govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_25-cv-01402-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
Civil Action No. 25-1402 (TJK) 
YI SUN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JAMES U. NOTICE et al., 
Defendants. 
 
MEMORANDUM 
Yi Sun, proceeding pro se, sued several parties over a landlord-tenant dispute relating to 
her New York City apartment. ECF No. 1. Only some of the sued Defendants made an appear-
ance, and the Court dismissed those that appeared for lack of personal jurisdiction. ECF No. 61. 
The Court then expressed doubts that the remaining Defendants were properly served and ordered 
Sun—to the extent she sought to maintain this action —to show cause why they should not be 
dismissed for insufficient service of process. See Minute Order of May 1, 2026. 
Sun has since filed two items on the docket. First, she has provided additional points and 
authorities in opposition to the Court’s dismissal of two Defendants, La Casa Nuestra Housing 
Development Corporation and James U. Notice. ECF No. 64. Second, she has moved for a pre-
liminary injunction and temporary restraining order. ECF No. 65. In addition to requesting relief, 
the latter filing also includes representations about Sun’s service on the remaining Defendants . 
Accordingly, the Court construes it as a response to the Court’s show-cause order. For the reasons 
given below, the Court will decline to revise its prior Memorandum Order dismissing the Defend-
ants that appeared, deny Sun’s motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining or-
der, and dismiss this case for failure to timely serve. 

 
 
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I. The Court Will Not Revise Its Prior Memorandum Order 
 
Previously, Defendants La Casa Nuestra Housing Development Corporation and James U. 
Notice moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. ECF No. 56. The Court granted their 
motion, explaining that “none of the alleged actions” taken by either Defendant “take place outside 
of New York,” and thus “ Sun alleges no connection between La Casa Nuestra or Notice and the 
District of Columbia.” ECF No. 61 at 3. However, Sun contended that she was not given her full 
time to file an opposition to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss before the Court issued its Memo-
randum Order, see ECF No. 62 at 2, so the Court granted her additional time to file further points 
and authorities, offering to “modify its Memorandum Order if necessary.” Minute Order of May 
4, 2026. Sun has done so. See ECF No. 64. 
Nothing in Sun’s filing persuades the Court to modify its prior order. Her additional argu-
ments fail to address the basis on which the Court granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss: lack 
of personal jurisdiction. Instead, in her “rebuttal to Defendants’ Attorneys’ main point,” Sun ar-
gues that the Court “has jurisdiction of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C . § 1331 and 1343(4),” as 
well as the “‘Fair Housing Amendments Act’ and ‘42 U.S. Code § 3631 . . . and ‘Privacy Act’ and 
‘Amendment IV.’” ECF No. 64 at 5–6. But all these cited authorities go to the Court’s subject 
matter jurisdiction, not its personal jurisdiction. Whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction 
in a suit depends on whether “[t]he character of the controvers[y]” falls within “those subjects 
encompassed within a statutory grant of jurisdiction .” Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie 
des Bauxites de Guinee , 456 U.S. 694 , 701 (1982). The Court agrees that it possesses subject 
matter jurisdiction over Sun’s complaint due to this being a “civil action[] arising under the Con-
stitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. ” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. That Sun has sued under 
various federal laws, however, does not mean that the Court has personal jurisdiction over La Casa 

 
 
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Nuestra and Notice. The fact remains that all the allegations Sun makes against them concern their 
activity in New York. In the end, nothing about Sun’s submission changes the Court’s conclusion 
that it lacks personal jurisdiction over them. 
II. The Court Will Deny Sun’s Request for Preliminary Injunctive Relief 
 
