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govinfo:USCOURTS-ctd-3_24-cv-01993-1

U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut · 2026-05-20

· GavelSight synced 2026-09-06 03:52:02

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT 
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MEMORANDUM & 
ORDER 
 
3:24-CV-1993 (VDO) 
PEARL RODRIGUEZ, on behalf of herself and all 
others similarly situated, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
-against- 
 
TRUMBULL INSURANCE COMPANY, 
HARTFORD INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE 
SOUTHEAST, and JOHN DOES 1 through 21, 
 
Defendants. 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
VERNON D. OLIVER, United States District Judge: 
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Pearl Rodriguez’s motion for 
reconsideration of an order granting Defendants Trumbull Insurance Company (“Trumbull”) 
and Hartford Insurance Company of the Southeast’s motion to dismiss the claim for a 
declaratory judgment and to compel appraisal of the breach of contract claim.1 The 
reconsideration motion is ripe as of December 8, 2025.2 Familiarity with the facts and prior 
proceedings of this action is assumed, as they were set forth in the Court’s November 10, 2025 
Memorandum and Order.3 
I. LEGAL STANDARD 
In the District of Connecticut, a party may file a motion for reconsideration within 
seven days of the filing of a decision or order. D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 7(c)1. That motion must 
 
1 Mot., ECF No. 69 
2 Mem., ECF No. 70; Opp’n, ECF No. 71; Reply, ECF No. 72. 
3 See Rodriguez v. Trumbull Ins. Co., No. 24-CV-1993 (VDO), 2025 WL 3140717 (D. Conn. Nov. 
10, 2025). 

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“be accompanied by a memorandum setting forth concisely the controlling decisions or data 
the movant believes the Court overlooked.” Id. Reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy 
to be employed sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial 
resources,” United States v. Yudong Zhu, 41 F. Supp. 3d 341, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (cleaned 
up), and the standard for granting a motion for reconsideration is strict, Cho v. Blackberry Ltd., 
991 F.3d 155, 170 (2d Cir. 2021). The three primary grounds for reconsideration are “an 
intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct 
a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Wachovia Mortg., FSB v. Toczek, 841 F. App’x 
267, 272 (2d Cir. 2021) (summary order) (quoting Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. Nat’l Mediation 
Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992)). 
“Reconsideration is not intended for the court to reexamine a decision or the party to 
reframe a failed motion.” Fan v. United States, 710 F. App’x 23, 24 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary 
order). Therefore, “[a] motion for reconsideration is ‘not a vehicle for relitigating old issues, 
presenting the case under new theories, securing a rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking 
a second bite at the apple.’” Geomatrix Sys., LLC v. Eljen Corp., No. 20-CV-1900 (SVN), 
2025 WL 777218, at *2 (D. Conn. Mar. 11, 2025) (quoting Analytical Survs., Inc. v. Tonga 
Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir. 2012)). 
II. DISCUSSION 
Plaintiff contends that the Court misapplied Illinois law to the facts of this case in 
compelling appraisal of the breach of contract claim. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the 
decisions by Illinois’s Fifth District Court of Appeals in the putative class actions Travis v. 
Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 782 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) and Hanke v. Am. Int’l S. Ins. 
Co., 782 N.E.2d 328 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002), preclude this Court from finding Plaintiff’s breach 

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of contract claim—which alleges a systemic failure of her auto insurer to pay the required 
actual cash value for totaled vehicles—to be covered by the appraisal provision. 
It is well established that, when a federal court sits in diversity, “the ruling of an 
intermediate appellate state court is a datum for ascertaining state law which is not to be 
disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other persuasive data that the highest 
court of the state would decide otherwise. Statharos v. New York City Taxi & Limousine 
Comm’n, 198 F.3d 317, 321 (2d Cir. 1999) (cleaned up). As relevant here, “appraisal is an 
informal dispute-resolution process, most often used to determine the amount of the loss 
sustained under a property insurance policy.” St. John’s United Church of Christ v. State Auto 
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 25-CV-1022, 2026 WL 685396, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2026) 
(cleaned up). Because an appraisal is a contractual alternative dispute resolution mechanism, 
like an arbitration provision, it is enforceable by a court pursuant to the Federal Arbitration 
Act. See Milligan v. CCC Info. Servs. Inc., 920 F.3d 146, 152 (2d Cir. 2019). 
While Plaintiff properly acknowledges a federal court’s deference to an intermediate 
appellate state court’s decision on an issue of state law, Plaintiff overstates the applicability of 
Travis and Hanke. Upon due consideration, the Court finds that Travis and Hanke are 
distinguishable, as they stand for the proposition that a “dispute is not covered by the appraisal 
clause” when a plaintiff’s complaint “presents much more than a disagreement between the 
parties concerning the actual cash value of plaintiff’s vehicle”—specifically, when the 
complaint includes claims of fraud. Travis, 782 N.E.2d at 327; see also Hanke, 782 N.E.2d at 
332 (same). Key to the holdings of Travis and Hanke was that the policyholder plaintiffs there 
not only brought a breach of contract claim, but also claims for statutory fraud and common 
law fraud. Travis, 782 N.E.2d at 323; see also Hanke, 782 N.E.2d at 332. In affirming a denial 

