govinfo:USCOURTS-ctd-3_24-cv-01451-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

JACOB S. WARD,
Plaintiff,

AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC,
Defendant.

No. 3:24-cv-01451 (VAB)
RULING AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Jacob S. Ward (“Plaintiff” or “Mr. Ward”) brings six claims: (1) gender discrimination
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; (2)
gender harassment under Title VII; (3) retaliation under Title VII; (4) gender discrimination
under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (“CFEPA”), Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60 et
seq.; (5) sexual orientation harassment under CFEPA; and (6) retaliation under CFEPA. See
Compl., ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”).
Amazon.com Services, LLC (“Defendant” or “Amazon”) has filed a motion for summary
judgment as to the claims against it. Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 22.
For the following reasons, Amazon’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
The Title VII claims are dismissed with prejudice, and the Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, dismissing them without prejudice
to refiling in state court.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
On November 27, 2020, Amazon hired Jacob Ward as an Onsite Medical Representative
at its LEX2 facility in Lexington, Kentucky. Pl.’s SMF ¶ 9. According to the Unpaid Time

Policy (“UPT Policy”), Mr. Ward was issued ten hours of unpaid time at the outset of his
employment and thereafter accrued eight hours per month. Id. ¶ 10. Mr. Ward was aware at the
time he was hired that Amazon could terminate his employment for violating its attendance
policies. Id. ¶ 11.
In May 2022, Mr. Ward applied for and was approved for a transfer to an Onsite Medical
Representative position at BDL4, a new Amazon facility scheduled to open in Windsor,
Connecticut. Id. ¶¶ 13-14. Hiring Manager Kathy O'Connell, the Warehouse Safety Manager,
approved the transfer and set an effective start date of June 12, 2022. Id. ¶ 14. At BDL4, Ms.
O'Connell supervised Michelle Zadrozny, another Warehouse Safety Manager, who in turn
directly supervised Mr. Ward. Id. ¶ 15.
BDL4 officially opened in October 2022. Id. ¶ 19. Before BDL4's opening, Mr. Ward and
other members of the BDL4 medical team completed short-term assignments (“STAs”) at
Amazon's CLE3 facility in Cleveland, Ohio from July to August 2022, and at BDL2 in Windsor,
Connecticut from September to October 2022. Id. ¶¶ 16-18. Ms. O'Connell and Ms. Zadrozny
also participated in the STA at CLE3. Id. ¶ 17. Mr. Ward testified that he had a “pretty healthy”
relationship with Ms. Zadrozny, but that his relationship with Ms. O’Connell deteriorated once
BDL4 opened. Id. ¶ 20. Mr. Ward attributed this change to Ms. O'Connell developing her
relationship with senior leadership at the site. Id. ¶ 21.
Amazon maintains an equal employment opportunity policy prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of gender, sexual orientation, and all other legally protected characteristics. Id. ¶¶ 1-
2. Amazon also maintains a workplace harassment policy prohibiting “[s]tatements or actions
that offend or demean a person based on” protected characteristics, including gender and sexual
orientation. Id. ¶ 4. In addition, Amazon maintains an Attendance and Punctuality Policy and an

Unpaid Time Policy. Id. ¶ 5. According to the Attendance and Punctuality Policy, employees are
expected to work their scheduled hours, and unsatisfactory attendance may result in disciplinary
action up to and including termination. Id. ¶ 6. The UPT Policy allows an employee to accrue
and use their unpaid time to cover unexpected absences, in addition to paid time off. Id. ¶ 7. The
UPT Policy also states that a negative unpaid time balance constitutes a violation of Amazon's
attendance policies and can lead to termination if not resolved. Id. ¶¶ 8, 32. Mr. Ward alleges
that Amazon’s Standard of Conduct Policy classifies time and attendance violations as Category
Two infractions, which “generally result in corrective action” rather than termination. Id. at 17,
¶¶ 13-16. Amazon alleges that, absent unusual circumstances, its practice is to terminate
employees who carry negative UPT balances. Id. ¶ 70.
Mr. Ward’s weekly schedule was available to him through Amazon's A to Z Application.
Id. ¶ 22. Mr. Ward has admitted that he did not appear for all of his scheduled shifts. Id. ¶ 23.
In or around July 2022, Mr. Ward changed his pronouns to “it/they” on Amazon's
internal systems. Id. ¶ 54.
In or around August and September 2022, Ms. O'Connell asked Plaintiff two or three
times whether he was dating a female coworker on the medical team. Id. ¶ 57; id. ¶¶ 17-19. After
the third inquiry, Mr. Ward told Ms. O'Connell he was “getting uncomfortable” with these
questions. Id. ¶ 58; id. at 17, ¶ 18. Mr. Ward alleges that, rather than ceasing the inquiries
entirely, Ms. O'Connell subsequently directed Ms. Zadrozny to ask him about the relationship,
which he also objected to in October 2022. Id. ¶ 58; id. at 17, ¶¶ 21-22.
Ms. O'Connell testified that she asked about the relationship to ensure HR procedures for
disclosing workplace relationships were being followed. Id. ¶¶ 60, 65. Mr. Ward alleges that by
asking if he was in a relationship with a female employee, Ms. O'Connell was actually

