govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-2_25-cv-15438-0

NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
BELTON C. HAIG, SR., 
 Plaintiff, 
v. 
NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER 
CORPORATION (AMTRAK)
, VRC 
INVESTIGATIONS, EDWARD BELENGER, 
LEROY KELLY, II,
 and JOHN BONVENTRE 
 Defendants. 
Civil Action No.: 2:25-cv-15438 
 
 
OPINION & ORDER 
 
 
 
CECCHI, District Judge. 
This matter comes before the Court on three motions: (1) Pro Se Plaintiff Belton C. Haig’s 
(“Plaintiff” or “Haig”) motion to remand, ECF No. 7; (2) Defendants National Railroad Passenger 
Corporation (“Amtrak”) and John Bonventre’s (“Bonventre”) motion to dismiss pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), ECF N o. 9; and (3) Defenda nts VRC Investigations 
(“VRC”), Edward Belenger (“Belenger”), and Leroy Kelly II’s (“Kelly”, collectively the “VRC 
Defendants”, and together with Amtrak and Bonventre “Defendants”) motion for judgment on the 
pleadings under Rule 12(c), ECF No. 20. The Court decides these motions without oral argument 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s 
motion is DENIED and Defendants’ motions are GRANTED. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This case arises out of Defendants’ alleged misconduct during a prior lawsuit. ECF No. 1-
1, Exhibit A, Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶ 11.1. That prior case involved a “serious vehicular accident” 
while Plaintiff, an Amtrak employee, was w orking in a “faulty company vehicle.” Id. ¶¶ 10–11. 
Plaintiff asserts he sustained “multiple perman ent physical injuries” and ultimately won at trial 
with judgment being entered in Plaintiff’s favor on November 16, 2023. Id. ¶¶ 10, 11.1; Haig v. PageID:
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Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 18-cv-12370 (D.N.J.) at ECF No. 121. The instant lawsuit stems from 
alleged “acts of perjury, defamation, and other misconduct committed by Defendants during those 
[prior] proceedings [which] subs tantially undermined the fairne ss of the process and diminished 
the monetary award rendered by the jury.” Compl. ¶ 11.1. 
Haig makes allegations against Amtrak (his employer), Bonventre (Amtrak’s attorney in 
the prior case), VRC (an entity which Amtrak hire d to investigate the prior action), and VRC’s 
investigators (Defendants Belenger and Kelly). Id. ¶¶ 2–6. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that 
“Amtrak, in coordination with VRC . . . engaged in ongoing harassment and surveillance of 
Plaintiff” during that case from January 2022 to September 2023. Id. ¶ 12. He further states that 
VRC, Belenger, and Kelly followed, stalked, and secretly filmed Plaintiff through “deception and 
intrusion.” Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiff also alleges that “Belenge r, Kelly, and Bonventre knowingly gave 
false testimony and committed perjury” which “damag e[ed] Plaintiff's credibility” in the prior 
action. Id. ¶ 15. Finally, Plaintiff claims that he is di sabled and that Amtrak denied his requests 
for reasonable accommodations. Id. ¶¶ 1, 16. 
Plaintiff filed suit in the Superior Court of New Jersey Essex County, Law Division in 
August 2025. See Compl. The complaint alleges six counts: violation of the New Jersey 
Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”) (Count 1); violation of the New Jersey Civil 
Rights Act (“NJCRA”) (Count 2); intrusion upon s eclusion (Count 3); inten tional and negligent 
infliction of emotional distress (“IIED” and “NIE D”) (Count 4); civil conspiracy and aiding and 
abetting (Count 5); and failure to accommodate under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination 
(“NJLAD”) and Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) (Count 6). Defendants timely removed 
the case to this Court on September 10, 2025. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff then filed a motion to remand 
the case. ECF No. 7. The VRC Defendants fi led their answer, ECF No. 8, and Amtrak and PageID:
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Bonventre filed a motion to dismiss. ECF No. 9. The VRC Defendants then filed a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings. ECF No. 20. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
A. Motion to Remand 
Federal courts maintain jurisdiction for “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, 
laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S. C. § 1331. The “well-pleaded complaint rule” 
provides that “federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of 
the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). 
