govinfo:USCOURTS-ohsd-1_25-cv-00861-2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 
WESTERN DIVISION 
 
CHRISTOPHER-MICHAEL 
WILLIAMS, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
HAMILTON COUNTY, et al., 
 
Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
JUDGE DOUGLAS R. COLE 
Magistrate Judge Litkovitz 
 
OPINION AND ORDER 
Using her authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), Magistrate Judge Litkovitz 
screened Plaintiff Christopher-Michael Williams’ Complaint (Doc. 5) and issued a 
Report and Recommendation in which she recommends dismissal. (R&R, Doc. 6, 
#108). Specifically, the R&R concludes that Williams’ federal claims are barred by 
quasi-judicial immunity and sovereign immunity, or in any event, fail to state a claim. 
(Id. at #104–08). Then, based on that find ing as to the federal claims, the R&R 
recommends the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 
remaining state-law claims. (Id. at #108). Williams objected, (Doc. 8), and also moved 
to amend his Complaint, (Doc. 7). The Magistrate Judge granted the motion to amend 
but then issued a supplemental R&R still recommending dismissal of the Amended 
Complaint, consistent with the reasoning in the original R&R. (Doc. 9, #159). 
Williams filed a Motion of Erratum (Doc. 12) and Corrected Objections (Doc. 13) 
following the Supplemental R&R, in which he sought to correct minor mistakes in his 
original objections. The Magistrate Judge granted the motion to correct. (Doc. 14). 
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For the reasons stated below, the Court OVERRULES Williams’ Objections (Doc. 8) 
and ADOPTS the original and supplemental R&Rs (Docs. 6, 9). Thus, the Court 
DISMISSES Williams’ federal claims WITH PREJUDICE, and his state-law claims 
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 
BACKGROUND 
Williams is a state prisoner currently confined at Chillicothe Correctional 
Institution. (Compl., Doc. 5, #68). While imprisoned, Williams twice tried to sue the 
Ohio Department of Job and Family Services and Ohio Child Support Enforcement 
Agency “due to multiple violations of not correcting the accounting ledger for past 
payments made by him.” (Id. at #71–72, 80). First, on September 30, 2022, Williams 
mailed a complaint to the Hamilton County Clerk’s Office via certified mail. ( Id. at 
#71). But he claims that while someone at the Clerk’s office signed the return receipt 
for the certified mail, they actually discarded his complaint instead of filing it. ( Id.). 
After not hearing from the court, two of Williams’ family members called the Clerk’s 
office, and someone there informed them that they did not have Williams’ complaint. 
(Id.). So that Clerk’s office empl oyee recommended he refile it. ( Id. at #71–72). On 
January 18, 2023, Williams attempted to do so, again via certified mail. ( Id. at #72). 
But he alleges that, once again, someone signed the return receipt but failed to file 
his action. (Id.). 
Based on these two failed attempts to file his action there, Williams decided to 
sue Hamilton County, the Hamilton County Clerk of Courts (Pavan Parikh), and two 
unnamed Clerk’s office employees in the instan t case. (Doc. 5, #67). To that end, on 
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November 18, 2025, he requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis, (Doc. 1), which 
Magistrate Judge Litkovitz granted, (Doc. 4). Thus, Williams’ Complaint was 
docketed on March 6, 2026. (Doc. 5). 
While Williams’ Complaint makes clear who Williams is suing, it does not fare 
as well in terms of describing the actual causes of action. The Complaint includes two 
different sets of claims. (See id. at #73–77 (first set), 82–86 (second set)). In the first 
set, Williams seems to assert (1) a failure-to-train claim against Hamilton County; 
(2) a failure-to-train claim against Parikh; (3) a violation of Williams’ right to access 
court records under the Ohio Constitution , against the two unknown deputy clerks; 
(4) a violation of his First Amendment right to access the courts, once more as against 
the unknown deputy clerks; and (5) a violation of his 14th Amendment equal 
protection rights, also against the unknown deputy clerks. (Id. at #73–77). The second 
set of claims are clearer. They somewhat ov erlap with the first set, except they are 
all asserted against all Defendants: (1) a First Amendment violation for denial of 
access to the courts; (2) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for substantive and procedural due 
process violations, again related to the alleged denial of court access; and (3) a § 1983 
civil conspiracy claim. (Id. at #82–86).1 On top of that, Williams discusses a number 
of Ohio statutes, although it is unclear if he intends these as distinct claims. ( Id. at 
#75–80). 
