govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-2_25-cv-01853-0

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
 
K.E.I., 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER OF 
SOCIAL SECURITY, 
Defendant. 
 
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Civil Action No. 25-01853 (SRC) 
 
 
OPINION 
 
CHESLER, District Judge 
This matter comes before the Court on appeal by Plaintiff K.E.I . (“Plaintiff”) of the final 
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) determining that she was not 
disabled under the Social Security Act (“Act”). This Court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 405(g) and, having considered the submissions of the parties without oral argument, 
pursuant to L. CIV. R. 78.1(b), finds that the Commissioner’s decision will be VACATED and 
REMANDED. 
I. BACKGROUND 
In brief, this appeal arises from Plaintiff’s application for benefits, alleging disability 
beginning May 2, 2022. A hearing was held before A dministrative Law William T. Ross (the 
“ALJ”) on December 20, 2023, and the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on Ma y 24, 2024. 
Plaintiff sought review of the decision from the Appeals Council. After the Appeals Council 
denied Plaintiff’s request for review on January 16, 2025, the ALJ’s decision became the PageID:
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Commissioner’s final decision, and Plaintiff filed this appeal. 
In the decision of May 24, 2024, the ALJ found that, at Step One, Plaintiff had not engaged 
in substantial gainful activity since the onset date of August 15, 2022. Tr. 42. At Step Two , the 
ALJ found Plaintiff had severe impairments of : back disorder with history of lumbar surgery, 
migraine headaches , history of traumatic brain injury/neurocognitive disorder, expressive 
language disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and anxiety disorder (20 CFR 
404.1520(c)). Id. At Step Three, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s impairments, either singly or in 
combination, did not meet or medically equal the severity of any of the listed impairments set forth 
in the Listing of Impairments. Id. at 43. At Step Four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the 
residual functional capacity ( “RFC”) to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) 
except she is able to lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, as well as sit 
for 6 hours and stand or walk for 4 hours in an 8-hour day. Id. at 46. The ALJ further found that 
the claimant cannot climb ladders, ropes or scaffolding, but that she can occasionally kneel, stoop, 
crouch, crawl and climb stairs and ramps and balance on narrow, unsteady and erratic surfaces. 
Id. The ALJ also found that the claimant must avoid concentrated exposure to humidity, wetness 
unprotected heights, and dangerous machinery, but that she can understand, remember and carry 
out simple instructions , she can perform simple, routine and repetitive tasks over an eight -hour 
workday within a normal break schedule over a 40-hour week, she can make simple work-related 
decisions, and she can tolerate simple routine changes in a work setting . Id. At Step Four, the 
ALJ also found Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work. Id. at 55. At Step Five, 
the ALJ determined Plaintiff could perform a significant number of jobs existing in the national 
economy. Id. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not been disabled within the PageID:
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meaning of the Act. Id. at 58. 
On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the Commissioner’s decision should be reversed and the 
case remanded with three principal arguments: (1) the ALJ failed to proper ly consider critical 
medical opinions when formulating the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) finding; (2) the ALJ 
failed to carry the agency’s burden at Step Five of the sequential evaluation process; (3) the ALJ 
failed to properly weigh and consider the statements of the Plaintiff and her mother consistent with 
the Agency’s rulings and regulations; and (4) the administrative record provides sufficient basis 
for an award of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
As to the burden of proof, Plaintiff bears the burden in the first four steps of the analysis 
of demonstrating how h er impairments, whether individually or in combination, amount to a 
qualifying disability. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987). As to the harmless error 
doctrine, the Supreme Court explained its operation in a similar procedural context in Shinseki v. 
Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009), which concerned review of a governmental agency 
determination. The Court stated: “the burden of showing that an error is harmful normally falls 
upon the party attacking the agency’s determination.” Id. In such a case, “the claimant has the 
‘burden’ of showing that an error was harmful.” Id. at 410. Plaintiff thus bears the burden, on 
appeal, of showing not merely that the Commissioner erred, but also that the error was harmful. 
At the first four steps, this requires that Plaintiff also show that, but for the error, s he might have 
proven her disability. In other words, when appealing a decision at the first four steps, if Plaintiff 
cannot articulate the basis for a decision in h er favor, based on the existing record, s he is quite 
unlikely to show that an error was harmful. PageID:
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III. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to adhere to Social Security Ruling 00-4p and failed to 
carry the Agency’s burden at Step Five of the Sequential Evaluation Process .1 (Pl.’s Br. at 14-
15). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to identify and resolve the conflict in the 
vocational testimony, which was raised on cross-examination and highlighted by the Plaintiff’s 
objection. Id. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s limitation to understanding, remembering, and 
carrying out simple instructions and performing simple, routine, and repetitive tasks conflicts with 
the three jobs identified by the vocational expert —price marker, routing clerk, and electrical 
assembler—which have General Educational Development (GED) reasoning levels of 2. Id. at 
16-17. Plaintiff further argues that the vocational expert, on cross -examination, acknowledged 
this conflict. Id. Defendant responds that because the Third Circuit has held that there is no 
conflict between “simple, repetitive tasks” and a “GED reasoning level of 2,” there was no conflict 
between the ALJ’s RFC determination and the jobs proffered by the vocational expert. (Def.’s 
Opp. at 10). 
Under SSR 00- 4p, “before relying on VE or VS evidence to support a disability 
determination or decision, our adjudicator must: (1) Identify and obtain a reasonable explanation 
for any conflicts between occupational evidence provided by VEs or VSs and information in the 
Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), and (2) explain in the determination or decision how 
any conflict that has been identified was resolved.” SSR 00-4p. “An adjudicator must resolve the 
 
