govinfo:USCOURTS-gand-1_12-cr-00285-6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
ATLANTA DIVISION 
 
JOSHUA THOMAS HILL, 
 Movant, CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 
 1:12-CR-0285-1-CAP 
 
 CIVIL ACTION NO. 
 v. 1:16-CV-1476-CAP 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 Respondent. 
 
OR DER 
This action is before the court on the magistrate judge’s report and 
recommendation (“R&R”) [Doc. No. 435]. The movant has filed objections 
thereto [Doc. No. 457]. 
I. Standard of Review 
In reviewing a magistrate judge's R&R, the district court “shall make a 
de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed 
findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 636(b)(1). “Parties filing objections to a magistrate's report and 
recommendation must specifically identify those findings objected to. 
Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections need not be considered by the 

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district court.” United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353, 1361 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Marsden v. Moore, 847 F.2d 1536, 1548 (11th Cir. 1988)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The district judge must “give fresh consideration 
to those issues to which specific objection has been made by a party.” Jeffrey 
S. v. State Bd. of Educ. of Ga., 896 F.2d 507, 512 (11th Cir. 1990) (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted). Absent objection, the district judge 
“may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings and 
recommendations made by the magistrate judge,” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and 
“need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in 
order to accept the recommendation,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, advisory committee 
note, 1983 Addition, Subdivision (b). 
II. Discussion 
A. Background 
The movant and two co-defendants were indicted on one count of 
conspiring to commit sex trafficking of children. Additionally, the movant 
was charged with three counts of sex trafficking of children and one count of 
being a felon in possession of a firearm. Second Superseding Indictment 
[Doc. No. 201]. 
On April 18, 2014, the movant pled guilty to the conspiracy count, and 
the government dismissed the remaining counts [Doc. No. 324]. In the plea 

 3 
agreement, the government agreed to recommend a sentence of 180 months, 
and the movant agreed that the probation office and the court could still 
consider the underlying conduct from the dismissed counts. The movant 
expressly waived his right to appeal unless he received a sentence above the 
recommended 180 months. 
On July 17, 2014, this court sentenced the movant to 192 months’ 
imprisonment [Doc. No. 372]. After the movant filed a timely notice of 
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the movant’s conviction and sentence 
by order dated April 17, 2015. United States v. Hill, 783 F.3d 842 (11th Cir. 
2015). 
 B. Section 2255 Motion 
 The movant now collaterally challenges his conviction and sentence. 
He claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel. As relief, the movant 
asks that he be resentenced to the recommended 180 months. 
Under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant has the right to “reasonably 
effective” legal assistance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984). In the context of a guilty plea, “counsel owes a lessor duty to a client 
who pleads guilty than to one who decides to go to trial, and in the former 
case counsel need only provide his client with an understanding of the law in 
relation to the facts, so that the accused may make an informed and 

 4 
conscious choice between accepting the prosecution’s offer and going to trial.” 
Wofford v. Wainwright, 748 F.2d 1505, 1508 (11th Cir. 1984). “An attorney’s 
responsibility is to investigate and to evaluate his client’s options in the 
course of the subject legal proceedings and then to advise the client as to the 
merits of each.” Stano v. Dugger, 921 F.2d 1125, 1152 (11th Cir. 1991). 
Given the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide 
range of reasonably professional assistance, representation is constitutionally 
ineffective only when counsel commits “serious derelictions” of his duties 
when advising the defendant. Id. at 1150-51. 
Second, a movant must also demonstrate that counsel’s unreasonable 
acts or omissions prejudiced him. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. That is, a 
movant “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.” Id. The Strickland test applies in the context of 
a guilty plea, where, “in order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the 
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on 
going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). 

 5 
It is well settled that a guilty plea must be both knowing and 
voluntary. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969). Because a 
guilty plea constitutes a waiver of the constitutional right to a jury trial, to 
confront one’s accusers, and to the privilege against self-incrimination, “[t]he 
standard was and remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and 
intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the 
defendant.” North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970). Accordingly, 
before a trial court accepts a criminal defendant’s plea of guilty, it must 
assure (1) that the defendant was not coerced, (2) that the defendant 
understands the nature of the charges, and (3) that the defendant knows and 
understands the consequences of his guilty plea. United States v. Bell, 776 
F.2d 965, 968 (11th Cir. 1985). 
A voluntary and intelligent guilty plea generally forecloses federal 
collateral review of alleged constitutional, nonjurisdictional errors that 
precede the entry of the plea. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 
(1973). Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, however, may be reviewed 
in a collateral proceeding to the extent that the alleged ineffectiveness bears 
upon the voluntariness of the plea. Hill, 474 U.S. at 53-59; Stano, 921 F.2d 
1125, 1150-51. “Without ‘reasonably effective assistance of counsel in 
connection with the decision to plead guilty,’ a defendant cannot enter a 

 6 
knowing and voluntary plea because the plea does not represent an informed 
choice.” Stano, 921 F2d at 1151. 
 The Supreme Court has determined that “the representations of the 
defendant . . . [at a plea proceeding] as well as any findings made by the 
judge accepting the plea, constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent 
collateral proceedings. Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong 
presumption of verity.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977). 
In the R&R, the magistrate judge reviewed the allegations of ineffective 
assistance of counsel as well as the statements by the movant during the 
court’s plea colloquy. Given the definitive statements by the movant at his 
plea hearing regarding his understanding that the court was not bound by 
the 180-month recommendation, the magistrate concluded that the plea was 
knowing and voluntary. Moreover, the magistrate judge points out that the 
relief sought by the movant in this § 2255 petition belies his claim of 
prejudice because the movant is not seeking to vacate his conviction and 
sentence and go to trial on the charges against him. Rather, he seeks to 
maintain the benefits he received as a result of the plea agreement (dismissal 
of four counts) and be re-sentenced to the recommended 180 months on count 
one. 

 7 
The movant filed objections to the R&R [Doc. No. 457]. Despite the 
order stating that objections shall specify with particularity the alleged error 
or errors made by the magistrate judge [Doc. No. 453], the movant simply re-
argued his allegations of ineffective assistance. He fails to assert a single 
error by the magistrate judge. 
The court has reviewed the transcript of the movant’s plea hearing and 
finds that his plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. With regard to 
the movant’s claim that his attorney was ineffective in failing to alert him 
that he would be required to register as a sex offender before he entered his 
guilty plea, the court agrees with the conclusion of the magistrate judge that 
this is not a collateral consequence of pleading guilty such that failure to so 
advise a defendant would amount to constitutionally deficient performance of 
counsel. Furthermore, there is no indication that the movant would have 
chosen to go to trial rather than plead guilty had he been told about the sex 
offender registry before the plea because he was notified immediately before 
his sentencing hearing, yet he remained silent on this issue and raised no 
concerns with the court when the registration requirement was discussed 
during sentencing. 

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III. Conclusion 
Based on the foregoing, the movant’s objections [Doc. No. 457] are 
OVERRULED, and the magistrate judge's R&R [Doc. 452] is ADOPTED as 
the order of the court. 
IT IS ORDERED that the motion to vacate [Doc. 435] is DENIED, and 
that a COA is DENIED. 
The clerk is DIRECTED to close the civil action associated with the 
filing of the motion to vacate. 
SO ORDERED, this 22nd day of August, 2018. 
 
 
 
 /s/CHARLES A. PANNELL, JR. 
 CHARLES A. PANNELL, JR. 
 United States District Judge 

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