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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CRIMINAL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 25-241

JOSIAH DAVID SECTION: “E”

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is a Motion for Revoca tion of the Magistrate Judge’s Detention
Order filed by Defendant Josiah David (“Defendant”). 1 The Government filed an
opposition.2 Defendant filed a reply.3
BACKGROUND
On September 25, 2025, a federal grand ju ry in the Eastern District of Louisiana
indicted Defendant, another named individu al co-defendant, and multiple business
entity co-defendants, in an eight-count indictment. 4 Defendant faces charges for
conspiracy to commit wire fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy to obstruct justice.5
On October 27, 2025, Defendant made hi s initial appearance before Magistrate
Judge Currault.6 In the minute entry for this proceeding, entered on October 27, 2025,
Magistrate Judge Currault released the De fendant and ordered him to reappear on
October 31, 2025 for his arraignment, dete ntion hearing, and hearing to determine
counsel.7 Magistrate Judge Currault also provisionally ordered Defendant not to contact
“victims, witnesses, co-defendants, or re presentation of co-defendants other than

1 R. Doc. 116.
2 R. Doc. 118.
3 R. Doc. 119.
4 R. Doc. 1.
5 Id.
6 R. Doc. 15.
7 Id. at p. 2.

through counsel pending [his] detention hearing scheduled for October 31, 2025.”8 The
only reasonable interpretation of this or der is that the magistrate judge allowed
Defendant to have contact with victims, witnesses, and co-defendants only through his
counsel in this action.
The Government presented evidence that, the next day, on October 28, 2025,
Defendant sent an email to an attorney, who was not Defendant’s counsel of record in
this action,9 attaching a message he intended to be read to investors in the business
entity co-defendants in this action. 10 The email instructed th e attorney to “send the
attached letter to the Board of [D]irectors” and informed the attorney that he “want[ed]
this [letter] read” to the investors.11 In this letter, Defendant bemoaned the fact that he
was not allowed to “talk directly or indirectly with anyone who has any involvement with
the case” and stated that “the ones who have been obstructing justice this whole time
are [his] opponents” who are “seeking to take away [his] rights to defend [him]self.”12
On October 31, 2025, Defendant appear ed for his arraignment, detention
hearing, and hearing to determine counsel.13 On that date, Magistrate Judge Currault
ordered Defendant released on bond subject to a series of conditions, including that he
have “[n]o contact directly or indirectly with witnesses, victims, representatives of co-
defendants to include all investors in any of the companies [referenced in the
indictment] absent the counsels of record” and that he not “act in the capacity of an
advisor or assistant to any company.”14

8 Id.
9 The attorney, Anthony Montemurro, was Defendant’s counsel in an SEC investigation against him.
10 R. Doc. 116-2.
11 Id. at p. 2 (Defendant’s October 28, 2025 Letter).
12 Id.
13 R. Doc. 22.
14 R. Doc. 26 at pp. 2-3.

On November 20, 2025, the Government filed a motion to revoke Defendant’s
bond as a result of Defendant’s October 28, 2025 email and Defendant having his
statement read at a November 4, 2025 meeting of investors.15 Magistrate Judge Currault
held a three day hearing on December 17, 16 18, 17 and 22, 2025 18 on the Government’s
motion. At Defendant’s December 17, 2025 bond revocation hearing, Department of Labor
Inspector General Special Agent Allyson Hoffine testified that Bob Graham, an investor in
one of the business entity co-defendants, who is not Defendant’s attorney in this action or
otherwise, read Defendant’s letter at the November 4, 2025 investor meeting. 19 Special
Agent Hoffine further testified that, on November 11, 2025, investors received an unsigned
email from “Backroom@oopra.org.” 20 While the Government did not establish that
Defendant sent this email, the Government did point out that the email used “verbiage
eerily similar to David’s tone and parlance,” and that the email “conveyed significant
information designed to influence the investors.” 21 Specifically, the email discussed the
“logistics of a ‘Go Fund me’ style account” to pay for Defendant’s legal expenses and
claimed that the Government sought to “shut up” Defendant and “not allow him to speak”
to investors.22 The magistrate judge found Defendant had violated his bond by contacting
investors in the business entity co-defendants. 23 Rather than revoke Defendant’s bond,
on January 6, 2026, Magistrate Judge Currault issued an order imposing additional bond
conditions, including:

