the City of New Haven. 
As I mentioned in the preliminary instructions, Defendants have advanced defenses that 
you will be instructed about in these instructions. 
I will now explain the law applicable to Section 1983. After that, I will proceed to explain 
the law applicable to each of Mr. Morant’s individual state law claims. 
IV. MR. MORANT’S FEDERAL SECTION 1983 CLAIMS 
All of Mr. Morant’s federal law claims are brought pursuant to a federal civil rights statute, 
Section 1983. Section 1983 permits a plaintiff to seek money damages in a federal court if he has 
been deprived of rights protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Section 1983, 
by itself, does not establish or create any federally protected right. Rather, this statute allows Mr. 
Morant to enforce rights guaranteed to him by the United States Constitution or other laws of the 
United States. 
For each claim he brings under Section 1983, Mr. Morant must prove, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, three elements. 
First, he must prove that the Defendants were acting under color of law, meaning for the 
individual Defendants that they were acting as New Haven Police officers and for the City that it 
was acting as a governmental body. This element is undisputed by the parties, so I instruct you to 
find it has been met. 
Second, Mr. Morant must prove that the relevant Defendant’s conduct intentionally or 
recklessly deprived Mr. Morant of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 
An act is intentional if it is done voluntarily and deliberately and not because of mistake, accident, 
negligence, or other innocent reason. An act is reckless if done in conscious disregard of its known 

 
20 
probable consequences. In other words, even if a Defendant did not intentionally seek to deprive 
Mr. Morant of his rights, if nevertheless he purposely disregarded the high probability that his 
actions would deprive Mr. Morant of his rights, then this ele ment would be satisfied. Intent can 
be proved directly or it can be proved by reasonable inference from circumstantial evidence. Mr. 
Morant alleges several different deprivations of his rights here, which I will explain to you further 
in a moment. You must find at least intentionality or recklessness for all of Mr. Morant’s Section 
1983 claims, though some of the claims below may require a finding of a specific higher level of 
intent. If so, follow the applicable instructions for that claim. 
Third, Mr. Morant must prove that the applicable Defendant(s)’ acts caused Mr. Morant’s 
injuries. To show Defendant(s)’ acts caused Mr. Morant’s injuries, Mr. Morant must establish 
“but for” and “proximate” causation. But for causation is established whenever a particular 
outcome would not have happened “but for” the purported cause. In other words, a but for test 
directs us to change one thing at a time and see if the outcome changes. If it does, there is a but 
for cause. Often, events have multiple but for causes. So, for example, if a car accident occurred 
both because the defendant ran a red light and because the plaintiff failed to signal his turn at the 
intersection, we might call each a but for cause of the collision. Here, so long as the relevant 
Defendant’s violation was one but for cause of Mr. Morant’s deprivation of liberty, that is enough. 
An act is a proximate cause of an injury if it was a substantial factor in bringing about that 
injury, and if the injury was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the relevant Defendant’s 
actions. To constitute a “substantial factor,” Mr. Morant must prove that the relevant Defendant’s 
actions contributed materially and not just in a trivial or inconsequential manner to his injuries —
specifically, his conviction. If you find that the relationship between the relevant Defendant’s 

 
21 
actions and Mr. Morant’s injuries is too remote, Mr. Morant will not have established proximate 
cause by a preponderance of the evidence as to that Defendant. 
If you find that Mr. Morant has established each of these elements as to any of his federal 
counts, you may proceed with considering whether Mr. Morant is entitled to damages. I will now 
describe each of Mr. Morant’s claims in more detail. 
A. Count One: Malicious Prosecution against Mr. Raucci and Mr. Maher 
For his Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim against Mr. Raucci and Mr. Maher, the 
constitutionally secured right Mr. Morant alleges was violated is his Fourth Amendment right to 
be free from unreasonable or unwarranted restraints on his personal liberty. 
To succeed on his malicious prosecution claim, Mr. Morant must prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that: (1) the relevant Defendant(s) initiated or continued the criminal proceeding 
against him; (2) the criminal proceedings terminated in his favor; (3) the Defendant(s) acted 
without probable cause; (4) the Defendant(s) acted maliciously, or for a purpose other than 
bringing Mr. Morant to justice; (5) Mr. Morant suffered a post -arraignment deprivation of his 
liberty; and (6) Mr. Morant’s deprivation of liberty occurred as a result of the malicious 
prosecution. 
1. Initiated or Continued the Criminal Proceeding 
As to the first element, Mr. Morant may prove that the relevant Defendant initiated or 
continued a criminal proceeding against him by showing that the Defendant played an active role 
in the prosecution, such as giving advice and encouragement or prompting the prosecutor to act. 
This may include filing the charges, seeking the arrest of Mr. Morant , or forwarding false 
information to the prosecutor , which information is then instrumental in bringing about or 
continuing the charges. 