On a motion to remand, the removing party has the burden of establishing the propriety of removal. 
Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990). “A case must be remanded if, 
at any time before final judgment, the distr ict court discovers that it lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear the case.” Stephens v. Gentilello , 853 F. Supp. 2d 462, 465 (D.N.J. 2012) 
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)). 
B. 12(b)(6) and 12(c) 
To survive dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a complaint must 
contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted). A claim is facially plausible when supported 
by “factual content that allows the court to draw th e reasonable inference that the defendant is 
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. A complaint that contains “a formulaic recitation of the 
elements of a cause of action” su pported by mere conclusory s tatements or offers “‘naked 
assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’” will not suffice. Id. (citation omitted). In 
evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, the court accepts all factual allegations as true, draws all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and disregards legal conclusions. Phillips PageID:
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v. Cnty. of Allegheny , 515 F.3d 224, 231–34 (3d Cir. 2008). Courts liberally construe a pro se 
litigant’s complaint. Higgs v. Atty. Gen. of the U.S. , 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011). Finally, 
“A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rul e 12(c) is analyzed under the same standards 
that apply to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Wolfington v. Reconstructive Orthopaedic Assocs. II PC , 
935 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted). 
III. DISCUSSION 
As discussed below, the Court has subject ma tter jurisdiction over the case and will 
accordingly deny Plaintiff’s motion to remand. A dditionally, Plaintiff’s claims that stem from 
Defendants’ alleged statements and communications during prior litigation will be dismissed due 
to litigation privilege and Plaintiff’s remaining claims will be dismissed as insufficiently pled. 
A. Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand 
Plaintiff’s motion to remand must be denied because the Court has federal subject matter 
jurisdiction and, as such, Amtr ak’s removal was proper. In s hort, Plaintiff contends that his 
“claims do not depend on the resolution of a federal issue” because the majority of claims are 
under state law. ECF No. 7-2 at 2. This is unav ailing as Plaintiff’s complaint expressly alleges 
that Defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, a federal law. Compl. ¶ 27. Thus, 
a “federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” 
Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 392; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Federal courts maintain jurisdiction 
for “all civil actions arising under the . . . laws . . . of the United States.”). 
Separately, the Court has federal subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1349, which 
confers district courts with jurisdiction over cases in which “the United States is the owner of more 
than one-half of [a defendant’s] capital stock.” See Hollus v. Amtrak Ne. Corridor, 937 F. Supp. 
1110, 1113 (D.N.J. 1996), aff’d, 118 F.3d 1575 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Because a majority of the capital PageID:
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stock of Amtrak is owned by the United States, the federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction 
over any action involving Amtrak.”). 1 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to remand is denied. 
Nevertheless, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to rema nd because he did not intend to rely on federal 
claims, or assert claims against entities that would confer jurisdiction on this Court (e.g., Amtrak), 
he may amend his Complaint as consistent with this opinion and order. 
B. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 
Before considering the Parties’ arguments, the Court must first address the applicable 
standard when, as here, one group of defendants (Amtrak and Bonventre) filed a motion to dismiss, 
and another (VRC Defendants) moved for judgmen t on the pleadings. A party may move for 
judgment on the pleadings “after the pleadings are closed—but ea rly enough not to delay trial.” 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). In a multi-defendant case li ke this one, “the pleadings are not considered 
closed until every defendant has answered the complaint.” Newton v. Greenwich Twp. , No. 12-
238, 2012 WL 3715947, at *1 n.1 (D.N.J. Aug. 27, 2012).2 Here, Amtrak and Bonventre have not 
answered the Complaint, whereas the VRC Defendants have. See ECF No. 8. In these 
circumstances, courts have “discretion to pe rmit Rule 12(c) motions even where not every 
defendant has answered, so long as no pr ejudice to any party would result.” Newton, 2012 WL 
3715947, at *1 n.1 (collecting cases). No party would be prejudiced here if the Court considers 
the motions simultaneously. In their 12(c) motio n, the VRC Defendants argue that Plaintiff has 
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See ECF No. 20-3 (“VRC Br.”) at 5–6; 
 
1 Because the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over all of Plaintiff’s claims under 28 U.S.C. § 
1349, it does not address the issue of whether the Court could have supplemental jurisdiction over 
Plaintiff’s state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 
2 The Third Circuit has not addressed this issue but a number of district courts in this circuit have 
held the same. See, e.g., TD Bank, N.A. v. Cont’l Ins. Co. of New Jersey, No. 23-1951, 2024 WL 
1327971, at *4–5 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2024); Cook v. TransUnion, No. 23-1146, 2024 WL 128204, 
at *1–2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2024) (collecting cases). PageID:
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see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2)(B) (“[The] [f]ailure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted [defense] . . . may be raised by a motion under Rule 12(c).”). Amtrak and Bonventre 
advance the same argument in their 12(b)(6) motion. See generally ECF No. 9-3 (“Amtrak Br.”). 
Accordingly, this Court will exercise its discreti on and consider both mo tions under the same 
12(b)(6) standard.
3 See Wolfington, 935 F.3d at 195 (“A motion for judgment on the pleadings 
under Rule 12(c) is analyzed under the same sta ndards that apply to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” 
(quotation omitted)). 
1. Litigation Privilege 
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed be cause they are protected by 
the litigation privilege. See Amtrak Br. at 5–7; VRC Br. at 6–9. Defendants are correct to the 
extent Plaintiff’s claims arise out of Defendants’ statements and communications made in the prior 
lawsuit. 
New Jersey’s litigation privilege is “well-established and broadly applicable.” Rickenbach 
v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. , 635 F. Supp. 2d 389, 401 (D.N.J. 2009). The privilege provides 
“absolute protection” for “[s]tatements made by lawyers , judges, witnesses, and parties” as well 
as investigators. DeNicholas v. Centene Corp. , No. 17-0924, 2017 WL 7542616, at *2 (D.N.J. 
Oct. 20, 2017); Hawkins v. Harris , 661 A.2d 284, 291–92 (N.J. 1995). It “applies to 
communications ‘(1) made in judicial or quas i-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other 
participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some 
connection or logical relation to the action.’” Shih v. Maselli, Mills & Fornal, P.C., No. 24-6300, 
 
3 To the extent the VRC Defendants’ motion is a motion for judgment on the merits, the motion is 
denied as improper in the current posture. See e.g., TD Bank, 2024 WL 1327971, at *5 (construing 
12(c) motion as motion to dismiss and denying the motion to the extent it “requests a judgment on 
the merits”). PageID:
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2025 WL 957680, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2025) (quoting Roggio v. McElroy, Deutsch, Mulvaney 
& Carpenter, 415 F. App’x 432, 433 (3d Cir. 2011)). The privilege “is not limited to statements 
made in a courtroom during a trial; it extends to all statements or communications in connection 
with the judicial proceeding.” Hawkins, 661 A.2d at 289 (quotation omitted). “The application of 
the litigation privilege is a question of law which may be determined at the motion to dismiss 
phase.” Shih, 2025 WL 957680, at *3 (quoting Burgess v. Bennet , No. 20-7103, 2021 WL 
1050313, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2021)). 