15 R. Doc. No. 37.
16 R. Doc. 63.
17 R. Doc. 64.
18 R. Doc. 65.
19 R. Doc. 112 at p. 20. Agent Hoffine testified that she listened to a recording of this meeting. December 17,
2025 Bond Revocation Hearing Exhibit No. 2 (recording of the meeting).
20 R. Docs 118-3; 112 at p. 26. “OOPRA” is the abbreviation for Out of Pocket Relief for Americans, LLC,
which is one of the business entity co-defendants in this matter.
21 R. Doc. 118 at p. 5.
22 R. Doc. 118-3.
23 R. Doc. 113 at p. 13.

• The defendant shall not send an emai l without including one or more of
his counsel of record in the instant matter as a recipient.24

On January 30, 2026, the U.S. Probation Office filed a petition requesting the
magistrate judge order Defendant to appear and show cause why his bond should not be
revoked for additional violations of the conditions of his release. 25 Magistrate Judge
Currault granted this petition and issued a summons to Defendant.26
Magistrate Judge Currault held a bond revocation hearing on April 6, 2026. 27 At
the hearing, U.S. Probation Officer Gregory Burch testified that Defendant violated the
additional bond condition imposed on January 6, 2026 by failing to copy his counsel on
emails he sent on January 22 and March 3, 5, and 6, 2026. 28 At the hearing, the
Government played an audio recording from a March 25, 2026 conference call involving
investors in the business entity co-defendants during which one of the investors relayed
information from a meeting he had had with Defendant. 29 Based on his listening to this
recording, Probation Officer Burch testified that the investor who had participated in the
meeting with Defendant informed the other investors that Defendant had identified three
“urgent” tasks for the business entity co-defe ndants to complete, namely (1) a patent
filing, (2) replacing the attorney in a lawsui t brought by the SEC in New Jersey against
the business entity co-defendants, and (3) retaining counsel in the instant case. 30
Probation Officer Burch testified that the investors agreed to provide $20,000 to address
these three issues. 31 Following the hearing, Magistrate Judge Currault issued an order

24 R. Doc. 71 at p. 2.
25 R. Doc. 80.
26 R. Doc. 81.
27 R. Doc. 105.
28 R. Doc. 115 at pp. 11-14, 16-19; April 6, 2026 Bond Revocation Hearing Exhibit Nos. 1-2.
29 Id. at pp. 24-25.
30 Id.
31 Id. at p. 25.

revoking the Defendant’s bond and remandin g Defendant to the custody of the United
States Marshal.32
On April 27, 2026, Defendant filed the instant motion to revoke Magistrate Judge
Currault’s decision. 33 Defendant argues Magistrate Judge Currault should not have
revoked his bond. 34 Defendant argues Magistrate Judge Currault should never have
modified the conditions of his bond to include the requirement that he copy his counsel
on every email; that the October 28, 2025 statement he authored and directed to investors
did not constitute a violation of his bond conditions because he made this statement
indirectly by passing it through an attorney, even though this attorney was not his counsel
of record in this matter; and that the Govern ment never provided clear evidence that he
sent the November 11, 2025 email. 35 Defendant admits he violated the modified
conditions of his bond by failing to copy his counsel of record on multiple emails 36 but
argues he later forwarded these emails to hi s attorneys, making these violations “minor,
inadvertent failures” that do not justify revocation.37 Defendant further argues his age and
health conditions justify his release on bond; Defendant argues he has a papilloma in his
throat which requires specialized care he is not receiving while in jail.38
The Government argues Defendant’s bond conditions allowed him to
communicate with investors only through couns el of record, and that the attorney to
whom Defendant sent the October 28, 2025 letter was never his counsel of record in this