 
22 
2. The Criminal Proceedings Terminated in Mr. Morant’s Favor 
I instruct you that a pardon by the State of Connecticut Board of Pardons and Paroles is a 
termination of criminal proceedings in Mr. Morant’s favor as a matter of law. As the parties have 
stipulated that Mr. Morant received an absolute pardon, you must consider this element to have 
been met as to both Mr. Raucci and Mr. Maher. 
3. The Defendant(s) Acted without Probable Cause 
As to the third element, Mr. Morant must prove that the relevant Defendant lacked probable 
cause to initiate or continue the criminal proceedings against him . Probable cause exists when a 
police officer has knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances 
that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person committed 
the crime charged. 
The issuance of an arrest warrant by a judge typically carries with it a rebuttable 
presumption of probable cause. But that presumption goes away if Mr. Morant shows that the 
person who swore to the information contained in the affidavit that was presented to the judge 
knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, made a false statement or 
material omission in the affidavit that was necessary to the finding of probable cause. 
The existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a malicious prosecution claim. If 
you find that the relevant Defendant had probable cause to initiate or continue the criminal 
proceedings against Mr. Morant, you must stop here and find that Mr. Morant has not established 
his malicious prosecution claim. 
4. The Defendant(s) Acted With Malice 
If you find that Mr. Raucci and/or Mr. Maher did not have probable cause to initiate or 
continue the prosecution of Mr. Morant , then you may proceed to determin e whether each 
Defendant acted with malice. Malice is not just hatred or ill will. You may find a Defendant acted 

 
23 
out of malice if you find any of the following: the Defendant acted with reckless disregard for Mr. 
Morant’s rights; the Defendant used the prosecution of Mr. Morant for an improper purpose; the 
Defendant did not actually believe Mr. Morant was guilty; or the Defendant intentionally 
misrepresented the facts to the prosecutor or intentionally withheld favorable information from the 
prosecutor that was helpful to Mr. Morant. You can also infer malice from the absence of probable 
cause to prosecute Mr. Morant. You do not need to find that all of these were the case ; a single 
basis for finding malice is sufficient. 
5. Post-Arraignment Deprivation of Liberty 
There is no dispute in this case that Mr. Morant suffered a post-arraignment deprivation of 
liberty through imprisonment. Therefore, I instruct you as a matter of law to find that Mr. Morant 
has proven this element. 
6. Causation 
As described above, Mr. Morant must show his deprivation of liberty occurred as a result 
of the malicious prosecution. That means but for and proximate cause, as I have already instructed 
you. 
B. Count Three: Failure to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence Against Mr. Raucci, 
Mr. Maher, and Mr. Sweeney 
In Count Three, Mr. Morant alleges his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and a 
fair trial was violated by Mr. Raucci, Mr. Maher, and Mr. Sweeney, because they withheld material 
information that was favorable to him. In describing this claim, I will use the terms “information” 
and “evidence” interchangeably. 
A claim of withholding of favorable evidence is also known as a “ Brady” claim, named 
after the 1963 Supreme Court case Brady v. Maryland. You will have heard lawyers on both sides 

 
24 
refer to this claim as Mr. Morant’s “Brady claim” throughout the trial. I, too, will refer to this 
claim as a “Brady claim” or “alleged Brady violation” in these instructions. 
To prove a Brady claim, Mr. Morant must prove each of the following elements by a 
preponderance of the evidence: (1) the relevant Defendant was aware of information that was 
favorable to Mr. Morant ; (2) the relevant Defendant deliberately withheld the favorable 
information from the prosecutor; (3) the withheld information, taken all together, was “ material” 
to Mr. Morant ’s criminal trial ; (4) Mr. Morant suffered a deprivation of liberty ; and (5) Mr. 
Morant’s deprivation of liberty was as a result of the withholding of the favorable information. 
As to the first element, information can be favorable in many ways. First, information is 
favorable if it is exculpatory, which means it tends to show that the accused did not commit the 
crime. Second, information is favorable if it could be used to undermine the credibility of a witness 
who provides information against the accused (known as impeachment evidence). Another type 
of favorable information is information that calls into question the integrity of the police 
investigation. 
As to the second element, Mr. Morant must prove that the relevant Defendant intentionally 
did not disclose the favorable information to the prosecutor. 
As to the third element, the favorable information is material if there is a reasonable 
probability that, had the information been disclosed, the outcome of the trial would have been 
different. In other words, the information is material if its absence from the criminal trial 
undermines confidence in the trial’s outcome. In assessing materiality, the suppressed information 
must be considered collectively, not item by item. 

 
25 
As to the fourth element, there is no dispute in this case that Mr. Morant suffered a 
deprivation of liberty through imprisonment . Therefore, I instruct you as a matter of law to find 
that Mr. Morant has proven this element. 
As to the fifth element, you must determine whether Mr. Morant suffered a deprivation of 
liberty as a result of the relevant Defendant’s withholding of the favorable information , which 
requires finding that the relevant Defendant’s actions were a but for and a proximate cause of Mr. 
Morant’s deprivation of liberty, as I have previously instructed you. 
You are to consider all elements of the Brady claim with respect to Mr. Raucci and Mr. 
Maher. 
With respect to Mr. Sweeney, I instruct you that, as a matter of law, Mr. Morant has proven 
elements one through four of his Brady claim against Mr. Sweeney. As a result, your only task as 
to Mr. Sweeney is to consider the fifth element of causation —that is, whether Mr. Morant has 
proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Mr. Sweeney’s withholding of information that 
was favorable to Mr. Morant was a but for and proximate cause of Mr. Morant’s deprivation of 
liberty. 
C. Count Four: Fabrication of Evidence against Mr. Raucci and Mr. Maher 
In Count Four, Mr. Morant alleges that his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of 
law was violated by Mr. Raucci and Mr. Maher, by their alleged fabrication of evidence . In 
describing this claim, I use the words “information” and “evidence” interchangeably. 
To succeed on his fabrication of evidence claim, Mr. Morant must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence each of the following eleme nts against the relevant Defendant : 
(1) the Defendant was an investigating official; (2) the Defendant fabricated information, such as 
by knowingly making false statements or material omissions; (3) such fabricated information was 
likely to influence a jury’s verdict; (4) the investigating official forwarded , or caused to be 

