govinfo:USCOURTS-ncwd-3_22-cv-00292-10

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
CHARLOTTE DIVISION 
3:22-CV-00292-MEO-DCK 
TYLER HOOD, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
 v. 
 
CAPSTONE LOGISTICS, LLC, 
 
Defendant. 
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MEMORANDUM & ORDER 
 
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Capstone Logistics LLC ’s 
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction or Want of Prosecution or, 
in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 87) , Defendant’s Rule 72(a) 
Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Order (Doc. No. 61) , Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss for Plaintiff’s Failure to Participate in Discovery or, in the A lternative, to 
Compel Discovery and Award Attorneys’ Fees (Doc. No. 68), and Plaintiff Tyler Hood’s 
Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and Substitute Class Representative (Doc. No. 
71). For the reasons explained below, the Court concludes that it lacks subject-matter 
jurisdiction to further adjudicate this matter . Accordingly, the Court will grant 
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 87) and dismiss this case without prejudice. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Tyler Hood, a former employee of Defendant, claims that Defendant failed to 
pay its workers minimum wage and overtime. (Doc. Nos. 1 ¶¶ 3–4; 23 ¶ 4). Hood filed 
a Complaint on June 30, 2022, seeking to bring a collective action under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (“ FLSA”) as well as a class action under the North Carolina 

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Wage and Hour Act. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 4–7). The putative collective action would include 
Capstone employees throughout the United States, while the putative class action 
would comprise only Capstone employees in North Carolina. Id. at ¶¶ 5, 7, 55, 66. 
After the parties had engaged in substantial motions practice, on January 29, 
2025, Hood informed his C ounsel that he “had received private medical news that 
would make it nearly impossible for him to continue being the representative plaintiff 
in this action.” (Doc. No. 73 ¶¶ 3, 8). On February 4, 2025, Hood “confirmed his 
decision to withdraw as the representative plaintiff in this action” and signed a 
declaration stating as such. Id. ¶ 9. Hood’s declaration states, “[f]or multiple personal 
reasons . . . I am unable to serve as the representative for the putative Class and 
Collective. However, I wish to remain part of the putative Class and Collective.” (Doc. 
No 73 -1 ¶ 4) . He continues: “I agree to be substituted by another representative 
plaintiff, who has yet to be determined .” Id. ¶ 5. On February 10, 2025, Plaintiff’s 
Counsel communicated to Defendant’s Counsel that “[Hood] has decided that he can 
no longer proceed as the class/collective representative” and that counsel was “in the 
process of trying to identify a replacement representative” but that Hood “will not be 
responding to discovery or attending [his] deposition.” (Doc. No. 70-8 at 4–5). When 
Hood expressed his desire to withdraw as the representative plaintiff, there were no 
other opt-in plaintiffs to the action. 
On March 12, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for Plaintiff’s Failure 
to Participate in Discovery or, in the Alternative, to Compel Discovery and Award 
Attorneys’ Fees. (Doc. No. 68). One week later, on March 18, 2025, Plaintiff’s Counsel 

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filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and Substitute Class Representative , 
requesting to substitute the named Plaintiff and leave to amend the complaint to 
include that substituted plaintiff . (Doc. No. 71). Notably, Plaintiff had not yet 
identified a substitute and requested the Court “grant him 30 days to identify and 
evaluate an appropriate substitute representative plaintiff.” Id. Nearly three months 
later, in June 2025, two individuals consented to join the collective action as opt -in 
plaintiffs. (Doc. Nos. 81-1; 82-1) (opt-in consent forms ). In September 2025, a third 
individual consented to join the collective action as an opt -in plaintiff. (Doc. No. 84 -
1) (same). 
On February 17, 2026, this case was reassigned to the undersigned. On April 
6, 2026, Defendant filed a second Motion to Dismiss —this time for lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction or want of prosecution or, in the alternative, for summary 
judgment. (Doc. No. 87). Defendant argues the Court lacked subject -matter 
jurisdiction over this ma tter once Hood, “as the sole named plaintiff, withdrew his 
participation.” (Doc. No. 88 at 12). 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” which “possess only that 
power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. 
of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this 
limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party 
asserting jurisdiction.” Id. (citations omitted). Subject-matter jurisdiction in federal 
court exists primarily where a federal question is presented, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or 