Separately, Sun has filed a motion styled as an “Order to Show Cause for ‘Preliminary 
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order’ and Request a Retrial.” ECF No. 65 at 2. The title 
does not match the body of the motion, with the body requesting “a rehearing by an [sic] neutral 
Judge,” which appears to be yet another recusal request. Id. Regardless of which relief Sun re-
quests, her motion fails. 
To the extent Sun is requesting a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order , 
she has not showed that she meets any of their requirements, which are the same. See Est. of Coll-
Monge v. Inner Peace Movement, 524 F.3d 1341, 1349–50 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (four-part test for such 
relief). Indeed, the body of her motion does not attempt at all to show a “likelihood of success on 
the merits” of her underlying suit or the “irreparable harm” she will suffer without the requested 
relief. Id. (quotation omitted). Thus, the Court will deny the motion to issue a preliminary injunc-
tion or temporary restraining order. 
To the extent Sun is requesting a “rehearing” before another judge, she seeks this Court’s 
recusal—for the fifth time. See Minute Order of July 10, 2025 (denying a motion for a temporary 
restraining order on the grounds the Court is “prejudiced”); Minute Order of July 31, 2025 (same); 
Minute Order of April 15, 2026 (same); Minute Order of May 4, 2026 (same). In support of her 
fifth attempt, she argues that the Court has treated her “unfairly.” ECF No. 65 at 3. Like her prior 
motions, many of her objections are just disagreements with the Court’s prior rulings. See id. 
(“The Chamber failed to properly evaluate the facts and evidence . . .”). As stated before, such 

 
 
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disagreements are not “legitimate reason[s] for recusal or reassignment outside of the Court's ‘ju-
dicial rulings.’” Minute Order of May 4, 2026 (quoting SEC v. Loving Spirit Found. Inc. , 392 
F.3d 486, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). The remaining arguments assert without factual support that the 
Court is “influenced by personal prejudices or conflicts of interest” in favor of Defendants . ECF 
No. 65 at 3. Again, as stated before, this bald assertion does not “provide[] ‘facts that would fairly 
convince a sane and reasonable mind to question this Court’s impartiality.’” Minute Order of May 
4, 2026 (quoting Walsh v. Comey, 110 F. Supp. 3d 73, 77 (D.D.C. 2015) ). Thus, Sun’s motion 
fails no matter how it is construed. 
III. The Court Will Dismiss the Remaining Defendants and the Case 
 
Finally, after the Court dismissed those Defendants that had appeared in the suit, it noted 
that “ the remaining Defendants that have not appeared may not have been served, or served 
properly, for various reasons.” Minute Order of May 1, 2026. The Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure mandate that “[i]f a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the 
court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action without prej-
udice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time.” Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 4(m) (emphasis added). And by “the plain text of Rule 4, the plaintiff has the burden to ‘demon-
strate that the procedure employed to deliver the papers satisfies the requirements of the relevant 
portions of Rule 4.’” Mann v. Castiel, 681 F.3d 368, 372 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (internal citation omit-
ted). 
At that point, it had been almost a year —361 days—since the complaint was filed . And 
during that time, Sun had made several missteps in properly serving all Defendants and ha d re-
ceived, on several occasions, guidance from the Court and additional time to serve . See Minute 
Order of May 15, 2025 (denying an attempt to serve by email or other alternate means); Minute 

 
 
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Order of June 18, 2025 (walking through the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
4(c)(2)); Minute Order of July 10, 2025 ( providing a reminder of the 90-day service deadline); 
Minute Order of July 31, 2025 (granting a 20 -day extension of time to effect service). Against 
that backdrop, the Court gave notice to Sun of its inclination to dismiss the remaining Defendants 
and ordered her, to the extent she wished to maintain this action—after all, it appears that the Court 
lacks personal jurisdiction over these Defendants, like the others —to “show cause by May 15, 
2026, why each remaining Defendant should not be dismissed for insufficient service of process.” 
Minute Order of May 1, 2026. 
That date passed a week ago, and it is not altogether clear that Sun has complied with the 
Court’s show-cause order. Certainly, no separate filing appears on the docket attempting to justify 
the validity of her service. And Sun has not moved for an extension of the time to serve by trying 
to show “good cause” for her failure to do so. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). That said, appended at the 
bottom of Sun’s motion seeking preliminary relief and/or recusal, she appears to address the va-
lidity of her service on the remaining six Defendants. ECF No. 65 at 4–6. Under the circum-
stances, the Court understands this to be Sun’s response. 
Sun has failed to carry her burden to show that service was proper on the remaining De-
fendants. As the Court noted, it appears that Defendant Karima—apparently a corporate subsidi-
ary of “Verizon Telecommunications Company,” ECF No. 1 ¶ 7—was not served at all. Minute 
Order of May 1, 2026. Sun counters that “Sun sent the Summons by Fax . . . to ‘Verizon Security 
Assistance Team.’” ECF No. 65 at 5 –6. But that is not an acceptable form of service. See Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 4(h) (describing acceptable forms of service on a “corporation”). Sun also asserts that 
she mentioned this form of service before and yet “the Court never brought up this.” ECF No. 65 
at 6. But the Court was not mistaken; the operative attempt at service does not mention Karima. 