 
26 
forwarded, the fabricated information to the prosecutor(s); (5) Mr. Morant suffered a deprivation 
of liberty; and (6) Mr. Morant’s deprivation of liberty was as a result of the fabricated information. 
I instruct you as a matter of law to find that Mr. Morant has established that both Mr. Raucci 
and Mr. Maher are investigating officers (element one) , and that Mr. Morant has suffered a 
deprivation of liberty through his imprisonment (element five). Accordingly, you must decide 
only elements two, three, four, and six. 
As to the sixth element, you must determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether 
the relevant Defendant’s alleged fabrication of evidence was a but for and proximate cause of Mr. 
Morant’s deprivation of liberty. 
D. Count Five: Coercion of Statements against Mr. Raucci and Mr. Maher 
In Count Five, Mr. Morant alleges that his Fifth Amendment right against self -
incrimination and Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law were violated by Mr. Raucci 
and Mr. Maher, when they allegedly coerced his statement. 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. Thus, the Constitution prohibits 
the use of an involuntary statement against a criminal suspect in a criminal proceeding. The use 
of an involuntary statement against a criminal suspect in a criminal proceeding also violates a 
person’s right to the due process of law. A statement is voluntary when it is the product of the 
person’s free choice. On the other hand, a statement is involuntary if it is obtained under 
circumstances that overbear the person’s will at the time he gave it. 
To succeed on this claim, Mr. Morant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
(1) that the relevant Defendant caused Mr. Morant to give an involuntary statement ; (2) that 
statement was used against Mr. Morant in a criminal proceeding ; (3) Mr. Morant suffered a 

 
27 
deprivation of liberty; and (4) the deprivation of liberty was as a result of the involuntary 
statement’s use against him in a criminal proceeding. 
There is no single criterion for you to use to determine whether Mr. Morant was caused to 
give an involuntary statement. Instead, in considering whether a statement was involuntary , you 
must consider the totality of the circumstances , including (1) the characteristics of Mr. Morant 
(such as experience, age, intelligence, education or lack thereof, and background); (2) the 
conditions of interrogation (such as its location, length, and the presence or absence of an attorney); 
and (3) the conduct of law enfor cement officials (including whether there was repeated and 
prolonged questioning; a failure to inform Mr. Morant of his constitutional rights; clear promises 
of leniency or benefits; use of psychologically coercive techniques; physical mistreatment such as 
physical abuse or long restraint in handcuffs; and any physical deprivations of food, water, sleep, 
or clothing for long periods of time). 
As to the second element, I instruct you that Mr. Morant’s statement was used against him 
in his criminal trial. Thus, you must find that this element has been met. 
As to the third element, t here is no dispute in this case that Mr. Morant suffered a 
deprivation of liberty through imprisonment . Therefore, I instruct you as a matter of law to find 
that Mr. Morant has proven this element. 
As to the fourth element, you must find that the use of the involuntary statement in criminal 
proceedings was a but for and proximate cause of Mr. Morant’s deprivation of liberty. 
E. Count Two: Conspiracy to Violate Mr. Morant’s Constitutional Rights Against 
Mr. Raucci & Mr. Maher 
In Count Two, Mr. Morant alleges that Mr. Raucci and Mr. Maher conspired amongst 
themselves and with others to violate his civil rights. In order for you to consider whether these 
Defendants are liable for a conspiracy to violate Mr. Morant’s civil rights, you must first find that 

 
28 
Mr. Morant was deprived of at least one other constitutional right by Mr. Raucci or Mr. Maher, as 
he alleges in Counts One (malicious prosecution), Three (Brady violation), Four (fabrication of 
evidence), and Five (coercion of statements). 
To establish his conspiracy claim, Mr. Morant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the 
evidence: (1) there was an agreement between the relevant Defendant and one or more other 
Defendants, other officers, or private actors, such as Frank Parise, Ovil Ruiz a/k/a Augustin Castro, 
or Hector Ortiz; (2) to act in concert to deprive Mr. Morant of his civil rights; (3) an overt act was 
taken to further the goal of depriving Mr. Morant of a constitutional right , which caused Mr. 
Morant harm; (4) Mr. Morant suffe red a deprivation of liberty; and (5) the deprivation of liberty 
was as a result of actions taken in furtherance of the conspiracy, which means but for and proximate 
cause. 
As to the first element, you do not have to find that there was an express verbal or written 
agreement. An agreement between conspirators can be tacit and reached without any written 
statement or express spoken words communicating the agreement. You may infer that there was 
an agreement and that a given Defendant or private actor participated in it based on circumstantial 
evidence. Further, you do not need to reach unanimous agreement on the issue of with whom Mr. 
Raucci and/or Mr. Maher conspired in order to find either or both of them liable for conspiracy. 
I instruct you to find as a matter of law that Mr. Morant suffered a deprivation of liberty, 
the fourth element. Thus, you must decide only elements one, two, three, and five. 
F. Count Six: Failure to Intercede against Mr. Maher 
In Count Six, Mr. Morant alleges that Mr. Maher failed to intercede in constitutional 
violations committed by Mr. Raucci. You should only reach this count if you have found that Mr. 
Raucci is liable as to at least one of the following four counts: Count One (malicious prosecution), 
Count Three (Brady violation), Count Four (fabrication of evidence), or Count Five (coercion of 