Here, Plaintiff alleges that “During depositi ons on July 7, 2022 and later during court 
proceedings from October 30 to November 6, 2023, Belenger, Kelly, and Bonventre knowingly 
gave false testimony and committed perjury, damaging Plaintiff’s credibility.” Compl. ¶ 15. And 
Plaintiff further contends that Defendants engaged in “acts of perjury” and “defamation . . . during 
those proceedings.” Id. ¶ 11.1. The Complaint does not allege with any specificity or detail what 
these statements were, or what made them false. Nevertheless, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s 
claims arising from these statements are barred by the litigation privilege. These statements, which 
were made “during depositions” and “court proceedings,” Compl. ¶ 15, are clearly 
communications made in judicial or quasi-jud icial proceedings by Amtrak’s lawyer and 
investigators—who are “participants authorized by law.” Hawkins, 661 A.2d at 292; Shih, 2025 
WL 957680, at *3. Moreover, statements made during depositions or in court are necessarily made 
to “achieve the objects of the litigation” and “have some connection or logical relation to the 
action.” Shih, 2025 WL 957680, at *3. So, to the extent Plaintiff’s claims are predicated on 
Defendants’ statements or communications in the prior action they are dismissed. 
The Court, however, cannot dismiss all of Plainti ff’s claims as barred by the litigation 
privilege because the privilege only extends to statements and communications, not actions. See PageID:
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Cowe v. All-Time Auto Body, No. 24-9803, 2025 WL 1034257, at *7 (D.N.J. Apr. 8, 2025) (“This 
privilege, however, applies to communications only, not all actions taken during litigation” 
(emphasis in original)). Plaintiff makes severa l allegations that pertain to Defendants’ actions in 
the prior case. Namely, Plaintiff contends th at Defendants followed, stalked, secretly filmed, 
harassed, and surveilled Plaintiff and placed tr acking devices on his vehicle. Compl. ¶¶ 12–15. 
Plaintiff’s claims based on these factual allegations are discussed in turn below. 
2. CEPA Claim (Count 1) 
To state a CEPA claim, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a reasonable belief of unlawful conduct; 
(2) a whistleblowing activity as defined by CE PA; (3) an adverse employment action; and (4) a 
causal connection between the two. Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 828 A.2d 893, 900 (2003). The extent 
of Plaintiff’s CEPA claim is that “Plaintiff dis closed unlawful conduct and was retaliated against 
through surveillance, denial of accommodations, and public defamation.” Compl. ¶ 20. Even 
when liberally construing the Complaint, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for several reasons. 
First, “when a plaintiff brings an action pursuant to [CEPA] the trial court must identify a 
statute, regulation, rule, or public policy that clo sely relates to the complained-of conduct.” 
Dzwonar, 828 A.2d at 901. Plaintiff has not alleged the specific law, rule, or policy that 
Defendants purportedly violated. Haig simply all eges that he disclosed “unlawful conduct.” 
Compl. ¶ 20. Second, it is unclear to the Court what “adverse employment action” Defendants 
took against Plaintiff. Plaintiff states that he was “retaliated against through surveillance, denial 
of accommodations, and public defamation.” Id. However, retaliatory actions under CEPA “must 
have impact ‘on the employee’s compensation or rank or be virtually equivalent to discharge.’” 
Patti v. Ibarrondo , No. 22-6365, 2023 WL 4927281, at *9 (D.N.J. Aug. 1, 2023) (quoting 
Fraternal Ord. of Police, Lodge 1 v. City of Camden , 842 F.3d 231, 241 (3d Cir. 2016)). There PageID:
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are no such allegations here. Finally, to the ex tent Haig asserts these claims against the VRC 
Defendants and Bonventre, those claims must fail as matter of law because those Defendants are 
not Haig’s employer. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Lodge 1 , 842 F.3d at 240 (“CEPA protects 
employees against retaliation by employers.”). 
3. New Jersey Civil Rights Act (Count 2) 
In Count 2, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants, acting under color of state or contractual 
authority, deprived Plaintiff of rights including privacy, equal protection, and employment rights.” 
