govinfo:USCOURTS-laed-2_16-md-02740-93

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 
 
IN RE: TAXOTERE (DOCETAXEL) ) MDL No. 16-2740 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY ) 
LITIGATION ) SECTION: “H” (5) 
 ) 
This document relates to: ) 
Cases identified in Exhibit “A” ) 
to Sanofi’s Motion to Enforce ) 
(Doc. 18790-2) ) 
 
ORDER AND REASONS 
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Enforce Settlement and for 
Fees and Costs (Doc. 18790). For the reasons set forth herein, the Motion is 
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 
 
BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs in this multidistrict litigation (“MDL”) are suing several 
pharmaceutical companies that manufactured and/or distributed a 
chemotherapy drug, Taxotere or docetaxel, 1 which was administered to 
Plaintiffs for the treatment of cancer. Among these companies are Defendants 
sanofi-aventis U.S. LLC and Sanofi US Services Inc. (collectively, “Sanofi”). 
Plaintiffs allege that the drug caused permanent chemotherapy -induced 
alopecia (“PCIA”). Plaintiffs assert several claims, including failure to warn 
and negligence. 
Over the past year, the parties, the Magistrate Judge, and the Special 
Master have worked to resolve thousands of cases in this MDL. On December 
 
1 Docetaxel is the generic version of Taxotere, although the Court uses the term “generic” 
loosely. 

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19, 2025, Sanofi filed the instant Motion to Enforce, requesting dismissal of 
the claims against it in the cases identified in Exhibit “A” attached to its 
Motion.2 On April 28, 2026, Sanofi supplemented its Motion to Enforce with a 
Declaration from counsel in support thereof. 3 That same day, Sanofi advised 
the Court that certain Plaintiffs had filed notices dismissing their claims after 
the filing of Sanofi’s Motion to Enforce. Plaintiffs have not filed an opposition 
to Sanofi’s Motion.4 
 
LAW AND ANALYSIS 
In its Motion and Declaration, Sanofi alleges that Plaintiffs have signed 
settlement agreements resolving their claims against Sanofi. 5 Further, “in 
exchange for agreement to dismiss all claims against Sanofi and other terms, 
Sanofi funded the settlement of those cases through counsel for each plaintiff, 
upon the obligation of counsel to satisfy any obligations to the Common Benefit 
Fund and release the funds to plaintiffs.”6 Sanofi further contends that funding 
of the settlements for Plaintiffs has been completed for months, yet Plaintiffs 
have not voluntarily dismissed their claims. Sanofi has also made written 
demand via email to counsel requesting that Plaintiffs dismiss their claims. 
Sanofi therefore requests that Plaintiffs’ claims be dismissed against them 
with prejudice. Sanofi further requests that this Court award fees and costs 
associated with Plaintiffs’ failure to file dismissals. 
 
 
2 On September 3, 2025, Sanofi filed a similar motion to enforce as to certain other plaintiffs. 
Doc. 18640. On September 27, 2025, counsel for Sanofi notified the Court via email that 
Sanofi’s motion had been resolved. Accordingly, Sanofi’s first motion to enforce was denied 
as moot. Doc. 18709. 
3 Doc. 18840. 
4 Id. 
5 Doc. 18790; Doc. 18840. 
6 Doc. 18840. 

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I. Request for Dismissal 
In this case, Plaintiffs assert claims under the products liability laws of 
their respective states. Because this Court exercises diversity jurisdiction, it 
applies state substantive law.
7 Where a transferee court presides over multiple 
diversity actions consolidated for multidistrict litigation, it must apply the 
substantive law of each transferor forum. 8 Nevertheless, generally speaking, 
“a settlement agreement can and should be enforced whenever the evidence 
shows that the parties agreed on its essential terms and manifested an intent 
to be bound by them.” 9 Only “fraud or other compelling circumstances” 
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence may prevent the enforcement 
of the agreed-upon terms.10 
Here, Sanofi has provided a Declaration attesting to the following: (1) 
Plaintiffs identified in their Motion have signed settlement agreements 
resolving their claims against Sanofi; (2) in exchange for Plaintiffs’ agreement 
to dismiss all claims against Sanofi and other terms, Sanofi funded the 
settlement of those cases through counsel for each plaintiff, upon the obligation 
of counsel to satisfy any obligations to the Common Benefit Fund and release 
the funds to Plaintiffs; and (3) Plaintiffs’ claims are therefore eligible for final 
disposition and dismissal. Plaintiffs have not filed a response contesting these 
 