 
29 
statements). If you have not found Mr. Raucci liable on one of these four counts , then you may 
not reach the failure to intercede count against Mr. Maher. 
All law enforcement officials have an affirmative duty to intervene to protect the 
constitutional rights of citizens from infringement by other law enforcement officers. The 
constitutional violation must be of sufficient duration to support a conclusion that an officer who 
stood by without trying to assist the citizen became a tacit collaborator. 
In addition to finding that Mr. Raucci is liable on at least one of the four counts described 
above, Mr. Morant must also demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: (1) Mr. Maher 
observed or had reason to know of one or more of Mr. Raucci’s constitutional violations; (2) Mr. 
Maher had a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the harm from occurring; (3) Mr. Maher 
failed to intervene to prevent the harm ; (4) Mr. Morant suffered a deprivation of liberty; and (5) 
the deprivation of liberty was as a result of Mr. Maher’s failure to intervene. 
As to the second element, if Mr. Maher had witnessed prior unconstitutional conduct by 
Mr. Raucci that would have alerted him to a likelihood of further unconstitutional conduct, this 
may be considered a realistic opportunity to intervene. 
As to the fourth element, t here is no dispute in this case that Mr. Morant suffered a 
deprivation of liberty through imprisonment . Therefore, I instruct you as a matter of law to find 
that Mr. Morant has proven this element. 
As to the fifth element, you must find that Mr. Maher’s failure was a but for and proximate 
cause of Mr. Morant’s deprivation of liberty. 
G. Count Seven: Municipal Liability Against the City of New Haven 
In a U.S. Supreme Court case called Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of 
New York, the Supreme Court held that local government units, including cities , may be liable 
under Section 1983 for unconstitutional actions taken by municipal employees under certain 

 
30 
circumstances. The fact that an employee of a municipality deprived the plaintiff of a federal right 
is not alone a sufficient basis for holding the municipality liable to the plaintiff. Before you can 
hold the municipality liable, the plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the action of the employee that deprived him of his federal right was the result either of an official 
policy of the municipality or a municipal custom that was in place even though such a custom had 
not necessarily received formal approval through the body’s official decision-making channels. 
You have heard this claim referred to during trial as Mr. Morant ’s “Monell claim,” or 
alternatively, Mr. Morant’s claim for municipal liability against the City of New Haven. Through 
this claim, Mr. Morant alleges that the City is responsible for the violations of his constitutional 
rights. As you have heard me say throughout the trial, there are particular pieces of evidence that 
you may only consider with respect to Mr. Morant’s Monell claim. 
You may only reach Mr. Morant’s Section 1983 Monell claim if you have already found 
that at least one individual Defendant has violated at least one of Mr. Morant’s constitutional rights 
in Counts One, Three, Four, Five, or Six. If you have not so found, you may not reach this count. 
The elements of a Monell claim are: (1) the existence of a municipal policy or custom; and 
(2) the municipal policy or custom caused Mr. Morant to suffer the deprivation of a constitutional 
right. 
To show a policy or custom justifying municipal liability, Mr. Morant need not identify an 
express rule or regulation. Rather, Mr. Morant may prove the existence of a municipal policy or 
custom in one of the following three ways: (1) a w idespread practice or custom; (2) deliberate 
indifference to the need to supervise or discipline; or (3) ratification. I will explain each theory in 
more detail in a moment . Mr. Morant need only prove one of these theories by a preponderance 
of the evidence to establish the first element of his Monell claim. 

 
31 
In addition to proving a municipal policy or custom through one of these theories, Mr. 
Morant must also prove that the policy or custom caused the deprivation of his constitutional rights, 
meaning that the policy was the “moving force” behind what happened in Mr. Morant’s case, 
which I will explain in a moment. To show that the policy was the moving force behind the alleged 
violations of Mr. Morant’s constitutional rights, Mr. Morant must prove that the municipal policy 
or custom existed before his convict ion. However, you may consider evidence of events that 
occurred after Mr. Morant’s conviction as circumstantial evidence of what policies or customs 
existed before his conviction. 
1. Municipal Policy or Custom 
I will now go through what is needed to prove each of the three options for a municipal 
policy or custom by a preponderance of the evidence. 
a. Option One: Widespread Practice or Custom 
Mr. Morant alleges that at the time of his conviction, the New Haven Police Department 
had a widespread practice or custom of suppressing evidence that was favorable to criminal 
defendants. 
To succeed on this theory of Monell liability, Mr. Morant does not have to establish that 
there was an express rule or regulation in place ; it is enough that he prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the practice or custom was so persistent and widespread, so as to effectively have 
had the force of law behind it. Isolated acts by lower-level employees are not enough to establish 
a practice or custom . Rather, the practice or custom must be so widespread as to imply the 
constructive acquiescence of Chief of Police Nicholas Pastore. 