32 R. Doc. 105. Magistrate Judge Currault also denied Defendant’s motion to modify the conditions of his
bond by removing the requirement that he be super vised by a third-party custodian and that he copy
counsel of record on all emails. R. Doc. 102.
33 R. Doc. 116-1.
34 Id.
35 Id. at pp. 4-6.
36 R. Doc. 116 at p. 1 (“the violations that occurred after those unnecessary modifications relate to four minor
and insignificant emails in which undersigned counse l was not copied, but which Mr. David forwarded to
counsel shortly thereafter.”)
37 R. Doc. 116-1 at p. 7.
38 Id. at p. 10.

matter.39 The Government further argues that Defendant admits he violated the
conditions of his bond by failing to copy his attorneys on emails he sent on January 22
and March 3, 5, and 6, 2026, and that these violations are not minor or insignificant given
Defendant’s history of obstruction.40
LAW AND ANALYSIS
The Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3142, governs whether a defendant should be
released or detained pending trial. When a court determines release is appropriate, it may
condition a defendant’s pretrial release on th e defendant’s satisfaction of one or more
conditions, as long as those conditions are th e least restrictive necessary to reasonably
assure the appearance of the defendant and the safety of any person and the community.41
The Act expressly permits conditions that re quire a defendant to “abide by specified
restrictions on personal associations,” “avoid all contact with . . . a potential witness who
may testify concerning the offense,” and “satis fy any other condition that is reasonably
necessary . . . to assure the safety of the community.”42 Courts may impose conditions that
restrict contact between a defendant and ot her individuals in order to protect the
community.43
A court may order the detention of a Defendant previously released on bond if the
court finds (1) there is clear and convincin g evidence the defendant has violated a
condition of release,44 and (2) considering the factors list ed in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g), there

39 R. Doc. 118 at p. 14.
40 Id. at p. 16.
41 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(c)(1), (c)(1)(B).
42 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(c)(1)(B)(iv), (v), (xiv).
43 See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, No. 24-164, 2025 WL 1032028 at *2 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 7, 2025).
44 18 U.S.C. § 3148(b)(1)(B). While the Court must find by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant
violated a condition of his release, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply strictly to bond proceedings.
Fed. R. Evid. 101 states that “(t)hese rules govern proceedings in the courts of the United States and before
United States magistrates, to the extent and with the exceptions stated in rule 1101.” Fed. R. Evid.
1101(d)(3) provides that “(t)he rules (other than with respect to privileges) do not apply (to) ... proceedings

is no condition or combination of conditions that will reasonably assure the appearance
of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community; or the
person is unlikely to abide by any condition or combination of conditions of release.45 The
§ 3142(g) factors require courts to conside r (1) the nature and circumstances of the
offense; (2) the weight of evidence ag ainst the defendant; (3) the history and
characteristics of the defendant; and (4) th e nature and seriousness of the danger posed
by release. If a court orders the detention of a criminal defendant, the defendant may file
a motion for revocation of this order of detention under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b) with the court
having original jurisdiction over the offense.46 The “court having original jurisdiction over
the offense” is the district court in which the criminal charges are pending.47 Such motion
“shall be determined promptly.” 48 W h e n r e v i e w i n g a m o t i o n t o r e v o k e o r a m e n d t h e
conditions of a magistrate judge's release or detention order, a district court “acts de novo
and must make an independent determination of the proper pretrial detention or
conditions for release.” 49 District courts in other circuits have detained criminal
defendants on bond for violating a no contact condition of bond.50
Defendant argues the Court should revoke Magistrate Judge Currualt’s detention
order because Magistrate Judge Currualt shou ld never have modified the conditions of

with respect to release on bail or otherwise.” See United States v. Montemayor, 666 F.2d 235, 237 (5th Cir.
1982).
45 18 U.S.C. § 3148(b)(2)(A)-(B).
46 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).
47 United States v. Brigham, 569 F.3d 220, 229-30 (5th Cir. 2009).
48 Id.
49 United States v. Rueben, 974 F.2d 580, 585 (5th Cir. 1992).
50 See, e.g., United States v. Jefferson , No. 23-109, 2024 WL 5077219, *2 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 10, 2024)
(affirming detention of defendant who violated “no contact” bond condition ); United States v. Taylor, No.
13-80031, 2020 WL 5507210, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 11, 2020) (detaining defendant who, violated his bond
condition the day after his release by contacting and attempting to influences witnesses); United States v.
Abovyan, No. 18-80122, 2018 WL 4203687, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2018); United States v. Heffington ,
No. 16-09, 2016 WL 5339606, at *5 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 21, 2016) (detaining defendant “[b]ecause Defendant
has proved himself willing to violate the one additional bond condition placed on him, which was designed
specifically to protect the quality of justice”).

