govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_25-cv-02605-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
 
ALIN DUMITRASCU, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
 v. 
 
VIOLETA DUMITRASCU, et al., 
 
 Defendants. 
 
Civil Action No. 25 - 2605 (SLS) 
Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
In this case, Alin Dumitrascu sues Violeta Dumitrascu and other defendants seeking relief 
related to the custody of their child. This is not the first lawsuit between the Dumitrascus. In 2021, 
Ms. Dumitrascu, a Romanian citizen, sued Mr. Dumitrascu, a United States citizen, pursuant to 
the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child Abduction and its implementing statute. See 
Dumitrascu ex rel. A.M.B.D. v. Dumitrascu, No. 21- cv-1813, 2021 WL 4197378 (D. Colo. Sep. 
15, 2021), aff’d, No. 21-1341, 2022 WL 1529624 (10th Cir. May 16, 2022). In that action, a federal 
court in Colorado concluded that Mr. Dumitrascu had wrongfully retained his and 
Ms. Dumitrascu’s child in the United States, and the court ordered the child’s return to Romania. 
Id. at *11, *14. In this action, Mr. Dumitrascu brings claims against Ms. Dumitrascu and other 
defendants who he believes were involved in that court - ordered return. Ms. Dumitrascu and the 
United States have moved to dismiss Mr. Dumitrascu’s Complaint on various grounds . 
Mr. Dumitrascu has also filed several motions. The Court recognizes that Mr. Dumitrascu is 
understandably upset that a court ordered his daughter’s return to Romania. But that does not mean 
that this Court is a proper forum for him to raise grievances about that dispute. For the reasons 

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below, the Court grants the Defendants’ motions and dismisses Mr. Dumitrascu’s claims against 
Ms. Dumitrascu, the Department of State, and the Ministry of Justice of Romania. 
BACKGROUND 
The Court draws the facts, accepted as true, from Mr. Dumitrascu’s Complaint and 
attachments. Wright v. Eugene & Agnes E. Meyer Found., 68 F.4th 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2023). The 
Court also takes “judicial notice of public records from other court proceedings.” Lewis v. DEA, 
777 F. Supp. 2d 151, 159 (D.D.C. 2011). Because Mr. Dumitrascu is proceeding pro se, the Court 
considers the Complaint “in light of all filings, including filings responsive to [the] motion to 
dismiss.” Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per curiam) 
(cleaned up). 
Mr. and Ms. Dumitrascu married in Romania in 2015 and moved to Colorado in 2016. 
Dumitrascu, 2021 WL 4197378, at *1. They traveled to Romania in 2019, and Ms. Dumitrascu 
gave birth to their daughter, A.M.B.D., there that year. Id. In early 2020, Ms. Dumitrascu agreed 
that Mr. Dumitrascu could return to the United States with A.M.B.D. until December 31, 2020, 
while Ms. Dumitrascu remained in Romania. Id. at *2. In July 2020, Mr. Dumitrascu took 
A.M.B.D. to the United States. Id. at *3. 
However, Mr. Dumitrascu did not return A.M.B.D. to Romania by December 2020. Id. 
Accordingly, Ms. Dumitrascu “filed an application with Romanian authorities” in January 2021 
“to secure A.M.B.D.’s return” to Romania. Id. That July, she filed a petition in the United States 
District Court for the District of Colorado under 22 U.S.C. § 9001 et seq. , and the Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child Abduction. Id. at *1, *3. After holding an evidentiary 
hearing, the court concluded that Romania was A.M.B.D .’s habitual residence and that 
Mr. Dumitrascu had violated Ms. Dumitrascu’s custody rights under Romanian law by retaining 
their daughter in the United States after December 31, 2020. Id. at *9 –10. After rejecting 