 
32 
b. Option Two: Deliberate Indifference to the Need to Supervise and 
Discipline 
As a second option, Mr. Morant alleges that a municipal policy existed because the City , 
through its policymaker, Chief of Police Nicholas Pastore, made a deliberate choice not to provide 
appropriate supervision and discipline of the New Haven police. 
To demonstrate a municipal policy through this deliberate indifference theory, Mr. Morant 
must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) Chief Pastore knew to a “moral certainty” 
that its officers would confront a given situation; (2) the situation presents an officer with a difficult 
choice of the sort that supervision or discipline would make less difficult, or there is a history of 
officers mishandling the situation; (3) the wrong choice by the officer will frequently cause the 
deprivation of a citizen’s constitutional rights ; and (4) Chief Pastore failed to make meaningful 
efforts to address the risk of harm. 
Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring that a municipal actor 
disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action. Mr. Morant’s evidence must establish 
that Chief Pastore had notice of a potentially serious problem of unconstitutional conduct, such 
that the need for corrective action or supervision was obvious, and his failure to investigate or 
rectify the situation evinces deliberate indifference , rather than mere negligence or mere 
bureaucratic inaction. In other words, Mr. Morant must show that based on the facts available to 
Chief Pastore, he knew or should have known that the particular omission was substantially certain 
to result in a constitutional violation. Deliberate indifference requires more than mere negligence 
by the City; it requires a conscious choice not to act. 
Deliberate indifference can be shown through expert testimony that a practice condoned 
by Chief Pastore was contrary to the practice of most police departments and was particularly 
dangerous because it presented an unusually high risk that constitutional rights would be violated. 

 
33 
The means of proving deliberate indifference vary from case to case; you should consider Chief 
Pastore’s conduct as a whole. 
c. Option Three: Ratification 
As a final option, Mr. Morant alleges that a municipal policy existed because Chief Pastore 
ratified the individual Defendants’ alleged unconstitutional conduct. 
To succeed on his ratification theory, Mr. Morant must prove, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that Chief Pastore was aware of, and consciously chose to ignore, one or more 
unconstitutional actions taken by one or more of the Defendants, effectively ratifying them. Chief 
Pastore’s knowledge and intent may be proven by circumstantial evidence, and even a single 
decision to ignore an unconstitutional action in Mr. Morant’s case is enough to demonstrate this 
theory. 
2. Causation 
If Mr. Morant proves the existence of a municipal policy or custom through at least one of 
the theories I have just discussed by a preponderance of the evidence , you may move on to 
considering whether he has demonstrated that the municipal policy or custom at issue caused the 
violation of his constitutional rights. 
To show causation, Mr. Morant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
alleged City policy or custom was the “moving force ” behind the constitutional violation . 
“Moving force” means but for and proximate cause. Post-conviction events cannot be the moving 
force behind Mr. Morant ’s alleged constitutional violations , because they occurred after those 
alleged violations. 
* * * 

 
34 
V. MR. MORANT’S STATE LAW CLAIMS 
Having completed the discussion of all of Mr. Morant’s federal law counts, I will now turn 
to Mr. Morant’s state law claims. As with Mr. Morant’s federal law counts, he must prove each 
element of his state law counts by a preponderance of the evidence. 
A. Count Eight: Negligence Against Gail Lawlor, as the Administratrix of the 
Estate of Robert Lawlor 
Mr. Morant alleges that Robert Lawlor was negligent under Connecticut state law. Because 
Mr. Lawlor is deceased, Gail Lawlor, as the administratrix of his estate, has been substituted for 
Robert Lawlor in this action. The substitution of Gail Lawlor as a party has no legal impact on 
your analysis of this claim. For simplicity, I will continue to refer to the Defendant whom Mr. 
Morant alleges was negligent as “Mr. Lawlor.” 
Negligence is the violation of a legal duty which one person owes to another. To succeed 
on this claim, Mr. Morant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: (1) Mr. Lawlor 
owed Mr. Morant a duty of care ; (2) Mr. Lawlor breached his duty to use reasonable care under 
the circumstances; (3) Mr. Lawlor’s negligence caused harm to Mr. Morant; and (4) Mr. Morant 
suffered damages. 
As to the first element, a duty to use care exists when a reasonable person, knowing what 
Mr. Lawlor here either knew or should have known at the relevant time, would foresee that harm 
of the same general nature as that which occurred here was likely to result from that conduct. If 
harm of the same general nature as that which occurred here was foreseeable, it does not matter if 
the manner in which the harm that actually occurred was unusual, bizarre, or unforeseeable. 
As to the second element, r easonable care is the care that a reasonably prudent person 
would use in the same circumstances . In determining the care that a reasonably prudent person 
would use in the same circumstances, you should consider all of the circumstances which were 

 
35 
known or should have been known to Mr. Lawlor at the time of the conduct in question. Whether 
the care is reasonable depends upon the dangers that a reasonable person would perceive in those 
circumstances. It is common sense that the more dangerous the circumstances, the greater the care 
that ought to be exercised. Mr. Morant need only prove that Mr. Lawlor failed to use reasonable 
care in one way. 
As to the third element, Mr. Morant must prove that he was harmed in some way by Mr. 
Lawlor’s negligence—meaning there is some harm that would not have occurred if Mr. Lawlor 
had used reasonable care. Mr. Morant is not required to prove that Mr. Lawlor’s negligence was 
the only cause of the harm, or even the most significant cause. Mr. Morant does have to prove, 
however, that Mr. Lawlor’s negligence was a substantial factor in producing the harm, meaning 
that Mr. Lawlor’s negligence contributed materially and not just in a trivial or incon sequential 
manner. 
As to the fourth element, Mr. Morant is not required to prove that Mr. Lawlor actually 
foresaw or should have foreseen the extent of the harm suffered or the manner in which it occurred. 
Instead, Mr. Morant must prove that the harm he suffered was of the same general nature as that 
which a reasonably prudent person in Mr. Lawlor’s position should have anticipated, in view of 
what Mr. Lawlor knew or should have known at the time of the negligent conduct. 
1. Defense to Mr. Morant’s Negligence Claim: Governmental Immunity 
Mr. Lawlor was a municipal employee at the time of the events giving rise to his alleged 
liability for negligence. So, if you find the elements of Mr. Morant’s negligence claim satisfied as 
to Mr. Lawlor, you must then consider whether he would nevertheless be immune from negligence 
liability. 
Ordinarily, a municipal employee has immunity from liability for negligence in connection 
with discretionary acts performed within the scope of his employment . However, a municipal 