questioning his sexual orientation, though he concedes that Ms. O'Connell never directly asked
about his sexual orientation. Id. ¶¶ 72-74.
In or around September 2022, Ms. O'Connell asked him about his “it/they” pronoun
designation twice. Id. ¶¶ 54-55. Mr. Ward alleges that she later inquired about his pronouns with
other safety team employees and told Plaintiff that members of senior leadership were discussing
his pronoun designation. Id. at 17, ¶ 23.
Ms. O'Connell has admitted that she asked the Plaintiff about his pronouns, but states she
did so because she was concerned that he may have changed his pronouns as a joke and did not
want him to get in trouble. Id. ¶¶ 62-64. She testified that she thought he might be joking because
Mr. Ward had previously allegedly made an “off-color” joke about the LGBTQ+ community,
and she feared he was putting himself at risk for inappropriate behavior. Id. ¶ 64. Apart from Ms.
O'Connell's two inquiries, Mr. Ward was not aware of anyone else at Amazon who made
comments about his gender or sexual orientation. Id. ¶ 56.
On September 21, 2022, Mr. Ward did not report to work, though he alleges having been
accidentally scheduled to work on that day. Id. ¶ 24. Despite this alleged misunderstanding, the
parties agree that Mr. Ward’s unpaid time balance would still have been negative in October
2022. Pl.’s SMF ¶ 27. As of October 8, 2022, Mr. Ward had a negative unpaid time balance of -
2.22 hours. Id. ¶ 28. On October 20, 2022, his unpaid time balance reached its lowest point of -
11.89 hours. Id. ¶ 30. Amazon alerted Plaintiff on his pay records that his unpaid time balance
was negative. Id. ¶ 29.
On October 20, 2022, Mr. Ward spoke with Amazon’s on-site Human Resources (“HR”)
regarding his negative unpaid time balance, and stated it was negative because of the September
21, 2022 shift, which he maintains was scheduled accidentally. Id. ¶ 31.

On October 23, 2022, Amazon's centralized HR, which monitors negative unpaid time
and operates independently of on-site HR, contacted Mr. Ward by e-mail to notify him about his
negative balance and warned that it “can lead to termination if not resolved.” Id. ¶ 32. Mr. Ward
responded the same day and claimed that his negative unpaid time “was from a [sic] accidental
scheduled day, and from a week of hardship of being late a couple of times.” Id. ¶ 33. Amazon's
centralized HR directed Mr. Ward to speak with on-site HR on his next scheduled shift, October
27, 2022, to reconcile his unpaid balance. Id. ¶ 35. In accordance with its attendance policies,
Amazon reviewed Mr. Ward’s ongoing attendance violations in late October 2022. Id. ¶ 36.
On October 27, 2022, after HR alerted Ms. O'Connell that Mr. Ward’s employment
would be terminated for his negative unpaid time balance, Ms. O'Connell messaged HR stating:
"I vote for final written" rather than termination. Id. ¶ 37. Despite Ms. O’Connell’s
recommendation, Mr. Ward was terminated effective November 4, 2022. Id. ¶¶ 38, 40. Mr.
Ward alleges he received no verbal coaching or written warnings about his attendance prior to
his termination. Id. at 17, ¶¶ 1-2.
On November 13, 2022, Mr. Ward appealed his termination to Amazon. Id. ¶ 42. In his
appeal, he wrote that he was “late multiple times” which resulted in approximately six hours of
unpaid time being taken to cover his absences. Id. ¶ 43. This made him “approximately 15 hours
negative because the wrongly scheduled day (9/21) still hadn't been fixed.” Id. He then sought
reinstatement, stating he had not realized he was “up for” termination. Id. ¶ 44. On November
18, 2022, Mr. Ward attended an appeal hearing with Senior Site Leader Paul Collins. Id. ¶ 45.
On November 21, 2022, Amazon notified him that his termination was upheld, finding that “all
policies were applied properly and consistently.” Id. ¶ 46.

On December 4, 2022, approximately one month after his termination and following the
conclusion of his appeal, Mr. Ward filed a complaint with Amazon against Ms. O'Connell. Id. ¶
49. In that complaint, he alleged that Ms. O'Connell had retaliated against him by failing to
adjust his unpaid time, and that she had discriminated against him by asking about his pronouns
and whether he was dating a female coworker. Id. ¶ 49. The parties agree that Ms. O'Connell
played no role in adjudicating Plaintiff's appeal. Id. ¶¶ 47-48.
The parties dispute whether the Plaintiff formally complained about Ms. O'Connell
before his termination. Amazon asserts that he never complained about Ms. O'Connell until he
filed a complaint on December 4, 2022. Id. ¶ 52. Mr. Ward alleges that he informally objected by
telling Ms. O'Connell directly to stop asking about his relationship with the female coworker. Id.
¶ 52; id. at 17, ¶ 20. In investigating the Plaintiff’s December 4, 2022 complaint, Amazon
substantiated that Ms. O'Connell asked Plaintiff about his pronouns and his relationship with the
female coworker, and Amazon terminated Ms. O'Connell's employment on January 11, 2023. Id.
¶ 66. The investigation found that the Plaintiff's retaliation claim was unsubstantiated, noting that
Ms. O'Connell had, in fact, advocated for a lesser disciplinary measure (a final written warning)
rather than termination. Id. ¶¶ 53, 69.
Mr. Ward alleges that another co-worker held a similarly situated position as Safety
Specialist, worked on the same team under Ms. O'Connell's supervision, was subject to the same
rules and policies, incurred a negative unpaid time balance under comparable circumstances, but
was not terminated. Id. at 17, ¶¶ 4-8, 12. In light of this alleged differential treatment, Mr. Ward
alleges that his termination was discriminatory in nature. Id. ¶ 68; id. at 17, ¶¶ 3-12.

