govinfo:USCOURTS-tnwd-2_08-cv-02425-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
 WESTERN DIVISION 
 
 
 
TONY VON CARRUTHERS, ) 
 ) 
Petitioner, ) 
 ) 
v. ) Case No. 2:08-cv-02425-TLP-cgc 
 ) 
KENNETH NELSEN, WARDEN, ) 
 ) 
Respondent. ) 
 
 
 
ORDER DENYING APPLICATION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION 
 
 
 Petitioner Tony Carruthers petitioned the Court for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 
U.S.C. § 2254 (ECF No. 225) and applied, through counsel, for a stay of execution on Friday 
evening, May 15, 2026. (ECF No. 226.) Respondent responded the following Monday (ECF 
No. 236), and Petitioner replied the next day (ECF No. 237). Petitioner’s execution is scheduled 
for Thursday morning. 
 The Tennessee Supreme Court (“TSC”) has already considered Petitioner’s request to 
stay the execution and denied it. So the narrow issues here are whether the TSC’s decision was 
“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law…” or 
that its decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 
presented…” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) –(2). If so, the Court reviews this claim de novo. But if 
not, the Court applies considerable deference to the findings and ruling of the TSC.
1 
 For the reasons below, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s Application. 
 
1 Because the decision of the TSC is central to this ruling, the Court will quote extensively from 
the TSC’s opinion. 

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BACKGROUND 
 The TSC helpfully summarized the criminal trial that led to this Petition, and while long 
(about 8 pages), the Court includes it here to provide necessary context. 
The proof introduced at the guilt phase of the trial showed that one of the 
victims, Marcellos Anderson, was heavily involved in the drug trade, along with 
two other men, Andre “Baby Brother” Johnson and Terrell Adair. Anderson wore 
expensive jewelry, including a large diamond ring, carried large sums of money on 
his person, and kept a considerable amount of cash in the attic of the home of his 
mother, victim Delois Anderson. When his body was discovered, Anderson was 
not wearing any jewelry and did not have any cash on his person. Anderson was 
acquainted with both defendants, and he considered Carruthers to be a trustworthy 
friend. The proof showed that Anderson’s trust was misplaced. 
 
In the summer of 1993 Jimmy Lee Maze, Jr., a convicted felon, received 
two letters from Carruthers, who was then in prison on an unrelated conviction. In 
the letters, Carruthers referred to “a master plan” that was “a winner.” Carruthers 
wrote of his intention to “make those streets pay me” and announced, “everything 
I do from now on will be well organized and extremely violent.” Later, in the fall 
of 1993, while incarcerated at the Mark Luttrell Reception Center in Memphis 
awaiting his release, Carruthers was assigned to a work detail at a local cemetery, 
the West Tennessee Veterans’ Cemetery. At one point, as he helped bury a body, 
Carruthers remarked to fellow inmate Charles Ray Smith “that would be a good 
way, you know, to bury somebody, if you're going to kill them. . . . [I]f you ain’t 
got no body, you don’t have a case.” 
 
Smith also testified that he overheard Carruthers and Montgomery, who 
also was incarcerated at the Reception Center, talking about Marcellos Anderson 
after Anderson had driven Carruthers back to the Reception Center from a furlough. 
According to Smith, whe n Montgomery asked Carruthers about Anderson, 
Carruthers told him that both Anderson and “Baby Brother” Johnson dealt drugs 
and had a lot of money. Carruthers said he and Montgomery could “rob” and “get” 
Anderson and Johnson once they were released from prison. 
 
When Carruthers was released from the Department of Correction on 
November 15, 1993, he left the Reception Center with Anderson. Carruthers 
accompanied Anderson to Andre Johnson’s house, and received a gift of $200 cash 
from Anderson, Johnson, and Terrell Adair, who was present at Johnson’s house. 
 
One month later, on December 15, 1993, Smith was released from the 
Department of Correction. Upon his release, Smith warned Anderson and Johnson 
of Carruthers’ and Montgomery’s plans to “get them.” According to Smith and 
Johnson, Anderson did not take the warning or the defendants’ threats seriously. 
 

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In mid -December 1993, Maze, his brother and Carruthers were riding 
around Memphis together. They came upon Terrell Adair’s red Jeep on the street 
in front of Delois Anderson’s home where a drive -by shooting had just occurred. 
Adair had been injured in the shooting and was in the hospital. Jonathan “Lulu” 
Montgomery, James Montgomery’s brother, was at the scene of the shooting, and 
he joined Carruthers in the back seat of Maze’s car. According to Maze, Carruthers 
remarked to Jonathan that, “it would be the best time to kidnap Marcellos,” and 
Jonathan asked, “which one Baby Brother or Marcellos?” Carruthers then nudged 
Montgomery with his elbow and said “it” was going to take place after James 
Montgomery was released from prison. About two weeks later, on Dece mber 31, 
Maze saw Carruthers loading three antifreeze containers into a car, and Carruthers 
indicated to Maze that the containers were filled with gasoline. 
 
On January 11, 1994, James Montgomery was released from prison. After 
his release, Montgomery told “Baby Brother” Johnson that he, not Johnson, was in 
charge of the neighborhood. Montgomery said, “It was my neighborhood before I 
left, and now I’m back and its [sic] my neighborhood again.” Montgomery asked 
Johnson if he wanted to “go to war about this neighborhood.” When Johnson said, 
“no,” Montgomery replied “You feeling now like I’m about to blow your motherf–
––g brains out” and “you all need to get in line around here or we’re going to war 
about this.” Near the end of January or the first of February 1994, Johnson and 
Adair saw the defendants sitting together in an older model grey car down the street 
from Johnson’s mother’s home. It was late at night, bet ween 11 p.m. and 1 a.m. 
When the defendants approached Johnson and Adair, Montgomery asked why they 
thought he was trying to harm them. Montgomery told them, “Look, I told you, we 
ain’t got no problem with nobody in this neighborhood. We already got our ma n 
staked out. If we wanted some trouble or something, we got you right now. We’d 
kill your whole family.” Confirming Montgomery’s statement, Carruthers told 
them, “We already got our man staked out. You all right. If it’s any problem, we’ll 
deal with it later.” Montgomery explained that he intended to take the “man’s” 
money and drugs, and said, “if the police didn’t have no body, they wouldn’t have 
no case.” 
 
On February 23, 1994, Marcellos Anderson borrowed a white Jeep 
Cherokee from his cousin, Michael Harris. Around 4:30 on the afternoon of 
February 24, 1994, witnesses saw Marcellos Anderson and Frederick Tucker riding 
in the Jeep Cherokee along with James a nd Jonathan Montgomery. About 5 p.m. 
that day, James and Jonathan Montgomery and Anderson and Tucker arrived in the 
Jeep Cherokee at the house of Nakeita Shaw, the Montgomery brothers’ cousin. 
Nakeita Shaw, her four children, and Benton West, also her cousin, were present at 
the house when they arrived. 
 
The four men entered the house and went downstairs to the basement. A 
short time later, James Montgomery came back upstairs and asked Nakeita Shaw if 
she could leave for a while so he could “take care of some business.” Nakeita Shaw 
told West that she thought “they” were being kidnapped, and then she left the house 

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with West and her children. West agreed to care for Nakeita Shaw’s children while 
she attended a meeting. 
 
When Nakeita Shaw returned home after the meeting, she saw only 
Carruthers and James Montgomery. Montgomery asked her to go pick up her 
children and to “stay gone a little longer.” Nakeita Shaw returned home with her 
children before 10 p.m. The Jeep Cherokee was gone, but James Montgomery and 
Carruthers were still present at her home. Montgomery told Nakeita Shaw to put 
her children to bed upstairs and remain there until he told her he was leaving. 
Sometime later, Montgomery called out to Nakeita Shaw that he was leaving. She 
returned downstairs and saw James Montgomery, Carruthers, and the two victims, 
Anderson and Tucker, leave in the Jeep Cherokee. Prior to trial, Nakeita Shaw told 
the police that Anderson’s and Tucker’s hands were tied behind their backs when 
they left her house. While she admitted making this statement, she testified at trial 
that the statement was false and that she had not seen Anderson’s and Tucker’s 
hands tied when they left her home. 
 
In the meantime, around 8 p.m. on February 24, Laventhia Briggs 
telephoned her aunt, victim Delois Anderson. When someone picked up the 
telephone but said nothing, Briggs hung up. Briggs called “a couple of more times” 
but received no answer. Briggs was li ving with Delois Anderson at the time and 
arrived at her aunt’s home around 9:00 p.m. Although Delois Anderson was not 
home, her purse, car, and keys were there. Food left in Anderson’s bedroom 
indicated that she had been interrupted while eating. Briggs went to bed, assuming 
her aunt would return home soon. A co-worker, whom Delois Anderson had driven 
home around 7:15 p.m., was the last person to have seen her alive. 
 
Chris Hines, who had known the defendants since junior high school, 
testified that around 8:45 p.m. on February 24, 1994, Jonathan Montgomery 
“beeped” him. Jonathan said, “Man, an –––r got them folks.” When Hines asked, 
“What folks?” Jonathan replied, “Cell o and them” and said something about 
stealing $200,000. Jonathan then indicated that he could not talk more on the 
telephone and arranged to meet Hines in person. Jonathan arrived at Hines’ home 
at about 9:00 p.m. and told him, “Man, we got them folks out at the cemetery on 
Elvis Presley, and we got $200,000. Man, a n––– r had to kill them folks.” At that 
point, James Montgomery “beeped in” and talked with Jonathan. When the 
telephone call ended, Jonathan asked Hines to drive him to the cemetery. Hines 
refused, but he allowed Jonathan to borrow his car, which Jonathan promised to 
return in an hour. When the car was not returned, Hines called James Montgomery’s 
cellular telephone at around 11 p.m. James told Hines that he did not know where 
Jonathan was, that Jonathan did not have a driver’s license, and that the car should 
be returned by 4 a.m. because Jonathan was supposed to drive James to his 
girlfriend’s house. 
 
The Jeep Cherokee that Anderson had borrowed was found in Mississippi 
on February 25 around 2:40 a.m. It had been destroyed by fire. About 3:30 a.m., 

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after he was informed of the vehicle fire by law enforcement officials, Harris 
telephoned Delois Anderson’s home, and Laventhia Briggs then discovered that 
neither her aunt Delois nor her cousin Marcellos had returned home. Briggs filed a 
missing person report with the police later that day. 
 
The Montgomery brothers and Carruthers did not return Hines’ car until 
approximately 8:30 a.m. on February 25. The car was very muddy. Hines drove 
James Montgomery and Carruthers to Montgomery’s mother’s home and then 
drove away with Jonathan Montgomery. T hat morning Jonathan, whom Hines 
described as acting “paranoid” and “nervous,” repeatedly told Hines that “they had 
to kill some people.” About two hours later, James Montgomery and Carruthers 
came to Hines’ home looking for Jonathan. Hines advised Carruthers and James 
Montgomery that he was celebrating his birthday, and he asked James Montgomery 
to give him a birthday present. James agreed to give Hines twenty dollars after he 
picked up his paycheck, and James also agreed to have Hines’ car washed 
immediately as a birthday present. 
 