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when the parties are of diverse citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds 
$75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the dismissal 
of claims where the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the lawsuit. 
Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time by a litigant or the court 
itself. Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884). “If the court 
determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must 
dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving 
that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a case or claim. Adams v. Bain, 
697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982). In cases where the federal court has original 
jurisdiction, the court “shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that 
are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form 
part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States 
Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 
III. DISCUSSION 
Defendant moves to dismiss for lack of subject -matter jurisdiction. For the 
reasons set forth below, the Court finds that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over 
the FLSA claim and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 
state-law claim. 
A. Jurisdiction 
Defendant argues that this Court should dismiss the action because the Court 
lost subject-matter jurisdiction “when [Hood], as the sole named plaintiff, withdrew 

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his participation” in favor of becoming a “non-participating” opt-in plaintiff. (Doc. No. 
88 at 12, 15). Plaintiff’s Counsel responds that the Court has not lost subject-matter 
jurisdiction because Hood and the three other individuals who provided opt -in 
consent forms supply the jurisdictional hook necessary for the court to retain 
jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 89 at 9–12). The Court agrees with Defendant. 
The FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. , “establishes federal minimum -wage, 
maximum-hour, and overtime guarantees that cannot be modified by contract.” 
Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk , 569 U.S. 66, 69 (2013). Further, the FLSA 
“gives employees the right to bring a private cause of action on their own behalf and 
on behalf of ‘other employees similarly situated’ for specified violations of the FLSA.” 
Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)). Specifically, the FLSA provides that “[a]n action to 
recover the liability prescribed . . . may be maintained against any employer . . . by 
any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other 
employees similarly situated.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (emphasis added). In general, the 
text of the FLSA makes clear that an FLSA claim must be maintained by at least one 
individual. 
The FLSA includes an “opt-in requirement.” See Degidio v. Crazy Horse Saloon 
& Rest. Inc., 880 F.3d 135, 143 (4th Cir. 2018). The opt-in requirement provides “[n]o 
employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in 
writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such 
action is brought.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Thus, a named plaintiff represents only himself 
until another individual or individuals consent to join the action. 
See Simmons v. 

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United Mortg. & Loan Inv., LLC, 634 F.3d 754, 758 (4th Cir. 2011). Here, Hood was 
the named plaintiff–and the only plaintiff in this action–when he chose to step down. 
Hood’s desire to “remain part of the putative Class and Collective ,” (Doc. No 73-1 ¶ 
4), provides an insufficient basis for the court to retain jurisdiction. 
The cases Defendant relies on are persuasive. In Smith v. ERJ Dining, LLC, 
the plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, asserting claims under both the 
FLSA and state minimum wage laws. No. 11-CV-2061, 2013 WL 1286674, at *1 (N.D. 
Ill. Mar. 28, 2013) . After extensive litigation and seeking to certify her state- law 
claims as a class action, the plaintiff “severed ties with her counsel.” Id. at *2. Instead 
of moving to withdraw from the case, the plaintiff’s counsel moved to substitute the 
plaintiff as the named plaintiff and proposed class representative with another 
putative class member who had not yet opted in to the FLSA claim. Id. at *2–3. The 
plaintiff’s counsel noted the plaintiff had “personal reasons for wanting to be 
removed” but still wanted to pursue her claims as a class member. Id. at *2. The 
district court held that the court lost subject -matter jurisdiction on the date the 
plaintiff severed ties with her counsel because the FLSA claim provided the 
“jurisdictional hook” for the court, and the “ FLSA claim [ became] moot without a 
plaintiff.” 
Id. at *5. The court specified that “once the FLSA claim . . . transitioned 
from a one- plaintiff claim to a no -plaintiff claim, neither Counsel nor any of the 
putative collective action members had any role to play in advancing it in its present 
form.” 
Id. at *6; see also Scully, 2015 WL 1527647, at *1–3 (granting the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss the amended complaint because “there was no longer a ‘case or 

