govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_23-cv-03588-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
 
FLORET IKOME, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
SEAN W. O’DONNELL, in his official capacity 
as the Inspector General of the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, 
 
Defendant. 
 
 
 
Case No. 23-cv-3588 (JMC) 
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
Floret Ikome used to work for a company that did business with the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA). After Ikome was removed from his job, he sued the company alleging 
discrimination and retaliation. Ikome lost that case. Ikome also filed a whistleblower complaint 
with the EPA’s Inspector General, alleging that he was removed from his role in retaliation for 
reporting his company’s misconduct in its dealings with the EPA. After the Inspector General 
failed to issue a report in response to Ikome’s complaint, Ikome filed another lawsuit against his 
former employer, this time alleging whistleblower retaliation. Another district court dismissed that 
lawsuit under the doctrine of claim preclusion, reasoning that Ikome could have but did not include 
his whistleblower retaliation claims in the first lawsuit. Now, Ikome has filed this third lawsuit, 
asking the Court to compel the Inspector General to issue a report about Ikome’s complaint. 
Because the Inspector General is not at this point required to issue any report, the Court dismisses 
Ikome’s complaint.1 
 
1 Unless otherwise indicated, the formatting of citations has been modified throughout this opinion, for example, by 
omitting internal quotation marks, emphases, citations, and alterations and by altering capitalization. All pincites to 
 

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I. BACKGROUND 
A. Statutory Background 
“Congress enacted [41 U.S.C.] § 4712 as part of the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2013 as a ‘Pilot program for enhancement of contractor protection from reprisal 
for disclosure of certain information.’” Jacobs Proj. Mgmt. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 64 F.4th 
123, 125 (3d Cir. 2023) (quoting Pub. L. No. 112-239, 126 Stat. 1632, 1837 (2013)). The law 
“prohibits contractors from engaging in reprisals against their employees for disclosing ‘gross 
mismanagement of a Federal contract’ or any other ‘violation of [] law, rule, or regulation related 
to a Federal contract.’” Id. (quoting 41 U.S.C. § 4712(a)). 
Section 4712 includes a remedial scheme, as well. First, a “person who believes that” they 
were “subjected to a reprisal” prohibited by the statute can “submit a complaint to the Inspector 
General of the executive agency involved.” 41 U.S.C. § 4712(b)(1). “Unless the Inspector General 
determines that the complaint is frivolous, fails to allege a violation of the prohibition” in the 
statute, “or has previously been addressed in another Federal or State judicial or administrative 
proceeding initiated by the complainant, the Inspector General shall investigate the complaint and, 
upon completion of such investigation, submit a report of the findings of the investigation.” Id. 
The Inspector General has 180 days from the date she receives the complaint to either (1) “make 
a determination that the complaint is frivolous, fails to allege a violation[,] . . . or has previously 
been addressed in another Federal or State judicial administrative proceeding initiated by the 
complainant” or (2) “submit a report.” Id. § 4712(b)(2)(A). The Inspector General can, however, 
request a 180-day extension from the “person submitting the complaint” if the Inspector General 
“is unable to complete [the] investigation in time to submit a report within the [initial] 180-day 
 
documents filed on the docket in this case are to the automatically generated ECF Page ID number that appears at the 
top of each page. 

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period.” Id. § 4712(b)(2)(B). After the Inspector General issues a report, “the head of the executive 
agency concerned” has 30 days to decide whether any disciplinary or remedial actions are 
warranted. Id. § 4712(c)(1). 
After those agency proceedings run their course, a complainant can bring a “de novo action 
at law or equity . . . seek[ing] compensatory damages and other relief available . . . in the 
appropriate district court of the United States.” Id. § 4712(c)(2). The time for bringing that lawsuit 
is set by the statute. “If the head of an executive agency issues an order denying relief . . . , the 
complainant [is] deemed to have exhausted all administrative remedies” and can then file their 
lawsuit. Id. The complainant is also “deemed to have exhausted” and free to file suit if the “head 
of an executive agency . . . has not issued an order within 210 days after the submission of a 
complaint” or, in a case where the complainant consented to a 180-day extension of the Inspector 
General’s time to issue a report, “not later than 30 days after the expiration of the extension of 
time.” Id. (emphasis added). A complainant has “two years [from] the date on which remedies are 
deemed to have been exhausted” to file their lawsuit. Id. If the Inspector General issued a report 
or agency head issued an order, it is “admissible in evidence” in the lawsuit. Id. § 4712(c)(3). 
There is also a separate provision providing for judicial review of an order issued by the head of 
an agency. Id. § 4712(c)(5). 
B. Factual Background 
Floret Ikome worked for CSRA, LLC—a federal contractor. See ECF 1 ¶ 7. In 2017, Ikome 
sued CSRA, alleging the company discriminated against him on the basis of race and national 
origin and retaliated against him by firing him after he complained about discrimination. See id. 
The District Court for the District of Maryland granted partial summary judgment to CSRA, and 
a jury resolved the remaining claims in CSRA’s favor after a trial. See id. ¶¶ 8, 14; Ikome v. CSRA, 