Hines, the Montgomery brothers, and Carruthers drove to a carwash, and 
James Montgomery paid an unidentified elderly man to clean the car. The man 
cleaned the interior of the car and the trunk of the car. Neither Carruthers nor James 
Montgomery supervised the cleaning of the car. After Jonathan Montgomery 
abruptly left the carwash, Carruthers and James Montgomery asked Hines what 
Jonathan had tol d him, but Hines did not tell them. Several days later James 
Montgomery came to Hines’ home and offered Hines an AK–47 assault rifle 
because Montgomery said he had “heard that Hines was into it with some people 
on the street.” James Montgomery told Hines the rifle had “blood on it.” Hines 
testified that he interpreted this statement to mean that someone had been shot with 
the weapon. 
 
On March 3, 1994, about one week after a missing person report was filed 
on Delois and Marcellos Anderson, Jonathan Montgomery directed Detective Jack 
Ruby of the Memphis Police Department to the grave of Dorothy Daniels at the 
Rose Hill Cemetery on Elvis Presley Boulevard. Daniels’ grave was located six 
plots away from the grave site of the Montgomery brothers’ cousin. Daniels had 
been buried on February 25, 1994. Pursuant to a court order, Daniels’ casket was 
disinterred, and the authorities discovered the bodies of the three victims buried 
beneath the casket under several inches of dirt and a single piece of plywood. 
 
An employee of the cemetery testified that a pressed wood box or vault had 
been placed in Daniels’ grave during working hours on February 24 and that it 
would have taken at least two people to remove the box. Daniels’ casket had been 
placed in the grave in side the box on February 25, and, according to Dr. Hugh 
Edward Berryman, one of the forensic anthropologists who assisted in the removal 
of the bodies from the crime scene, there was no evidence to suggest that Daniels’ 
casket had been disturbed after she was buried. Thus, it can be inferred that the 
bodies of the three victims were placed in the grave and covered with dirt and a 

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piece of plywood prior to the casket being placed in the grave. 
 
Dr. O.C. Smith, who helped remove the bodies from the grave and who 
performed autopsies on the victims, testified that, when found, the body of Delois 
Anderson was lying at the bottom of the grave and the bodies of the two male 
victims were lying on top of her. The hands of all three victims were bound behind 
their backs. Frederick Tucker’s feet were also bound and his neck showed signs of 
bruising caused by a ligature. A red sock was found around Delois Anderson’s 
neck. Marcellos Anderson was not wearing a ny jewelry. Dr. Smith testified that 
Delois Anderson died from asphyxia caused by several factors: the position of her 
head against her body, dirt in her mouth and nose, and trauma from weight on her 
body. Frederick Tucker had received a gunshot wound to his chest, which would 
not have been fatal had he received medical care. He had also suffered injuries from 
blunt trauma to his abdomen and head resulting in broken ribs, a fractured skull, 
and a ruptured liver. Dr. Smith opined that Tucker was shot and placed in the grave, 
where the force of compression from being buried produced the other injuries and, 
along with the gunshot wound, caused his death. According to Dr. Smith, Marcellos 
Anderson had been shot three times: a contact wound to his forehead that w as not 
severe and two shots to his neck, one of which was also not serious. However, the 
gunshot causing the other neck wound had entered Anderson’s windpipe and 
severed his spinal cord, paralyzing him from the neck down. This wound was not 
instantaneously fatal. Anderson had also suffered blunt trauma to his abdomen from 
compression forces. Dr. Smith opined that each victim was alive when buried. 
 
Defendant James Montgomery presented no proof. Carruthers, acting pro 
se, called several witnesses to rebut the testimony offered by the State, primarily 
by attacking the credibility of the State’s witnesses. 
 
A health administrator at the Mark Luttrell Reception Center testified that, 
because of an injury to his arm, Carruthers had been given a job change on October 
6, 1993, and had not worked at the cemetery after that date. Another official at the 
Reception C enter testified that Carruthers was not released on furlough after 
Montgomery arrived at the Reception Center on November 4, 1994. This proof was 
offered to impeach Smith’s testimony that Montgomery and Carruthers discussed 
robbing and getting Marcellos Anderson after Anderson drove Carruthers back to 
the Reception Center following a furlough. An investigator appointed to assist 
Carruthers with his defense testified that he had interviewed Maze, who admitted 
he did not know anything about the “master plan” to which Carruthers referred in 
the letters until Carruthers was released from prison. On cross -examination, the 
investigator admitted that Maze said that when he was released from prison, 
Carruthers had explained that the master plan involved kidnapping M arcellos 
Anderson. Carruthers’ brother and another witness testified that Jonathan 
Montgomery was not at the scene of the drive-by shooting involving Terrell Adair. 
This proof was offered to impeach Maze’s testimony that Carruthers and Jonathan 
Montgomery discussed kidnapping Marcellos on the day that Terrell Adair was 
shot. Another witness, Aldolpho Antonio James testified that he and Carruthers had 

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been visiting a friend between the hours of 1:00 a.m. and 2:00 a.m. the day before 
these homicides were first reported on the news. This testimony was offered to 
provide at least a partial alibi for Carruthers for the early morning hours of February 
25, 1994. However, on cross -examination, James admitted that he and Carruthers 
had been together. 
 
Carruthers also called Alfredo Shaw as a witness. After seeing a television 
news report about these killings in March of 1994, Alfredo Shaw had telephoned 
CrimeStoppers and given a statement to the police implicating Carruthers. Alfredo 
Shaw later testified before the grand jury which eventually returned the indictments 
against Carruthers and Montgomery. Prior to trial, however, several press reports 
indicated that Alfredo Shaw had recanted his grand jury testimony, professed that 
the statement had been fabricated, and intended to formally recant his grand jury 
testimony when called as a witness for the defense. Therefore, when Carruthers 
called Alfredo Shaw to testify, the prosecution announced that if he took the stand 
and recanted his prior sworn testimony, he would be charged with and prosecuted 
for two counts of aggravated perjury. In light of the prosecution’s announcement, 
the trial court summoned Alfredo Shaw ’s attorney and allowed Alfredo Shaw to 
confer privately with him. Following that private conference, Alfredo Shaw’s 
attorney advised the trial court, defense counsel, including Carruthers, and the 
prosecution, that Alfredo Shaw intended to testify consiste ntly with his prior 
statements and grand jury testimony and that any inconsistent statements Alfredo 
Shaw had made to the press were motivated by his fear of Carruthers and by threats 
he had received from him. 
 
Despite this information, Carruthers called Alfredo Shaw as a witness and 
as his attorney advised, Shaw provided testimony consistent with his initial 
statement to the police and his grand jury testimony. Specifically, Alfredo Shaw 
testified that he had be en on a three -way call with Carruthers and either Terry or 
Jerry Durham, and during this call, Carruthers had asked him to participate in these 
murders, saying he had a “sweet plan” and that they would each earn $100,000 and 
a kilogram of cocaine. Following his arrest for these murders, Carruthers was 
incarcerated in the Shelby County Jail along with Alfredo Shaw, who was 
incarcerated on unrelated charges. Carruthers and Alfredo Shaw were in the law 
library when Carruthers told Alfredo Shaw that he and some other unidentified 
individuals went to Delois Anderson’s house looking for Marcellos Anderson and 
his money. Marcellos was not there when they arrived, but Carruthers told Delois 
Anderson to call her son and tell him to come home, “it’s something important.” 
When Anderson arrived, the defendants forced Anderson, Tucker, who was with 
Anderson, and Delois Anderson into the jeep at gunpoint and drove them to 
Mississippi, where the defendants shot Marcellos Anderson and Tucker and burned 
the jeep. According to Alfredo Shaw, the defendants then drove all three victims 
back to Memphis in a stolen vehicle. Alfredo Shaw testified that, after they put 
Marcellos Anderson and Tucker into the grave, Delois Anderson started screaming 
and one of the defendants told her t o “shut up” or she would die like her son and 
pushed her into the grave. Carruthers also told Alfredo Shaw that the bodies would 

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never have been discovered if “the boy wouldn’t have went and told them folks.” 
Carruthers told Alfredo Shaw that he was not going to hire an attorney or post bond 
because the prosecution would then learn that the murders had been a “hit.” 
Carruthers told Alfredo Shaw that Johnson also was supposed to have been “hit” 
and that Terry and Jerry Durham were the “main people behind having these 
individuals killed.” Carruthers said that the Durhams wanted revenge because 
Anderson and Johnson had previously stolen from them. 
 
In response to questioning by Carruthers, Alfredo Shaw acknowledged that 
he had told the press that his statement to police and his grand jury testimony had 
been fabricated, but said he had done so because Carruthers had threatened him and 
his family. Acco rding to Alfredo Shaw, one of Carruthers’ investigators had 
arranged for a news reporter to speak with him about recanting his grand jury 
testimony. 
 As impeachment of his own witness, Carruthers called both Jerry and Terry 
Durham, twin brothers, as witnesses. The Durhams denied knowing Alfredo Shaw 
and said they had never been party to a three-way telephone call involving Alfredo 
Shaw and Carruthers. C arruthers also called attorney AC Wharton who testified 
that he was initially retained by Carruthers’ mother to represent her son on these 
murder charges, but was required to withdraw because of a conflict of interest. This 
testimony was offered to impeac h Alfredo Shaw’s statement that Carruthers had 
said he was not going to hire an attorney or post bond. Finally, Carruthers called an 
administrative assistant from the Shelby County jail who testified that jail records, 
[sic] indicated that Alfredo Shaw was not in the law library at the same time as 
Carruthers in either February or March of 1994. According to jail records, Alfredo 
Shaw was in protective custody for much of that time and, as a result, would have 
been escorted at all times by a guard. However, on cross-examination, this witness 
admitted that the jail records regarding the law library were not always complete or 
accurate and that Alfredo Shaw had been housed outside of protective custody from 
mid-March to early April 1994 which would have afforded him the opportunity to 
interact with Carruthers. The record reflects that Alfredo Shaw came forward and 
provided a statement to police on March 27, 1994 and that the indictments were 
returned on March 29, 1994. 
(ECF No. 228-31 at PageID 32942–49 (quoting State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 524–30 (Tenn. 
2000) (footnotes omitted).) 
 The jury found Petitioner guilty of three counts of first-degree murder for killing 
Marcellos Anderson, his mother Delois Anderson, and Frederick Tucker and then sentenced him 
to death for the 1994 murders. See Carruthers v. State, 145 S.W.3d 85, 88 (Tenn. Crim. App. 
2003). Both state and federal courts have reviewed Petitioner’s conviction and upheld it each 