his bond to include the requirement that he copy his counsel on every email he sends. 51
Defendant’s counsel represents that Defend ant sent the October 28, 2025 email and
letter, but only to his attorney (although not his attorney in this action), and that his
attorney, not him, sent th is letter to the investors. 52 Defendant argues this did not
constitute a violation of his bo nd terms because he made the contact only indirectly by
passing it through an attorney who had represented him in an SEC investigation. 53
Defendant further argues the Government did not provide sufficient evidence that
Defendant sent the November 11, 2025 email from the address “backroom@oopra.org.”54
As a result, Defendant argues Magistrate Ju dge Currault modified the conditions of his
bond on January 6, 2026 under the mistaken belief Defendant had violated his bond when
he had not and, as a result, he should not have been subject to these modified conditions
which he later violated.55
Defendant further argues the § 3142(g) factors weigh in favor of his release. 56
Defendant argues the nature and circumstances of the offenses charged in the indictment
weigh in favor of release, as he is not charged with a crime of violence or other crimes that
involve the safety of the community.57 Defendant argues that, considering his history and
characteristics, this Court should order his release on bond. 58 Defendant argues his age
and physical condition support his release, as he has a papilloma on his throat which
requires specialized medical care from a doctor. 59 Defendant argues he is not receiving

51 R. Doc. 116-1 at pp. 4-6.
52 Id. at pp. 4-5.
53 Id. at pp. 4-6.
54 Id. at p. 6.
55 Id.
56 Id. at p. 9.
57 Id.
58 Id. at p. 10.
59 Id.

this specialized care while incarcerated.60 Defendant further argues he has never failed to
appear before this Court or any other court in a criminal case against him. 61 In addition,
Defendant argues his failure to copy his attorneys on multiple emails is a minor violation
of the conditions of his bond that do not warrant his detention.62
The Government argues Defendant’s original bond conditions, imposed on
October 31, 2025, allowed him to communicate with investors only through counsel of
record, and that the attorney to whom Defe ndant sent the October 28, 2025 letter was
never his counsel of record in this matter. 63 The Government argues Magistrate Judge
Currault appropriately modified Defendant’s bond conditions on January 6, 2026 to
include the requirement that he copy his cou nsel of record on every email he sent. 64 The
Government further argues Magistrate Judge Currault appropriately revoked
Defendant’s bond on April 6, 2026. 65 The Government argues that application of the §
3142(g) factors makes clear that no condition or combination of release conditions exists
to assure Defendant will not pose a danger to the community. 66 The Government argues
Defendant has repeatedly violated the condition s of his bond and that his contacts with
the investors in the business entity co-de fendants were strategically designed to
manipulate his victims and inhibit the judicial process.67
First, the Court finds the Government o ffered clear and convincing evidence that
Defendant violated the conditions of his releas e. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c) states that a court
may impose conditions of release that requ ire a defendant to “abide by specified

60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at p. 7
63 R. Doc. 118 at p. 15.
64 Id. at p. 15.
65 Id. at p. 16.
66 Id.
67 Id. at p. 17.

restrictions on personal associations,” “avoid all contact with . . . a potential witness who
may testify concerning the offense,” and “satis fy any other condition that is reasonably
necessary . . . to assure the safety of the community.”68 Courts in this circuit have routinely
imposed these types of conditions.69
Magistrate Judge Currault properly imposed a contact restriction, requiring
Defendant to copy his counsel on every emai l; Defendant violated this condition. The
Government offered clear and convincing evid ence that Defendant sent emails without
copying his counsel on January 26, Ma rch 3, March 5, and March 6, 2026. 70 In fact,
Defendant admits he violated the conditions of his bond by failing to copy his counsel of
record on multiple emails.71 Furthermore, the Government offered clear and convincing
evidence that Defendant violated his original and provisional bond conditions by not
withdrawing his instructions to his attorney , who was not his counsel of record in this
matter, to send his October 28, 2025 lette r to investors in the business entity co-
defendants and to read the letter at an investor meeting.72 Courts have revoked a criminal
defendant’s bond when presented with eviden ce that the defendant violated his or her
bond by contacting witnesses. 73 In this case, Defendant clearly contacted individuals