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LLC (Ikome I), No. 17-cv-3407, 2019 WL 3253391, at *10 (D. Md. July 19, 2019) (summary 
judgment ruling); Ikome I, No. 17-cv-3407, ECF 147 (judgment).2 
After the district court granted partial summary judgment but before the jury trial, Ikome 
filed a whistleblower complaint with the EPA’s Inspector General. ECF 1 ¶ 9. In that complaint, 
Ikome alleged that CSRA fired him because he complained to federal officials about CSRA’s 
misconduct in its dealings with the EPA. See id. Following the procedure outlined in 41 U.S.C. 
§ 4712(b)(2), the Inspector General asked Ikome for a 180-day extension of time to complete an 
investigation and report. See id. ¶ 10. Ikome agreed. See id. But the extended deadline came and 
passed without the issuance of any report. See id. ¶ 11. Nevertheless, staff from the Inspector 
General’s office “repeatedly told” Ikome that the office was “still investigating” Ikome’s 
allegations, and Ikome sat for several interviews and provided information “over the course of 
nearly two years.” Id. ¶¶ 12, 15. Finally, two years after the extended deadline, Ikome filed a 
whistleblower retaliation lawsuit in federal court. See id. ¶¶ 16–17. Ikome filed his complaint on 
the last day allowed under the statute of limitations. See id.; 41 U.S.C. § 4712(c)(2). 
The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed Ikome’s whistleblower 
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). See ECF 1 ¶ 18; Ikome v. Gen. Dynamics Info. Tech., Inc. (Ikome 
II), No. 22-cv-1004, 2023 WL 3901791, at *7 (E.D. Va. June 7, 2023). The court reasoned that the 
whistleblower lawsuit “ar[o]se out of the same . . . core of operative facts” as Ikome’s previous 
discrimination and retaliation lawsuit—his “termination by CSRA.” Ikome II, 2023 WL 3901791, 
at *5. Because its other requirements were also satisfied, “the doctrine of claim preclusion” barred 
Ikome’s whistleblower lawsuit. Id. at *7; see also ECF 1 ¶ 18. 
 
2 On a motion to dismiss, the Court can “take judicial notice” of “public documents filed on a court docket.” Lewis v. 
Parker, 67 F. Supp. 3d 189, 195 n.6 (D.D.C. 2014). 

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Ikome then filed this lawsuit. In this case, he challenges the EPA’s Inspector General’s 
failure to issue a report in response to Ikome’s whistleblower complaint. See ECF 1 ¶ 20. Under 
section 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Ikome seeks to “compel” the Inspector 
General to issue the report, claiming its issuance has been “unlawfully withheld or unreasonably 
delayed.” Id. ¶¶ 23–25; see 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). Alternatively, Ikome seeks a writ of mandamus 
compelling the Inspector General “to investigate and submit [the] report.” ECF 1 ¶ 29. The 
Inspector General moved to dismiss the APA claim under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, 
and the mandamus claim under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction. See ECF 8 at 6–7. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
Faced with a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, a court takes the 
“factual allegations in the complaint as true.” Kareem v. Haspel, 986 F.3d 859, 866 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 
2021). The same is true for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 
(2009). Accepting those facts, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, the 
court asks if the complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.” Id. at 678. 
III. ANALYSIS 
Ikome’s complaint alleges one claim for agency action “unlawfully withheld or 
unreasonably delayed” under section 706(1) of the APA, and another under the Mandamus Act. 
See ECF 1 at 4–5. “[T]he standards for obtaining relief” on those two claims “are essentially the 
same.” Vietnam Vets. of Am. v. Shinseki, 599 F.3d 654, 659 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2010). To prevail on 
either, Ikome needs to have plausibly alleged—among other things—that the Inspector General 
has failed to take an action that he “is required to take.” Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All. (SUWA), 
542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004); see also Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 189 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 