B. Procedural History
On September 10, 2024, Mr. Ward filed a Complaint against Amazon. Compl., ECF No.
1. On October 4, 2024, Amazon filed its Answer with affirmative and special defenses. Answer,
ECF No. 11.
On November 17, 2025, Amazon filed a motion for summary judgment and an
accompanying memorandum of law. Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 22; Mem. in Support of Mot.
for Summ. J., ECF No. 23 (“Mot.”). The same day, Amazon filed a statement of material facts.
Deft.’s Statement of Material Facts, ECF No. 24 (“Deft.’s SMF”).
On December 23, 2025, Mr. Ward filed an objection to the motion for summary
judgment. Obj., ECF No. 28 (“Obj.”).
On January 13, 2026, Amazon filed its reply. Reply, ECF No. 31 (“Reply”).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A court will grant a motion for summary judgment if the record shows no genuine issue
as to any material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine dispute
of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The non-moving party may
defeat the motion by producing sufficient evidence to establish that there is a genuine issue of
material fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). “[T]he mere
existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise
properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine
issue of material fact.” Id. at 247–48.
“[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material.” Id. at 248. “Only disputes
over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly

preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id.; see Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir.
1996) (“[M]ateriality runs to whether the dispute matters, i.e., whether it concerns facts that can
affect the outcome under the applicable substantive law.” (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248)).
“The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need
for a trial—whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be
resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either
party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. When a motion for summary judgment is supported by
documentary evidence and sworn affidavits and “demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact,” the non-moving party must do more than vaguely assert the existence of some
unspecified disputed material facts or “rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated
speculation.” Robinson v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 781 F.3d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
The party opposing the motion for summary judgment “must come forward with specific
evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative,
summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (citing Dombrowski v. Eastland,
387 U.S. 82, 87 (1967); and First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290
(1968)).
A court must view any inferences drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the
party opposing the summary judgment motion. See Dufort v. City of New York, 874 F.3d 338,
343, 347 (2d Cir. 2017) (“On a motion for summary judgment, the court must ‘resolve all
ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom
summary judgment is sought.’”). A court will not draw an inference of a genuine dispute of

material fact from conclusory allegations or denials, see Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347,
358 (2d Cir. 2011), and will grant summary judgment only “if, under the governing law, there
can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict,” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
III. DISCUSSION
Mr. Ward has brought claims under Title VII and CFEPA alleging gender discrimination,
harassment and hostile work environment, and retaliation.
The Court addresses the federal claims first, and if necessary, the supplemental state law
claims.
A. The Title VII Claim
Under Title VII, to continue past summary judgment on a gender discrimination claim, a
plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Abrams v. Dep't of Public Safety,
764 F.3d 244, 251 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Under McDonnell Douglas [Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973)], a plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence a
prima facie case of discrimination . . . .”). A prima facie case requires that: (1) the plaintiff is a
member of a protected class; (2) the plaintiff was qualified for the position; (3) the plaintiff
suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that action “occurred under circumstances giving
rise to an inference of discriminatory intent.” Abrams, 764 F.3d at 251–52.
Once a plaintiff has satisfied this burden, “it is then the defendant’s burden to proffer a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions; the final and ultimate burden is on the
plaintiff to establish that the defendant’s reason is in fact pretext for unlawful discrimination.” Id.
at 251.
Amazon argues that Mr. Ward’s gender discrimination claims fail for two reasons. First,
Amazon argues that Mr. Ward cannot establish that his termination occurred under

circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory intent on the basis of gender. Rather,
the termination occurred under “unremarkable circumstances” related to the violation of
Amazon’s attendance policies. Mot. at 11. And Ms. O’Connell, against whom the claims are
asserted, had no authority to impose an adverse employment action, nor did she so desire, since
“when she learned HR planned to terminate Plaintiff’s employment for negative UPT she ‘voted’
for a final written warning instead.” Id. Amazon argues that Ms. O’Connell’s inquiries into Mr.
Ward’s pronouns were “stray workplace remarks” that are “entirely separate from Amazon’s
legitimate, non-discriminatory business decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment for failing
to comply with its attendance policy.” Id. at 13.
Second, Amazon argues that “even if [Mr. Ward] could establish a prima facie case of
gender discrimination, he cannot prove that Amazon’s articulated non-discriminatory business
reason for firing him,” namely that Mr. Ward’s violations of the attendance policies, “was a
pretext for a discriminatory motive.” Id. In support of this argument, Amazon points to the
repeated warnings Mr. Ward received as well as HR’s “consistent application of Amazon’s
policies and practices in responding to attendance issues[.]” Id.
Mr. Ward responds that Ms. O’Connell’s actions — repeated questioning of the
Plaintiff’s pronouns and of his relationship with a female co-worker — constitute sufficient
circumstantial evidence of gender stereotyping, and consequently sex discrimination. Obj. at 13.
Next, Mr. Ward argues that the Defendant’s deviation from its Standard of Conduct policy,
which suggests corrective action instead of termination for time and attendance infractions,
shows that Amazon’s non-discriminatory reason for termination was pretextual. Id. at 15-16.
And because Mr. Ward did not learn of his growing UPT balance until his termination, he argues
that he received neither notice of his infractions nor an opportunity to address them. Id. Finally,

Mr. Ward argues that Amazon’s differential treatment of Mr. Chidester, a similarly situated
employee, supports a finding of pretext. Id. at 16-17.
Amazon replies that Mr. Ward’s claims must ultimately fail because Ms. O’Connell was
neither a decisionmaker nor in favor of terminating Mr. Ward for his negative UPT balance.
Reply at 1. Thus, Ms. O’Connell’s allegedly discriminatory actions had no influence on HR’s
ultimate decision to terminate Mr. Ward over Ms. O’Connell’s objection. Id. at 2. Amazon also
notes that undisputed business records show that Mr. Chidester never had a negative UPT
balance and is therefore an “inapt comparator” who does not establish that Mr. Ward was
discriminated against. Id. Finally, Amazon argues that it “terminated Plaintiff’s employment
consistent with its typical practices,” which is not evidence of pretext.
Specifically, Amazon notes that while its attendance policy does not require it to issue a
warning following unsatisfactory attendance, it nonetheless did warn Mr. Ward by e-mail, and
“Amazon’s practice is to terminate employees when they continue to carry negative UPT
balances despite HR’s outreach.” Id. at 3-4. Therefore, Amazon argues that its compliance with
its policies and typical practices is not evidence of pretext. Id. at 4.
The Court agrees.
For purposes of its analysis, the Court will assume without definitively deciding that Mr.
Ward can make out a prima facie case, and address whether Amazon’s proffered legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for the termination “is in fact a pretext for unlawful discrimination.”
Abrams, 764 F.3d at 251; see id. at 252 (“The district court . . . avoided resolving the matter
conclusively because it determined that even had [Plaintiff] made out a prima facie case, he
could not establish pretext at the final stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis.”). The answer is
no.

