govinfo:USCOURTS-ncwd-3_22-cv-00292-6

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
CHARLOTTE DIVISION 
3:22-cv-00292-RJC-SCR 
 
TYLER HOOD, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
CAPSTONE LOGISTICS, LLC, 
 
Defendant. 
 
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ORDER 
 
 
 
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Motion to Certify the District 
Court’s August 22, 2023 Order for Interlocutory Appeal filed by Capstone Logistics, 
LLC. (Doc. No. 36). For the reasons below, the Motion is DENIED. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Tyler Hood, a resident of North Carolina and a former employee of Capstone 
Logistics, LLC, claims that Capstone failed to pay its workers minimum wage and 
overtime. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 1, 3–4, 16). Based on that allegation, Hood seeks to bring 
a collective action under the Fair Labor Stan dards Act (FLSA) and a class action 
under the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act. (Id. at ¶¶ 74–126). The putative 
collective action would include Capstone employees throughout the United States, 
while the putative class action would comprise only Capstone e mployees in North 
Carolina. (Id. at ¶¶ 5, 7, 55, 66). 
Capstone moved to dismiss or strike the claims related to Hood’s nationwide 
collective action. (Doc. No. 17). Capstone argued that, under Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. 

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v. Superior Court of California , 582 U.S. 255 (2017), this Court would lack personal 
jurisdiction over any claims brought by collective members who worked outside of 
North Carolina. (Doc. No. 18). 
Hood contested Capstone’s application of Bristol-Myers, arguing that 
Capstone’s motion was premature. (Doc. No. 21 at 33). In support of the latter 
argument, Hood pointed out that, at this point in the litigation, no collective members 
have opted into the suit, and no out -of-state claims exist yet. (Id.) He argued that it 
was too early for the Court to evaluate its ability to exercise jurisdiction over such 
claims. (Id. at 33–34). 
This Court denied Capstone’s motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 35 at 5). It reasoned 
that, as there were currently no out -of-state plain tiffs, to issue a decision would 
ultimately be an advisory opinion, and such opinions are prohibited by the 
Constitution. (Id. at 4–5). See also Carney v. Adams, 592 U.S. 53, 58 (2020). 
Capstone subsequently moved this Court to certify for interlocutory appeal its 
order denying Capstone’s Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. No. 36-1 at 2). 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND DISCUSSION 
A district court may certify an order for interlocutory appeal if the district court 
determines that “such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there 
is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the 
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of litigation .” 28 U.S.C. § 
1292(b). The statute sets forth three requirements for an interlocutory appeal to be 
granted: (1) a controlling question of law (2) for which there is substantial ground for 
difference of opinion and (3) the immediate appeal may materially advance the 

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termination of litigation. See id.; see also Milic v. McCarthy, 469 F. Supp. 3d 580, 582 
(E.D. Va. 2020). Interlocutory appeals under 1292(b) should be used “sparingly,” and 
“its requirements must be strictly construed.” Myles v. Laffitte, 881 F.2d 125, 127 (4th 
Cir. 1989). These appeals are extraordinary remedies. Fannin v. CSX Transp., Inc. , 
No. 88–8120, 1989 WL 42583, at *5 (4th Cir. Apr. 26, 1989). Thus, the movant bears 
the burden of persuading the Court that the extraordinary relief of certification under 
§ 1292(b) is warranted. 
“[F]or a question to be ‘controlling,’ the district court must actually have 
decided such question .” Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel. Integra Rec LLC v. 
Countrywide Sec. Corp., No. 3:14CV706, 2015 WL 3540473, at *4 (E.D. Va. June 3, 
2015) (citations omitted). “[T]he kind of question best adapted to discretionary 
interlocutory review is a narrow question of pure law whose resolution will be 
completely dispositive of the litigation, either as a legal or practical matter, whichever 
way it goes.” Fannin, 1989 WL 42583, at *5. 
 Capstone puts forth two questions that it contends are controlling questions of 
law: (1) whether district courts should decide based on the face of the Complaint 
whether a plaintiff has demonstrated that it may exercise personal jurisdiction over 
a defendant with respect to nationwide claims that a plaintiff asserts; and (2) whether 
Bristol-Meyers restricts the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant 
in nationwide collective action claims. (Doc. No. 36-1 at 7). These are not controlling 
questions of law. 
Here, there were no out -of-state collective claims before the Court. (Doc. No. 

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35 at 3 ). Thus, t he Court declined to address its jurisdiction over out -of-state 
collectives claims and resolved to “evaluate its jurisdiction . . . at a later stage, if 
necessary.” Id. at 5. As to Capstone’s first question, whether the Court decides if it 
may exercise personal jurisdiction from the face of the Complaint or at some later 
point, is not a controlling question of law . The timing issue itself would not be 
dispositive of the litigation in part or in full nor does it advance the ultimate 
termination of the litigation . Fannin, 1989 WL 42583, at *5 (“The mere fact that 
[resolution of this issue] at this time may save pre-trial and trial effort and expense 
is not determinative; that of course can be said of any interlocutory appeal. ” (citing 
Palandjian v. Pahlavi, 782 F.2d 313, 314 (1st Cir. 1986) )). Further, as to Capstone’s 
second question, should a certification for interlocutory appeal be granted, any 
opinion rendered by the Fourth Circuit would be only an advisory opinion, as the 
issue was not addressed by this district court. Schwartz v. Rent A Wreck of Am., Inc., 
603 F. App ’x 142, 145 n. 2 (4th Cir. 2015) ; see Countrywide Sec. Corp. , 2015 WL 
3540473, at *6 (“The Court cannot certify for interlocutory appeal a question not ruled 
upon.”). Accordingly, there is no controlling question of law in this motion , and 
without it, an interlocutory appeal should not be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 
III. CONCLUSION 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that: 
1. The Motion to Certify the District Court’s August 22, 2023 Order for 
Interlocutory Appeal (Doc. No. 36) is DENIED. 
 
 
Signed: July 1, 2024 

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