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time. Petitioner filed a direct appeal of his convictions in the state appellate courts. (See ECF 
Nos. 195, 211, 214.) And then he sought post-conviction relief in state court and habeas relief at 
the federal district court and appellate levels.2 (See ECF Nos. 195, 211, 214.) 
 In September 2025, the TSC set an execution date for May 21, 2026, at 10:00 a.m. (See 
ECF No. 227-4.) It then remanded the case to the Criminal Court of Shelby County to determine 
Petitioner’s “present competency” to be executed under the procedures in Van Tran v. State, 6 
S.W.3d 257 (Tenn. 1999) and the standard in State v. Irick, 320 S.W.3d 284 (Tenn. 2010). (See 
id.) The TSC directed Petitioner to petition no sooner than February 11, 2026, and no later than 
February 13, 2026, to “ensure the determination of Mr. Carruthers’ competency to be executed 
occurs in close proximity to his scheduled execution date.” (Id. at PageID 20753.) 
 In his petition (“Incompetency Petition”) that followed, Petitioner’s counsel 
acknowledged that Petitioner was aware of the execution date and that the State has set the date 
because of his murder convictions.3 (See ECF No. 227-5 at PageID 20758.) Counsel, however, 
asserted that Petitioner suffers “gross delusions” because of brain damage and schizoaffective 
disorder bipolar type. (Id. at PageID 20758–59.) And Counsel asserted that these delusions 
interfere with Petitioner’s ability to rationally understand the execution and the reasons why he is 
being executed. (Id. at PageID 20759.) According to his counsel, Petitioner’s awareness of a 
link between his crime and the punishment is “so far removed from reality that the punishment 
can serve no proper purpose.” (Id. at PageID 20768 (quoting Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 
 
2 The evidence presented at trial and information about Petitioner’s state court appeal and initial 
habeas petition can be found in the Court’s order denying habeas relief. (See ECF No. 195.) 
3 The provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) 
addressing “second or successive” petitions, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), do not apply to the instant 
incompetency to be executed claim, which has only recently become ripe. See Panetti v. 
Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 945 (2007). 

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930, 960 (2007)). 
 Counsel further claimed that Petitioner believes a “cabal of corrupt judges, prosecutors, 
and defense attorneys have conspired to secure his conviction and death sentence” and that they 
are “essentially playing a game of chicken with him” to avoid payment of his claims for financial 
damages against the corrupt state actors. (Id. at PageID 20760–61.) Counsel asserted that 
Petitioner believes his counsel conspired against him and that he speaks of his imminent release. 
(Id. at PageID 20761–63.) And Counsel argued that Petitioner is obsessed with “taking the bar 
cards” of lawyers who committed “fraud on the court” related to Alfredo Shaw’s testimony 
without understanding that “sanctioning of counsel will not save his life.” (Id. at PageID 20764–
65.) Counsel also addressed Petitioner’s belief that his calls are illegally wiretapped. (Id. at 
PageID 20765–66.) 
 Attached to the Incompetency Petition was a February 11, 2026, report from psychiatrist 
Bhushan Agharkar. Dr. Agharkar’s report is based on (1) his evaluation of Petitioner in 2011;
4 
(2) Tennessee Department of Corrections medical and institutional records; (3) recorded 
telephone calls from October 1, 2025, and January 22, 2026; (3) voicemails that Petitioner left 
with his attorney’s office from December 1, 2025, until January 27, 2026; and (4) the 
declarations of Petitioner’s counsel, a paralegal, and an attorney with another Federal Public 
Defender’s office. (See id. at PageID 20802–11.) 
The state trial court held a four-day hearing in March 2026 over whether Petitioner is 
competent for execution. See State v. Carruthers, No. W1997-00097-SC-DDT-DD, 2026 WL 
1257769, at *7 (Tenn. May 7, 2026), pet for cert. docketed (U.S. May 14, 2026). Petitioner 
 
4 Agharkar determined that Petitioner was not competent to represent himself at the 1996 trial, as 
an advocate at his capital sentencing hearing, or to waive mental health claims in the post-
conviction proceedings. (Id. at PageID 20802.) 

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testified, as did his former counsel Richard Tennent, Houston Goddard, and Kelley Henry, 
paralegal Satyra Deaver, Attorney Casey Swanson, and Agharkar, and he introduced forty-six 
exhibits. See id. at *9. The State relied on the testimony of court-appointed expert Dr. Thomas 
Schacht. Id. The trial court made findings of fact and concluded that Petitioner was competent 
to be executed. (See ECF No. 228-15 at PageID 30958–79.) On appeal, the TSC affirmed the 
trial court and denied Petitioner’s request to stay his execution. (See ECF No. 228-31.) 
 Petitioner petitions here for habeas corpus relief, asserting that he is incompetent to be 
executed based on Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 
930 (2007), and Madison v. Alabama, 586 U.S. 265 (2019). (See ECF No. 225; see also ECF 
No. 226 at PageID 20529; ECF No. 233.) Respondent responded in opposition. (ECF No. 235.) 
Petitioner replied. (ECF No. 237.) 
 Petitioner also sued in the United States District Court of Middle District of Tennessee 
and moved to stay his execution over claims about the evidence in his murder trial. On May 15, 
2026, that court denied a stay of execution, see Carruthers v. Skrmetti, No. 3:26-cv-00540, 2026 
WL 1365275 (M.D. Tenn. May 15, 2026), and Petitioner has appealed. See Carruthers v. 
Skrmetti, No. 26-5433 (6th Cir. May 15, 2026). On May 19, 2026, the United States Supreme 
Court denied a stay of execution and a petition for writ of certiorari. (See ECF No. 238-2.) 
Carruthers v. Tennessee, No. 25-7377, 2026 WL 1392958 (U.S. May 19, 2026). 
 Petitioner has also moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2244 seeking leave to file a second or 
successive habeas petition in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. See In re: 
Tony Carruthers, No. 26-5434, Doc. 1 (6th Cir. May 16, 2026). 
THE COMPETENCY HEARING 
Because the trial court’s evaluation of Petitioner and the evidence presented at the 

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competency hearing and the TSC’s evaluation of the trial court are central to the dispute here, the 
Court will take the time to recount the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing. 
Fortunately, the TSC accurately summarized the evidence presented at the competency hearing. 
See Carruthers, 2026 WL 1257769, at *9–19. (See ECF No. 228-31 at PageID 32954–66.) The 
Court will therefore rely on the TSC’s retelling of the hearing here. 
Attorney Tennent represented Petitioner from 2018 through 2023. (ECF No. 228-31 at 
PageID 32954.) He worked as a Federal Public Defender in the Capital Habeas Unit, and he 
prepared Petitioner’s 2019 response to the State’s motion to set an execution date. (Id.) 
Attorney Tennent spoke with Petitioner about seventy-five times a year over the phone and met 
with him twice in person. (Id.) He last spoke with Petitioner in 2023. (Id.) 
Attorney Tennent testified to the many “false beliefs or delusions” that he believed that 
Petitioner maintained 
In Mr. Tennant’s layman’s view, Mr. Carruthers is fixated on multiple false 
beliefs or delusions. As examples, he cites Mr. Carruthers’ belief that he is under 
constant surveillance and that his telephone calls are being monitored by everyone 
involved in the case. According to Mr. Tennent, Mr. Carruthers falsely believes he 
is entitled to significant compensation for each of these ethical violations based on 
Tennessee Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3. 
Mr. Tennent testified that Mr. Carruthers is also fixated on Alfredo Shaw, a 
defense witness at trial who claimed Mr. Carruthers confessed to him in jail. He 
said Mr. Carruthers mentioned Mr. Shaw in every conversation. He added that Mr. 
Carruthers believes everyone knows he did not commit these crimes and was 
framed by Mr. Shaw. Further, Mr. Carruthers believes Mr. Shaw is a liar who gave 
false testimony and is a paid government informant . . . . Mr. Tennent said Mr. 
Carruthers’ beliefs about Mr. Shaw are “far from delusional,” explaining that many 
related issues were litigated in the post- conviction proceedings. . . . Mr. Tennent 
said Mr. Carruthers believed the parties responsible for the fraud would be arrested, 
and he would be released. . . . 
During re -direct examination, Mr. Tennent recalled that Mr. Carruthers 
believed some of his former male counsel had a sexual interest in him and had 
“made passes at him.” Finally, when asked if he believes Mr. Carruthers believes 
the State does not wish to execute him, Mr. Tennent responded that he is convinced 
Mr. Carruthers thinks “this is all a sham . . . to coerce an Alford plea.” 

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(Id. at PageID 32954–55.) But Attorney Tennent clarified and softened some of his statements 
on cross-examination. 
On cross-examination, Mr. Tennent clarified that when he states that Mr. 
Carruthers is delusional or displays paranoia, Mr. Tennent means Mr. Carruthers 
believes things that Mr. Tennent believes are not true. As to Mr. Carruthers’ belief 
that his calls fro m prison are being monitored, Mr. Tennent acknowledged his 
awareness of a class action lawsuit against Global Tel Link involving improper 
recording of attorney-client calls, adding that such lawsuits can result in monetary 
judgments. Mr. Tennent also agreed that on approximately six occasions he likely 
reinforced Mr. Carruthers’ belief that their conversations were being recorded. . . . 
Regarding Mr. Carruthers’ belief that he is being illegally incarcerated, Mr. 
Tennent agreed that, stated differently, Mr. Carruthers has a deeply held belief he 
is innocent of the crimes for which he was convicted. Although Mr. Tennent 
believes Mr. Carruthers thinks this is a “giant farce” and that the death penalty is 
only being used to coerce him into entering a plea, Mr. Tennent agreed Mr. 
Carruthers has never disputed that he has been convicted of these crimes. Mr. 
Tennent agrees that it seems Mr. Carruthers believes if he files complaints with the 
Board of Professional Responsibility (BPR) against the attorneys involved in the 
fraud, the BPR will investigate, and he will be immediately released and 
exonerated. 
(Id. at PageID 32955.) On recall, Attorney Tennent testified that he spoke with Petitioner about 
an Alford plea in 2019, 2020, and 2021. (Id. at PageID 32963.) According to Attorney Tennent, 
Petitioner was angry that his co-defendant took an Alford plea after his conviction was 
overturned because Petitioner believed his co-defendant to be innocent and his plea to therefore 
be fraudulent. (Id. at PageID 32963–64.) “Mr. Tennent testified that . . . Mr. Carruthers believes 
all of the conspirators know he is not guilty; however, they are . . . trying to avoid paying [him] 
$3.3 million . . . and . . . losing their law licenses by forcing him to take a plea. . . . [or] hav[ing] 
him found incompetent.” (Id.) Attorney Tennent also testified that he thinks that Petitioner does 
not believe the State is serious about executing him. (Id. at PageID 32964.) 
 Attorney Kelley Henry, another Federal Public Defender in the Habeas Capital Unit, 
supervised Attorney Tenant and worked on Petitioner’s case in 2019. (Id. at PageID 32956.) 
She took over direct representation of Petitioner in 2020. (Id.) She reassigned the case to 

