govinfo:USCOURTS-ksd-2_24-cv-02065-2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 
 
 
JAMIE HEUTON, individually and as 
administrator of the estate of Andrew 
Heuton and as next friend of A.H., 
ASHLEY HEUTON, and ANDREW 
HEUTON, JR., 
 
Plaintiffs, 
 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
 
Plaintiffs asserted wrongful death and survival claims against defendant United States of 
America under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Now, plaintiffs ask the court—for a second 
time—to approve the settlement they have reached with defendant. Doc. 132. 
The court denied plaintiffs’ first Application for Approval of Wrongful Death Settlement 
(Doc. 126). Doc. 130 at 14. That first putative settlement apportioned one-fourth of the 
settlement to Jamie Heuton. Doc. 126 at 3. In so doing, it asserted that Jamie Heuton qualified 
as an heir because she was the common-law wife of Andrew Heuton, the decedent. Id. at 2. But 
the court concluded that Jamie Heuton hadn’t shouldered her burden to establish that she was 
decedent’s spouse at the time of his death. Doc. 130 at 11. Under the Kansas Wrongful Death 
Act, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1905, only an heir may receive proceeds from a wrongful death 
settlement. See Mason v. Gerin Corp., 647 P.2d 1340, 1343 (Kan. 1982) (“[T]he wrongful death 
action authorized by 60-1901 et seq., is for the exclusive benefit of the heirs[.]” (emphasis 

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added)). What’s more, the court found that the settlement apportionment wasn’t in the best 
interests of the minor heir, A.H. The court reasoned that a settlement which apportioned part of 
the proceeds to a non-heir reduced A.H.’s recovery in contravention of Kansas law. Doc. 130 at 
13. For these two reasons, the court denied plaintiffs’ first Application. Id. 
Now, plaintiffs have filed an Amended Application for Approval of Wrongful Death 
Settlement (Doc. 132). The Amended Application no longer apportions proceeds to Jamie 
Heuton. Instead, the settlement equally apportions proceeds between decedent’s two adult 
children and his one minor child. This revision in apportionment cures both of the court’s 
concerns about plaintiffs’ first Application. 
With those concerns abated, the court grants plaintiffs’ motion and approves the parties’ 
settlement and its apportionment. The court explains this ruling below, starting with the 
approval of attorneys’ fees under the Kansas Wrongful Death Act. 
A. Attorneys’ Fees 
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1905 “requires the district court to determine a reasonable fee for 
the plaintiffs’ attorneys in a wrongful death case.” Baugh v. Baugh ex rel. Smith, 973 P.2d 202, 
207 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999). “The general rule is that an attorney is entitled to the reasonable value 
of services performed for the client.” Id. 
Here, the parties’ Stipulation for Compromise Settlement and Release specifies that any 
attorneys’ fees owed by plaintiffs “shall not exceed” 25% of the settlement amount. Doc. 126-1 
at 2, 3. The court finds this fee reasonable for two reasons. First, the FTCA limits attorney fee 
awards in FTCA matters to 25% of the settlement. See 28 U.S.C. § 2678. Courts have explained 
the legislative intent behind Congress’s amendment of the FTCA’s fee-award statute that put the 
25% cap in place. 

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When Congress amended the FTCA’s attorney’s fees provision to create the 
twenty-five percent cap, it intended to incentivize good attorneys to take FTCA 
cases. . . . As Congress recognized, good attorneys will not take FTCA cases if 
they cannot earn what they would normally receive in private practice. 
Shaw v. United States, No. CIV 17-0147 JB/LF, 2018 WL 3598513, at *9 (D.N.M. July 26, 
2018); see also Ouandji v. Hedglen, No. CIV-16-1303-C, 2018 WL 2050162, at *1 (W.D. Okla. 
May 2, 2018) (“Section 2678 was amended in 1966, at which time Congress raised that limit on 
attorneys’ fees from 20 percent to the present level of 25 percent. The legislative history of that 
amendment indicates that its purpose was to assure competent representation and reasonable 
compensation in matters litigated under the FTCA.” (quotation cleaned up)). In short, Congress 
reasoned that a 25% fee rate was necessary to incentivize competent representation in FTCA 
cases, which suggests such a rate is reasonable. 
Second, this court frequently has approved settlement agreements—albeit in non-FTCA 
cases—with considerably larger fee percentages. See Aiken v. Assurance Health Sys. LLC, No. 
22-2385-DDC-ADM, 2025 WL 1810014, at *5 (D. Kan. July 1, 2025) (approving 40% 
contingency fee as aligning with those charged in the area); Sedlock v. Overland Park Med. 
Invs., LLC, No. 19-2614-DDC, 2021 WL 1056516, at *4–5 (D. Kan. Mar. 19, 2021) (finding that 
a 40% contingency fee award was reasonable given the circumstances). 
To align with Congress’s intent to incentivize competent attorneys to take FTCA cases—
and because the attorneys here will receive fees considerably more modest than they would 
litigating another contingency-fee case—the court finds that counsel’s request for fees here is a 
reasonable one and thus approves it. 
 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1905 also allows the court to award counsel reasonable costs 
incurred during litigation. See Newton v. Amhof Trucking, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1108 (D. 
Kan. 2004) (identifying § 60-1905 as providing for costs); Trotter v. Harris, No. 16-4005-DDC, 

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2018 WL 1412065, at *3 (D. Kan. Mar. 21, 2018) (same). Plaintiffs’ counsel submitted an 
itemized statement of costs to the court. The court reviewed the costs and communicated 
informally over email with counsel about a few unclear expenses—expenses which counsel 
clarified with a thorough response. Having completed that review, the court finds that the 
submitted costs “are reasonable and incurred during litigation.” Trotter, 2018 WL 1412065, at 
*3. 
B. Apportionment of Settlement 
Finally, the court considers how to apportion the remaining wrongful death settlement 
proceeds—after deducting attorneys’ fees and expenses. Plaintiffs confirmed—either at the 
settlement hearing or by affidavit—that they have reviewed the settlement documents and are 
satisfied with the work their attorneys performed. The heirs now ask the court to split the 
remaining settlement proceeds equally between them—one-third each. Doc. 132 at 3. The court 
concludes the proposed equal apportionment between Ashley Heuton, Andrew Heuton, Jr., and 
A.H. is appropriate and in minor A.H.’s best interest. So, the court approves plaintiffs’ proposed 
apportionment. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT plaintiffs’ Amended 
Application for Approval of Wrongful Death Settlement (Doc. 132) is granted. The court 
approves counsel’s costs and fee request and apportions the wrongful death settlement proceeds 
in the fashion described by this Memorandum and Order. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 21st day of May, 2026, at Kansas City, Kansas. 
s/ Daniel D. Crabtree 
Daniel D. Crabtree 
United States District Judge 
 

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