68 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(c)(1)(B)(iv), (v), (xiv).
69 United States v. Olivarez, No. 22-00687, 2022 WL 1683 6338, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2022) (“The no-
contact order is necessary to prevent Defendant fr om colluding with perhaps the prosecution’s most
important witness in this harboring case[.]”); United States v. Barker, No. 16- 516, 2017 WL 345643, at *2
(N.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2017) (denying motion to amend conditions of bond that included a condition to “[a]void
all contact, directly or indirectly (including by any electronic means), with any known codefendants except
in the presence of counsel.”)
70 R. Doc. 115 at pp. 11-14, 16-19.
71 R. Doc. 116 at p. 1 (“the violations that occurred after those unnecessary modifications relate to four minor
and insignificant emails in which undersigned counse l was not copied, but which Mr. David forwarded to
counsel shortly thereafter.”).
72 18 U.S.C. § 3148(b)(1)(B) provides that a defendant’s bond may be revoked if a court finds that there is
“clear and convincing evidence that the person has violated any other condition of release.” The statute
does not require a court to consider only a defendant’s most recent bond violations.
73 See, e.g., United States v. Jefferson , No. 23-109, 2024 WL 5077219, *2 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 10, 2024)
(affirming detention of defendant who violated “no contact” bond condition ); United States v. Taylor, No.
13-80031, 2020 WL 5507210, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 11, 2020) (detaining defendant who, violated his bond
condition the day after his release by contacting and attempting to influences witnesses).

other than through his counsel of record and failed to copy his counsel of record on emails,
all in violation of the conditions of his bond. While Defendant argues these violations were
insignificant, the Court finds that such fail ures demonstrate a consistent propensity to
flaunt the conditions of bond that Magistrate Judge Currault imposed.
In addition, considering the § 3142(g) factors, the Court finds that no condition or
combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of Defendant as
required and the safety of any other person and the community. Co urts have recognized
that concerns for the safety of the community include being free from efforts to obstruct
proceedings.74 Defendant has shown that he will not hesitate to contact investors in an
attempt to influence their reactions to his criminal charges. Specifically, Defendant’s
October 28, 2025 letter, which he admits he sent and intended to be read at an investor
meeting, clearly sought to discredit the Go vernment’s case against the Defendant and
further legitimize his alle gedly fraudulent scheme.75 Furthermore, Defendant continued
to communicate with investors and attempted to direct the activities of the business entity
co-defendants even after Magistrate Judge Currault issued a summons for Defendant’s
second bond revocation hearing. 76 As Defendant is charged with obstruction of justice,
such communications are persuasive evidence that he intended to alter the investors’
reactions to these proceedings, and to continue directing their activities. Accordingly, the
nature of Defendant’s crimes and the concern that he may continue to contact investors
in the business entity co-defendants—factors (1) and (4) of § 3142(g)—weigh in favor of
his detention.

74 See, e.g., United States v. Ashley, No. 20-318, 2022 WL 1046363, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2022) (“There
is sufficient evidence that Defendant's release would endanger the community and would present a risk that
Defendant would obstruct just ice or flee prosecution.”); United States v. Stern , 465 F. Supp. 3d 699, 702
(S.D. Tex. 2020).
75 R. Doc. 116-2 at p. 2.
76 R. Doc. 115 at pp. 24-25.