 
36 
employee is not immune from liability for such acts if his actions were likely to cause imminent 
harm to an identifiable person. I will call this the “identifiable person, imminent harm” exception. 
I have determined as a matter of law that Mr. Lawlor’s conduct in the investigation of Mr. 
Morant was a discretionary act within the scope of his employment , so he would be entitled to 
governmental immunity unless the “identifiable person, imminent harm” exception applies. 
To invoke this exception to immunity, Mr. Morant must prove, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that each of the following elements existed at the time of his alleged injury: 
(1) Mr. Morant was an identifiable person; (2) that the harm which Mr. Morant claims befell him 
was imminent when Mr. Lawlor acted or failed to act; and (3) that it would have been apparent to 
Mr. Lawlor that his conduct was likely to subject Mr. Morant to the particular harm alleged. 
As to the first element (identifiable person), you must determine whether Mr. Morant was 
an identifiable person. Mr. Morant alleges that no later than at the time of his conviction, he was 
a readily identifiable person, such that a person in Mr. Lawlor’s shoes could understand that he 
may be subjected to imminent harm. 
The second element of this exception (imminent harm) requires you to determine whether 
Mr. Morant has proven that the harm to which he was subjected, if any, was imminent. A harm is 
imminent if a dangerous condition existed and that the dangerous condition was so likely to cause 
harm to Mr. Morant that Mr. Lawlor had a clear and unequivocal duty to act immediately to prevent 
the harm. A harm is not imminent if it could have occurred at any future time or not at all . For 
the harm to be deemed imminent, the potential for harm must be sufficiently immediate. 
The third element (apparentness) is that the particular, imminent danger to which Mr. 
Morant claims that he was exposed would have been apparent to a reasonable person in Mr. 
Lawlor’s position. The risk must have been sufficiently great so that it must have been apparent 

 
37 
to Mr. Lawlor that there was a clear and unequivocal need to act promptly. “Apparent” means 
easily observed and understood. 
You must refrain from resorting to the clarity of hindsight when evaluating the situation of 
Mr. Lawlor. Also, you must use only the information that was available to Mr. Lawlor at the time. 
Although the components have been identified separately, they are interconnected. The 
criteria of identifiable person and imminent harm must be evaluated with reference to each other. 
An allegedly identifiable person must be identifiable as a potential v ictim of specific imminent 
harm. Likewise, the alleged imminent harm must be imminent in terms of its impact on a specific 
identifiable person. 
Unless you find that Mr. Morant has proved all of the elements of this exception as I have 
explained them to you, Mr. Lawlor retains immunity from Mr. Morant’s negligence claim. If you 
find that Mr. Morant has not proven all of the elements of this exception, you must return a verdict 
for Mr. Lawlor on the negligence claim. If, however, you find that Mr. Morant has proven the 
elements of the “identifiable person, imminent harm” exception by a preponderance of the 
evidence, then Mr. Lawlor has no immunity, and you must return a verdict in favor of Mr. Morant 
on this claim, and proceed to considering the issue of damages. 
B. Count Nine: Assumption of Liability 
I will decide this claim, if it is necessary to reach it. You need not make any findings as to 
this count. 
C. Count Ten: Direct Action Against the City 
Finally, in Count Ten, Mr. Morant brings a claim of direct action negligence against the 
City of New Haven. 
The City’s liability on Count Ten flows from your finding in Count Eight as to Mr. 
Lawlor’s negligence. If you found that Mr. Lawlor did not act negligently in Count Eight or that 

 
38 
the “identifiable person, imminent harm” exception does not apply to Mr. Lawlor,3 you must, in 
turn, return a verdict for the City on Count Ten. If you found that Mr. Lawlor acted negligently in 
Count Eight and that the “identifiable person, imminent harm” exception applies to Mr. Lawlor, 
then you must, in turn, return a verdict for Mr. Morant on Count Ten. 
VI. DAMAGES 
A. General Instructions 
If you find that any Defendants are liable to Mr. Morant on any of his claims, then you 
must determine the amount of money to award to Mr. Morant as damages. 
Before I instruct you on the issue of damages, a few words of caution are in order. The 
fact that I am telling you about the law of damages does not mean that I believe that you will, or 
should, find damages for Mr. Morant. Rather, my instructions include both liability and damages 
because I must give you instructions on all the issues in the case. With respect to the damages 
claimed, as with every other matter before you, you can award only such damages as are justified 
by the proof and the law. 
I will now explain the types of damages that apply here. Plaintiff seeks only compensatory 
damages. 
B. Compensatory Damages 
If you find for Mr. Morant on any claim, then you must then decide the amount of damages 
that will reasonably and fairly compensate him for any harm caused by any Defendant’s unlawful 
actions. These damages are known as compensatory damages. Compensatory damages seek to 
make Mr. Morant whole—that is, to compensate for the losses or injuries suffered. Keep in mind, 
 
3 On May 26, 2026, after reading this portion of the instructions to the jury, counsel for Plaintiff and for the City 
alerted the Court to an error. The instructions previously read “ . . . the ‘identifiable person, imminent harm’ exception 
applies to Mr. Lawlor,” when it should have read “ . . . the ‘identifiable person, imminent harm’ exception does not 
apply to Mr. Lawlor.” With the consent of counsel, the Court then instructed the jury on the record to write this change 
into their copies of the instructions. 