1 The agency recently issued a new Social Security Ruling that rescinds and replaces SSR 00 -4p 
and applies to determinations or decisions dated on or after January 6, 2025. See SSR 24-3p, 89 
Fed. Reg. 97,158, available at 2024 WL 498840. Because the ALJ decision at issue here predates 
the new ruling’s effective date, the new ruling does not apply to this case. PageID:
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conflict by determining if the explanation given by the VE or VS is reasonable and provides a 
basis for relying on the VE or VS testimony rather than on the DOT information.” Id. 
The ALJ’s determination reads as follows: 
The vocational expert testified that given all of these factors the 
individual would be able to perform the requirements of 
representative occupations such as: 
• Price Marker, DOT 209.587- 034, an unskilled 
occupation with an SVP of 2 requiring a light level of 
exertion comprising 45,00 jobs in the national economy; 
and 
• Routing Clerk, DOT 222.687- 022, an unskilled 
occupation with an SVP of 2 requiring a light level of 
exertion comprising 36,000 jobs in the national 
economy; and 
• Electrical Assembler, DOT 729.687- 010, an unskilled 
occupation with an SVP of 2 requiring a light level of 
exertion comprising 2,700 jobs in the national economy 
 
Although the vocational experts testimony is inconsistent with the 
information contained in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, 
there is a reasonable explanation for the discrepancy. The vocational 
expert testified that the above job numbers were reduced by 70% to 
account for the reduction in standing and walking to 4 hours within 
a light exertional capacity in the above residual functional capacity. 
The vocational expert stated that her testimony with respect to the 
ability to perform the above jobs with standing and walking limited 
to 4 hours and the reduction in job numbers was based on both her 
professional experience and information obtained from the Bureau 
of Labor’s Occupational Requirements Survey. 
 
Pursuant to SSR 00- 4p, the undersigned has determined that the 
vocational experts testimony is consistent with the information 
contained in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles as well as the 
experts education, training, and personal and professional 
knowledge of the national labor market. 
 
Lastly, in a post -hearing brief at Exhibit 16E, the claimants 
representative raised an objection to the vocational experts 
testimony regarding availability of jobs in the national economy in 
response to the above hypothetical. The claimants representative PageID:
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argues that the above jobs require Reasoning Level 2 defined as 
involving the ability to understand, remember, and carry out detailed 
but uninvolved instructions. The representative maintains that 
because the vocational expert stated that any kind of detailed 
instructions would pre clude this work then therefore, there do not 
exist a significant number of jobs in the national economy that fall 
inside the hypothetical. Further, the representative stated that the 
vocational expert failed to identify this confl ict thus further 
rendering her testimony questionable and should not be relied upon 
in an unfavorable determination (Ex. 16E). 
 