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Mr. Dumitrascu’s defenses, the court granted Ms. Dumitrascu’s petition and ordered A.M.B.D.’s 
return to Romania. Id. at *11–14. Mr. Dumitrascu appealed, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. See 
Dumitrascu, 2022 WL 1529624, at *1. 
In August 2025, Mr. Dumitrascu initiated this action . He alleges that the proceedings 
before the District of Colorado were defective, and that the court improperly ordered A.M.B.D.’s 
return to Romania . Compl. at 1, ECF No. 1. He also alleges that since A.M.B.D.’s return, 
Ms. Dumitrascu has mistreated A.M.B.D. and failed to comply with visitation orders. Id. And he 
accuses the Ministry of Justice of Romania of misconduct for its role in securing A.M.B.D.’s return 
to Romania. Id. Mr. Dumitrascu attached several exhibits to his Complaint, many of which are 
accompanied by cover sheets elaborating on the alleged harm sustained by A.M.B.D. and the 
defects in the District of Colorado proceedings. See ECF No. 1 - 1 at 4–5. Ultimately, 
Mr. Dumitrascu requests that this Court prohibit “any further enforcement or recognition of the 
Romanian return order,” “[g]rant interim custody and safeguarding of” A.M.B.D., “[o]rder that 
[A.M.B.D.] be removed from her mother’s care and placed under immediate protective care in the 
United States,” and, if necessary, “[a]ppoint a Guardian Ad Litem or Independent attorney” for 
A.M.B.D. Compl. at 2 (boldface omitted). 
It is difficult to discern the nature of Mr. Dumitrascu’s claims—or even whom he intended 
to be defendants—from his Complaint. The Complaint has no heading identifying any defendants, 
nor does it have a section naming the parties to this litigation. See Compl. at 1–2. But a page titled 
“Certificate of Service (Ex Parte)” attached to the Complaint has a heading naming 
Ms. Dumitrascu as a “Respondent.” Compl. at 4. And the Civil Cover Sheet that Mr. Dumitrascu 
completed identifies no defendant but lists as attorneys for the defendant Habib Nasrullah, Kelsey 
Johnson, “U.S. Department of State,” and “Mini[s]try of Justice of Romania.” ECF No. 1- 4. On 

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that Cover Sheet, as his causes of action, Mr. Dumitrascu wrote “22 U.S.C. § 9001; 
28 U.S.C.[ ]§[ ]1331,” and described his cause as “Hague Convention Violation & Unlawful[] 
Removal of U.S.[ ]Citizen Child.” Id. 1 Mr. Dumitrascu’s contemporaneously filed Emergency 
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order provides no further clarity about the nature of his claims. 
ECF No. 2 at 1. That motion identifies as “Defendants”: Ms. Dumitrascu, Habib Nasrullah, Kelsey 
Johnson, the United States Department of State, and the Ministry of Justice of Romania. Id. 
As this case has progressed, Mr. Dumitrascu has filed several motions. Among them is a 
Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint. ECF No. 32. The Proposed Amended Complaint 
identifies as defendants Ms. Dumitrascu and the Department of State. Proposed Am. Compl. at 1, 
ECF No. 32- 1. It then states: “Additional defendants, including private attorneys and foreign 
officials, were previously named in this action as reflected in the original Complaint; Plaintiff does 
not add new defendants in this Amended Complaint.” Id. The Proposed Amended Complaint also 
seeks to “add a distinct claim under the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”), 
22 U.S.C. § 9003, against Defendant Violeta Dumitrascu.” Id. In addition to the ICARA claim, the 
Proposed Amended Complaint lists as “Count I”: “Existing claims (unchanged) (as pleaded in the 
operative Complaint in this action ).” Id. at 3. It elaborates that Mr. Dumitrascu “re-
 alleges the 
claims previously asserted in his original Complaint as to the Department of State and other 
defendants . . . and does not expand those theories in this Amended Complaint.” Id. 
Ms. Dumitrascu and the Department of State have each filed motions to dismiss, which are 
fully briefed and ripe for review. See Dumitrascu Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 18; Dumitrascu Mot. 
 
1 The Court references the Civil Cover Sheet only to highlight the lack of clarity in 
Mr. Dumitrascu’s filings. See Favors v. Coughlin, 877 F.2d 219, 220 (2d Cir. 1989) (“The civil 
cover sheet, of course, is merely an administrative aid to the court clerk, and is therefore not 
typically considered part of a litigant’s pleading papers.”). 

