govinfo:USCOURTS-gand-1_24-cv-03400-2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
 ATLANTA DIVISION 
 
TAMARRA E. STUPPARD-WILSON, 
as Administratrix of the Estate of Dino 
Vandarrel Walker, deceased, 
 
 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
 
 
 
 v. 
 
 CIVIL ACTION FILE 
 NO. 1:24-CV-3400-TWT 
FULTON COUNTY, GEORGIA, et al. 
 
 Defendants. 
 
 
OPINION AND ORDER 
 This is a civil rights action. It is before the Court on Plaintiff Tamarra 
E. Stuppard-Wilson’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint [Doc. 69]. For the 
reasons set forth below , the Plaintiff Stuppard-Wilson’s Motion for Leave to 
Amend Complaint [Doc. 69] is DENIED. 
I. Background 
 This case arises from the murder of Dino Walker, a pretrial detainee 
fatally stabbed by another pretrial detainee at the Fulton County Jail in 2022. 
(Suppl. Compl. ¶¶ 1 , 14, 46 [Doc. 59].) Plaintiff Tamarra E. Stuppard -Wilson 
is the personal representative of Walker’s estate. ( Id. ¶ 4.) She alleged six 
claims in her original complaint , all but one of which (Count III) the Court 
dismissed in August 2025. (Op. & Order, Aug. 28, 2025 [Doc. 58].) 
 Following the Court’s Order, the Plaintiff timely moved for 
reconsideration or, alternatively, leave to amend. She explained that, while 

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Count IV was incorrectly styled as the state law equivalent of a § 1983 claim, 
she had intended for that count to be a Georgia common law claim for the 
negligent performance of ministerial duties under Ga. Const. art. I, § 2, 
¶ IX(d). This Court denied the reconsideration motion as an “improper vehicle 
to ‘clarify’ a claim that was not properly ple[aded] in the first place.” (Op. & 
Order, Nov. 7, 2025 [Doc. 65].) The Court further denied leave to amend, 
finding that the Plaintiff failed to properly present her request for leave. Id. at 
4 (“The Plaintiff’s sole reference to leave to amend appears in the title of her 
motion, and she provides neither a proposed amended complaint nor a 
summary of her proposed amended complaint. Nor does she engage with Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).”). 
 Now before the Court is the Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend 
Complaint and a copy of her proposed Second Amended Complaint. The 
proposed amendment contains two counts against Defendant Muhammad: 
(1) the § 1983 claim (formerly Count III), and (2) the Georgia negligence claim 
(formerly Count IV). (
See Pl.’s Mot. for Leave to Amend Compl., Ex. 1 ¶¶ 68–
84 [Doc. 69-1].) 
II. Legal Standard 
 When a party is not entitled to amend its pleading as a matter of course, 
it must obtain the opposing party’s consent or the court’s permission to file an 
amendment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Rule 15(a)(2) provides that a court should 

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“freely” give leave to amend a pleading “when justice so requires.” Id. This 
decision is discretionary, but the Eleventh Circuit has explained that “district 
courts should generally exercise their discretion in favor of allowing 
amendments to reach the merits of a dispute.” Pinnacle Advert. & Mktg. Grp., 
Inc. v. Pinnacle Advert. & Mktg. Grp., LLC, 7 F.4th 989, 1000 (11th Cir. 2021). 
Generally, “where a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim, a 
plaintiff must be given at least one chance to amend the complaint before the 
district court dismisses the action with prejudice.” Garcia v. Chiquita Brands 
Int’l, Inc., 48 F.4 th 1202, 1220 (11th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). There are 
three exceptions to this rule: “(1) where there has been undue delay, bad faith, 
dilatory motive, or repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments; 
(2) where allowing amendment would cause undue prejudice to the opposing 
party; or (3) where amendment would be futile.” 
Id. (citation omitted). 
III. Discussion 
The Court will exercise its discretion to deny the Plaintiff’s Motion for 
Leave to Amend Complaint as untimely. See Campell v. Emory Clinic, 166 F.3d 
1157, 1162 (11th Cir. 1999) (describing district courts’ discretion in this area 
as “extensive”). While the clarified legal theory in Count II (formerly Count IV) 
may have resulted in a meritorious negligence claim, the Plaintiff’s undue 
delay precludes amendment at this stage. The Court issued its Order on the 
Motion for Reconsideration in November 2025. The Plaintiff did not file her 

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Motion for Leave to Amend until March 2026 —approximately four months 
later and approximately one -and-a-half months before the close of discovery, 
which has since closed on April 20, 2026. The Plaintiff offers no explanation for 
this delay other than to state that discovery “has just begun.” (Pl.’s Mot. for 
Leave to Amend, at 7 [Doc. 69].) District courts retain discretion to deny leave 
to amend “when the moving party offers no adequate explanation for a lengthy 
delay.” In re Engle Cases, 767 F.3d 1082, 1119 (11th Cir. 2014); see also id. at 
1119 n.37 (“The party seeking leave to amend under Rule 15 bears the burden 
of establishing his entitlement to it—particularly where there has been such a 
long and seemingly unjustified delay .”). Moreover, the proposed amendment 
would constitute the Plaintiff’s third iteration of her complaint. Although the 
Court acknowledges it would be her first amendment since the Court dismissed 
Count II as alleging an improper legal theory , all the information needed to 
state a neglig ence claim—the relevant facts and case law —were available to 
the Plaintiff from the very start. 
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the P laintiff Tamarra E. 
Stuppard-Wilson’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint [Doc. 69] is 
DENIED. 
SO ORDERED, this 20th day of May, 2026. 

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__ ________ _______ __ _ __ _ 
THOMAS W. THRASH, JR. 
United States District Judge 

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