The undersigned has considered the objection to the vocational 
experts testimony and is not persuaded by the representatives 
arguments. The undersigned takes judicial notice that Level 2 
Reasoning is equivalent to reasoning at grades 4 -6. Additionally, 
Level Reasoning 2 requires the ability to apply commonsense 
understating to carry out detailed but uninvolved written or oral 
instructions. During the hearing, the representative posed the 
following question to the vocational expert: given that the 
hypothetical calls for jobs involving only simple instructions, is it 
fair to assume that any job requiring any kind of detailed instructions 
would take it outside the hypothetical? The vocational expert 
responded in the affirmative (Hearing Testimony). The vocational 
experts affirmative response to a narrow question without the 
benefit of the full definition of the reasoning requirement language 
being questioned and thus any further context is not persuasive in 
this matter and nor does it render the entirety of her testimony 
unreliable. The representative crafted a question to the vocational 
expert that omitted the qualifying language of uninvolved that is 
used in defining the type of detailed tasks involved in Reasoning 
Level 2. When considering the full definition, the undersigned does 
not interpret Reasoning Level 2 to mean any detailed tasks would be 
precluded as all instructions including simple ones will contain 
some amount of detail but would not be complex by virtue of being 
simple in nature. Further, the unde rsigned finds that detailed but 
uninvolved instructions are consistent with the unskilled jobs 
provided above, which the vocational expert testified were within 
the hypothetical requiring no more than simple, routine, and 
repetitive instructions and tasks. 
 
The hypothetical posed by the undersigned specifically included a 
limitation to short and simple instructions and tasks of a routine and 
repetitive nature. Short and simple instructions are typically the kind 
that can be learned in 30 days or less consistent with Social Security PageID:
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rules and regulations. Under SSR 85- 15, the basic mental demands 
of competitive, remunerative, unskilled work include the abilities 
(on a sustained basis) to understand, carry out and remember simple 
instructions, to respond appropriately to supervision, coworkers and 
usual work situations and to deal with changes in a routine work 
setting. POMS DI 25001.001A.86 defines unskilled work as work 
that requires little or no judgment to do simple duties that a claimant 
can learn on the job in a short period of ti me (i.e., 30 days or less). 
The undersigned asked the vocational expert what is required for the 
above unskilled jobs to be learned. The vocational expert testified 
that the above jobs overall could be learned and done with just 
demonstration. The claimant s attorney had the opportunity to 
discuss any suggested conflict with respect to reasoning level 
required for the above jobs with the vocational expert at the hearing, 
but did not raise the issue until a post -hearing memorandum. The 
undersigned finds that the vocational experts testimony concerning 
the requirements to learn the job is sufficient to reconcile the issue 
of whether the light unskilled jobs cited are consistent with the 
hypothetical, the DOT, the Bureau of Labor s Occupational 
Requirements Survey and Social Security rules and regulations. 
Consistent with HALLEX I-2-5-48, the undersigned has considered 
the testimony of the vocational expert as well as considered all of 
the other evidence presently before the undersigned and weighed it 
appropriately. [Plaintiff’s attorney’s] objections are overruled, and 
the undersigned accepts the testimony of the vocational expert in 
accordance with SSR 00-4P. 
 
(Tr. 56-58). 
 