On this record, there is no genuine issue of fact that violation of Amazon’s attendance
policies could result in termination. Under Amazon’s attendance and punctuality policy, it is
undisputed that “unsatisfactory attendance may be a basis for disciplinary action, up to and
including dismissal.” Pl.’s SMF ¶ 6 (citing Exhibit 3, the Amazon Attendance and Punctuality
Policy). It also is undisputed that a negative unpaid time balance (“UPT”) will result in Amazon
“review[ing] your employment in accordance with its attendance policies.” Id. ¶ 8 (citing
Amazon’s Attendance UPT Policy). It is further undisputed that Mr. Ward knew “when he
started working at Amazon the Company could terminate his employment for violating
Amazon’s attendance policies.” Id. ¶ 11 (citing Mr. Ward’s deposition testimony).
On this record, there also is no genuine issue of fact that Mr. Ward had a negative unpaid
time balance with Amazon in October of 2022, in violation of Amazon’s attendance and
punctuality policy. Indeed, even if Amazon gave Mr. Ward credit for September 21, 2022, when
he claims he had been “accidentally scheduled,” id. ¶ 27, he still would have had a negative
unpaid time balance going into October of 2022. Id. (quoting Mr. Ward’s deposition testimony:
“Q. And so, even if we remove that – the ten hours from that shift [on September 21, 2022] you
still would have been negative at that point, is that right? A. Yeah.”).
Moreover, it is undisputed Mr. Ward had been notified by Amazon of his negative unpaid
time balance, and further informed that he had to correct the situation. On October 8, 2022,
“Amazon alerted Plaintiff on his pay records that his UPT balance was negative.” Id. ¶ 29.
Amazon then later “contacted Plaintiff by email on October 23, 2022 to alert him further to his
negative UPT balance, writing: As a reminder, a negative UPT balance [ ] is considered a
violation of our attendance policy, and can lead to termination if not resolved.” Id. ¶ 32 (citations
omitted). The very next day, October 24, 2022, in response to Mr. Ward, Amazon reminded him

that action had to be taken to resolve the negative unpaid time balance. Id. ¶ 35 (citations
omitted).
Then, on October 27, 2022, Amazon informed Ms. O’Connell, who supervised Mr.
Ward’s supervisor, of a decision to terminate Mr. Ward because of his negative unpaid time
balance. Id. ¶ 37. While Ms. O’Connell urged Amazon to instead issue a final written warning,
id., it is undisputed that “the decisionmakers, Regional Safety Manager, Safety HR, Site HR
Manager, and Site [Senior Human Resources Business Partner], proceeded with termination in
accordance with Amazon’s policies and practices for responding to attendance violations like
Plaintiff’s.” Id. ¶ 38 (citing the deposition of Jaime Guzman, Site Senior Human Resources
Business Partner). Amazon then terminated Mr. Ward on November 4, 2022. Id. ¶ 40.
Despite all of these undisputed facts — facts Mr. Ward concedes are true — he argues
nonetheless that his termination was a pretext for Ms. O’Connell’s allegedly discriminatory
remarks, as evidenced by an alleged comparator, Michael Chidester, and that he should have
received a written warning, rather than be terminated. None of these arguments, however, create,
much less suggest, a genuine issue of material fact to be tried here.
First, as to Ms. O’Connell’s alleged comments, there is nothing in this record from which
a reasonable jury could infer that they played any role in his termination. As noted above, it is
undisputed who the “decisionmakers” were: Amazon’s Regional Safety Manager, Amazon’s
Safety Human Resources, Amazon’s Site Human Resources Manager, and Amazon’s Site Senior
Human Resources Business Partner. Id. ¶ 38 (responding to this statement of fact as
“Admitted”). Even more importantly, the undisputed facts indicate that Ms. O’Connell opposed,
not supported, Mr. Ward’s termination. See id. ¶¶ 37-38 (citing Ms. O’Connell as “writing: I
vote for final written” instead of termination.”). Thus, regardless of what she might have said

about or to Mr. Ward, there is nothing in this record to suggest that her views of or comments
about him played any role in his termination. See Desrosiers v. Summit Sec. Servs., Inc., No. 21-
CV-10941 (JPO), 2022 WL 13808524, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2022) (“Desrosiers's failure to
allege that Hackett was the relevant decisionmaker in Desrosiers's termination strongly weighs
against considering the alleged comments Hackett made as to Desrosiers's national origin to be
evidence of discriminatory motivation in Desrosiers's termination.”); see also Holcomb v. Iona
Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 143 (2d Cir. 2008) (allowing a Title VII plaintiff “to succeed, even absent
evidence of illegitimate bias on the part of the ultimate decision maker so long as the individual
shown to have the impermissible bias played a meaningful role . . . in the process”) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
In any event, in order to determine whether her comments were “stray remarks” or are
circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent, courts in this Circuit consider four factors, none
of which are dispositive: “(1) who made the remark (i.e., a decision-maker, a supervisor, or a
low-level co-worker); (2) when the remark was made in relation to the employment decision at
issue; (3) the content of the remark (i.e., whether a reasonable juror could view the remark as
discriminatory); and (4) the context in which the remark was made (i.e., whether it was related to
the decision-making process).” Henry v. Wyeth Pharms., Inc., 616 F.3d 134, 149–50 (2d Cir.
2010).
As to the first factor, and as discussed above, while Ms. O’Connell supervised Ms.
Zadrozny, who in turn directly supervised Mr. Ward, Pl.’s SMF ¶ 15, and formed part of site
management, she had no decision-making authority over Mr. Ward’s employment, retention, or
termination, nor over the appeal of his termination.1 Id. ¶¶ 32, 41, 48. Because she played no role