7 See Newsome v. Int’l Paper Co., 123 F.4th 754, 761 (5th Cir. 2024) (citing Smith v. Christus 
Saint Michaels Health Sys., 496 F. App’x 468, 470 (5th Cir. 2012)). 
8 In re Taxotere (Docetaxel) Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 16 -2740, 2022 WL 110494, at *2 
(E.D. La. Jan. 12, 2022) (Milazzo, J.) (quoting In re Air Disaster at Ramstein Air Base, 
Germany on 8/29/90, 81 F.3d 570, 576 (5th Cir. 1996)); In re: Zicam Cold Remedy Mktg., Sales 
Pracs., & Prods. Liab. Litig., 797 F. Supp. 2d 940, 942 (D. Ariz. 2011) (“Where a transferee 
court presides over several diversity actions consolidated under the multidistrict rules, the 
choice of law rules of each jurisdiction in which the transferred actions were originally filed 
must be applied.”). 
9 Chansky v. Calmare Therapeutics, Inc., No. CV 17- 583, 2018 WL 11449516, at *1 (D.N.J. 
Feb. 1, 2018) (citing U.S. v. Lightman, 988 F. Supp. 448, 458 (D.N.J. 1997)). 
10 Id. (citing Nolan v. Lee Ho, 120 N.J. 465, 472 (1990)). 

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facts. As such, the Court will grant Sanofi’s request for dismissal as to the 
following Plaintiffs, whose claims against Sanofi remain pending: 
1. Peggy Williams, Case No. 2:17-cv-15835 
2. Rita Devine, Case No. 2:17-cv-15502 
3. Marquese Ford, Case No. 2:17-cv-15583 
4. Eleanor L. Littleton, Case No. 2:17-cv-15601 
5. Shelly Jones, Case No. 2:20-cv-00974 
6. Mary Allyn Dexter, Case No. 2:20-cv-00971 
7. Gwendolyn Hartford, Case No. 2:20-cv-00973 
8. Tykesha Williams-Saunders, Case No. 2:20-cv-00979 
9. Patricia Bramblett, Case No. 2:20-cv-02677 
10. Jeannette Vargas, Case No. 2:17-cv-10663 
11. Joan E. Karpinski, Case No. 2:17-cv-07708 
As to Plaintiffs who filed dismissals of their claims since Sanofi filed its 
Motion to Enforce, Sanofi’s request is denied as moot. 
II. Request for Attorney’s Fees and Costs 
Pursuant to the “bedrock principle known as the ‘American Rule,’ ‘[e]ach 
litigant pays his own attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract 
provides otherwise.’”11 As an exception to this rule, however, the Supreme 
Court has held that “federal courts have inherent power to assess attorney’s 
fees,” such as “when a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or 
for oppressive reasons.”
12 “It is well-settled, however, that the threshold for the 
use of inherent sanctioning power is high, and once the power is invoked, it 
must be ‘exercised with restraint and discretion.’”
13 
 
11 Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp. 568 U.S. 371, 382 (2013) (citation modified). 
12 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45– 46 (1991) (citation modified); see also Seals v. 
Herzing Inc.-New Orleans, 482 F. App’x 893, 897 (5th Cir. 2012) (unpublished). 
13 Maguire Oil Co. v. The City of Houston, 143 F.3d 205, 209 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Chaves 
v. M/V Medina Star, 47 F.3d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1995)). In addition to this inherent authority, 