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Petitioner’s current counsel in 2025. (Id.) She met with Petitioner once in person, a meeting 
during which Petitioner only wanted to discuss Alfredo Shaw. (Id.) And she spoke with 
Petitioner on the phone every two months while she represented him. (Id.) Attorney Henry also 
described her experiences with Petitioner and his beliefs. 
Ms. Henry said that, due to the perceived federal wiretap, the calls began 
with Mr. Carruthers announcing himself and informing the listeners they owe him 
$3.3 million dollars for listening to his attorney- client calls. Ms. Henry said Mr. 
Carruthers regularly left voicemails for her with some variation on the theme of Mr. 
Shaw, ‘fraud on the court,’ and writing to the BPR. She said that at some point, Mr. 
Carruthers brought the idea of federal income taxes into the “delusion,” informing 
Ms. Henry she should report to her superiors that confidential informants are not 
paying federal income taxes. . . . 
Ms. Henry recalled that Mr. Carruthers told her she could take certain 
actions that would result in his immediate release. For example, to secure his 
immediate release, she could report his former counsel to Sandy Garrett at the BPR; 
inform John Bledsoe, Assistant Attorney General and “officer of the court” of the 
fraud on the court; and/or inform the IRS that confidential informants do not pay 
their income taxes on payments made by prosecutors. 
(Id.) On cross-examination, Attorney Henry noted that Petitioner “has always maintained his 
innocence.” (Id.) 
 Satyra Deaver was the chief paralegal in the Federal Public Defender’s Office and 
worked on Petitioner’s case since 2008. (Id. at PageID 32957.) “In her layperson view, Mr. 
Carruthers exhibits various paranoias including: his food and toothpaste are being poisoned; 
TDOC employs homosexuals who are against him; his cell door is monitored by a camera 24/7; 
the phones have wiretaps; and a named federal counsel has sexually transmitted infections 
(STIs).” (Id.) Deaver echoed Attorney Tennent in testifying that Petitioner is fixated with 
“taking the bar cards of every attorney and judge who has wronged him,” and she also stated that 
he is fixated with “promoting hashtags; and with the number 3.3.” (Id.) The hashtags that she 
claims that he seeks to promote all relate to freeing Petitioner or Alfredo Shaw’s perceived fraud. 
(Id.) In her view, Petitioner promotes these hashtags to secure his freedom and the money he 

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believes he is owed. (Id.) 
Deaver also presented communications from Petitioner related to the “fraud on the 
court,” Alfredo Shaw, and “Shaw’s purported failure to pay income taxes on monies paid to him 
as a confidential informant.” (Id.) Deaver stated that Petitioner expressed no concern about his 
execution and had not mentioned it in recent calls. (Id.) 
On cross-examination, Deaver agreed that Petitioner had not disputed the murders, his 
conviction, or his death sentence, but she also stated that they had not discussed them either. 
(Id.) She also agreed that Petitioner had been trying to overturn his conviction since his trial and 
that pushing hashtags can create results in exoneration campaigns. (Id.) 
Attorney Casey Swanson is a Federal Public Defender from Detroit who received 
voicemails from Petitioner referencing wiretaps and $3.3 million or trillion. (Id.) At first she 
ignored the messages, but then, she spoke with Petitioner in 2022. (Id. at PageID 32957–58.) 
From then on, Petitioner “routinely talked about wiretaps, the $3.3 million, Alfredo Shaw, tax 
evasion, and hashtags.” (Id. at PageID 32958.) She would send Petitioner’s voicemails to 
Deaver. (Id.) 
Dr. Bhushan Agharkar is a board-certified psychiatrist from Atlanta, Georgia. (Id.) His 
testimony at the competency hearing was extensive, and the TSC summarizes it well. 
Mr. Carruthers’ former counsel first contacted Dr. Agharkar in 2008 
initially seeking assistance in improving communication with Mr. Carruthers and 
ultimately seeking an evaluation of Mr. Carruthers’ competency to stand trial (post-
trial) and his competency to waive certain rights. In 2011, Dr. Agharkar conducted 
an in-person interview that lasted approximately three and a half hours. In the fall 
of 2025, counsel asked Dr. Agharkar to update his 2011 interview by conducting a 
new psychiatric interview or evaluation related to a January 2026 hearing on Mr. 
Carruthers’ pro se fingerprint petition and his competency to proceed pro se in those 
proceedings. Dr. Agharkar attempted to interview Mr. Carruthers on two occasions; 
however, Mr. Carruthers refused to meet with him. Dr. Agharkar prepared a report 
for the January 2026 hearing, and subsequently, prepared an updated report, which 
was attached to Mr. Carruthers’ petition to be declared incompetent to be executed. 

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Dr. Agharkar recalled the 2011 interview and his diagnosis of 
schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type. Turning to the 2026 evaluation, Dr. Agharkar 
again noted that he was unable to interview Mr. Carruthers despite his preference 
to interview Mr. Carruthers to talk to him about his symptoms. He said, in the 
absence of an interview, he obtained that kind of information from other sources. 
Dr. Agharkar included a comprehensive list of the data he reviewed, noting that he 
primarily relied on the declarations, the handwritten letters, the recorded calls and 
voicemails, and the TDOC medical records. Dr. Agharkar identified specific TDOC 
records spanning from 2011 through 2023 that, in his view, support his diagnosis. 
Upon reviewing these additional materials, Dr. Agharkar said his diagnosis remains 
the same. 
 
As to the delusions, Dr. Agharkar said Mr. Carruthers believes there is a 
conspiracy against him. According to Dr. Agharkar, Mr. Carruthers believes his 
attorneys are trying to get him killed; that everything is working against him; and 
that there is a “fraud upon the court” based on ethical violations and that as a result 
of the ethical violations he is entitled to monetary damages. When asked to clarify 
his understanding of Mr. Carruthers’ understanding of the purpose of his execution, 
Dr. Agharkar said that Mr. Carruthers believes the State’s reason for executing him 
is to deprive him of remuneration for his claims. He explained that Mr. Carruthers 
believes the State is playing a “game of chicken” in order to force him to settle his 
monetary claims or to deprive him of his money. Dr. Agharkar described another 
delusion about the number 3.3, which is based on ethical guideline 3.3 and relates 
to the amount of money to which Mr. Carruthers believes he is entitled to receive 
for every ethical violation. 
 
Dr. Agharkar also generally discussed Mr. Carruthers’ delusions about 
federal taxes owed by informants; poisoning of his food; constant monitoring in 
prison; his former counsel’s STIs; social media hashtags; a wiretap; and a possible 
connection between Jud ge Joe Brown withdrawing from the mayor’s race and 
Governor Lee possibly listening to his calls. (521) When asked how these delusions 
relate to whether Mr. Carruthers has a rational understanding of the connection 
between his conviction, his sentences, and his execution, Dr. Agharkar testified that 
based on the assessment of everything he had reviewed, Mr. Carruthers does not 
have a rational connection and rational understanding between why he was 
convicted and the execution. Instead, according to Dr. Aghar kar, Mr. Carruthers 
thinks that the vast conspiracy is keeping him from the money he is owed and that 
he will be executed or forced into a settlement of some kind. Dr. Agharkar testified 
he was addressing only the rational component of the Panetti standard and was not 
testifying that Mr. Carruthers lacks awareness of his conviction and death sentence. 
 
On cross-examination, Dr. Agharkar said that in his observations of Mr. 
Carruthers during the competency hearing, Mr. Carruthers did not appear to be in a 
manic state at this time; did not appear to be psychotic; and showed no signs of 
psychosis. 

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Dr. Agharkar also acknowledged that Mr. Carruthers was able to 
communicate about problems related to his housing during the week of the hearing 
and was able to communicate with counsel. When asked about his direct testimony 
that Mr. Carruthers believes his attorneys are trying to kill him, Dr. Agharkar 
agreed that Mr. Carruthers does not believe his attorneys are literally trying to kill 
him. Instead, he means his attorneys are not raising issues he believes have merit 
and could result in his exoneration. H owever, Dr. Agharkar would like the ability 
to ask Mr. Carruthers more about the meaning. 
 
During redirect examination, Dr. Agharkar compared Mr. Carruthers with 
Mr. Panetti. Dr. Agharkar had evaluated Mr. Panetti during Mr. Panetti’s case. Dr. 
Agharkar testified that based on his writings, Mr. Carruthers does not believe “this 
to be real” becau se he keeps talking about going free, even as recently as the 
January 2026 hearing, and he continues to believe his execution is a way to force 
him to settle or to stop him from getting the money he is owed. Thus, Dr. Agharkar 
opined that, like Mr. Panetti , Mr. Carruthers’ understanding was compromised by 
this belief that was a delusion. Dr. Agharkar, who evaluated Mr. Panetti, 
acknowledged that he was able to conduct an interview with Mr. Panetti regarding 
his competency-to-be-executed claim. 
 
At the close of recross examination, the trial court questioned Dr. Agharkar 
about his testimony. When asked if Mr. Carruthers links his compensation to his 
wrongful conviction, Dr. Agharkar responded that Mr. Carruthers believes he is 
entitled to compensa tion because of his lawyers’ ethical violations. When asked 
where he got that information, Dr. Agharkar said he talked to Mr. Carruthers about 
the compensation in 2011, but he added that the amount had obviously increased. 
The trial court then questioned D r. Agharkar about his testimony concerning Mr. 
Carruthers’ rational understanding for purposes of the competency standard. Dr. 
Agharkar opined that Mr. Carruthers believes he will be executed to prevent him 
from getting the money. Dr. Agharkar added, “I think it’s two things. One is that 
the execution will not go forward because the whole point of it is to get him to settle 
for money, but that if he were to be executed, it would be to stop him from getting 
the money.” Noting again that Dr. Agharkar has not interviewed Mr. Carruthers 
about this belief, the trial court pointed out that, despite the importance of this 
testimony, Dr. Agharkar did not mention in his report provided to the trial court 
that Mr. Carruthers believes he is going to be executed to prevent him from getting 
the money. The court took a recess to allow Dr. Agharkar the opportunity to review 
his report again to see if any declaration or any evidence supports this testimony. 
When court reconvened, Dr. Agharkar said he could not find it in any declaration 
or in either of his reports. Dr. Agharkar apologized if he misspoke or “took that too 
far.” 
 