1 While Mr. Ward speculates that Ms. O’Connell made the decision to terminate his employment, as discussed

in Mr. Ward’s termination or in adjudicating the appeal of his termination, these comments were
“not directly related to the adverse action against the plaintiff.” Henry, 616 F.3d at 150.
As to the second factor, Ms. O’Connell’s remarks were made in or around August and
September 2022. Pl.’s SMF ¶¶ 54, 57. HR first contacted Mr. Ward by e-mail to alert him to his
negative UPT balance on October 23, 2022, and his employment was terminated effective
November 4, 2022. Id. ¶¶ 32, 40. While the relative proximity between Ms. O’Connell’s remarks
and Mr. Ward’s subsequent termination may ordinarily be probative of discriminatory intent, her
lack of involvement in the termination decision makes any such probative value, very limited at
best, if not otherwise inadmissible because of its potentially prejudicial effect. See Tomassi v.
Insignia Fin. Grp., Inc., 478 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[R]emarks made by someone other
than the person who made the decision adversely affecting the plaintiff may have little tendency
to show that the decision-maker was motivated by the discriminatory sentiment expressed in the
remark.”); see also Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 847 (2d Cir. 2013)
(“Temporal proximity alone is insufficient to defeat summary judgment at the pretext
stage.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2) (evidence submitted in support of a motion
for summary judgment may be struck if inadmissible); Pacenza v. IBM Corp., 363 Fed.Appx.
128, 130 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that the Court “is obliged not to consider inadmissible evidence
at the summary judgment stage [and] it remains in that court’s discretion whether to strike the
inadmissible portions or simply disregard them.”); see also Wanamaker v. Town of Westport Bd.
of Educ., No. 3:11-CV-1791 (MPS) (WIG), 2013 WL 3816592, at *1 (D. Conn. July 22, 2013)
(noting that “a court may only consider admissible evidence when ruling on a motion for
summary judgment”) (citation omitted).

above, there is no record evidence to support this assertion. See Pl.’s SMF ¶ 41; see also Decl. of Jaime Guzman,
ECF No. 31-1 ¶ 14.

As to the third factor, whether a reasonable juror could view the remarks as
discriminatory, on this record, the remarks about the Plaintiff’s listed pronouns and alleged
romantic relationship suggest concern as to Mr. Ward’s gender identity and sexual orientation,
even if not as troubling as comments considered more facially discriminatory in other contexts.
Cf. Sethi v. Narod, 12 F. Supp. 3d 505, 541 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (“You f––king Indian, what do you
think about yourself? I will make sure you are sent back to India. You don't know who you are
dealing with. You fear my wrath in your dreams.”); O'Diah v. Yogo Oasis, 954 F. Supp. 2d 261,
272 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding a statement by an individual at the time the plaintiff was fired that,
“You Nigerians can't be trusted,” “support[s] the inference that [the individual's] decision to
terminate [the plaintiff] was motivated by discriminatory animus.”); Richmond v. Gen. Nutrition
Cntrs. Inc., No. 08–CV–3577, 2011 WL 2493527, at *3, *11 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2011) (finding
that where the defendant told the plaintiff to “Go back to Africa,” criticized his accent, and
advised him that he was being demoted because an African should not be in his position, the
defendant had made “racially charged comments” supporting the plaintiff's disparate treatment
claim). But this factor, weighed in the context of the other factors discussed above and below,
does not create a genuine issue of fact on the issue of pretext.
As to the fourth factor, the context in which the remark was made, given that Ms.
O’Connell did not make, and could not have made, these comments in connection with the
decision to terminate Mr. Ward, as she lacked any decision-making authority in this regard, the
weighing of the various Henry factors suggests that these comments were stray remarks as
opposed to circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent. See Sloan v. United Techs. Corp.,
596 F. App'x 35, 36 (2d Cir. 2015) (“The stray remarks cited by plaintiff were either facially race

neutral or too removed from plaintiff's discharge to support an inference of discriminatory
causation.”) (citing Henry, 616 F.3d at 149-50).
Second, as to the alleged comparator, Michael Chidester, there is no record evidence that
this person even had a negative unpaid time balance. See Exhibit 1 to Exhibit A 4-41, ECF No.
31-1 (business records reflecting that Mr. Chidester never had a negative UPT balance). Thus, no
reasonable jury could conclude that Mr. Ward’s termination was pretextual for that reason.
Third and finally, on this record, it is undisputed that Mr. Ward had been warned in
writing that failure to correct his unpaid time balance could result in termination. Pl.’s SMF ¶¶
32-35 (admitting that Amazon warned him by email that he may be terminated if he did not
resolve his negative UPT balance). Thus, on this record, no reasonable jury could conclude that
anything more than the written warnings already provided to him were appropriate here. See,
e.g., Giudice v. Red Robin Int'l, Inc., 555 F. App'x 67, 69 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[N]o reasonable
factfinder could conclude that it was Giudice's complaint that resulted in his termination, as
opposed to Red Robin's stated reason for firing him, which was his failure to properly pay
employees after receiving a final warning requiring him to abide by the company's policies
concerning the payment of employees.”).
Accordingly, having failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to his gender
discrimination claim, Amazon’s motion for summary judgment will be granted as to this Title
VII claim.
B. The Title VII Harassment and Hostile Work Environment Claim
Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating in “compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of [an] individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). “The phrase ‘terms, conditions, or privileges of employment’