 
1 While Williams does not raise all of his constitutional claims as § 1983 claims, they are 
properly construed as such because the Supreme Court has not recognized implied causes of 
action against state officials under the Constitution for those rights. See Egbert v. Boule, 596 
U.S. 482, 490–91 (2022). 
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Also worth noting, this was not Williams’ first attempt to sue the Clerk’s Office 
over this matter. Rather, Williams had filed an almost identical case in this Court a 
year and a half earlier. Williams v. Parikh, 708 F. Supp. 3d 1345 (S.D. Ohio 2023). 
The undersigned handled that case. Id. at 1349–50. There, Williams alleged that he 
“twice attempted to file a lawsuit in th e Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas 
but succeeded neither time.” Id. at 1350. And he asserted “three categories of claims: 
claims against ‘All Clerk Staff of the Hamilton County Court,’ claims against Parikh 
in his individual capacity, and claims against Parikh in his official capacity.” Id. at 
1352. As for the causes of action, he claimed that his First Amendment rights and 
Fifth Amendment due process rights were violated. Id. at 1350. 
This Court determined that his claims against the Clerk’s Office (and Parikh 
in his official capacity, which is another way of saying the same thing) were barred 
by sovereign immunity, as the Hamilton County Clerk’s Office, name 
notwithstanding, is a state entity. Id. at 1353–56. And this Court further found that 
his claims against Parikh in his individual capacity should be dismissed both because 
(1) Williams failed to adequately allege Parikh individually was liable, and 
(2) because Parikh is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity. Id. at 1357. Based 
on those determinations, the Court dismissed Williams’ claims without prejudice. Id. 
at 1365. The only exception was Williams’ Fifth Amendment due process claim, which 
the Court dismissed with prejudice becaus e that amendment applies only to the 
federal government, not the states. Id. Williams appealed, and the Sixth Circuit 
affirmed the dismissal on immunity grounds. Williams v. Parikh, No. 24-3059, 2024 
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WL 5355086, at *3 (6th Cir. Sep. 4, 2024). But in doing so, it noted that, unlike this 
Court, it only understood Williams to be advancing official-capacity claims in that 
suit. Id. at *2 n.2. 
That brings us back to the present case. When the Magistrate Judge screened 
Williams’ current Complaint under § 1915(e)(2), she began with a res judicata 
analysis. (Doc. 6, #104–06). The Magistrate Judge, noting that the previous case was 
limited to claims against Parikh in his official capacity, found that to the extent that 
Williams currently sues Parikh in his individual capacity, res judicata does not bar 
the new claims. (Id. at #105–06 (citing Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811, 823 (6th 
Cir. 2003))). Moreover, regardless of the specific claims, the R&R concluded that res 
judicata did not preclude the current suit because the Court dismissed (and the Sixth 
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of) the previous case without prejudice, except for the 
Fifth Amendment claim, which Williams does not raise here. ( Id. at #106 (citations 
omitted)). 
But, while the Magistrate Judge dete rmined that res judicata would not 
prevent the action from moving forward, the R&R nonetheless recommends that the 
Court dismiss William’s Complaint. ( Id.). That is so for multiple reasons. First, 
Parikh, as well as the deputy clerks, are enti tled to quasi-judicial immunity in their 
individual capacities. ( Id. at #106–07). Second, to the extent Williams sues the 
unknown deputy clerks in their official capacities, those claims are essentially 
against the Clerk’s Office itself. (Id. at #107). Because the Clerk’s Office is protected 
by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, these claims should also be dismissed. 