 
39 
however, that compensatory damages are not allowed as a punishment and must not be imposed 
or increased to penalize any Defendant. Mr. Morant must prove his damages by a preponderance 
of the evidence. 
The law places the burden on Mr. Morant to prove facts that will enable you to arrive at 
the amount of damages with reasonable certainty. This is not a requirement of mathematical 
precision, and you are permitted to determine the amount of damages by estimation or 
approximation, as long as Mr. Morant provides you with a reasonable basis for such estimation or 
approximation, such that you are not required to make a calculation by guessing or speculation. 
You should be guided by dispassionate common sense. Compensatory damages must not be based 
on speculation or sympathy. They must be based solely on evidence presented at trial. Anything 
you may have seen or heard outside the courtroom is not evidence and must be disregarded. You 
are to decide the issues in this case based on the evidence presented here in this courtroom. 
You shall award damages only for those injuries that you find Mr. Morant has proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Moreover, you may not simply award damages for any injury 
suffered by Mr. Morant—you must award damages only for those injuries that are caused by any 
Defendant’s conduct. However, for any and all injuries you do find were caused by Defendants’ 
conduct, you must fully assess damages as required by law. 
The source of payment of any damages you may award, if you find for Mr. Morant, is not 
an appropriate matter of concern for you. You are not to speculate about the source of payment of 
any damages you may find it appropriate to award. 
Mr. Morant seeks non-economic damages. Non-economic damages are monies awarded 
as compensation for all non -monetary losses and injuries that Mr. Morant has suffered, or is 
reasonably likely to suffer in the future, as a result of the Defendants’ violation of his constitutional 

 
40 
rights and/or negligence. They are awarded for such things as loss of liberty, physical pain and 
suffering, mental and emotional pain and suffering, and loss or diminution of the ability to enjoy 
life’s pleasures. 
In determining the measure of compensatory damages, you may consider the following: 
• The loss of liberty for the period Mr. Morant spent in wrongful confinement. You 
may consider the loss of time and the sense of loss of freedom, which is inherent 
in any wrongful confinement, separate and apart from any other particular harms 
you may find Mr. Morant suffered as a result of Defendants’ conduct. In other 
words, loss of liberty damages compensate Mr. Morant for the reasonable value of 
each day of freedom lost. 
• Mr. Morant ’s emotional pain and suffering beginning with the constitutional 
violations and continuing through to today and into the future, including fear, 
humiliation, or mental anguish Mr. Morant has already experienced, and the fear, 
humiliation, or mental anguish he is reasonably certain to experience in the future; 
• Physical harm to Mr. Morant during and after the events at issue, including ill 
health, physical pain, disability, or discomfort, and any such physical harm Mr. 
Morant is reasonably certain to experience in the future; and 
• Mr. Morant’s loss of a normal life, including his loss of family connections and 
family interactions, loss of relationships, loss of companionship, and loss of 
enjoyment of life’s activities. 
No evidence of the dollar value of loss of liberty, physical or mental and emotional pain 
and suffering, or loss of a normal life has been or needs to be introduced. There is no exact standard 
for setting the damages to be awarded on account of these factors. You are to determine an amount 

 
41 
that will fairly compensate Mr. Morant for the injury he has sustained. Any award you make 
should be fair and reasonable in light of all of the evidence presented at trial, and should be guided 
by common sense, not bias, passion, sympathy, speculation, or guesswork. You must use your 
best judgment, remembering always that it is incumbent upon Mr. Morant to prove his damages 
by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Counsel for the parties may suggest to you a dollar figure for compensatory damages. Any 
such suggestion is only a suggestion, or the attorney’s comment on the evidence. It is not itself 
evidence. You should give any such comment or suggestion whatever weight you decide; you are 
not required to adopt it. Any award of damages should be based on the evidence and is within 
your discretion. 
VII. CLOSING ARGUMENTS 
At this point, we will interrupt the instructions to hear closing arguments of counsel. I will 
conclude the instructions after those summations. Remember, what the lawyers say in their closing 
arguments is not evidence, but it is merely argument about what the evidence shows. 
VIII. INSTRUCTIONS FOR DELIBERATIONS (AFTER CLOSING ARGUMENTS) 
You have just heard closing arguments of counsel. I want to remind you that what the 
lawyers have just said is not evidence, even if it seemed at times as if they were testifying. The 
lawyers merely presented their arguments about what the evidence presented to you over the course 
of the trial has shown. Their credibility is not an issue that should enter into your decision in this 
case. 
I must add a few general instructions concerning your deliberations. You were permitted 
to take notes during the course of the trial. Any notes you have taken should be used only as 
memory aids; do not give your notes more importance than your independen t recollection of the 