Compl. ¶ 21. The NJCRA creates a private right of action for “Any person who has been deprived 
of any substantive due process or equal protection rights, privileges or immunities secured by the 
Constitution or laws of the United States [or of New Jersey] by a person acting under color of 
law.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:6-2 (West 2004) (em phasis added). So, to state a claim under the 
NJCRA the plaintiff must identify the state acto r, i.e., “the person acting under color of law, that 
has caused the alleged deprivation.” Filgueiras v. Newark Pub. Schs. , 45 A.3d 986, 997 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012). Haig has not met that burden. 
At its core, this dispute is about Defenda nts’ conduct in a prior lawsuit between an 
employee and his employer and supposed retaliation after the case closed. Plaintiff contends that 
because Amtrak “is a federally chartered co rporation created by Congress to perform a public 
transportation function, extensively regulated and subsidized by the federal government” it is a 
state actor under the NJCRA. ECF No. 18 at 8. This is unavailing. When, as here, a suit pertains 
to private conduct of an employer, “state action may be found if, though only if, there is such a 
close nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be 
fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 
531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) (quotation omitted). The extent of Plaintiff’s allegations on this point is PageID:
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that “Defendants, acting under color of state or contractual authority, deprived Plaintiff of rights.” 
Compl. ¶ 21. This is wholly conclusory. As such, the Court cannot reasonably infer that Amtrak, 
let alone Bonventre or the VRC Defendants, is a New Jersey state actor here. The NJCRA claim 
is dismissed. 
4. Intrusion Upon Seclusion (Count 3) 
Plaintiff next claims that “Defendants intrude d on Plaintiff’s priva te medical care and 
personal life through surveillance and deception” a nd that this amounts to invasion of privacy 
through intrusion upon seclusion. Compl. ¶ 22. Haig specifically alleges that Defendants secretly 
filmed and surveilled him during the prior case, including at his “VA facility.” Id. ¶¶ 13–14. And, 
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants placed “tracking devices” on his vehicle. Id. ¶ 14. 
To state a claim for intrusion upon seclusion, a plaintiff must allege (1) an intentional 
intrusion (2) upon the seclusion of another that is (3) highly offensive to a reasonable person. In 
re Nickelodeon Consumer Priv. Litig. , 827 F.3d 262, 293 (3d Cir. 2016). Critically, a plaintiff 
must establish that they “possessed a reas onable expectation of privacy in [the] matters and 
concerns” intruded upon. G.D. v. Kenny, 15 A.3d 300, 320 (N.J. 2011). Intrusion upon seclusion 
claims must clear a “high threshold.” Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc. , 990 A.2d 650, 660 
(N.J. 2010). 
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for intrus ion upon seclusion into his “private medical 
care.” Haig claims that he “was filmed at his VA facility” which was a “private medical and 
rehabilitation setting.” Compl. ¶¶ 13–14. He elabo rated in his opposition brief, stating that 
Defendants “followed and recorded him in public spaces but also entered private areas, including 
a VA medical facility and other locations where Plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy, 
without consent.” ECF No. 18 at 10. Filming in a medical setting without a patient’s permission PageID:
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can amount to an intrusion upon seclusion. See, e.g., Castro v. NYT Television , 895 A.2d 1173, 
1177–78 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (trier of fact could find that filming in a hospital 
amounted to intrusion upon seclusion). Here, however, Plaintiff has not provided sufficient factual 
allegations showing that Defendant s filmed in a place where he ha d a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. Although he claims as such in his brief, the Complaint does not elaborate on whether, for 
example, Defendants filmed Haig while being treated or undergoing tests. In other words, Plaintiff 
has offered only conclusory allegations that he was filmed while in a private space. Without more, 
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. 