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Opp’n, ECF No. 21; U.S. Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 17; U.S. Mot. Opp’n, ECF No. 22; U.S. Mot. 
Reply, ECF No. 28. Ms. Dumitrascu argues that Mr. Dumitrascu’s claims against her must be 
dismissed under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(6). 
Dumitrascu Mot. Dismiss 1. The United States seeks dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). U.S. Mot. 
Dismiss 1. Mr. Dumitrascu has also filed several motions. Am. Emergency Mot. TRO & Injunctive 
Relief, ECF No. 23; Mot. Leave File Am. Compl., ECF No. 32; Mot. Leave File Notice & Exs., 
ECF No. 33; Mot. Entry Default, ECF No. 38. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
“When a defendant brings a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must demonstrate 
that the court indeed has subject -matter jurisdiction to hear his claims.” Hill v. U.S. Dep’t of the 
Interior, 699 F. Supp. 3d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2023) (first citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
561 (1992); and then citing U.S. Ecology, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 231 F.3d 20, 24 (D.C. 
Cir. 2000)). And “[b]ecause the court may not address the plaintiff’s claims without subject-matter 
jurisdiction, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) [also] imposes an affirmative obligation on 
the court to ensure that jurisdiction is proper.” Himex Co. v. United States , 17 F. Supp. 3d 77, 79 
(D.D.C. 2014). In reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), courts “construe the complaint liberally, granting plaintiff the benefit of 
all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Thomas v. Principi , 394 F.3d 970, 972 
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
When a party moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction, “[t]he 
plaintiff has the burden of establishing a factual basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant.” Crane v. New York Zoological Soc ’y, 894 F.2d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
Although a court must resolve factual discrepancies in the plaintiff’s favor, id., the plaintiff “must 
allege specific acts connecting [the] defendant with the forum” and “cannot rely on conclusory 

6 
allegations” alone, Clay v. Blue Hackle N. Am., LLC , 907 F. Supp. 2d 85, 87 (D.D.C. 2012) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Second Amend. Found. v. U.S. Conf. of Mayors, 274 F.3d 521, 524 
(D.C. Cir. 2001)). A court also “need not treat all of [a] plaintiff[’s] allegations as true, and instead 
‘may receive and weigh affidavits and any other relevant matter to assist it in determining the 
jurisdictional facts.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Philip Morris In c., 116 F. Supp. 2d 116, 120 
n.4 (D.D.C. 2000)). 
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court will dismiss a complaint that does not “contain sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 
When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts “must construe the complaint ‘in 
favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from 
the facts alleged.’” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Schuler 
v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ). But courts need not accept as true “a legal 
conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” nor an inference unsupported by the facts set forth in 
the complaint. See Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 
478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) ). “A pro se complaint is to be ‘liberally construed’ and ‘held to less 
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Ho v. Garland, 106 F.4th 47, 50 
(D.C. Cir. 2024) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 
DISCUSSION 
A. Motions to Dismiss 
The Court begins by addressing the motions to dismiss filed by Ms. Dumitrascu and the 
Department of State. 

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1. Ms. Dumitrascu 
Ms. Dumitrascu moves to dismiss Mr. Dumitrascu’s claims against her pursuant to Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(6). Because Mr. Dumitrascu has 
failed to demonstrate that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Ms. Dumitrascu, it grants her 
motion under Rule 12(b)(2) and declines to address her other bases for dismissal . Ruhrgas AG v. 
Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 585 (1999) (“It is hardly novel for a federal court to choose 
among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits.”). 
“Lawsuits require personal jurisdiction” so that the Court may “exercise coercive authority 
over a defendant.” Gu v. Trump, No. 25-cv-460, 2025 WL 3684896, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2025) 
(cleaned up) . “Personal jurisdiction can be established in three ways. First, so -called specific 
jurisdiction permits suits that arise out of or relate to a defendant’s activities in the forum state. 
Second, general jurisdiction allows the Court to hear the suit when a defendant is essentially at 
home in the State. Third, express or implied consent can serve as a ground for personal jurisdiction 
as well.” Id. (cleaned up). 
Here, Mr. Dumitrascu provides no indication that Ms. Dumitrascu should be considered at 
home in this District, nor that she has consented to suit here. What remains is specific jurisdiction. 
Assessing whether a court has specific jurisdiction over a non- resident defendant “typically 
implicates a state’s jurisdictional statute or rule.” Canuto v. Mattis , 273 F. Supp. 3d 127, 138 
(D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Alkanani v. Aegis Def. Servs., LLC, 976 F. Supp. 2d 13, 21 (D.D.C. 2014)). 
“[A] court must engage in a two- part inquiry: A court must first examine whether jurisdiction is 
applicable under the state’s long-arm statute and then determine whether a finding of jurisdiction 
satisfies the constitutional requirements of due process.’” Gu, 2025 WL 3684896, at *3 (quoting 
GTE New Media Servs. Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). 