Courts within the Third Circuit have declined to adopt a categorical rule that a limitation 
to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks is inherently inconsistent with Reasoning Level 2 
occupations. Rather, the inquiry is more nuanced. Even where a potentia l inconsistency exists, 
the Court must determine whether the ALJ’s Step Five finding is otherwise supported by 
substantial evidence and whether any conflict has been adequately addressed. Here, the Court 
cannot conclude that the ALJ’s Step Five finding is supported by substantial evidence. 
During the hearing, the ALJ posed a hypothetical question to the vocational expert, asking 
if an individual restricted to the limitations found in Plaintiff’s RFC would be able to do perform PageID:
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Plaintiff’s past work. (Tr. 1306- 07). The vocational expert responded in the negative because 
all of Plaintiff’s prior work was “more than simple,” and further testified in response that a person 
so limited could still perform work as (1) a price marker (DOT 209.587- 034), (2) a routing clerk 
(DOT 222.687-022), and (3) an electrical assembler (DOT 729.687-010). (R. 56, 1307). Id. All 
of these jobs are Reasoning Level 2 jobs which, as per their DOT definitions, require the ability to 
carry out “detailed, but uninvolved” instructions. (DOT, Appendix C). On cross-examination, 
Plaintiff’s counsel asked the vocational expert whether , because the hypothetical involved jobs 
requiring only simple instructions, “any jobs requiring any kind of detailed instructions” would be 
precluded, and the vocational expert answered in the affirmative. (Tr. 1039- 10).2 
Plaintiff then objected to the vocational expert’s testimony via letter dated December 23, 
2023, pointing out that the vocational expert testified at the hearing that Plaintiff could perform 
jobs which the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) describes as requiring detailed 
instructions (i.e., Reasoning Level 2 jobs) , which conflicts with the ALJ’s RFC finding that 
specifically called for work involving no more than “simple instructions”. (Tr. 274). Moreover, 
Plaintiff pointed out the vocational expert’s conflicted testimony wherein she testified that jobs 
requiring any kind of detailed instructions would be precluded by the specific restriction to “simple 
instructions”. (Tr. 274-275, 1310). Plaintiff thus raised the apparent conflict between the 
occupational evidence provided by the vocational expert and the information in the DOT, which 
brings the requirements of SSR 00-4p into consideration. 
In an effort to address this conflict, the ALJ’s opinion states, in relevant part: 
The undersigned takes judicial notice that Level 2 Reasoning is 
 
2 The Court notes that the ALJ’s opinion expressly acknowledges that this exchange had occurred 
on cross-examination. (Tr. 57). PageID:
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equivalent to reasoning at grades 4 -6. Additionally, Level 
Reasoning 2 requires the ability to apply commonsense understating 
to carry out detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions. 
During the hearing, the representative posed the following question 
to the vocational expert: given that the hypothetical calls for jobs 
involving only simple instructions, is it fair to assume that any job 
requiring any kind of detailed instructions would take it outside the 
hypothetical? The vocational expert responded in the affirmative 
(Hearing Testimony). The vocational experts affirmative response 
to a narrow question without the benefit of the full definition of the 
reasoning requirement language being questioned and thus any 
further context is not persuasive in this matter and nor does it render 
the entirety of her testimony unreliable. The representative crafted a 
question to the vocational expert that omitted the qualifying 
language of uninvolved that is used in defining the type of detailed 
tasks involved in Reasoning Level 2. When considering the full 
definition, the undersigned does not interpret Reasoning Level 2 to 
mean any detailed tasks would be precluded as all instructions 
including simple ones will contain some amount of detail but would 
not be comple x by virtue of being simple in nature. Further, the 
undersigned finds that detailed but uninvolved instructions are 
consistent with the unskilled jobs provided above, which the 
vocational expert testified were within the hypothetical requiring no 
more than simple, routine, and repetitive instructions and tasks. 
 