Factor (3), the history and characteristics of Defendant, also weighs in favor of his
detention. While Defendant argues his heal th condition, namely the papilloma on his
throat for which he requires treatm ent, warrants his release on bond, 77 the Court finds
this factor alone does not justify revoking Magistrate Judge Currault’s detention order.
Defendant has failed to offer proof he is not receiving adequate treatment for this
condition while incarcerated. Defendant offers a surgical appointment packet given to
him in advance of a procedure on his papilloma that he underwent on February 23, 2026
as proof of his medical condition and that he is not receiving his required treatment. 78
However, this document merely contains instructions for Defendant to carry out before a
medical procedure; it does not prove that De fendant has not received adequate medical
treatment while incarcerated. Moreover, De fendant has a demonstrated history of
attempting to influence the investors who might be witnesses in this action. Accordingly,
factor (3)—the history and characteristics of the Defendant—weighs in favor of his
detention. Considering the § 3142(g) factor s, the Court finds that no condition or
combination of conditions other than incarceration will reasonably assure the appearance
of Defendant as required and the safety of any other person and the community.
In addition, the Court finds Defendant is unlikely to abide by any condition or
combination of conditions of his release. De fendant has violated his bond on numerous
occasions. In addition to his failures to cop y his counsel on multiple emails, Defendant
violated his provisional bond condition, entered on October 27, 2025, that prohibited him
from contacting “victims, witnesses, co-defend ants, or representation of co-defendants
other than through counsel,” and his original bond condition, entered on October 31, 2025,

77 R. Doc. 116-1 at p. 3.
78 R. Doc. 84-2.

that prohibited him from making “contact dire ctly or indirectly with witnesses, victims,
representatives of co-defenda nts to include all investor s in any of the companies
[referenced in the indictment] absent the counsels of record.”79 The Government presented
evidence that, on October 28, 2025, Defendan t sent a letter to an attorney, who was not
his counsel of record in this action, asking this attorney to pass along the letter so it could
be read to investors at an up-coming meeting.80 The Government presented evidence that
a “representative” of Defendant, who was not his counsel of record in this matter, read
this statement at a November 4, 2025 meeting.81 Defendant clearly intended this letter to
be read to investors, not a different audien ce; he stated in his email to his attorney
(although not in this action) that he wanted the attorney to send this letter to the board
of directors and that he wanted the letter to be read to the investors. 82 This constitutes a
violation of Defendant’s provisional and original bond conditions that prohibited him
from contacting investors except through his counsel of record in this action. The Court has
found that the only reasonable interpretation of Magistrate Judge Currault’s provisional
bond condition is that Defendant could contact investors only through Defendant’s counsel
in this matter. Even if this were not the only reasonable interpretation, Magistrate Judge
Currault clarified in her October 31, 2025 order setting Defendant’s original bond
conditions that Defendant was prohibited from making contact with victims or witnesses
“absent the counsels of record.”83 Defendant was, or should have been, aware several days
before the November 4, 2025 meeting that having someone who was not his counsel of
record read his letter at the meeting would vi olate a condition of his bond. Before the

79 R. Doc. 26 at p. 2.
80 R. Doc. 116-2 at p. 1.
81 R. Doc. 112 at p. 19.
82 R. Doc. 116-2 at p. 1.
83 R. Doc. 26 at p. 2.

November 4, 2025 meeting occurred, Defendant could have withdrawn his statement and
prevented it from being read at the meeting, but he did not. Furthermore, Defendant has
made clear that he does not find the restri ctions on his ability to communicate with
investors reasonable, 84 and his repeated violations sh ow that Defendant intends to
behave as he sees fit rather than how the Court instructs him.
Accordingly, the Court finds (1) there is clear and convincing evidence that
Defendant has violated a condition of his release 85 and (2) considering the factors listed
in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g), there is no condi tion or combination of conditions that will
reasonably assure the appearance of Defend ant and the safety of any other person and
the community. 86 The Court further finds that Defend ant is unlikely to abide by any
condition or combination of conditions of rele ase. As a result, Defendant will remain in
the custody of the U.S. Marshal.
CONCLUSION
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Revocation of the Magistrate
Judge’s Detention Order is DENIED.87
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 14th day of May, 2026.

_____________________________
SUSIE MORGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

84 R. Doc. 116-2 (Defendant’s letter to the Court and to the investors in the business entity co-defendants)(“I
am charged with a serious crime and I have to build a ca se to defend myself, but I cannot talk directly or
indirectly with anyone who has any involvement with the case. Does that make any sense to you, Judge?”).
85 18 U.S.C. § 3148(b)(1)(B).
86 18 U.S.C. § 3148(b)(2)(A)-(B).
87 R. Doc. 116.

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