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Sanofi argues that because Plaintiffs’ refusal to dismiss their cases 
pursuant to the settlement agreement is “unsupportable” and/or “without 
justification,” an award of attorneys’ fees is supported.14 Although Plaintiffs do 
not offer a response to Sanofi’s assertions, the Court finds that, as to Plaintiffs 
who dismissed their cases, as well as those who have not yet filed dismissals, 
an award of attorneys’ fees is not warranted. The Supreme Court has 
pronounced that “[a] court should invoke its inherent power to award 
attorney’s fees only when it finds that ‘fraud has been practiced upon it, or that 
the very temple of justice has been defiled.’”
15 A “finding of bad faith must be 
supported by clear and convincing proof.” 16 And while another section of this 
Court has recognized that “[i]n some cases, a finding of bad faith has not been 
required before a court will award attorneys’ fees when enforcing a settlement 
agreement,”
17 such cases generally at least involve “vexatious” or “oppressive” 
conduct.18 Here, Plaintiffs do not appear to have engaged in such conduct. 
Accordingly, the Court will deny Sanofi’s request for attorney’s fees and costs. 
 
the Court may impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
for papers filed with the Court. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, a district court may also “shift 
reasonable attorney’s fees to any attorney who so multiplies the proceedings in any case 
unreasonably and vexatiously. The court can shift fees only to counsel, not to parties.” Proctor 
& Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 280 F.3d 519, 526 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation modified). 
14 Doc. 18790-1 (citing Seals, 482 F. App’x at 897). 
15 Boland Marine & Mfg. Co. v. Rihner, 41 F.3d 997, 1005 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Chambers, 
501 U.S. at 46). 
16 Hammervold v. Blank, 3 F.4th 803, 811 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting In re Moore, 739 F.3d 724, 
730 (5th Cir. 2014)). 
17 Saeed v. Kamboj, No. 17-13427, 2019 WL 3526710, at *8 (E.D. La. June 21, 2019) (collecting 
cases). 
18 See Seals, 482 F. App’x at 897 (finding that district court did not abuse its discretion in 
awarding the defendant attorney’s fees and costs, on motion to enforce, where the plaintiff 
filed an “unsupportable” and borderline “frivolous” motion to suppress); Kreher v. Orleans 
Parish Sch. Bd., No. 95 -1076, 1996 WL 715506, at *2 (E.D. La. Dec. 10, 1996) (awarding 
attorney’s fees and costs where the plaintiff unilaterally added language to an existing 
settlement agreement and arrived late to a status conference on the issue, the Court warned 
that it was prepared to impose sanctions, the plaintiff’s counsel acknowledged that the 
change had been made yet failed to cooperate with the defendant’s counsel, and the plaintiff 
failed to oppose the defendant’s motion to enforce); but see David v. Deep Towing, No. 91 -
2842, 1992 WL 236922, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 31, 1992) (enforcing a settlement agreement and 
awarding interest from the sixtieth day after the signing of the dismissal order and awarding 

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CONCL
USION 
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that Sanofi’s Motion to 
Enforce is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Sanofi’s request to 
dismiss the claims of Plaintiffs identified in Exhibit “A” to its Motion to Enforce 
that remain pending as of the time of this Order is GRANTED. The following 
Plaintiffs’ claims against Sanofi are therefore DISMISSED WITH 
PREJUDICE: 
1. Peggy Williams, Case No. 2:17-cv-15835
2. Rita Devine, Case No. 2:17-cv-15502
3. Marquese Ford, Case No. 2:17-cv-15583
4. Eleanor L. Littleton, Case No. 2:17-cv-15601
5. Shelly Jones, Case No. 2:20-cv-00974
6. Mary Allyn Dexter, Case No. 2:20-cv-00971
7. Gwendolyn Hartford, Case No. 2:20-cv-00973
8. Tykesha Williams-Saunders, Case No. 2:20-cv-00979
9. Patricia Bramblett, Case No. 2:20-cv-02677
10. Jeannette Vargas, Case No. 2:17-cv-10663
11. Joan E . Karpinski, Case No. 2:17-cv-07708
As to Plaintiffs identified in Exhibit “A” to Sanofi’s Motion to Enforce
who have dismissed their claims as of the date of the issuance of this Order, 
Sanofi’s request is DENIED AS MOOT. Sanofi’s request for attorney’s fees 
and costs is DENIED. 
attorneys’ fees for the time involved to bring the motion to enforce, noting that without an 
award of attorneys’ fees, the plaintiff “will not be made whole”). 

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__________________________________ 
JANE TRICHE MILAZZO 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 13th day of May, 2026. 

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