The hypothetical posed by the undersigned specifically included a 
limitation to short and simple instructions and tasks of a routine and 
repetitive nature. Short and simple instructions are typically the kind 
that can be learned in 30 days or less consistent with Social Security 
rules and regulations. Under SSR 85- 15, the basic mental demands 
of competitive, remunerative, unskilled work include the abilities 
(on a sustained basis) to understand, carry out and remember simple 
instructions, to respond appropriately to supervision, coworkers and 
usual work situations and to deal with changes in a routine work 
setting. POMS DI 25001.001A.86 defines unskilled work as work 
that requires little or no judgment to do simple duties that a claimant 
can learn on the job in a short period of time (i.e., 30 days or less). 
The undersigned asked the vocational expert what is required for the 
above unskilled jobs to be learned. The vocational expert testified 
that the above jobs overall could be learned and done with just 
demonstration. The claimants attorney had the opportunity to 
discuss any suggested conflict with respect to reasoning level 
required for the above jobs with the vocational expert at the hearing, 
but did not raise the issue until a post -hearing memorandum. The PageID:
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undersigned finds that the vocational experts testimony concerning 
the requirements to learn the job is sufficient to reconcile the issue 
of whether the light unskilled jobs cited are consistent with the 
hypothetical, the DOT, the Bureau of Labor s Occupational 
Requirements Survey and Social Security rules and regulations. 
Consistent with HALLEX I-2-5-48, the undersigned has considered 
the testimony of the vocational expert as well as considered all of 
the other evidence presently before the undersigned and weighed it 
appropriately. Attorney Tovinskys objections are overruled, and the 
undersigned accepts the testimony of the vocational expert in 
accordance with SSR 00-4P. 
 
(Tr. 57-58). 
The Court finds that the vocational expert’s statement, on cross-examination, that Plaintiff 
could not perform “any jobs requiring any kind of detailed instructions” fully undercut the 
vocational expert’s previous testimony that Plaintiff could perform the three jobs identified. (Tr. 
1310). In short, the vocational expert’s testimony does not constitute substantial evidence which 
supports the ALJ’s Step Five determination that jobs exist in the national economy that Plaintiff 
can perform. 
The ALJ attempted to address this issue in the written decision, but the Court finds the 
ALJ’s reasoning unpersuasive for several reasons. First, the ALJ incorrectly stated that 
Reasoning Level 2 involves “detailed tasks,” but the DOT defines Reasoning Level 2 as requiring 
the ability to carry out “detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions.” (DOT, Appendix 
C). The ALJ also stated that Reasoning Level 2 is equivalent to grades 4- 6 without providing a 
citation for the same. This Court does not see how these observations address the simple fact that 
the vocational expert testified that that Plaintiff could not perform “any jobs requiring any kind of 
detailed instructions.” (Tr. 1310). 
Further, the ALJ failed to resolve the actual conflict identified during the hearing as PageID:
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required by SSR 00-4p. Specifically, the ALJ failed to address the conflict between the vocational 
expert’s testimony that jobs involving “any kind of detailed instructions” would be precluded by 
the RFC limitation to “simple instructions”, and the DOT’s definition that dictates that Reasoning 
Level 2 jobs require the ability to carry out “detailed but uninvolved instructions”. Additionally, 
the ALJ incorrectly concluded that Plaintiff’s counsel’s cross-examination to the vocational expert 
did not include “uninvolved” detailed instructions. The record reflects that Plaintiff’s counsel 
specifically asked whether jobs requiring “any kind of detailed instructions” would be inconsistent 
with the RFC limitation to “simple instruction s”, thus clearly encompassing all such jobs, 
including those involving “uninvolved” detailed instructions. (Tr. 1309- 10). The Court is not 
convinced by the ALJ’s suggestion that Plaintiff’s counsel’s failure to include the word 
“uninvolved” from the question would somehow alter the analysis. The expert’s testimony on 
cross-examination was quite clear: jobs involving “any kind of detailed instructions” would be 
precluded by the RFC limitation. (Tr. 1310). Jobs which require detailed but uninvolved 
instructions require one kind of detailed instructions, which the expert testified that Plaintiff cannot 
perform. 
Thus, it is clear to the Court that the ALJ failed to adequately resolve the conflict as 
required by SSR 00-4p. The ALJ’s decision at Step Five is not supported by substantial evidence. 
At Step Five, the Commissioner bears the burden of proof, and that burden was not met. The 
Commissioner’s decision will be vacated and remanded for further proceedings. Because the 
Court is vacating and remanding on the merits of Plaintiff’s Step Five argument, the Court need 
not address Plaintiff’s remaining arguments. PageID:
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner’s decision is VACATED and REMANDED 
for further proceedings in accordance with this Opinion. 
An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion. 
 
____________________________ 
 STANLEY R. CHESLER, U.S.D.J.
Dated: May 22, 2026 
/s/ Stanley R. Chesler PageID:
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