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(plaintiff seeking mandamus “must demonstrate . . . that the government agency or official is 
violating a clear duty to act”). Ikome has not, however, plausibly alleged that the Inspector General 
is, at this stage, required to investigate Ikome’s complaint or issue a report. 
Start with the APA. That statute authorizes a court to “compel agency action unlawfully 
withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). The only action that can be compelled, 
however, is “required agency action.” SUWA, 542 U.S. at 65. Ikome’s theory is that under 
section 4712, the Inspector General was required to issue a report “within 180 days [of] receiving 
the complaint” or—as happened in this case—within the additional 180-days that Ikome agreed to 
give the Inspector General. 41 U.S.C. § 4712(b)(2)(A)–(B); see ECF 1 ¶ 25. 
But the statute does not require the Inspector General to belatedly issue a report if he is 
unable to finish his work within the statutory time period. Instead, it expressly contemplates that 
the Inspector General and “head of” the EPA might “not issue[] an order” within the time limit. 
41 U.S.C. § 4712(c)(2). Rather than require the agency to take any action at that point, the statute 
says that the “complainant shall be deemed to have exhausted all administrative remedies” and can 
“bring a de novo action at law or equity” in a federal district court. Id. In other words, after the 
agency missed the deadline, the statute put an end to the administrative proceedings and authorized 
Ikome to go to court—which is precisely what he did. See ECF 1 ¶ 17. In adopting this set up, 
Congress deployed a familiar statutory scheme. It “confine[d] agencies . . . to a tight schedule” for 
resolving whistleblower complaints under section 4712 and provided complainants “prompt access 
to the courts” upon the expiration of an agency’s “finite time to deal” with their complaints. Wilson 
v. Pena, 79 F.3d 154, 167 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (describing similar scheme in employment 
discrimination statutes). What these schemes contemplate after the agency’s time to act is up is the 
filing of a lawsuit, not further administrative action. 

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To be sure, that does not necessarily mean the Inspector General is barred from issuing a 
report after the time has expired. While the question is not presented by this case, other courts have 
held that an Inspector General and agency do have the power to act even after the statutory 
deadline. See Jacobs Project Mgmt. Co., 64 F.4th at 130. But even assuming the Inspector General 
could still issue a report in response to Ikome’s complaint, Ikome’s claim fails. Section 706(1) 
“empowers a court only to compel . . . non-discretionary act[s].” SUWA, 542 U.S. at 64. Because 
Ikome has not identified any source of law that requires the Inspector General to complete the 
report after the deadline has passed and administrative remedies are “exhausted,” 41 U.S.C. 
§ 4712(c)(2), he has failed to allege a plausible APA claim.3 
That conclusion also dooms Ikome’s mandamus claim. Mandamus is available only where 
the “official is violating a clear duty to act.” Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 189. Ikome has not 
identified any such “clear duty.” Id. While that failure goes to the merits of the APA claim, it is a 
“jurisdictional” “requirement[]” for mandamus. Id. The Court therefore dismisses this claim “for 
lack of jurisdiction.” Id. 
* * * 
The Inspector General’s motion to dismiss, ECF 8, is GRANTED. The APA claim is 
dismissed for failure to state a claim and the mandamus claim is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
Ikome’s case is DISMISSED. A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion. 
SO ORDERED. 
 __________________________ 
 JIA M. COBB 
 United States District Judge 
 
Date: May 22, 2026 
 
3 The Inspector General also argues that Ikome’s APA claim fails because Ikome had another “adequate remedy”—
de novo review of his whistleblower complaint in the case he filed after his administrative remedies were exhausted. 
See ECF 8 at 15; Ikome II, 2023 WL 3901791. The Court does not reach this alternative ground. 

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