Next, Dr. Agharkar agreed the court was required to focus on Mr. 
Carruthers’ current competency. Dr. Agharkar testified, “I think [Mr. Carruthers] 
would understand why the State says they are going to execute him for the 

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conviction of murder. I think he would say that. Again, I’m so limited because I 
can’t talk to him. But yes, I believe he understands that from his writings.” When 
the court reminded Dr. Agharkar he testified on direct that Mr. Carruthers does not 
have a r ational understanding of the connection, Dr. Agharkar said “[Mr. 
Carruther’s] belief that it’s a sham that it’s about the money and that the execution 
is to get him to settle, you know, to bludgeon him into basically taking a deal 
because he believes he’s going to go free and everyone seems to know that[’s] his 
belief. So I believe that’s where the execution comes in that this is not real.” When 
the court asked where Dr. Agharkar got that information, Dr. Agharkar said “[f]rom 
letters he’s sent to people” and from Richard Tennent’s declarations. (718) At the 
court’s request, Dr. Agharkar read the following excerpt from Mr. Tennent’s 
declaration: 
 
Mr. Carruthers sincerely believes things that are not true. He is 
delusional. Based on his false and delusional beliefs, Mr. Carruthers 
has created an illogical intellectual construct that explains why the 
State is pretending to plan his execution. Mr. Car ruthers believes 
that his conviction and impending execution are all part of an 
elaborate bluff by the State. Mr. Carruthers knows that the State 
recognizes that he is innocent. He knows the State is trying to 
pressure him into accepting an Alford plea for time served. Despite 
the obvious allure of being released from prison and avoiding 
execution, Mr. Carruthers states that he is unwilling to accept the 
State’s imaginary offer because to do so would extinguish his claims 
to millions of dollars in damages that he believes he is entitled to 
because of various illegal and unconstitutional acts by the State. 
 
When the court expressed concern about the timing of the statement [for purposes 
of assessing present competency], Dr. Agharkar said he was unsure when the 
statement was made, adding that Mr. Tennent did not put a date on it. Upon being 
reminded that Mr. T ennent’s representation ended in 2023, the court asked, “But 
it’s your belief that you can sit here and testify and tell me he still thinks that 
today?” Dr. Agharkar responded, “I’m limited because I can’t interview him about 
it so I have to see if any of that – if he’s continuing to write about the same types 
of things, from my opinion he would continue to believe them, but I can’t know for 
sure since I can’t interview him.” 
 
The trial court then turned to Dr. Agharkar’s evaluation of Mr. Carruthers’ 
competency to be executed contained on page 7 of his final report dated March 5, 
2026, and Dr. Agharkar read the following portion into the record: 
 
Mr. Carruthers suffers from many persistent debilitating delusions 
that compromise his perceptions of that which is going on around 
him and render his understanding of the relationship between his 
conviction and his execution irrational. Mr. Carruthers is paranoid 
about his lawyers, their role in what he perceives is the injustice of 

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his case, and their role in setting his execution date. He illogically 
believes that execution date notwithstanding, he is about to be 
released from custody as soon as various improbable actors (the 
Board of Professional Responsibility, the Attorney Genera l’s 
Office, the Department of Justice, Governor Bill Lee, and “Kim 
Kardashian mama”) agree to accomplish various improbable acts. 
These actions include making his hashtag go “viral,” or posting 
Judge Addison’s order authorizing the release of information about 
Alfredo Shaw, each of which Mr. Carruthers [believes] will result 
in his immediate release. Finally, his paranoia about the conspiracy 
against him has evolved into a belief his continued incarceration is 
to prevent him from receiving the 3.3 or 33.3 million rightly due to 
him for exposing various bad acts (the nonpayment of taxes by 
criminal informants nationwide, his claims against TDOC, and his 
entitlement because of the illegal wiretap on his attorney’s phone). 
Each of these delusions interlocks or overlaps with the other 
combining synergistically to prevent a rational understanding of the 
State’s rationale for his execution, Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 
930, 959 (2007). 
 
As to his remarks about Mr. Carruthers’ belief that his continued 
incarceration is to prevent him from receiving the $3.3 or $33 million due to him 
for exposing the bad acts, Dr. Agharkar indicated he learned this from Mr. 
Tennent’s declaration but also fr om the letters Mr. Carruthers writes about the 
money. When asked how he was linking Mr. Carruthers’ beliefs about the money 
to his execution, Dr. Agharkar said he thinks he is relying on Mr. Tennent’s 
declarations. Dr. Agharkar reiterated Mr. Carruthers’ u nderstanding that the 
execution is a bluff in order to get him to settle or not get his money. Dr. Agharkar 
said that even though he does not know when Mr. Carruthers expressed the beliefs 
cited by Mr. Tennent, the diagnosis remains unchanged. Turning to Mr. Carruthers’ 
paranoia about his attorneys, the court asked Dr. Agharkar “what does that have to 
do with him understanding the rationale for his execution?” Dr. Agharkar 
responded that he is not sure he made that link. 
 
The trial court reminded Dr. Agharkar that in his February 11, 2026 report, 
he said there are three reasons to have a competency hearing, then in his March 5, 
2026 report, Dr. Agharkar gave three reasons he believes Mr. Carruthers meets the 
Panetti standard: Mr. Carruthers’ paranoia; his belief that his execution was a sham; 
and his belief in his immediate release. Focusing on the third reason—his 
immediate or imminent release—Dr. Agharkar cited a January 2026 telephone call 
during which Mr. Carruthers believed he was going to be released after the hearing 
on his fingerprint petition. (728- 729) When the trial court surmised that Mr. 
Carruthers likely hoped he was going home after the hearing, the court again asked 
for the basis of Dr. Agharkar’s opinion. Dr. Agharkar said, “I don’t know what he 
believes today as he sits here now. I can’t talk to him. He won’t talk to me so that I 
could give you that information so the best I can do is January.” 

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Finally, the court returned to the following quote from Dr. Agharkar’s 
report: “Each of these delusions interlocks or overlaps with the others combining 
synergistically to prevent a rational understanding of the State’s rationale for his 
execution.” The court asked if this sentence means that each of the three things Dr. 
Agharkar cites as reasons he believes Mr. Carruthers meets the Panetti standard are 
not good enough alone, but somehow the combined effects of them are greater than 
their sum. Dr. Agharkar responded, “It means greater than their sum, yes.” Then 
the court asked, “So one plus one plus one doesn’t equal three, it equals three three 
three three three three?” Dr. Agharkar answered, “or it means five. I mean, it’s more 
than the sum, yes.” 
(Id. at PageID 32958–32962.) 
The State called Dr. Thomas Schacht, a clinical and forensic psychologist. (Id. at PageID 
32962.) While discussing rational understanding under Panetti, he noted that “it is perilous to 
rely solely on your own point of view as an observer without having access to the understanding 
and point of view of the person articulating whatever is being said.” (Id. at PageID 32962–63.) 
Petitioner refused to speak with Dr. Schacht for an evaluation. (Id.) But when Dr. Schacht 
visited Petitioner’s prison cell, Schacht noted that Petitioner was “well-groomed and appear[ing] 
clean,” and his cell was “very well-organized and clean.” (Id. at PageID 32963.) After 
reviewing Petitioner’s November 2025 pro se pleading and some of his phone calls, Schacht 
concluded that the pleading “did not look to be the product of a mind that is cognitively 
impaired” and that it was “’organized, reasonably well-written’ and seemingly void of delusional 
material.” (Id.) 
Petitioner’s counsel cross-examined Schacht and asked him about an excerpt from his 
report which stated “[t]o be considered for classification as a delusion, a false belief must be held 
and maintained with subjective sincerity. . . . False beliefs propagated insincerely can be 
observed in the context of goal-directed manipulations, con schemes, gaslighting, vindictive 
harassment, and malignant scripts and interpersonal agenda characteristic of severe personality 

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disorders.” (Id.) He explained that “in the absence of an interview, assessing the sincerity of 
Mr. Carruthers’ beliefs is extremely difficult because you have no basis to assess the sincerity.” 
(Id.) Schacht did not diagnose Petitioner. (Id.) 
Attorney Houston Goddard represented Petitioner from January 2022 to Fall 2023 while 
he was a Federal Public Defender. (Id. at PageID 32964.) Goddard spoke with Petitioner twice 
per week and recalled a specific conversation with him discussing an Alford plea. (Id.) He states 
that Petitioner told him “the State had offered him an Alford plea, and if accepted, he would be 
released that day; however, he would not be able to claim the $3.3 million owed to him due to 
the wiretap.” (Id.) And he told him that “the execution was a ploy to get him to take the Alford 
plea.” (Id.) Goddard did not believe Petitioner thought the State was serious about executing 
him. (Id.) 
On cross-examination, Goddard agreed that Petitioner did not dispute his murder 
convictions or death sentences. (Id.) He only insisted on his innocence and disputed the 
credibility of witnesses. (Id.) Goddard also recognized that he did not represent Petitioner at a 
time when the execution date had been set, so he did not review Petitioner’s statements about the 
execution. (Id.) 
Petitioner also testified at the competency hearing, and the TSC’s summary of his 
testimony is useful here. 
Current counsel, Amy Harwell, informed the trial court that she planned to 
call Mr. Carruthers as a witness. After discussing potential issues and options 
should Mr. Carruthers choose not to testify, the trial court brought Mr. Carruthers 
back into the courtroom. The trial court informed Mr. Carruthers that counsel 
wanted to question him as a witness. When Mr. Carruthers asked, “[a] witness for 
who?,” the court explained that this was his competency petition and that counsel 
wanted to call him as a witness. Mr. Carruthers was sworn and questioned. 
 
The trial judge informed Mr. Carruthers it would permit counsel to call him 
as a witness, explaining that he has no Fifth Amendment right to remain silent at 

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this juncture. Mr. Carruthers asked the court to appoint independent counsel for 
him, which the court declined. The court further declined Mr. Carruthers’ request 
to appoint the BPR or “at least notify them of this ethical problem.” The court 
further explained that counsel called him to help his case rather than to be a witness 
against himself, adding “[y]ou have an opportunity to speak.” 
 
Ms. Harwell asked Mr. Carruthers if his first degree murder conviction is a 
sham. Mr. Carruthers responded, “I’ve never stated my case was a sham. I’ve been 
transported for six days in shackles and restraints with some of the highest security 
[by] TDOC and the Sheriff Department. I’ve never thought this was a sham.” Ms. 
Harwell repeated the same question to which Mr. Carruthers responded, “I’ve tried 
to answer ma’am. I have mittimus that keeps me in shackles and restraints where I 
cannot leave any prison at any time because I’ve been convicted. I’ve never thought 
that people tote me around with restraints and guns was a sham. Never thought that 
ever.” Ms. Harwell next asked Mr. Carruthers why the State is going to execute 
him. Mr. Carruthers described how false evidence provided by Mr. Shaw was used 
against him to obtain his conviction. 
 