Similarly, Plaintiff insufficiently pled how placing “tracking devices” on his vehicles 
amounts to intrusion upon seclusion. The Complai nt lacks detail as to where his vehicles were 
tracked, when they were tracked, and for how l ong. That is, Haig has not alleged whether 
Defendants ever tracked him to a place where he had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Without 
that information, the Court cannot plausibly in fer that Defendants intruded upon Plaintiff’s 
privacy. See, e.g., Villanova v. Innovative Investigations, Inc., 21 A.3d 650, 651–52 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2011) (holding that “the placement of a GPS device in plaintiff’s vehicle without his 
knowledge, but in the absence of evidence that he drove the vehicle into a private or secluded 
location that was out of public view and in which he had a legitimate expectation of privacy, does 
not constitute the tort of invasion of privacy.”). The claim is dismissed. 
5. Intentional and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count 4) 
Plaintiff’s fourth count states that “Defendants engaged in outrageous and extreme conduct 
intended to harm Plaintiff emotionally” and that “Plaintiff suffered severe distress, requiring 
additional medical care and medication.” Comp l. ¶¶ 23–24. Plaintiff further claims that 
Defendants’ conduct worsened his “PTSD, anxiety, and depression.” Id. ¶ 17. PageID:
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To state an IIED claim the plaintiff must “establish intentional and outrageous conduct by 
the defendant, proximate cause, and distress that is severe.” Griffin v. Tops Appliance City, Inc., 
766 A.2d 292, 296 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (quoting Buckley v. Trenton Sav. Fund Soc’y, 
544 A.2d 857, 863 (N.J. 1988)). “The conduct must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme 
in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and 
utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Id. (citing Buckley, 544 A.2d at 863). And, “the 
emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff must be so severe that no reasonable man could be 
expected to endure it.” Id. (citing Buckley, 544 A.2d at 863). Plaintiff’s allegations of surveillance, 
tracking, retaliation, stalking, perjury, de nying workplace accommodations, and defamation 
simply do not meet this standard. Moreover, Haig has not alleged that he suffered distress so 
severe that no reasonable person should endure it. The IIED claim is dismissed. 
As for Haig’s NIED claim, in New Jersey a p laintiff may recover for negligent infliction 
of emotional distress under two circumstances. Heard v. City of Plainfield , No. 24-10293, 2025 
WL 3017902, at *23 (D.N.J. Oct. 28, 2025). First, a claim may proceed where “negligence causes 
fright from a reasonable fear of immediate personal injury.” Falzone v. Busch, 214 A.2d 12, 17 
(N.J. 1965). Second, a claim ma y proceed where one witnesses the death of someone to whom 
they have an intimate or familial relationship, and the death was caused by a defendant’s 
negligence. Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521, 528 (N.J. 1980). Neither circumstance is alleged here. 
Accordingly, the NIED claim is dismissed. 
6. Aiding and Abetting and Civil Conspiracy (Count 5) 
Plaintiff next claims that “Defendants knowingly acted in concert and aided one another to 
retaliate against Plaintiff and cover up Amtrak’s discriminatory acts.” And Plaintiff further asserts 
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execution.” Compl. ¶¶ 25–26. However, it “is well-settled law that when a plaintiff brings a civil 
conspiracy or aiding and abetting claim . . . he or she must allege a viable underlying tort.” Avataa 
USA, LLC v. Yaminsky, No. 24-6314, 2025 WL 892716, at *8 (D.N.J. Mar. 24, 2025) (collecting 
cases). Because, as discussed above, Plainti ff has not adequately alleged an underlying tort, the 
claim is dismissed. 
7. Failure to Accommodate under the ADA and NJLAD (Count 6)4 
Plaintiff’s final claim is that Amtrak deni ed him reasonable w orkplace accommodations 
due to his disability, despite repeated requests and after providing medical documentation. Compl. 
¶ 27. Haig further notes that “[h]e was locked out of Amtrak’s job portal and ignored, despite the 
availability of sedentary roles.” Id. ¶ 16. In opposition, Amtrak co ntends that Plaintiff did not 
exhaust administrative remedies under the ADA before filing this suit and, even if he had, he has 
failed to state a claim under both the ADA and NJLAD. Amtrak Br. at 23–25. Amtrak is correct. 