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Mr. Dumitrascu’s claims against Ms. Dumitrascu “falter[] at the first step: D.C. law.” Id. 
(alteration in original) (quoting Nwosu, 2024 WL 1050339, at *1). 
D.C. law permits courts to: 
exercise personal jurisdiction over a person . . . as to a claim for relief arising from 
the person’s — 
(1) transacting any business in the District of Columbia; 
(2) contracting to supply services in the District of Columbia; 
(3) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission in 
the District of Columbia; 
(4) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission 
outside the District of Columbia if he regularly does or solicits business, 
engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue 
from goods used or consumed, or services rendered, in the District of Columbia; 
(5) having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in the District of 
Columbia; 
(6) contracting to insure or act as surety for or on any person, property, or risk, 
contract, obligation, or agreement located, executed, or to be performed within 
the District of Columbia at the time of contracting, unless the parties otherwise 
provide in writing; or 
(7) marital or parent and child relationship in the District of Columbia [in 
specified circumstances.] 
D.C. Code § 13–423. None of Mr. Dumitrascu’s filings indicate that Ms. Dumitrascu’s relevant 
conduct falls under any of these bases of jurisdiction. Mr. Dumitrascu alleges that Ms. Dumitrascu 
obtained a defective favorable ruling from the District of Colorado and has mistreated their 
daughter. Compl. at 1–2. But those alleged occurrences have no connection to the District of 
Columbia. 
Mr. Dumitrascu argues that this Court has specific jurisdiction over Ms. Dumitrascu 
because her prior residence in the United States and participation in proceedings in the District of 
Colorado demonstrate that she intentionally directed conduct “toward the United States and toward 
[Mr. Dumitrascu] and the minor U.S. citizen child.” Dumitrascu Mot. Opp’n 4–5. Yet directing 
conduct toward the United States as a whole is different from directing it toward the District of 

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Columbia. And D.C. law—which in this circumstance provides the rule for the specific jurisdiction 
of this Court—requires contacts with the District of Columbia. See Canuto, 273 F. Supp. 3d at 138; 
see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1) (“Serving a summons . . . establishes personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant . . . who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where 
the district court is located.”).2 
Accordingly, Mr. Dumitrascu has failed to carry his burden to establish a basis for this 
Court to exercise jurisdiction over his claims against Ms. Dumitrascu. Those claims must be 
dismissed. 
2. Department of State 
The Department of State moves to dismiss Mr. Dumitrascu’s claims against it under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). It initially argued that Mr. Dumitrascu’s Complaint 
failed to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 because, among other things, it failed to 
allege any conduct by the Department. U.S. Mot. Dismiss 2–3. But after Mr. Dumitrascu filed 
further documents elaborating on his view of the Department’s relevant conduct, the Department 
pointed out in its Reply that Mr. Dumitrascu lacks standing. U.S. Mot. Reply 4–5. Because 
“standing goes to subject matter jurisdiction over the case, the Court has ‘an affirmative obligation 
to ensure’” that Mr. Dumitrascu has standing to press his claims against the Department. Attias v. 
CareFirst, Inc., 344 F.R.D. 38, 44 (D.D.C. 2023) (quoting Smallwood v. DOJ, 266 F. Supp. 3d 
217, 219 (D.D.C. 2017)); see also Alter v. United States, No. 25-cv-2573, 2026 WL 879289, at *1 
 
2 It is true that when a claim “arises under federal law,” this Court may also exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant if “the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of 
general jurisdiction” and “exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United States Constitution 
and laws.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2). But Mr. Dumitrascu does not argue that this is such a case, and 
in any event, it appears that Colorado’s courts of general jurisdiction could exercise personal 
jurisdiction over his claims against Ms. Dumitrascu. 