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(Id.). Third, Williams’ claims against Hamilton County must be dismissed for failure 
to state a claim. (Id. at #107–08). As to the latter, the Magistrate Judge explains that 
in order to adequately plead a claim against the county, Williams must allege that 
the county had a policy or custom that caused the clerk’s failure to file his lawsuit. 
(Id. at #107). But the R&R finds that Williams only made conclusory allegations at 
m o s t o n t h a t f r o n t , s o h e f a i l e d t o p lausible allege a failure-to-train claim. ( Id. at 
#107–08). Last, as to any remaining state- law claims, the R&R concludes that the 
Court should decline to exercise supplementa l jurisdiction because all of the federal 
claims should be dismissed. (Id. at #108). 
At bottom, the Magistrate Judge re commends that the Court (1) dismiss 
Williams’ federal claims with prejudice; (2) decline to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over Williams’ state-law claims, and so dismiss those without prejudice, 
and (3) certify that an appeal of any Order adopting the R&R would not be taken in 
good faith. (Id. at #108). 
The R&R further explains that Williams had fourteen days to object. ( Id. at 
#108–09). He did so in a timely fashion. (Doc. 8). In his objections, Williams argues 
that “court personnel do not maintain absolute judicial immunity.” ( Id. at #148). He 
further attempts to distinguish his case from the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Bush v. 
Rauch, 38 F.3d 842 (6th Cir. 1994). ( Id. at #149–51). Unlike in Rauch, Williams 
argues that the clerk was not acting under the direct order of a judge. ( Id. at #151). 
Instead, he maintains that his case is more akin to Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, 508 
U.S. 429 (1989), where the Supreme Court found that a court reporter was not 
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protected by quasi-judicial immunity. ( Id.). Overall, Williams argues that quasi-
judicial immunity should not bar his claims. He does not mention his failure-to-train 
claims, sovereign immunity, nor does he address the state-law claims. Alongside his 
objections, Williams also moves to amend his Complaint to supposedly address the 
R&R’s concerns. (Doc. 7). 
In response to those objections, Ma gistrate Judge Litkovitz issued a 
Supplemental R&R. (Doc. 9). There, she granted Williams’ Motion to Amend (Doc. 7), 
particularly given he was still entitled to amend his Complaint once as a matter of 
course under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). (Doc. 9, #157–58). The Amended 
Complaint, however, made “only slight al terations [] to several paragraphs.” ( Id. at 
#158). Accordingly, the Supplemental R&R still recommends dismissal of Williams’ 
claims for the same reasons explained in the original R&R. (Id. at #159). 
Again, the Supplemental R&R informed Williams that he had fourteen days in 
which to object. (Id. at #159–60). While Williams filed a Motion of Erratum following 
the Supplemental R&R, he merely requested to address errors in his certificate of 
service for the motion to amend as well as to supply a missing case from his previous 
objections. (Doc. 12, #209). Then, Willia ms filed his “Corrected Objection to 
Magistrates Report and Recommendation” (Doc. 13), incorporating those minor 
adjustments. So the Supplemental R&R is unobjected. 
With that, the matter is ripe for the Court’s review. 
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LEGAL STANDARD 
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3), “district courts review a[] 
[report and recommendation] de novo after a party files a timely objection.” Bates v. 
Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr. , No. 1:22-cv-337, 2023 WL 4348835, at *1 (S.D. Ohio 
July 5, 2023). But that de novo review requirement extends only to “any portion to 
which a proper objection was made.” Id. (citation omitted). In response to such an 
objection, “the district court may acce pt, reject, or modify the recommended 
disposition; receive further evidence; or re turn the matter to the magistrate judge 
with instructions.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3)) (cleaned up). 
By contrast, if a party makes only a general objection, that “has the same 
effect[] as would a failure to object.” Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs. , 932 
F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991). A litigant must identify each issue in the report and 
recommendation to which he objects with su fficient clarity for th e Court to identify 
it, or else the litigant forfeits the Court’s de novo review of the issue. Miller v. Currie, 
50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995) (“The object ions must be clear enough to enable the 
district court to discern those issues that are dispositive and contentious.”). 