Ms. Harwell asked Mr. Carruthers what all of the information about Mr. 
Shaw and CrimeStoppers had to do with $3.3 million. Mr. Carruthers explained 
that ABA Standard 3.3 and Tennessee Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3 prohibit 
attorneys from participating in fraud, and therefore, the various attorney 
participants who aided Alfredo Shaw are liable under their legal malpractice 
policies when a notice of claim is submitted “just like car insurance.” When Ms. 
Harwell asked Mr. Carruthers if he had submitted “a lot of notice[s] of claims,” Mr. 
Carruthers explained that he filed a notice before his post-conviction hearing asking 
that all the attorneys called to testify at the hearing be required to submit their legal 
malpractice carrier and the policy limits. Mr. C arruthers added, “[j]ust having a 
notice of claim is not a claim. You have to put a monetary value on [the claim]. 
And the number is the same one that gets them disbarred, 3.3.” Ms. Harwell again 
asked if he had submitted “a lot of notice[s] of claims.” Mr . Carruthers responded 
that no attorney had provided their legal malpractice information although ethically 
bound to do so, and none had submitted a claim to their insurance company. Ms. 
Harwell asked if the $3.3 million is owed to Mr. Carruthers or to someone else. Mr. 
Carruthers responded that, “[i]t’s owed to the person who’s been injured.” 
 
Continuing with the issue of notice of claims, Mr. Carruthers used the 
example of his DNA claim. Mr. Carruthers said he filed a notice of claim when he 
realized DNA evidence had been withheld in violation of his constitutional rights, 
adding that because he had been injured money was owed to him. When asked the 
identity of the attorneys, Mr. Carruthers identified three or four attorneys by name, 
and he referred Ms. Harwell to his “fraud upon the court” packet, which details 
those involved in the Alfredo Shaw fraud. Mr. Carruthers further explained that his 
counsel’s office had compiled the packet and submitted the packet to the Tennessee 
Attorney General and the Tennessee Supreme Court. Mr. Carruthers believed his 
federal habeas corpus counsel failed to submit the packet in the federal proceedings. 

PageID <pageID>
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Mr. Carruthers said that, among other things, the packet asserted then -Assistant 
District Attorney John Campbell committed fraud upon the court throughout the 
post-conviction proceedings when he told Charlie Ray that Alfredo Shaw had never 
been an informant and failed to inform other named authorities. 
 
When asked if he really wanted to “take the bar cards” of all of the attorneys 
involved in the fraud, Mr. Carruthers responded that the ethical investigations and 
disbarment could begin with Ms. Harwell and continue, like dominos, until each 
attorney invol ved in the fraud is disbarred. Ms. Harwell asked, “If all of the 
attorneys fall the way you want them to, will you be executed?” to which Mr. 
Carruthers responded, “I hope not.” 
 
Ms. Harwell asked Mr. Carruthers to recall Mr. Tennent’s testimony that 
Mr. Carruthers believes the State is playing a “game of chicken” with him; that this 
whole thing is a “sham”; and that the State is trying to coerce him into taking an 
Alford plea. Mr. Carruthers said those are Mr. Tennent’s words, not his words. 
When asked to give “his words,” Mr. Carruthers said, “I’ve been trying to get 
exonerated.” When Ms. Harwell asked if the State was trying to execute him to 
keep him from getting his money, Mr. Carruthers told her to ask the State. Mr. 
Carruthers added that these conver sations came from counsel’s mouth, not his 
mouth, adding that he had never heard counsel ask the State, “Are y’all wanting to 
execute Mr. Carruthers knowing that y’all committed fraud?” 
 
On cross-examination, Mr. Carruthers agreed that he had been raising the 
“fraud” issue for over thirty years to anyone who would listen. Mr. Carruthers was 
then asked, “And you believe sitting here today that if you are executed, it will be 
because you were wrongfully convicted based upon this false information; is that 
fair?” to which Mr. Carruthers responded, “Yes.” 
(Id.at PageID 32964–66.) 
 As the Court turns to its analysis, it begins with the applicable legal standards. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Legal Standard for Stay of Execution 
 Petitioner seeks a stay of his execution. He asserts that the TSC erred when it affirmed 
the trial court’s determination that he is competent to be executed. Federal courts have the 
authority to stay an execution under 28 U.S.C. § 2251(a)(1). The exercise of stay jurisdiction 
under § 2251 is within the sound discretion of a federal court. See McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 
849, 858 (1994). Courts apply a four-factor test to determine whether to grant a stay: 1) whether 

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there is a likelihood the petitioner will succeed on the merits of his claim; 2) whether there is a 
likelihood the petitioner will suffer irreparable harm absent a stay; 3) whether the stay will cause 
substantial harm to others; and 4) whether the stay would serve the public interest. See Bedford 
v. Bobby, 645 F.3d 372, 375 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Workman v. Bell, 484 F.3d 837, 839 (6th 
Cir. 2007)). 
 The State’s interest in finality grows weightier as an execution date approaches, and the 
Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit have counseled against last-minute stays that interfere with 
the state’s ability to carry out its sentences. See Barr v. Lee, 591 U.S. 979, 981 (2020) (“[L]ast-
minute stays . . . should be the extreme exception, not the norm.”); see Bedford, 645 F.3d at 375 
(“[T]he last-minute nature of an application to stay execution bears on the propriety of granting 
relief.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Because a stay is an equitable remedy, 
there is a strong presumption against the grant of a stay where a claim could have been brought 
at such a time as to allow consideration of the merits. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 649–50 
(2004); see id. at 649 (“A stay is an equitable remedy, and [e]quity must take into consideration 
the State’s strong interest in proceeding with its judgment . . . and attempt[s] at manipulation.’” 
(citation omitted)). 
The likelihood of success on the merits is crucial to the Court’s determination of the need 
for a stay, so the Court will next summarize the legal standards for incompetency to be executed 
and for habeas review. 
II. Incompetency to be Executed 
The Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments prohibits the State from 
“inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane.” Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 
399, 410 (1986). In Ford, the Supreme Court questioned the “retributive value of executing a 

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person who has not comprehension of why he has been singled out and stripped of his 
fundamental right to life.” Id. at 409. Justice Marshall noted that the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits executing “one whose mental illness prevents him from comprehending the reasons for 
the penalty or its implications.” Id. at 417. And Justice Powell, in a separate opinion, found that 
“the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution only of those who are unaware of the punishment 
they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it.” Id. at 422. 
And then in Panetti, the Court elaborated on the principles in Ford. It distinguished a 
“prisoner’s awareness of the State’s rationale for an execution” from a rational understanding of 
it. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 959 (2007). The Court found that “[s]omeone who is 
condemned to death for an atrocious murder may be so callous as to be unrepentant; so self-
centered and devoid of compassion as to lack all sense of guilt; so adept in transferring blame to 
others as to be considered, at least in the colloquial sense, to be out of touch with reality. Those 
states of mind, . . . , are not what petitioner contends lie at the threshold of a competence 
inquiry.” Id. at 959–60. The Court then noted that a psychotic disorder is “[t]he beginning of 
doubt about competence” and that “documented mental illness that is the source of gross 
delusions preventing [the prisoner] from comprehending the meaning and purpose of the 
punishment to which he has been sentenced” should be considered. Id. at 960. Because the State 
in Panetti ignored the significance of the petitioner’s delusions and “the extent to which severe 
delusions may render a subject’s perception of reality so distorted that he should be deemed 
incompetent,” the Court remanded the case for further consideration. Id. at 961-962. 
More recently, in Madison, the Supreme Court explained that the “critical question” in 
deciding whether one is competent to be executed is whether a “‘prisoner’s concept of reality’ is 
‘so impair[ed]’ that he cannot grasp the execution’s ‘meaning and purpose’ or the ‘link between 

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[his] crime and its punishment.’” 586 U.S. 265, 269 (2019) (quoting Panetti, 551 U.S. at 958). 
This Court next addresses the legal standards it applies for habeas review. 
III. Standards for Habeas Review 
As noted above, Petitioner asserts that the TSC erred when it affirmed the trial court’s 
determination that Petitioner is competent to be executed. In other words, the TSC has addressed 
Petitioner’s claim on the merits. And under 28 U.S.C § 2254(d), when a state court has decided 
a claim on the merits, a federal court should only grant a habeas petition if the state court’s 
decision: 
(1) was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
States; or 
 
(2) was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2). 
Because incompetency to be executed is a fact-intensive inquiry, the Sixth Circuit has 
examined the issue under § 2254(d)(1) because that is the standard most favorable to the 
Petitioner. See Coe v. Bell, 209 F.3d 815, 823–24 (6th Cir. 2000). A state court’s decision is 
“contrary” to federal law when it “arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached” by the 
Supreme Court on a question of law or “decides a case differently than” the Supreme Court has 
“on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13 
(2000). “[A] run-of-the-mill state-court decision applying the correct legal rule . . . to the facts 
of a prisoner’s case” does not “fit comfortably within § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘contrary to’ clause.” Id. at 
406. 
An “unreasonable application” of federal law occurs when the state court “identifies the 
correct governing legal principle from” the Supreme Court’s decisions “but unreasonably applies 

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that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. This application of federal law must 
be “objectively unreasonable” for the writ to issue. Id. at 409. It is not sufficient that the habeas 
court, in its independent judgment, determines that the state court decision applied clearly 
established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) 
(“We have explained that ‘an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an 
incorrect application of federal law.’” (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 410)). 
Petitioner carries the burden of proof on this “difficult to meet” and “highly deferential 
[AEDPA] standard,” which “demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the 
doubt.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (first quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 
U.S. 86, 102 (2011), then quoting Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)). A 
state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling was “so lacking in justification that there 
was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for 
fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. 
In deciding whether to grant habeas relief, federal courts give considerable deference to 
state-court credibility determinations. In fact those findings are presumed to be “correct absent 
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.” See Wesson v. Shoop, 17 F.4th 700, 705 (6th 
Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). In habeas proceedings, federal courts do not reweigh evidence or 
reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. See Brown v. Konteh, 567 F.3d 191, 205 (6th Cir. 2009). 
Rather, federal courts presume that a state court’s factual findings are correct, and that 
presumption can be rebutted only with “clear and convincing evidence.” See 28 U.S.C. § 
2254(e)(1). 
The Court will now summarize the Parties’ arguments before evaluating them. 
 