 
 
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See ECF No. 16. Only a prior attempt at service mentioned Karima, see ECF No. 8 at 13–14, but 
that attempt was not by fax, and in any case, the Court already explained why that attempt was 
faulty, see Minute Order of June 18, 2025. 
The Court also noted its concern that Defendant Tito could not be served through a “Mr. 
Luis Vargas.” Minute Order of May 1, 2026. Sun counters that Tito is a “hired electrician by ‘La 
Casa Nuestra Housing Development Fund Corporation/El Barrio’s Operation Fightback, Inc” and 
that “Mr. Luis Vargas” is the “Head Officer” of La Casa Nuestra,” making Vargas able to accept 
service of process on Tito’s behalf. ECF No. 65 at 4. But while Vargas can perhaps accept service 
on behalf of La Casa Nuestra because he is that corporation’s officer , see Fed. R. Civ. P. 
4(h)(1)(B), this does not mean that he can also accept service on behalf of Tito, who is an individ-
ual. Service of process via agent for an individual can only be done if the agent is “authorized by 
appointment or by law to receive service of process ” on the individual’s behalf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 
4(e)(2)(C). Sun has provided no reason to think that Vargas fits the bill for Tito. 
Service on the remaining Defendants suffers from similar problems , and Sun’s explana-
tions do not meet her burden to prove service for them, either . Defendant Marty Watson is a 
“cleaner” hired by La Casa Nuestra, ECF No. 65 at 4, and, like Tito, was served via Vargas, see 
ECF No. 16 at 4. The service on him is faulty for the same reasons it was faulty on Tito. Defend-
ants Evon Asforis is a “judge of the Housing Court for the Civil Court of the City of New York” 
and was apparently served via “Martiza Rosa,” the administrative assistant of “James Cooney,” 
who is in turn alleged to be Asforis’s attorney. ECF No. 65 at 4–5. Sun provides no reason to 
think that Rosa, let alone Cooney, is authorized to accept service on Asforis’s behalf, making this 
explanation insufficient. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4( e)(2)(C). Defendant New York State Division of 
Housing and Community Renewal was apparently also served via Martiza Rosa. ECF No. 65 at 

 
 
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5. But, as Rosa does not even work for the Division directly, Sun has provided no reason to think 
Rosa could be “an officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent authorized by appoint-
ment or by law to receive service of process” for the Division. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B). Finally, 
Sun states that she served the remaining Defendant, the 25th Precinct of the New York Police 
Department, through the Precinct’s “Commanding Officer ,” who is “Captain Eric Carrasquillo.” 
ECF No. 65 at 5. But “the NYPD is a non -suable agency of the City ,” making this attempt at 
service on one of its precincts improper, as all service would need to be directed at “the city of 
New York” instead. Jenkins v. City of New York , 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting 
N.Y.C. Charter § 396). 
In sum, after providing her repeated guidance and additional time to serve in the past, the 
Court provided “ notice to the plaintiff” that her service appeared deficient for all remaining six 
Defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). She has failed to meet her burden to show service was proper, 
nor has she sought more time to serve. Thus, the Court will “dismiss the action” as to all six , as 
well as the case. Id. 
IV. Conclusion 
For all these reasons, the Court will deny Sun’s motion for a preliminary injunctive relief 
and dismiss the remaining six Defendants—Evon M. Asforis, Marty Watson, Karima, the 25th 
Precinct of the New York Police Department, the New York State Division of Housing and Com-
munity Renewal, and Tito—for insufficient service of process. The Court will also dismiss the 
case. A separate order will issue. 
 
/s/ Timothy J. Kelly 
TIMOTHY J. KELLY 
United States District Judge 
Date: May 22, 2026 

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