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controversy’” without a plaintiff when the plaintiff, who was the only party plaintiff 
in the case, withdrew consent to pursue his claim). 
When Hood filed his Complaint, he asserted t he FLSA claim on behalf of 
himself and “all others similarly situated.” (Doc. No. 1). However, at the time Hood 
alerted his C ounsel to his desire to withdraw as the named plaintiff, no other 
individuals had consented to opt in to the case. Therefore, the FLSA claim went “from 
a one-plaintiff claim to a no-plaintiff claim.” Smith, 2013 WL 1286674, at *6. Article 
III demands that this Court “adjudicate only actual, ongoing cases or controversies,” 
Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990), and parties must maintain “the 
necessary stake” throughout the course of the litigation, Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 
692, 701 (2011) . It was not enough for Hood to say he’d like to “remain part of th e 
. . . Collective” (Doc. No 73-1 ¶ 4) without maintaining that necessary stake as the 
only named plaintiff. 
Plaintiff’s Counsel attempts to save this case through substitution with the 
2025 opt-in plaintiffs.1 But Counsel and opt -in plaintiffs are too late . These three 
individuals cannot save the claim . Plaintiff relies on Castillo to assert that “pre -
certification substitution of the representative is possible.” (Doc. No. 89 at 11) ; 
Castillo, 2018 WL 3429936, at *3 (addressing pre-certification substitution). But in 
Castillo, a substitution occurred immediately, whereas here, the substitute had yet 
to be determined when Hood abandoned his role. See (Doc. No. 73-1; Plaintiff’s Decl. 
 
1 Plaintiff’s Counsel represents that the additional individuals who opted in to the 
action in 2025 are “ready to take Mr. Hood’s place as the representative plaintiff as 
soon as the Court grants leave to amend the complaint.” (Doc. No. 89 at 11). 

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¶ 5) (“I agree to be substituted by another representative plaintiff, who has yet to be 
determined . . . .” (emphasis added)). Hood does not desire to continue to litigate his 
claims as the named or representative plaintiff , and at the time he alerted Counsel 
of his decision to withdraw, no other individual had joined Plaintiff’s suit. At that 
moment, the Court was divested of jurisdiction over the FLSA claim. Therefore, from 
that point forward, the Court did not have authority to adjudicate this matter. 
Lacking jurisdiction, the Court must dismiss the FLSA claim. 
B. Supplemental Jurisdiction 
In cases where the federal court has original jurisdiction, the court “shall have 
supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the 
action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or 
controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 
In other words, “[t]he federal court has supplemental jurisdiction over state-law 
claims sharing a ‘common nucleus of operative fact’ with the federal-law ones.” Royal 
Canin U. S. A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 31 (2025) (quoting United Mine 
Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1996)). “A district court’s decision 
whether to exercise that jurisdiction after dismissing every claim over which it had 
original jurisdiction is purely discretionary.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 
U.S. 635, 639 (2009); see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (“The district courts may decline to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has 
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” (emphasis added)). “The 
district court’s exercise of discretion as to whether to remand a case to state court 

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involves consideration of ‘principles of economy, fairness, convenience and comity.’” 
Hartman v. Univ. of Md. at Balt., 595 F. App’x 179, 180 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting 
Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988)). 
Hood’s only claim that raises a federal question is the FLSA claim, which the 
Court is dismissing with this order. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 10). The Court, in its discretion, 
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Hood’s North Carolina Wage and 
Hour Act claim. That claim is best reserved for the state court to decide. While the 
Court recognizes the parties and the Court have already consumed significant time 
and resources on the litigation of this case, the state -law issues have not been 
extensively briefed before this Court. Therefore, the Court declines to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim and dismisses it without prejudice. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that: 
1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction or 
Want of Prosecution or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment (Doc. 
No. 87) is 
GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED. 
2. The Clerk is directed to close this case. 
SO ORDERED. 
 
 Signed: May 20, 2026 
 
 

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