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IV. Summary of Arguments 
Petitioner contends that he has shown a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits 
and that he is entitled to de novo review because the TSC used a flawed legal standard from State 
v. Irick, 320 S.W.3d 284 (Tenn. 2010), which led to an unreasonable determination of facts. 
(ECF No. 226 at PageID 20531–33; see also ECF No. 237.) He asserts that there is no dispute 
that he will suffer irreparable harm from execution. (ECF No. 226 at PageID 20533.) Petitioner 
argues that a stay of execution will substantially injure the State’s interest and that the public’s 
interest lies in prohibiting an unconstitutional execution. (Id. at PageID 20533–35.) Petitioner 
also asserts that there was no delay in presenting his habeas claim. (Id. at PageID 20536–38.) 
In response to the Application, Respondent only addresses the likelihood of success on 
the merits and the State’s and public’s interests as equitable considerations. (See ECF No. 236 at 
PageID 33165–67.) Respondent argues that this Court should apply AEDPA deference under 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d) rather than de novo review. (Id. at PageID 33165.) Respondent asserts that “a 
minimal review” of the TSC’s opinion shows the reasonableness of its application of clearly 
established law. (Id.) He claims the TSC applied the governing standard in Panetti, concluding 
that Petitioner has “a rational understanding of the reason the State is going to execute him.” (Id. 
at PageID 33166 (quoting Carruthers, 2026 WL 1257769, at *21.) 
Respondent disputes that the TSC unreasonably determined the facts, stating that 
Petitioner’s position “boils down to a simple disagreement with findings made by the trier of fact 
who weighed the credibility of live witness testimony[.]” (Id.) For these reasons, Respondent 
concludes that the Petition lacks merit, that Petitioner has no likelihood of success, and that he, 
therefore, is not entitled to the equitable remedy of a stay of execution. (Id. at PageID 33167.) 
Respondent also argues that the balance of equities weigh in the State’s favor and that, given that 

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Petitioner committed these horrific offenses more than thirty-two years ago, there is no reason to 
justify further delay in the execution of the State’s judgment. (Id.) 
Respondent do not dispute that Petitioner’s execution would result in irreparable harm. 
See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986) (“[E]xecution is the most irremediable and 
unfathomable of penalties; that death is different.”). And for good reason— “ [t]he irreparable 
injury inflicted by an execution in violation of the Constitution is too obvious to require 
discussion.” Miller v. Parker, No. 3:18-cv-01234, 2018 WL 6003123, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 
15, 2018), aff’d, 910 F.3d 259 (6th Cir. 2018). 
V. The Likelihood of Success on the Merits 
 Because the Parties are not disputing that an unconstitutional execution is an irreparable 
injury, their arguments focus on whether Petitioner has shown a likelihood of success on the 
merits of his Petition. Petitioner contends here that the state court decision is both an 
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law and an unreasonable determination of 
the facts. (ECF No. 226 at PageID 20531.) And he asserts that the application of a flawed legal 
standard developed in State v. Irick, 320 S.W.3d 284, 295 (Tenn. 2010), led to an unreasonable 
determination of fact because the TSC’s findings of fact rely on evidence of Petitioner’s 
awareness, instead of his rational understanding. (Id. at PageID 20531–32.) For these reasons, 
Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to de novo review. 
 But under AEDPA, federal courts review state court rulings on the merits de novo only 
“in those rare cases” when a state court decides a federal claim in a way that is “contrary to” or 
an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Johnson v. 
Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 303 (2013); see Panetti, 551 U.S. at 953 (“When a state court’s 
adjudication of a claim is dependent on an antecedent unreasonable application of federal law, 

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the requirement set forth in § 2254(d)(1) is satisfied. A federal court must then resolve the claim 
without the deference AEDPA otherwise requires.”)). 
Despite Petitioner’s argument that the state courts misapplied Panetti, this Court finds 
that this is not one of the rare cases warranting de novo review. The TSC noted that Petitioner 
had to overcome the presumption of competence to establish his present incompetency to be 
executed. Carruthers, 2026 WL 1257769, at *20. The TSC correctly set forth the standard for 
incompetency to be executed. 
We review the findings and conclusions below in light of the applicable 
competency standard. As we explained recently in Black v. State , No. M2000-
00641-SC-DPE-CD, 2025 WL 1927568 (Tenn. July 8, 2025), this Court held in 
Van Tran that a prisoner is not competent to be executed “if the prisoner lacks the 
mental capacity to understand the fact of the impending execution and the reason 
for it.” Id. at *5 (quoting Van Tran, 6 S.W.3d at 266). After the United States 
Supreme Court revisited the standard for competency to be executed in Panetti v. 
Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007), this Court concluded that the Van Tran 
competency standard must be construed consistently with the Panetti standard as 
follows: 
 
In our view, Panetti teaches that the test for competence to be executed 
requires a prisoner to have “a rational understanding of his conviction, his 
impending execution, and the relationship between the two.” Stated differently, 
under Panetti, execution is not forbidden so long as the evidence shows that the 
prisoner does not question the reality of the crime or the reality of his 
punishment by the State for the crime committed. 
 
Irick, 320 S.W.3d at 295; see also Black, 2025 WL 1927568, at *5. In Irick, this 
Court observed that Panetti “emphasizes that a prisoner seeking to establish 
incompetency may not be foreclosed from offering proof to show that a mental 
illness obstructs his rational understanding of his conviction, his impending 
execution, and the relationship between the two.” Irick, 320 S.W.3d at 295. Later, 
in Madison v. Alabama, the Supreme Court further explained that: 
 
[t]he critical question is whether a “prisoner’s mental state is so distorted by a 
mental illness” that he lacks a “rational understanding” of ‘the State’s rationale 
for [his] execution. Or similarly put, the issue is whether a “prisoner’s concept 
of reality” is “so impair[ed]” that he cannot grasp the execution’s meaning and 
purpose’ or the “link between [his] crime and its punishment.” 
 
586 U.S. 265, 269 (2019) (quoting Panetti , 551 U.S. at 958- 60). Thus, the judge 

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assessing a prisoner’s competency to be executed “must look beyond any given 
diagnosis to a downstream consequence.” Id . at 279 (explaining that “delusions 
come in many shapes and sizes, and not all will interfere with the understanding 
that the Eighth Amendment requires”). So, the critical question is whether the 
inmate “can reach a ‘rational understanding’ of why the St ate wants to execute 
him.” Id. at 283. 
 
Carruthers, 2026 WL 1257769, at *8–9. 
 
 The TSC identified the relevant Supreme Court precedent and the applicable standard for 
competency to be executed under Panetti. See id. The TSC acknowledged that the standard at 
issue was “whether Mr. Carruthers has a rational understanding of the connection or the reason 
the State intends to execute him.” Id. at *22. And it determined that “the trial court did not treat 
Mr. Carruthers’ ‘delusional belief system as irrelevant’ and it did not misapply the Panetti 
standard.” Id. The TSC noted that the trial court assessed the witnesses’ credibility, assigned 
weight and value to the evidence before it, and then applied Panetti to the evidence. Id. 
 In his reply, Petitioner focuses on a portion of Irick, 320 S.W.3d at 295. 
[E]xecution is not forbidden so long as the evidence shows that the prisoner does 
not question the reality of the crime or the reality of his punishment by the State for 
the crime committed. 
 
(See ECF No. 237 at PageID 33170.) He contends that this is not an errant sentence, but the 
controlling law according to the TSC. (Id.) But Petitioner ignores the standard stated by the 
TSC and fails to recognize the TSC’s inclusion of language from Panetti about consideration of 
a prisoner’s delusions in determining his conception of reality and whether he “can reach a 
‘rational understanding’ of why the State wants to execute him.” Carruthers, 2026 WL 
1257769, at *8–9. Petitioner also fails to acknowledge the TSC’s specific reference to the trial 
court’s consideration of Petitioner’s delusional belief system in its analysis. See id. at *22. 
Like Respondent’s concern about “flyspecking” the state court opinion on federal review 
(see ECF No. 235 at PageID 33146), the Court agrees that Petitioner cannot take isolated 

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portions of the standard set forth by the TSC to fit a narrative that the law was unreasonably 
applied. “[F]ederal courts have no authority to impose mandatory opinion-writing standards on 
state courts.” Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 300 (2013) (citation omitted). Because the 
goal is to protect against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal system, AEDPA “instructs us 
to look for ‘a decision’—not a few words or a stray thought —‘ that was contrary to, or involved 
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,’” Rogers v. Mays, 69 F.4th 381, 
392 (6th Cir. 2025), not to create a grading system for state-court opinion writing. The TSC’s 
statement of the law satisfies the standards in Ford and Panetti. 
 Petitioner compares his case to Thompson v. Bell, 580 F.3d 423, 436 (6th Cir. 2009), 
where the Sixth Circuit found that the TSC unreasonably applied Ford, when it determined that 
Petitioner’s delusions were irrelevant to a competency analysis. (ECF No. 237 at PageID 
33173–74.) 
 Unlike Thompson, the trial court did not ignore Petitioner’s claims of delusions. It found 
that Petitioner knows he is being executed because of his three murder convictions. He simply 
maintains his innocence and seeks exoneration. Petitioner has not expressed that the execution is 
not tied to his conviction and sentence or other delusional beliefs about the circumstances of his 
execution. The TSC found that the trial court’s conclusions were supported by the record. 
Although Petitioner argues that the TSC equated awareness of the conviction and 
sentence with a rational understanding of both, the trial court continuously addressed Agharkar’s 
reliance on sources other than the psychiatric evaluation to determine Petitioner’s delusional 
beliefs and how those purported delusions played into its determination that Petitioner rationally 
understood the impending execution and its connection to his conviction. See Carruthers, 2026 
WL 1257769, at *14–15. The arguments that Petitioner “irrationally believes he will not be 

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executed” (see ECF No. 237 at PageID 33174) go against the preponderance of the evidence. 
The Court will therefore apply the deferential § 2254(d)(1) analysis to determine the likelihood 
of success on the merits. See Coe, 209 F.3d at 823–24. 
With this deference in mind, the Court now turns to the testimony and evidence of the 
witnesses at the competency hearing. 
A. Carruthers 
Petitioner denied that his case or his conviction was a sham, saying: 
I’ve never stated my case was a sham. I’ve been transported for six days in shackles 
and restraints with some of the highest security [by] TDOC and the Sheriff 
Department. I’ve never thought this was a sham. 
 
Carruthers, 2016 WL 2026 WL 1257769, at *17. (See ECF No. 228-21 at PageID 31924.) 
When asked why the State planned to execute him, Petitioner responded that it was based 
“[o]n the false testimony of a[n] Organized Crime informant named Alfredo Bernard Shaw” and 
fraud on the court and that, without Shaw’s testimony, Petitioner has an actual innocence claim. 
(See id. at PageID 31924–26, 31941–42, 31949–50.) 
As for the statement the State is “playing chicken” with Petitioner, he said those are 
Attorney Tennent’s words, and Tennent is lying—“I never had those words.” (Id. at PageID 
31939.) 
Petitioner denied saying that the State tried to coerce him into an Alford plea saying “I’ve 
never had those words. I’ve been trying to get exonerated, you understand.” (Id. at PageID 
31939-40.) 
 When Petitioner was asked if the State was trying to kill him to keep him from getting 
money, he responded, “Ask them that question. You keep saying – these kind of conversations 
came from your mouth.” (Id. at PageID 31950.) 