 
42 
evidence. If you did not take notes, you should rely on your own memory of the proceedings and 
should not be unduly influenced by the notes of other jurors. The fact that a particular juror has 
taken notes entitles that juror’s opinions to no greater wei ght than those of any other juror, and 
your notes are not to be shown to any other juror during the course of deliberations. 
Your verdict must be based solely upon the evidence, or lack thereof, developed at this 
trial. Please bear in mind that all litigants are equal before the law. You should not, therefore, 
consider any personal feelings you may have about the race, religio n, national origin, sex, age, 
wealth, lifestyle, or other features of the parties. Similarly, it would be wrong for you to allow 
feelings you might have about the nature of the claim to influence you in any way. 
You have been chosen to try the issues of fact and reach a verdict on the basis of the 
evidence presented here. If you let sympathy or prejudice interfere with your clear thinking about 
the facts, there is a risk that you will not arrive at a just verdict. 
In reaching your verdict, you are not to be affected by sympathy for, or prejudice against, 
any of the parties. You are not to be affected by what the reaction of the parties or the public to 
your verdict may be, whether it will please or displease anyone, be popular or unpopular or, indeed, 
any consideration outside the case as it has been presented to you in this courtroom. Finally, each 
of the parties to this case must be regarded as equals by you. 
Your verdict must be unanimous and represent the considered judgment of each juror. 
Each of you must make your own decision, but you must consider impartially all of the evidence 
and the views of your fellow jurors. It is your duty to consult with one another and to deliberate 
with a view toward reaching an agreement, if you can do so consistent with the individual judgment 
of each juror. Until a verdict is agreed to by each juror, it is not a unanimous verdict. 

 
43 
In the course of your discussion, do not hesitate to re-examine your own individual views, 
or to change your opinions, if the deliberations and the views of your fellow jurors convince you 
to do so. But you should not surrender your honest convictions about the facts or about the weight 
or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinions of your fellow jurors or merely to bring an 
end to deliberations. 
Remember at all times that you must do everything possible to avoid any bias; you are the 
judges of the facts, and your sole interest is to seek the truth from the evidence in this case. 
When you return to the jury room, you should first elect one person to act as your 
foreperson who will preside over your deliberations and be your spokesperson. 
A verdict form has been prepared for your convenience. Focusing on the questions set 
forth in the verdict form will assist you in your deliberations. You must complete and return the 
verdict form in Court when you have reached your decision. You will be asked to answer the 
questions in the order in which they appear on the form, and each answer must be unanimous . 
When you have reached unanimous agreement as to your verdict, you will have your foreperson 
fill in your answers, and date and sign the verdic t form. You will then inform the Court Security 
Officer or Courtroom Deputy that you have reached a verdict. The verdict form must be used only 
in connection with the charge I have just given to you. The terms used in the verdict form are 
discussed in my instructions, and these instructions must govern your deliberations. 
I want to caution you now to take your time when completing the verdict form. As you 
will see when you retire to the jury room, the form consists of several questions. Each question 
calls for either a “yes” or “no” answer or a monetary amount. Answer each question as it appears 
and only those questions. As you review the form, you will see that there are instructions printed 
in italics after each question. Please read these instructions and follow them carefully. Depending 

 
44 
on your answer to a particular question, it may not be necessary to answer a later question. The 
italicized instructions will guide you through the verdict form. Finally, be consistent in your 
responses. 
When you go into the jury room to begin your deliberations, you will be able to review the 
exhibits, but you will not have a transcript of the testimony. If you want any of the testimony read 
to you, that can be done and will occur in open court. I encou rage you to limit the recitation of 
testimony. It is not easy to locate specific portions of the testimony, and reading the testimony is 
a time-consuming process, so please be as specific as possible if you decide to request a reading 
of portions of the testimony. 
Requests that testimony be read back, as well as any other communication with the Court, 
should be made in writing, signed by your foreperson, and given to the Courtroom Deputy, Ms. 
Denault, or a Court Security Officer. I will respond to your request as promptly as possible either 
in writing or by having you return to the courtroom so that I can address you orally. 
I also must warn you that in your communications with the Court you should never reveal 
your numerical division at any time. In other words, you should not indicate how many jurors are 
in favor of returning a verdict in favor of one party or the other. 
It is proper to add a final caution. Nothing that I have said in these instructions —and 
nothing that I have said or done during the trial —has been said or done to suggest to you what I 
think your verdict should be. What the verdict shall be is your exclusive duty and responsibility. 
Tomorrow, you may proceed to your deliberations in the jury room. You will not be called 
into the courtroom in the morning, but may begin deliberating in the jury room when you have all 
arrived. Throughout your deliberations, d eliberate only when all of you are present. No 
deliberations may take place without all jurors being present. If you bring your cell phones into 

 
45 
the jury room, you must turn them off during deliberations. You must not research any issue nor 
communicate with each other or with anyone about the case through the Internet, e -mail, your 
smartphone, text messaging, through any blog or website, through any internet chat room, or by 
way of any applications, including Facebook, Instagram, Twitter/X, TikTok, LinkedIn, and 
YouTube. Furthermore, if at any time a juror is using the restroom facilities or on a cell phone, 
the other jurors must cease deliberations immediately and may not begin deliberations again until 
all jurors are present and all cell phones are off. After you begin your deliberations, you are not 
to leave the jury room without first notifying the Court Security Officer. 
As you deliberate, determine the facts on the basis of the evidence as you have heard it and 
apply the law as I have outlined it for you. Render your verdict fairly, uprightly, and without a 
scintilla of prejudice. Take as long as you think is necessary to fairly and impartially reach your 
verdict. 
The Court operates on your schedule while you are deliberating. Thus, if you wish to stay 
past 4:00 p.m. on any deliberation day and you are all able to do so, the Court and the parties are 
able to stay until 5:00 p.m. Likewise, if you wish to modify your time of arrival in the morning 
on any deliberation day and you are all able to do so , please just let Ms. Denault know, and we 
will be happy to accommodate your schedule. Before you leave today, please decide your timing 
for deliberations tomorrow, and inform Ms. Denault of the schedule you have chosen. 
Thank you for your attention. 
 
 

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