evinces a congressional intent ‘to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment . . .,’ which
includes requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment.” Redd v.
N.Y. Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d 166, 175 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
To establish a hostile work environment under Title VII, “[a] plaintiff must . . .
demonstrate that [ ]he was subjected to the hostility because of h[is] membership in a protected
class.” Brennan v. Metro. Opera Ass'n, Inc., 192 F.3d 310, 318 (2d Cir. 1999), and “that ‘the
workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive
working environment.’” Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 320–21 (2d Cir. 2015)
(quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). “In determining whether a plaintiff
suffered a hostile work environment, [courts] must consider the totality of the circumstances.”
Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 321.
Amazon argues that these claims fail because the alleged conduct is not sufficiently
severe or pervasive to establish a hostile work environment. Specifically, Amazon argues that
Ms. O’Connell’s questioning of Mr. Ward’s pronouns “amounts to a petty slight or minor
annoyance” but is “not actionable hostile work environment harassment.” Mot. at 16. Amazon
also points to Mr. Ward’s concession of Amazon being “a very professional environment” and
the fact that neither Ms. O’Connell nor anyone else asked him directly about his sexual
orientation. Id. at 16-17. Finally, Amazon argues that it is subject to an affirmative defense
because (1) “the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any . . .
harassing behavior” and (2) “the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); see also Burlington Indus. Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (hereinafter “Faragher/Ellerth defense”).
Mr. Ward responds that he has sufficiently proved the elements for his sex and gender
harassment claims under Title VII. First, he argues that Ms. O’Connell’s “hyper-fixation on [his]
relationship with a female co-worker or his chosen pronouns” was unwelcome and offensive.
Obj. at 18, 26. Second, he argues that Ms. O’Connell’s conduct was motivated, at least in part,
by his sex, gender, and sexual orientation. Id. at 18, 26-27. Third, he argues that the allegedly
discriminatory conduct was sufficiently severe and pervasive because Ms. O’Connell “repeatedly
brought it up . . . got Zadrozny to ask [him] . . . went around asking other safety team employees
. . . [and] told [Mr. Ward] that members of senior leadership were talking about [his] pronouns.”
Id. at 19. Fourth, he argues that the Defendant is liable for O’Connell’s harassment and
Amazon’s affirmative defense fails because “the supervisor’s harassment culminate[d] in a
tangible employment action.” Id. at 20. He also argues that Ms. O’Connell was involved in his
termination decision and states that he was “told by a co-worker that O’Connell had gone to HR
and told HR not [to] fix [his] time.” Id. at 20, 6.
Amazon replies that Mr. Ward has not offered any admissible evidence to sustain his
claim. Reply at 4. Amazon argues that much of the evidence Mr. Ward puts forth—that his
coworker told him that Ms. O’Connell had told HR not to fix his time and that he was told that
senior leadership was also talking about his pronouns—is inadmissible hearsay that is
unsupported by the record. Id. As to Mr. Ward’s argument regarding Amazon’s Faragher/Ellerth
defense, Amazon argues that Mr. Ward has not proven that the alleged hostile work environment
caused his termination and cannot do so because Ms. O’Connell was not a decisionmaker in his
termination. Id. at 6. Finally, Amazon argues that once Mr. Ward submitted a complaint a month

after his termination, it “took reasonable care to prevent and correct complained-of conduct
through its internal complaint procedure, and [Mr. Ward] admittedly and unreasonably failed to
take advantage of these preventative and corrective measures during his employment,” id. at 6.
The Court agrees.
Mr. Ward has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact of being subjected to
hostility “because of” his sexual orientation or gender. Brennan, 192 F.3d at 319 (recognizing
that “[w]hether a work environment is sufficiently abusive to be actionable under Title VII
depends on all of the circumstances of a given situation.”). A plaintiff can make such a showing
“by alleging facts that directly show discrimination or facts that indirectly show discrimination
by giving rise to a plausible inference of discrimination.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch.
Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 87 (2d Cir. 2015). As discussed with respect to Mr. Ward’s gender
discrimination claim, see supra Section III.A, however, Ms. O’Connell’s remarks constitute
neither direct evidence of discrimination nor circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent,
and Mr. Ward has failed to identify an apt comparator to give rise to a plausible inference of
discrimination. See Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 312 (An inference of discrimination can be shown by
“the employer's criticism of the plaintiff's performance in ethnically degrading terms; or its
invidious comments about others in the employee's protected group; or the more favorable
treatment of employees not in the protected group; or the sequence of events leading to the
plaintiff's discharge.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Even if he were able to create a genuine issue of material fact as to causation, Mr. Ward
has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact that Ms. O’Connell’s actions were
“sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an
abusive working environment.” Id. at 320-21. “This standard has both objective and subjective