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 When asked about a conspiracy on the part of the State, Petitioner responded that they 
have an ethical duty to address the phone calls about the crime and send evidence to the Board of 
Professional Responsibility. (Id. at PageID 31951.) He said, “That’s the only thing I think about 
them.” (Id.) 
 As to his purported delusion about wiretapping, Petitioner explains that, when he calls the 
office instead of asking for “voicemail”, he say just give me the “wiretap” because they 
understand he wants voicemail. (Id. at PageID 31953.) 
 When Petitioner asked if the State was executing him for triple murder, not for fraud, 
Petitioner responded, “That’s not true. . . . The Alfredo Shaw fraud happened. The lie saying he 
ain’t no informant, that happened. You can’t take that away. You can’t take that part out of the 
equation.” (Id. at PageID 31954.) 
 Essentially, Petitioner has provided the most current view of his competency through his 
own testimony. He denied having many of the purported delusions, asserting that these are 
counsel’s words or misinterpretations of his statements. Even Attorney Tennent and Agharkar 
acknowledge that there are “kernel[s] of truth” in Petitioner’s beliefs. See Carruthers, 2026 WL 
1257769, at *10, 21. Considering those kernels of truth makes it harder for this Court to second-
guess the TSC’s conclusions that Petitioner’s beliefs were not so far removed from reality that 
punishment can serve no proper purpose. 
Petitioner continues to assert fraud related to Alfredo Shaw’s involvement in the murder 
case. But he does not separate the execution from the murders and understands that he will be 
executed if he is not exonerated. The TSC reflected those statements in its findings that he does 
not believe the case is a sham and that he understands the State’s plan to execute him. 
Carruthers, 2016 WL, at *22. 

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B. Agharkar 
In Agharkar’s report, he noted his diagnoses of schizoaffective disorder in 2011, and his 
earlier findings. (ECF No. 227-5 at PageID 20802.) Agharkar said that Petitioner “has refused 
to participate in previous psychiatric evaluations” in prison and that Agharkar “attempted to 
evaluate Mr. Carruthers, [but] he did not acknowledge my presence or engage with me in any 
way.” (Id. at PageID 20803.) Agharkar attended a January 2026 hearing to witness Petitioner’s 
courtroom behavior. (Id.) Because of Agharkar’s inability to interview Petitioner, he relied on 
other sources for information. (Id.) Agharkar determined that “to a reasonable degree of 
medical certainty, Mr. Carruthers is not competent to be executed under the Panetti standard.” 
(Id. at PageID 20810.) Agharkar relied on the “voluminous data available” though “ideally” he 
would interview Petitioner “to gauge his current state of mind.” (Id.) Agharkar concludes that 
Petitioner’s “paranoia” precludes such an evaluation. (Id.) Agharkar also concludes that 
Petitioner’s “mental delusions are of the type and severity that vitiates rational understanding 
even though awareness of his impending execution date exists.” (Id.) 
The TSC noted Petitioner’s reliance on Agharkar’s testimony.
5 Carruthers, 2026 WL 
1257769, at *12. Agharkar testified that he was contacted in 2008, when counsel was seeking to 
improve communication with Petitioner and seeking psychiatric evaluation on Petitioner’s 
competency to stand trial and to waive certain rights. Id. Agharkar conducted an in-person 
interview in 2011, that lasted three hours. Id. In the fall of 2025, he was contacted to update his 
evaluation related to a January 2026 hearing. Id. Agharkar attempted to interview Petitioner on 
two occasions, but Petitioner refused. Id. Agharkar prepared a report for the January 2026 
hearing, which was attached to the state court petition. Id. at *12–13. So without a current 
 
5 (See ECF No. 228-19 at PageID 31413; ECF No. 228-20 at PageID 31668–740.). 

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interview, Agharkar’s report was based on other sources of information. 
Agharkar testified about Petitioner’s belief that: (1) there is a conspiracy against him; (2) 
his attorneys are “trying to get him killed”; (3) that everything is working against him; (4) that 
there is a “fraud upon the court” based on ethical violations; and (5) that Petitioner is entitled to 
money because of the ethical violations. Id. at *13. Agharkar testified that Petitioner believes 
“the State’s reason for executing him” is to keep him from recouping money for his claim and 
that this is a “game of chicken.” Id. Agharkar described a delusion based on the ethical 
guideline 3.3 of the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct and Petitioner’s belief that it 
relates to money he will receive. Id. Agharkar discussed delusions about taxes owed by 
informants, food poisoning, being monitored in prison, wiretaps, social media hashtags, and 
other issues. Id. When asked how these delusions related to Petitioner’s rational understanding 
of his conviction, his sentence, and his execution, Agharkar concluded that Petitioner “does not 
have a rational connection and rational understanding between why he was conviction and the 
execution.” Id. Agharkar testified that he evaluated Mr. Panetti and compared his delusions to 
Petitioner’s concluding that Petitioner does not believe “this to be real”, despite the fact that 
Agharkar had not conducted a recent interview of Petitioner. Id. at *14. 
On cross-examination, Agharkar acknowledged that Petitioner did not appear manic or 
psychotic and otherwise showed no signs of psychosis. Id. at *13. Petitioner was able to 
communicate with counsel and to communicate issues with his housing. Id. Agharkar clarified 
that Petitioner did not believe that his counsel was literally trying to kill him, but that they are 
not raising issues Petitioner believes would result in his exoneration. Id. 
When Agharkar was questioned by the trial court about rational understanding, he 
opined: (1) Petitioner believes that the execution will not proceed because it is being used to get 

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Petitioner to settle his monetary claims, and (2) that, if he were to be executed, it would be to 
stop him from getting money. Id. at *14. When the trial court pointed out that his information 
was not in Agharkar’s report, Agharkar apologized if he misspoke, after he was given the 
opportunity to review his report and could not find those beliefs in any declaration or in either of 
his reports. Id. 
Agharkar agreed that Petitioner understood that he was going to be executed for his 
convictions. Id. Agharkar expressed that Petitioner believes the execution is “a sham” and that 
it is not real. Id. That information was purportedly taken from Petitioner’s letters and Tennent’s 
declarations. Id. Agharkar was unsure about the timing of Tennent’s statement, given that his 
representation ceased in 2023. Id. at *15. 
When the court asked Agharkar, “I want to know will [Petitioner] have what counselor 
says, an awareness and a rational understanding of why the State’s doing what they’re doing”, 
Agharkar responded, “My clinical opinion would be no, but I don’t, I don’t I have a basis for it . . 
.‘[c]ause I can’t interview him.” (See ECF No. 228-20 at PageID 31739.) This testimony is 
consistent with the TSC’s conclusions, based on its own review of the evidence, that the 
evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings and that the trial court asked 
specific questions about Petitioner’s delusions and their impact on the rational understanding 
prong. Carruthers, 2026 WL 1257769, at *22. 
C. Schacht 
Petitioner also refused an interview with Dr. Thomas Schacht, a clinical and forensic 
psychologist. Id. at *16. Schacht observed that Petitioner was “well-groomed” and appeared 
calm and that his cell was well-organized and cleaned. Id. Schacht reviewed a pro se filing by 
Petitioner and some phone calls and opined that the filing did not appear to be “the product of a 

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mind that is cognitively impaired.” Id. Schacht did not opine on legal issues, but he did point 
out that delusion requires that a belief be held with sincerity. Id. He testified that, in the absence 
of an interview, it is “extremely difficult” to determine the basis of Petitioner’s sincerity. Id. 
Schacht did not offer a diagnosis, but he opined that the “tone of his report weighed more heavily 
towards a personality disorder than a psychotic disorder.” Id. 
Schacht’s testimony neither establishes nor negates a conclusion that Petitioner is 
competent. But because there is a presumption of competency, it weighs against Petitioner in 
showing the likelihood of success on the merits. 
D. Former Counsel 
The TSC noted that testimony from Attorneys Tennent, Goddard, and Henry, was limited 
in that it was not recent, with the last communications being in 2023, in the fall of 2023, and in 
November 2025, respectively. Id. at *20. And the court noted that that counsel could offer only 
personal opinions about whether Petitioner continued to hold the same false beliefs that have 
been characterized as delusional. Id. The TSC, noting that this testimony is a necessary part of 
review, addressed the extensive lay testimony from former counsel about “counsels’ belief about 
Mr. Carruthers’ beliefs”, including assertions that Petitioner remains “delusional”, “paranoid”, 
and fixated on false belief. Id. 
However, given the differences between former counsel’s testimony and Petitioner’s own 
testimony, noted above, the Court finds that this testimony does little to establish that Petitioner 
met the standard in Panetti. 
Giving proper deference to the trial court on its credibility determinations and the 
weighing of the evidence, the Court finds that the TSC’s decision was not contrary to or an 
unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law or based on an unreasonable 

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determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. The finding that Petitioner was 
competent to be executed is not “so lacking in justification that there was an error well 
understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded [sic] 
disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. Petitioner has not shown the likelihood of success on 
the merits.
6 
VI. The State’s Interest & The Public’s Interest 
 While the Court has found that Petitioner has not shown a likelihood of success on the 
merits, it must still consider the harm to others, mainly the State, and the public interest. The 
public always has an interest in preventing the violation of a person’s constitutional rights. See 
Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 274 F.3d 377, 
400 (6th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); see Miller, 2018 WL 6003123, at *1. Even so, courts 
must consider the State’s interest in carrying out a lawful death sentence and in the finality of 
criminal judgments, see Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 912–13 (6th Cir. 2007), and the 
fact that “the public interest is not served by ordering a stay of execution for claims that are 
unlikely to prevail.” Bedford v. Kasich, No. 2:11-cv-351, 2011 WL 1691823, at *15 (S.D. Ohio 
May 4, 2011). Because Petitioner has not established that he is likely to succeed in proving his 
incompetence to be executed and therefore has not established an Eighth Amendment violation, 
the public’s interest does not way in his favor. The State’s interest in the execution of this 
judgment, after more than thirty-two years, for the commission of three horrific murders is great. 
 
 
6 The Court recognizes that Petitioner’s former counsel and Dr. Agharkar all testified to the 
severity of Petitioner’s delusions. This testimony as well as the documentary evidence, 
including Petitioner’s letters and phone calls, provide some support for Petitioner’s position. 
Still, that evidence is not enough to convince the Court to second guess the trial court and TSC’s 
analysis and their conclusion that Petitioner is competent to be executed 

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CONCLUSION 
 For these reasons, the Court, in its discretion, determines that Petitioner is not entitled to 
the equitable remedy of a stay of execution. The Court therefore DENIES the Application for a 
Stay of Execution. 
SO ORDERED, this 20th day of May, 2026. 
s/Thomas L. Parker 
THOMAS L. PARKER 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 

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