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n.1 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2026) (construing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion by the United States as a motion 
under Rule 12(b)(1) because the United States’ arguments sounded in standing). 
For a court to have subject -matter jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s claim, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that he has standing—that he has “suffered an injury in fact, fairly traceable to the 
challenged action of the defendant, and it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that 
the injury will be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Brundage v. Kennedy , 
No. 25-
 cv- 119, 2025 WL 2761634, at *3 (D.D.C. Sep. 29, 2025) (cleaned up). 
Mr. Dumitrascu’s allegations regarding the Department are unclear. His initial Complaint 
does not allege any conduct by the Department giving rise to Mr. Dumitrascu’s claims. Indeed, it 
does not mention the Department at all —or even give an indication that he intended to sue the 
Department. But because Mr. Dumitrascu is proceeding pro se , the Court must also construe the 
Complaint “‘in light of’ all filings, including filings responsive to [the] motion to dismiss.” Brown, 
789 F.3d at 152 (quoting Richardson v. United States , 193 F.3d 545, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ). In 
opposing the Department’s Motion to Dismiss, Mr. Dumitrascu states that his claims against the 
Department are based on it “accept[ing] and process[ing] a request labeled as a ‘Hague return’ in 
the absence of any wrongful removal or wrongful retention of the child, without determining the 
child’s habitual residence, and without verifying the legal validity of the documents transmitted 
by foreign authorities.” U.S. Mot. Opp’n 2 (boldface omitted). He also filed a letter he received 
from the Department in April 2021, in which a Department employee asks whether 
Mr. Dumitrascu would be “interested in working with Ms. Violeta Dumitrascu . . . to facilitate the 
resolution of [his] family’s conflict without engaging in litigation.” ECF No. 26-1 at 1. The letter 
goes on to state that if Mr. Dumitrascu elects not to voluntarily resolve the custody dispute, the 
Department would “be obligated under Article 7(f) of the [Hague] Convention to continue 

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processing the application and to facilitate the initiation of judicial proceedings by Ms. Violeta 
Dumitrascu.” Id. at 2. Mr. Dumitrascu adds that this letter “exerted pressure” on him. ECF No. 26 
at 1. 
Despite filing these documents, Mr. Dumitrascu does not articulate the injury that he 
believes the Department’s conduct inflicted on him. As best the Court can tell, he appears to think 
that the Department contributed to the District of Colorado’s decision to order A.M.B.D.’s return 
to Romania. Or perhaps he thinks that the “pressure” exerted by the Department’s letter itself 
constitutes an injury sufficient to support standing. But even assuming that either of those injuries 
are enough, Mr. Dumitrascu’s standing is nevertheless lacking because those injuries are not 
redressable through the relief requested by Mr. Dumitrascu . “To determine whether an injury is 
redressable, the Court considers the relationship between the judicial relief requested and the injury 
suffered.” Brundage, 2025 WL 2761634, at *3 (cleaned up). As mentioned above, 
Mr. Dumitrascu’s Complaint requests that this Court prohibit “any further enforcement or 
recognition of the Romanian return order,” “[g]rant interim custody and safeguarding of” 
A.M.B.D., “[o]rder that [A.M.B.D.] be removed from her mother’s care and placed under 
immediate protective care in the United States,” and, if necessary, “[a]ppoint a Guardian Ad Litem 
or Independent attorney” for A.M.B.D. Compl. at 2 (boldface omitted). But none of that requested 
relief appears to pertain to the Department. T here is no indication that the Department would 
properly have any role in the return of A.M.B.D. to the United States should this Court grant 
Mr. Dumitrascu’s requested relief. 
At bottom, this lawsuit appears to be one in which Mr. Dumitrascu seeks to relitigate the 
question of where A.M.B.D. should reside while he and Ms. Dumitrascu resolve their custody 
dispute. The Court understands that Mr. Dumitrascu is upset that the Department of State, in 