components: the conduct complained of must be severe or pervasive enough that a reasonable
person would find it hostile or abusive, and the victim must subjectively perceive the work
environment to be abusive.” Raspardo v. Carlone, 770 F.3d 97, 114 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing
Harris, 510 U.S. at 21–22); see also Harris, 510 U.S. at 23 (in determining whether a plaintiff
established there was a hostile work environment, courts must consider the totality of the
circumstances, including “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably
interferes with an employee's work performance.”).
As to the objective component, Ms. O’Connell’s conduct is not sufficiently severe or
pervasive to create a hostile work environment, since “a mere utterance . . . which engenders
offensive feelings in an employee does not sufficiently affect the conditions of employment to
implicate Title VII.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see
Daniel v. T & M Prot. Res. LLC, 87 F.Supp.3d 621, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (holding that, although
plaintiff’s testimony indicates that he was mistreated based in part on his race, perceived national
origin, and perceived sexual orientation . . . this “mistreatment does not rise to the level of
‘severe or pervasive’ harassment so as to create a ‘hostile or abusive’ work environment.”)
(citations omitted); see also Estevez v. Berkeley Coll., No. 21-1988, 2022 WL 16843460, at *1
(2d Cir. Nov. 10, 2022) (“[A] female co-worker staring and frequently making backhanded
compliments about the Employees’ clothes, bodies, and appearances, a male co-worker
frequently commenting that there was too much estrogen in the room, and a male supervisor
making a single comment arguably evidencing a bias against working mothers — is not
sufficiently severe or pervasive to support a hostile-work-environment claim.”) (citing Redd, 678
F.3d at 176).

In the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to conduct based on Mr. Ward’s
gender and/or sexual orientation or conduct sufficiently severe or pervasive to establish a hostile
work environment, Amazon is entitled to summary judgment on these claims.2 Tassy v.
Buttigieg, 51 F.4th 521, 535 (2d Cir. 2022) (affirming district court’s finding that defendant was
entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim because the plaintiff
could not show that the conduct was on account of his protected characteristics, and therefore
declining to address whether the conduct was sufficiently pervasive or severe); Rider v. Town of
Farmington, 162 F. Supp. 2d 45, 52 (D. Conn. 2001) (“Rider has provided no evidence that
would suggest that any of the actions she complains of were taken because of her gender.
Therefore, no genuine issue of material fact exists as to the presence of a hostile work
environment based on gender, and the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the
hostile work environment theory of the Title VII claim set forth in the First Count.”).
Accordingly, Amazon’s motion for summary judgment will be granted as to the Title VII
harassment and hostile work environment claim.
C. The Title VII Retaliation Claim
The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework governs Title VII discriminatory
retaliation claims. Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 719 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Claims for
retaliation are analyzed under the same burden-shifting framework established for Title VII
cases.”). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Plaintiff must prove: “(1) [he] engaged in
protected activity, (2) the defendant was aware of that activity, (3) [he] was subjected to a
retaliatory action, or a series of retaliatory actions, that were materially adverse, and (4) there

2 The Court thus need not determine whether Amazon is entitled to the Faragher/Ellerth defense. Suffice it to say,
there is no record evidence that Mr. Ward “[took] advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided
by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).

was a causal connection between the protected activity and the materially adverse action or
actions.” Carr v. New York City Transit Auth., 76 F.4th 172, 180 (2d Cir. 2023).
Amazon argues that Mr. Ward cannot establish the last two elements of a prima facie
case of retaliation. Amazon characterizes the protected activity for the purposes of this claim as
Mr. Ward’s post-termination complaint, in which he did not seek re-employment. Mot. at 19.
Amazon thus argues that its decision not to rehire Mr. Ward is not an adverse or retaliatory
action. Id. at 20. Amazon also argues that Mr. Ward cannot establish the necessary causal link,
since the reasons for his termination were unrelated to Ms. O’Connell’s alleged conduct.
Assuming Mr. Ward could establish a prima facie case, Amazon argues that Mr. Ward cannot
show that Amazon’s non-discriminatory reason for his termination was pretextual. Id. at 22.
Mr. Ward argues that the legally protected activity central to his retaliation claim is not
his post-termination complaint, but his request to Ms. O’Connell that she stop asking about his
alleged relationship with his co-worker. Obj. at 21. He argues that he attempted to be rehired by
internally appealing the termination decision, during which he complained about Ms.
O’Connell’s remarks. Id. He argues that both Ms. O’Connell and Amazon were aware of his
complaints, that the termination and failure to re-hire him were both materially adverse actions,
and that a causal connection exists between his opposition to Ms. O’Connell’s comments and the
materially adverse actions to which he was subject. Id. at 21-24.
Amazon responds that absent a showing that a decisionmaker had knowledge of the
protected activity, which Ms. O’Connell did not, no causal connection could be established
between Mr. Ward’s complaints and his termination. Reply at 6-7. Amazon also argues that a
claim of retaliation based on its decision not to re-hire Mr. Ward fails for three reasons. First,
because Ms. O’Connell was not a decisionmaker, no causal connection exists. Id. at 7. Second,

Mr. Ward’s internal appeal did not include any allegations of discrimination; his internal
complaint of discrimination was only submitted two weeks after his appeal had been fully
adjudicated. Id. Thus, “it is impossible that Amazon failed to rehire him through the appeal
process in retaliation for protected activity that had not yet occurred.” Id. Third, Amazon notes
that Mr. Ward never applied for reinstatement following the adjudication of his appeal, and he
therefore “cannot establish that Amazon took any adverse action toward him by not unilaterally
rehiring him after he filed his post-termination, post-appeal complaint.” Id. at 8.
The Court agrees.
As discussed above, there is no record evidence that Ms. O’Connell played a role in the
decision to terminate Mr. Ward. See Depo. of Jaime Guzman, ECF No. 28-6 at 11 (“Guzman
Depo.”) (stating that Mr. Guzman did not make the decision himself to terminate Mr. Ward.
Rather, the decision was made in coordination with the site HR manager, the regional safety
manager, and safety HR); Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 32 F.3d 718, 723 (2d Cir. 1994) (“To
defeat a motion for summary judgment[,] a plaintiff cannot rely on ‘conjecture or surmise.’”)
(citation omitted); Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir. 1985) (“[T]he summary judgment
rule would be rendered sterile . . . if the mere incantation of intent or state of mind would operate
as a talisman to defeat an otherwise valid motion.”). And when informed about the decision to
terminate him, she expressed a desire to retain, rather than terminate, his employment. Pl.’s SMF
¶ 37 (“[A]fter HR alerted O’Connell Plaintiff’s employment would be terminated for negative
UPT, O’Connell messaged HR, writing: ‘I vote for final written’ instead of termination.”). Mr.
Ward’s failure to rehire theory also fails because Amazon was not aware of Mr. Ward’s
protected activity until his appeal had been fully adjudicated. See Guzman Depo. at 24 (stating