That said, Williams is proceeding pro se. A pro se litigant’s pleadings should 
be construed liberally and are subject to less stringent standards than formal 
pleadings filed by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Franklin 
v. Rose, 765 F.2d 82, 84–85 (6th Cir. 1985). But pro se litigants still must comply with 
the procedural rules that govern civil cases. McNeil v. United States , 508 U.S. 106, 
113 (1993). But, notably, “[t]he liberal treatment of pro se pleadings does not require 
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lenient treatment of substantive law.” Johnson v. Stewart , No. 08-1521, 2010 WL 
8738105, at *3 (6th Cir. May 5, 2010). 
For any unobjected portions of an R&R, “the advisory committee notes to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) suggest that the Court still must ‘satisfy itself 
that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the 
recommendation.’” Redmon v. Noel , No. 1:21-cv-445, 2021 WL 4771259, at *1 (S.D. 
Ohio Oct. 13, 2021) (collecting cases). 
LAW AND ANALYSIS 
The Magistrate Judge recommends that the Court (1) dismiss Williams’ 
federal claims with prejudice, (2) decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
Williams’ state-law claims, and (3) certify that an appeal of any Order adopting this 
Report and Recommendation would not be taken in good faith. (Doc. 6, #108). 
While the exact scope of Williams’ object ions is unclear, he generally argues 
that clerks are not immune because quasi-judicial immunity does not apply to them. 
(See generally D o c . 8 ) . W i l l i a m s d o e s n o t , h o w e v e r , s e e m t o o b j e c t t o t h e R & R ’ s 
conclusions that he failed to state a claim against Hamilton County or that the deputy 
clerks should be immune in their official capacities. He also fails to address the 
Court’s supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. So the Court will review 
de novo whether the clerks are entitled to immunity in their individual capacities, 
but it will only review the other conclusions for clear error. As to all of them, though, 
the Court agrees with the R&R. 
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A. Res Judicata Does Not Apply. 
Before reaching Williams’ objections, though, the Court briefly pauses to 
address res judicata. At first glance, this case might seem a prime candidate for 
applying that doctrine. After all, res judicata is a legal doctrine under which “a final 
judgment on the merits bars further claims by parties or their privies based on the 
same cause of action.” Bragg v. Flint Bd. of Educ., 570 F.3d 775, 776 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979)). And here, not only has 
this Court already addressed Williams’ previous case involving the same facts and 
many of the same immunity questions, but the Sixth Circuit affirmed that decision. 
Williams, 2024 WL 5355086, at *3. 
Importantly, though, this Court dismissed most of the claims in the previous 
action without prejudice. Williams, 708 F. Supp. 3d at 1365. The only exception was 
Williams’ Fifth Amendment Due Process claim, id., which Williams does not raise 
again here. And a dismissal without prejudic e is not a judgment on the merits to 
which res judicata attaches. See Wallace v. United States , 81 F.3d 162, 1996 WL 
132172, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 21, 1996) (Table) (citation omitted) (“As the district court 
dismissed [Plaintiff’s claim] without prejudice in the first suit, res judicata does not 
bar [Plaintiff] from raising those claims in his present suit.”). So the R&R is correct 
that res judicata does not preclude Williams’ claims.2 
 
2 While a dismissal without prejudice generally does not constitute a final judgment on the 
merits for res judicata purposes, when that dismissal is on immunity grounds, it can 
nonetheless have a preclusive effect on a plaintiff’s ability to refile the same action in federal 
court. See N. Ga. Elec. Membership Corp. v. City of Calhoun, Ga. , 989 F.2d 429, 433 (11th 
Cir. 1993) (citations omitted) (“Although the dismissal of a complaint for lack of jurisdiction 
 
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B. Williams Fails to State a Claim for Failure to Train the Clerks or a 
Custom of Tolerance for Constitutional Violations. 