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of a motion to compel appraisal, the Travis court noted how the claims focused on two 
contentions: (1) whether the insurance company defrauded the policy holder, and (2) whether 
there was a breach of contract. Travis, 782 N.E.2d at 327 (“Here, plaintiff contends that 
defendant is engaged in a fraudulent scheme to undervalue insureds’ vehicles that are declared 
a total loss, in order to increase its own profits. Plaintiff’s claims focus upon whether defendant 
defrauded her and thereby breached the terms of the policy.”). Similarly, the Hanke court found 
cases that “center upon an issue that could be resolved by determining an amount or value” of 
the insured vehicle were “clearly distinguishable because [Hanke’s case] specifically involves 
fraud allegations.” Hanke, 782 N.E.2d at 333. 
Plaintiff makes much of the decision in Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 828 N.E.2d 
812 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005), but that case is also distinguishable. Unlike here, Kinkel “filed a class 
action lawsuit against the defendant, alleging that the early-termination fee constitutes both a 
breach of the service agreement and statutory fraud under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and 
Deceptive Business Practices Act.” Id. at 815 (emphasis added). That the Kinkel court 
explained “that the appraisal clause was a part of a fraudulent scheme” was not central to the 
holdings in Travis and Hanke does not bear on this Court’s decision to compel appraisal. Id. 
at 816. The Kinkel court simply reaffirmed the principles found in Travis and Hanke, that 
appraisal was unwarranted where it is shown that “a resolution of the issues involved in the 
plaintiff’s claims required far more than a determination of the actual cash value of the 
vehicles.” Id.. These cases show that appraisers “should not be asked to settle questions that 
require legal expertise” and thus, certain legal questions are excluded from the appraisal 
process. See Wysoczan v. Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins., No. 23-CV-905, 2023 WL 5530535, at 

5 
*4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 2023). But nothing from Travis or Hanke “suggests that appraisers are 
unable to settle purely factual questions about the cause of physical damage.” Id. 
Here, Plaintiff fails to show that her claims require “far more than a determination of 
the actual cash value” of the insured vehicle. As this Court previously found, the crux of 
Plaintiff’s Complaint is the allegation that her loss was $437.60 higher than what Trumbull 
calculated because Trumbull thought the amount of loss was $2,095.78 and Plaintiff thought 
the amount of loss was $2,533.38.4 After Plaintiff’s vehicle sustained damage in an accident 
in June 2020, Plaintiff filed a claim with Trumbull.5 Plaintiff’s car was declared a total loss 
and, subsequently, Trumbull made a payment on Plaintiff’s total loss claim.6 Application of 
the Projected Sold Adjustments (“PSA”) to the comparable vehicles used in Mitchell’s Vehicle 
Valuation Report resulted in Plaintiff being paid approximately $437.60 less than the full 
actual cash value.7 Plaintiff not only alleges that she was injured because she did not receive 
the full total loss benefits under a contract, but also that Trumbull’s conduct in breaching 
Plaintiff’s insurance contract by applying a “baseless” PSA reduced the value of Plaintiff’s 
totaled automobile and thus constituted a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.8 Unlike Travis, Hanke, and Kinkel, where those plaintiffs brought claims for statutory 
fraud and common law fraud, Plaintiff here only bring a claim for breach of contract. There is 
nothing remaining in Plaintiff’s Complaint other than a breach of contract claim related to the 
 
4 Rodriguez, 2025 WL 3140717, at *5; see also ECF No. 57 ¶¶ 49, 50. 
5 ECF No. 57 ¶¶ 49, 50. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. ¶ 3. 
8 Id. ¶¶ 84, 85. 

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value of the insured vehicle. Considering that the public policy of Illinois favors the resolution 
of disputes through informal procedures like appraisal, FTI Int’l, Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 
339 Ill. App. 3d 258, 260, 790 N.E.2d 908, 909–10 (2003), this Court predicts that the Illinois 
Supreme Court would compel appraisal here. Accordingly, the Court adheres to its ruling that 
appraisal must be compelled. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the motion for reconsideration is denied. This litigation 
is stayed pending the completion of appraisal proceedings. The parties shall file a status report 
within 120 days of this order. 
 
 
SO ORDERED. 
 
 
Hartford, Connecticut 
May 20, 2026 
 
/s/Vernon D. Oliver 
VERNON D. OLIVER 
United States District Judge 

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