that Mr. Guzman was not aware of the conflict between Mr. Ward and Ms. O’Connell at the time
he, along with the other decisionmakers, decided to terminate him).
Even assuming arguendo that Mr. Ward could establish a prima facie case of retaliation,
his claims nonetheless fail under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. If a
plaintiff satisfies the initial burden at the prima facie stage, “a presumption of retaliation arises”
that the defendant may rebut by “articulat[ing] a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the
adverse employment action.” Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 164–65 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation
omitted). The employee must then show “that retaliation was a substantial reason for the adverse
employment action.” Hicks, 593 F.3d at 165. A plaintiff can sustain this burden by proving that
“a retaliatory motive played a part in the adverse employment actions even if it was not the sole
cause[;] if the employer was motivated by retaliatory animus, Title VII is violated even if there
were objectively valid grounds for the [adverse employment action].” Id. at 164–65 (quoting
Sumner v. U.S. Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1990)).
Amazon has stated a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for Mr. Ward’s termination: his
negative UPT balance. There is no record evidence that any complaint raised by Mr. Ward to
Ms. O’Connell or anyone else resulted in his termination, and there is no genuine issue of fact
that any retaliatory motive played a part in his termination, or Amazon’s subsequent decision not
to rehire him. As discussed above, Ms. O’Connell was not involved in the decision to terminate
Mr. Ward, and she later indicated her preference not to terminate him. Mr. Ward thus cannot
establish that retaliatory animus motivated the initial termination decision.
As to Amazon’s alleged failure to rehire him, while Mr. Ward did seek reinstatement as
part of the internal grievance process, see Ward Appeal, ECF No. 24-17 at 5 (“I wish to be fully
reinstated as an OMR”), there is no record evidence that anyone adjudicating his appeal and

post-termination complaint knew of Ms. O’Connell’s comments. See id. at 2-5 (failing to identify
the allegedly discriminatory conduct or his protected activity in his appeal); see also Plaintiff
Complaint, ECF No. 24-20 (claiming retaliation by Ms. O’Connell, but not on the basis of his
gender identity or sexual orientation). At this stage of this case, Mr. Ward “must come forward
with at least some credible evidence that the actions of the [defendants] were motivated by [ ... ]
animus or ill-will.” Grillo v. New York City Transit Auth., 291 F.3d 231, 234 (2d Cir. 2002).
Although Mr. Ward can point to the temporal proximity between his protected action
(complaining to Ms. O’Connell and his post-termination complaint) and the materially adverse
employment decisions (his termination and alleged failure to rehire), at this stage of the
proceeding, this temporal proximity alone will not suffice. Butler v. New York Health & Racquet
Club, 768 F. Supp. 2d 516, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“[T]emporal proximity, without more, ‘is
insufficient to satisfy [the plaintiff's] burden to bring forward some evidence of pretext.’”) (citing
Simpson v. N.Y. State Dep't of Civil Serv., 166 Fed.Appx. 499, 502 (2d Cir. 2006)).
Accordingly, in the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to Mr. Ward’s Title VII
retaliation claim, Amazon’s motion for summary judgment will be granted with respect to this
claim.
D. The Remaining State Law Claims
“[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district
courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in
the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy
under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). “[D]istrict courts may
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim,” however, if “the district court has
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” Id. § 1367(c)(3).

The exercise of supplemental or pendent jurisdiction is “a doctrine of discretion,” not of
“right.” United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). “Once a district court's
discretion is triggered under § 1367(c)(3), it balances the traditional ‘values of judicial economy,
convenience, fairness, and comity’ in deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction.” Kolari v. N.Y.-
Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill,
484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)).
“[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the
balance of factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining
state-law claims.” Id. But as the Second Circuit recently emphasized, “[t]he principle that the
elimination of federal-law claims prior to trial generally points to declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction ‘in the usual case’ clearly does not mean that the balance of the factors
always points that way.” Catzin v. Thank You & Good Luck Corp., 899 F.3d 77, 86 (2d Cir.
2018). Thus, “[w]hen § 1367(c)(3) applies, the district court must still meaningfully balance the
supplemental jurisdiction factors” of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity before
declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Id.
Because the Court “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,” it
must decide whether to “decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over Mr. Ward’s state law
claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Here, after balancing the factors set forth in Gibbs and Cohill, the
Court will decline to retain supplemental jurisdiction. Mr. Ward’s remaining claims under
CFEPA raise quintessential questions of state law, and dismissal without prejudice with respect
to these claims “will procure for the parties ‘a surer-footed reading of applicable law’.” Klein &
Co. Futures v. Bd. of Trade of N.Y.C., 464 F.3d 255, 263 n.5 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Gibbs, 383
U.S. at 726).

Accordingly, the Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Ward’s
remaining state law claims, and these claims will be dismissed without prejudice to refiling in
state court.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Amazon’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
The Title VII claims are dismissed with prejudice, and the Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, dismissing them without prejudice
to refiling in state court.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment for the Defendant and to
close this case.
SO ORDERED at New Haven, Connecticut, this 22nd day of May, 2026.
/s/ Victor A. Bolden
VICTOR A. BOLDEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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