12 
discharging its responsibilities under the Hague Convention, sent him the April 2021 letter. But 
based on the allegations in Mr. Dumitrascu’s filings, the Department of State has at most a 
tangential relationship to the underlying custody issue at the core of this dispute . Mr. Dumitrascu 
therefore lacks standing to bring his claims against the Department, and they must be dismissed.3 
B. Motion to Amend 
Mr. Dumitrascu has moved for leave to file an amended complaint. Unless a party is 
entitled to amend their complaint as a matter of right, “a party may amend its pleading only with 
the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when 
justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 (a)(2). That means that “[i]n the absence of any apparent or 
declared reason—such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, 
repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the 
opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.—the leave 
sought should . . . be freely given.” Harris v. Koenig, 673 F. Supp. 2d 8, 11 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting 
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). But a “district court may deny a motion to amend a 
complaint as futile if the proposed claim would not survive a motion to dismiss.” Hettinga , 677 
F.3d at 480. 
As described above, the only claim added in Mr. Dumitrascu’s Proposed Amended 
Complaint is an ICARA claim against Ms. Dumitrascu. Proposed Am. Compl. at 3. “ICARA 
 
3 Mr. Dumitrascu has also filed a Motion for Leave to File Notice and Exhibits, ECF No. 33. He 
seeks leave to file a number of documents in support of his view that the Department acted 
improperly in relation to the proceeding in the District of Colorado. The Department opposes 
Mr. Dumitrascu’s request, arguing that the submission would constitute an impermissible 
sur- reply. U.S. Am. Compl. Opp’n 3, ECF No. 35. The Court has reviewed the documents 
provided by Mr. Dumitrascu , and nothing in them changes its conclusion that Mr. Dumitrascu 
lacks standing to bring his claims against the Department . Accordingly, the Court will grant 
Mr. Dumitrascu’s request for leave to file these documents. 

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permits a parent . . . seeking relief under the [Hague] Convention to file a petition for return of a 
child in state or federal court . . . and directs courts to ‘decide the[se] case[s] in accordance with 
the Convention.’” Golan v. Saada, 596 U.S. 666, 671 (2022) (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 9003(d)). But 
a petitioner seeking to initiate an ICARA action does so “by filing a petition for the relief sought 
in any court which has jurisdiction of such action and which is authorized to exercise its 
jurisdiction in the place where the child is located at the time the petition is filed.” 22 U.S.C. 
§ 9003(b); see also Flores Perla v. Perla Velasquez , No. 16-cv-95, 2016 WL 3878495, at *4–5 
(D. Md. July 18, 2016) (collecting cases concluding that an ICARA action can be brought only 
“where the child is located at the time of filing” ). Here, A.M.B.D. has been located in Romania 
throughout this action. Thus, ICARA would not permit this Court to adjudicate Mr. Dumitrascu’s 
proposed claim against Ms. Dumitrascu , and consequently, M r. Dumitrascu’s claim would not 
survive a motion to dismiss. The Court must therefore deny Mr. Dumitrascu’s motion as futile. 
C. Ministry of Justice of Romania 
Finally, Mr. Dumitrascu has filed a motion seeking that the Clerk of the Court enter default 
against the Ministry of Justice of Romania under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55. The Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq., “affords the ‘sole basis for obtaining 
jurisdiction over a foreign state’ in United States courts.” Wye Oak Tech., Inc. v. Republic of Iraq, 
24 F.4th 686, 690 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (quoting Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 
488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989)) ; see 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (providing that a foreign state “includes a 
political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state ”). The 
FSIA both “establishes the general rule for granting foreign sovereign immunity . . . and it also 
makes that grant of immunity subject to nine exceptions.” Wye Oak Tech. , 24 F.4th at 690. 