But while res judicata does not torped o his claims, other problems do. Start 
with his claim that Hamilton County and Parikh failed to adequately train the court 
clerks to avoid constitutional violations and that there was a custom of ignoring mail 
by inmates. (Doc. 5, #73–75). The Magistrate Judge did not clearly err when she 
concluded that Williams failed to adequately plead this claim. (Doc. 6, #107–08). 
“Allegations assuming that unlawful behavior must be the result of an entity’s failure 
to train or its policies or procedures are plainly insufficient.” Koren v. Neil, No. 1:21-
cv-9, 2022 WL 974340, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2022) (cleaned up). As the R&R 
says, Williams offers only conclusory allegations that merely assume that the alleged 
failure to file his complaints resulted from a policy or custom. (Doc. 6, #107–08). Those 
assumptions are not enough. 
That said, there is one small wrinkle. The R&R focuses solely on this claim as 
against Hamilton County. But Williams also alleges that “Defendant No. 2 [Parikh], 
in his individual capacity under color of law failed to properly train deputies.” (Doc. 
5, #74 (emphasis added)). That claim does not run against Hamilton County (as an 
 
does not adjudicate the merits so as to make the case res judicata on the substance of the 
asserted claim, it does adjudicate the cour t’s jurisdiction, and a second complaint cannot 
command a second consideration of the same jurisdictional claims.”). This Court has 
explained its understanding of the contours of that doctrine elsewhere. See Saqr v. Filak, No. 
1:20-cv-32, 2021 WL 6051964, at *5–7 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 2021). And that doctrine may have 
applicability here. But because Williams sues a variety of people and entities in a variety of 
capacities in each action, with some overlap, but not entirely, the Court declines to rely on 
that preclusive effect and instead elects to review the applicable immunity doctrines 
(although admittedly informed by the Sixth Circuit’s earlier ruling on those immunity issues 
in the previous Williams case). In the end, the Court finds that a similar immunity analysis 
applies to the claims here, so the Court dismisses Williams’ claims. 
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official capacity claim against Parikh would), but rather against Parikh himself. That 
said, the Court finds that the same defect —conclusory allegations that receive no 
weight—also means that the individual capacity failure-to-train claim falls short. 
C. Parikh and the Unknown Deputy Clerks Are Entitled to Absolute 
Quasi-Judicial Immunity in their Individual Capacities. 
The Court next addresses the individual-capacity claims that Williams asserts 
against both Parikh and the unknown deputy clerks. As noted, the R&R recommends 
dismissal on immunity grounds, and Williams has objected. So the Court reviews this 
issue de novo. 
As the Court stated previously, “court officers enjoy absolute immunity from 
suit on claims arising out of the performance of … quasi-judicial functions.” Williams, 
708 F. Supp. 3d at 1357–58 (quoting Foster v. Walsh , 864 F.2d 416, 417 (6th Cir. 
1988)). If the court officer can be “considered an arm of the judicial officer” because 
they perform “tasks so integral or intertwi ned with the judicial process,” then the 
officer is protected by quasi-judicial immunity. Id. at 1358 (citations omitted). And “it 
is clear that Parikh is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity because the heart 
of this claim relates to filing (or, more accurately, failing to file) a civil cause in court—
an intrinsically judicial act integr al to the adjudicatory process.” Id. (citing Wojnicz 
v. Davis, 80 F. App’x 382, 383–84 (6th Cir. 2003)). 
In the previous case, though, the Cour t acknowledged several nuances to its 
conclusion. For example, it noted contradictory caselaw about whether a plaintiff can 
request prospective equitable relief to overcome the judicial immunity hurdle. Id. at 
1359–63. The Court further recognized “tension” between the Sixth Circuit’s standard 
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for quasi-judicial immunity in Rauch and the Supreme Court’s decision in Antoine. 
Id. at 1364; see Rauch, 38 F.3d at 847; Antoine, 508 U.S. at 435–37. 