 Before filing an ADA lawsuit, a Plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies. Simko v. 
United States Steel Corp , 992 F.3d 198, 204 (3d Cir. 2021). “To exha ust, a plaintiff must file a 
charge of discrimination with the EEOC and receive a right-to-sue letter.” Litman v. Sch. Dist. of 
Philadelphia, No. 24-278, 2024 WL 3361596, at *4 (E.D . Pa. July 10, 2024) (citing Simko, 992 
F.3d at 206). Haig’s Complaint includes no fa ctual allegations as to whether he exhausted 
administrative remedies. As such his ADA claim must be dismissed. See, e.g. , Hickman v. 
 
4 To the extent these claims are asserted agai nst Bonventre and the VRC Defendants, they are 
dismissed. Plaintiff provides no allegations suggesting that Bonventre or the VRC defendants are 
his employer. Additionally, if Plaintiff intende d to assert that Bonventre, Kelly, and Belenger 
aided and abetted violations of the NJLAD in Count 5, that too must be dismissed. Although an 
individual who is not a plaintiff’s employer can be liable if they “aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce 
any of the acts forbidden” by the NJLAD, there are insufficient facts pled here. O’Toole v. Tofutti 
Brands, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 3d 458, 467 (D.N.J. 2016) (citatio n omitted). Mere allegations that 
Bonventre, Kelly, and Belenger “knowingly acted in concert and aided one another to retaliate 
against Plaintiff,” without more, will not suffice. Compl. ¶ 25. PageID:
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Amazon Fullfilment, 662 F. App’x 176, 178–79 (3d Cir. 2016) (affirming district court’s dismissal 
for failure to exhaust when plaintiff “never alleged that he exhausted administrative remedies with 
the EEOC.”); Akopian v. Inserra Supermarkets, Inc. , No. 23-00519, 2024 WL 4894620, at *2 
(D.N.J. Nov. 26, 2024).5 
 Even if Plaintiff had exhausted administrati ve remedies, he nevertheless fails to state a 
claim under the ADA and NJLAD. To state a claim for failure to accommodate under the ADA 
and NJLAD the plaintiff must show “(1) he was disabled, and his employer knew it; (2) he 
requested an accommodation or assistance; (3) hi s employer did not make a good faith effort to 
assist; and (4) he could have been reasonably accommodated.” Capps v. Mondelez Glob., LLC , 
847 F.3d 144, 157 (3d Cir. 2017); see also Armstrong v. Burdette Tomlin Mem’l Hosp., 438 F.3d 
240, 246 n.12 (3d Cir. 2006) (“The requirements for failure to accommodate claims under New 
Jersey’s LAD have been interpreted in accordance with the Americans with Disabilities Act.”). 
 As to the first element, Plaintiff states that he “is a 100% disabled veteran,” that he has a 
“mental disability stemming from military service,” and that he required “sedentary roles.” 
Compl. ¶¶ 1, 9, 16. A “disability” under the ADA is “(A) a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an 
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” Akopian, 2024 WL 4894620, 
at *3 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)). “[M]ajor life activities include, but are not limited to, caring 
for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, 
 
5 Plaintiff’s opposition brief included a notice of a right to sue letter from the EEOC dated May 2, 
2024, which gave Plaintiff 90 days to file suit. ECF No. 18-2 Exhibit B. This letter, however, is 
not properly before the Court as “it is axiomatic that the complaint may not be amended by the 
briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.” Com. of Pa. ex rel. Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, Inc., 836 
F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988). In any event, the Court notes that Plaintiff filed suit in August 2025, 
well after the 90 days elapsed. PageID:
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bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and 
working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). Here, as to the first two prongs, although Plaintiff may have 
been diagnosed with a mental health disorder (see Compl. ¶ 1, 9), he does not sufficiently allege 
that this illness “substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A); 
see also Vandervoort v. N. Allegheny Sch. Dist., No. 23-433, 2024 WL 4436858, at *11 (W.D. Pa. 