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Significantly, those exceptions “are exhaustive; if none applies to the circumstances presented in 
a case, the foreign state has immunity and the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id. 
This Court has an “‘ affirmative obligation ’ to determine whether it has subject -matter 
jurisdiction” over the Plaintiff’s claims against the Ministry of Justice of Romania. Mohammadi 
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 947 F. Supp. 2d 48, 61 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting James Madison Ltd. v. 
Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). Accordingly, the Court directed Mr. Dumitrascu to 
file a memorandum explaining why this Court has subject -matter jurisdiction to hear his claims 
against the Ministry of Justice of Romania under the FSIA. See Min. Order (Apr. 24, 2026). In his 
memorandum, Mr. Dumitrascu contends that his claims fall within 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), also 
known as the “commercial activities exception.” Suppl. Mem. at 3–4, ECF No. 39; see Wye Oak 
Tech., 24 F.4th at 689. The Court is not convinced. 
The commercial activities exception directs that a foreign state is not immune in a case “in 
which the action is based upon a commercial activity” with certain connections to the United 
States. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). Here, Mr. Dumitrascu’s claims against the Ministry of Justice of 
Romania are not based on any alleged commercial activity. As Mr. Dumitrascu himself describes 
his claims, they are “based on the Ministry’s case -specific operational conduct” related to the 
District of Colorado proceeding, including “the use of U.S. governmental channels, the triggering 
and reinforcement of a Hague- return proceeding in the United States, and direct consequences for 
the legal position and settled U.S.-based life of a U.S.-citizen child and her father.” Suppl. Mem. 
at 3–4. But none of these alleged acts are commercial activities. See Wye Oak Tech. , 24 F.4th 
at 691 (“[T]he FSIA’s commercial activities exception carves out, and exempts from sovereign 
immunity, a sphere of private commercial action that foreign states sometimes undertake.”); 

15 
28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (“A ‘commercial activity’ means either a regular course of commercial 
conduct or a particular commercial transaction.”). 
Thus, Mr. Dumitrascu has not carried his burden of showing that the Court has jurisdiction 
to hear his claims against the Ministry of Justice of Romania. The Court must dismiss those claims 
for lack of jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time 
that it lacks subject- matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); CC/Devas (Mauritius) 
Ltd. v. Antrix Cor p., 605 U.S. 223, 233 (2025) (“In order for subject -matter jurisdiction to exist 
under the FSIA, an exception to immunity must apply.”). 
* * * 
The Court understands that Mr. Dumitrascu disagrees with the District of Colorado’s 
decision to order his daughter’s return to Romania. Yet that does not mean that this Court provides 
a proper forum for Mr. Dumitrascu to relitigate that dispute, or to rais e other grievances with the 
people and entities involved. His claims against Ms. Dumitrascu, the Department of State, and the 
Ministry of Justice of Romania must be dismissed.
4 
CONCLUSION 
For all these reasons, t he Court grants the Department of State’s Motion to Dismiss, 
ECF No. 17, as well as Ms. Dumitrascu’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 18. The Court denies as 
moot Mr. Dumitrascu’s Amended Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 
 
4 As discussed above, it is difficult to understand whether Mr. Dumitrascu intended to bring claims 
against defendants other than Ms. Dumitrascu, the Department of State, and the Ministry of Justice 
of Romania. A heading of an early filing by Mr. Dumitrascu in this case also lists as defendan ts 
Habib Nasrullah and Kelsey Johnson. ECF No. 2 at 1. And the Proposed Amended Complaint 
mentions that “[a]dditional defendants, including private attorneys . . . , were previously named in 
this action.” Proposed Am. Compl. at 1, ECF No. 32- 1. Yet Mr. Dumitrascu has not filed proof 
that he served any other defendants. Thus, to the extent that Mr. Dumitrascu intended for his 
Complaint to bring claims against Mr. Nasrullah or Ms. Johnson, the Court orders him to file proof 
that he served those defendants in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 by June 15, 
2026. 

16 
Injunctive Relief, ECF No. 23, and his Request for Clerk’s Entry of Default Against Defendant 
Ministry of Justice of Romania, ECF No. 38. The Court denies Mr. Dumitrascu’s Motion for 
Leave to File Amended Complaint, ECF No. 32. The Court grants Mr. Dumitra scu’s Motion for 
Leave to File Notice and Exhibits, ECF No. 33, and will treat the attached documents, 
ECF Nos. 33-1 & 33-2, as filed. 
A separate order will issue. 
 
 
 
SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN 
United States District Judge 
 
Date: May 22, 2026 
 

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