Williams’ objections here seek to build on that tension. He argues that Rauch 
does not apply in light of Antoine. (See, e.g., Doc. 8, #151). Whatever the merits of that 
argument may be, though, the Sixth Circui t, upon review of the Court’s earlier 
decision, cited Rauch and clearly held that “Parikh is entitled to quasi-judicial 
immunity, which applies to non-judicial officials ‘performing tasks so integral or 
intertwined with the judicial process that these persons are considered an arm of the 
judicial officer who is immune.’” Williams, 2024 WL 5355086, at *3. Moreover, it 
stated that “[b]ecause Williams’s allegations are based on actions that Parikh took 
while performing his quasi-judicial duties , Parikh is entitled to absolute quasi-
judicial immunity.” Id. That is, the Sixth Circuit has already decided that the conduct 
at issue here is subject to quasi-judicial immunity. And this Court is obligated to 
follow that holding—especially given that this case involves the same parties and the 
same conduct. If Williams believes that the Sixth Circuit erred in its immunity 
determination, his proper path was to challenge that decision in the Supreme Court, 
which he attempted to do. But the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Williams v. 
Parikh, 145 S.Ct. 2713 (2025) (Mem). That is the end of the road on that legal 
determination. So Parikh is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. And to the extent 
that Williams sues unknown individual clerks who were involved in the same alleged 
failure to file his complaints, they are al so entitled to the same quasi-judicial 
immunity for the same reasons. 
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D. The Unknown Clerks Are Also Entitled to Immunity in their Official 
Capacities. 
Williams specifies that he is suing Parikh in only his individual capacity, but 
the capacity in which he sues th e other clerks is less clear. ( See Doc. 5, #69–70). To 
the extent that Williams sues them in their official capacities, the Court agrees with 
the Magistrate Judge that sovereign immunity bars any such claims. In the earlier 
case, the Sixth Circuit addressed any official-capacity claims against the individual 
clerks. Williams, 2024 WL 5355086, at *2. There, the court stated that: 
[C]laims against clerks in their official capacity would be barred by 
sovereign immunity, just like claims against the office itself. Williams 
asserted claims against Parikh and his staff members in their official 
capacities as employees of the Hamilton County Clerk of Courts, and “an 
official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as 
a suit against the entity.” Thus, Williams’s official-capacity claims for 
monetary damages are tr eated as claims against the Hamilton County 
Clerk of Courts, which is considered an arm of the state for purposes of 
§ 1983 and sovereign immunity. 
Id. (quoting first Kentucky v. Graham , 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985), and then citing 
Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., Loc. 860 v. Neff, 29 F.4th 325, 330–31 (6th Cir. 2022)). 
That holding controls here. 
E. The Court Declines to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction over the 
State-Law Claims. 
Finally, the Magistrate Judge recommended declining to exercise jurisdiction 
over any remaining state-law claims. (Doc. 6, #108). Williams does not address this 
conclusion in his objections, so the Court only reviews this recommendation for clear 
error. 
The Magistrate Judge did not clearly err in recommending the Court decline 
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court can 
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decline jurisdiction over state-law claims if it “has dismissed all claims over which it 
has original jurisdiction.” That is what happened here—the Court dismissed all of 
Williams’ federal claims. Given that this suit is just at the outset, meaning that the 
Court has not expended any judicial reso urces on the state-law claims, the Court 
declines to exercise jurisdiction over any potentially remaining state claims, and 
instead, dismisses them without prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court OVERRULES Williams’ 
Objections (Doc. 8) and ADOPTS the R&R and Supplemental R&R (Docs. 6, 9). 
Because this is the second time the Co urt has reviewed the federal claims and 
Williams still fails to overcome the immunity bar or adequately plead them, the Court 
DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Williams’ federal claims. The Court has not 
reviewed the state-law claims, though, so it DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE 
any remaining state-law claims. The Court further CERTIFIES pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an appeal of this Opinion and Order would not be taken in 
good faith. With that, the Court ORDERS the Clerk to terminate this case.
SO ORDERED. 
May 19, 2026
DATE DOUGLAS R. COLE
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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