Oct. 7, 2024) (explaining that “a person needs more than a diagnosed impairment in order to be 
considered ‘disabled’ under the ADA”). Th e Complaint merely alleges that Plaintiff had a 
disability and that Amtrak was “fully aware” “at the time of hire.” Compl. ¶ 9. Additionally, even 
under the third prong of the ADA which requires an individual to be “regarded” as having a 
disability, Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to pass muster. Amoroso v. Bucks Cnty. Court of 
Common Pleas, No. 13-0689, 2014 WL 1284791, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2014) (“Simply alleging 
that an employer knew about a disability is not sufficient to demonstrate that the employer regarded 
the employee as disabled.”). 
 As to the remaining elements of his failu re to accommodate claim, Plaintiff does not 
provide any factual support beyond conclusory statements. The second element, requires a 
plaintiff show they “requested an accommodation or assistance.” Capps, 847 F.3d at 157. Plaintiff 
alleges his “requests for reasonable accommodations from Amtrak were consistently denied,” that 
he made reports to HR, and that he provided “med ical documentation.” Compl. ¶¶ 16, 18, 27. 
Haig does not explain what accommodations he requested, when he made those requests, or what 
documentation he provided. 
The third and fourth elements require a show ing that the “employer did not make a good 
faith effort to assist” and that Plaintiff “could have been reasonably accommodated.” Capps, 847 
F.3d at 157. Here too, Plaintiff has provided no fa cts or context beyond stating that his requests PageID:
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were denied and “He was locked out of Amtrak’s job portal and ignored, despite the availability 
of sedentary roles.” Compl. ¶ 16. Plaintiff does not allege what other jobs were available or how 
Amtrak refused to accommodate him. In sum, P laintiff’s ADA and NJLAD claims for failure to 
accommodate his disability must be dismissed because it is not clear to the Court whether Plaintiff 
exhausted administrative remedies and what specific actions he and Amtrak took that amount to a 
failure to accommodate claim.6 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the case will not be remanded, and Plaintiff’s Complaint is 
dismissed without prejudice. 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, IT IS on this 22nd day of May, 2026; 
ORDERED the Plaintiff’s motion to remand (ECF No. 7) is denied; and it is further 
ORDERED that the Court grants Defendant Amtrak and Defendant Bonventre’s motion 
to dismiss (ECF No. 9) and grants Defendant VRC Investigations, Defendant Kelly, and Defendant 
Bellenger’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (ECF No. 20) and dismisses Plaintiff’s 
Complaint (ECF No. 1) without prejudice; and it is further 
ORDERED that Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days from entry of this Opinion and Order 
to submit an amended complaint that addresses the deficiencies identified in this Opinion. Insofar 
as Plaintiff submits a further amended complain t, he shall also provide a form of the amended 
complaint that indicates in what respect it differ s from the current complaint, by bracketing or 
 
6 Plaintiff attaches several documents to his opposit ion brief that pertain to his allegations. For 
example, he provides a letter from a treating physician, ECF No. 18-2 Exhibit C, a decision from 
the Social Security Administration finding him disabled, id. Exhibit H, and email correspondence 
and other documents showing requests to Amtrak for accommodations. Id. Exhibits I, J. As 
discussed above, however, the Complaint cannot be amended through briefing. See supra Note 5; 
Com. of Pa. ex rel. Zimmerman, 836 F.2d at 181. Given that the Court permits Plaintiff to file an 
amended complaint, he may include relevant factual allegations therein. PageID:
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striking through materials to be deleted and underlining materials to be added. See L. Civ. R. 
15(a)(2); and it is further 
ORDERED that should Plaintiff submit an amended complaint, he may not make factual 
allegations barred by the litigation privilege as described herein. 
SO ORDERED. 
CLAIRE C. CECCHI, U.S.D.J. 
s/ Claire C. Cecchi PageID:
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