govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_25-cv-01942-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
 
DELCINA PEARSON, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
 v. 
 
CACI, 
 
 Defendant. 
 
Civil Action No. 25 - 1942 (SLS) 
Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
Delcina Pearson brought this lawsuit against CACI International, Inc. (CACI) alleging 
discrimination and retaliation . CACI moves to dismiss for insufficient service of process and 
failure to state a claim under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6). For the 
reasons below, the Court grants CACI’s motion and dismisses this action. 
BACKGROUND 
The Court draws the facts, accepted as true, from the Plaintiff’s Complaint. Wright v. 
Eugene & Agnes E. Meyer Found. , 68 F.4th 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2023). Because Ms. Pearson is 
proceeding pro se, the Court considers the Complaint “in light of all filings, including filings 
responsive to [the] motion to dismiss.”1 Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 152 
(D.C. Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (cleaned up). 
Ms. Pearson commenced this lawsuit on June 20, 2025. Her Complaint says little about the 
basis for her claims. It alleges that she “faced discrimination and retaliation including wrongful 
 
1 CACI argues that Ms. Pearson “may not amend her complaint through an opposition to a motion 
to dismiss.” Reply 9 n.3. It is wrong. Because Ms. Pearson is proceeding pro se, the Court properly 
relies on her Response to the Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF. No. 10, in considering CACI’s motion. 

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termination.” Compl. 4, ECF No. 1. It further alleges that “[she] was assigned tasks (e.g. daily 
reporting) not given to [her] white [colleagues],” and that her manager disclosed her medical 
information without authorization. Id. Her accompanying Civil Cover Sheet identifies her causes 
of action as “retaliation, discrimination, [and] disability.” 2 Civil Cover Sheet at 2, ECF No. 1-1. 
On November 11, 2025, CACI moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6). ECF No. 4. 
That motion is fully briefed and ripe for review. Opp’n, ECF No. 10; Reply, ECF No. 9. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
“If the plaintiff does not properly effect service on a defendant, then the defendant may 
move to dismiss the complaint” under Rule 12(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Hilska v. Jones, 217 F.R.D. 16, 20 (D.D.C. 2003). “The party on whose behalf service is made has 
the burden of establishing its validity when challenged; to do so, he must demonstrate that the 
procedure employed satisfied the requirements of the relevant portions of Rule 4 and any other 
applicable provision of law.” Light v. Wol f, 816 F.2d 746, 75 1 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (cleaned up). 
“Unless proper service has been effected, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over a defendant” 
and may not proceed with the action. Corsi v. Mueller, 422 F. Supp. 3d 51, 60 (D.D.C. 2019). 
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must dismiss a complaint that does not “contain sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 
When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts “must construe the complaint in 
favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from 
the facts alleged.” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). But 
 
2 The Court takes note of the Civil Cover Sheet only to clarify the nature of Ms. Pearson’s claims. 
Favors v. Coughlin , 877 F.2d 219, 220 (2d Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (“The civil cover sheet, of 
course, is merely an administrative aid to the court clerk, and is therefore not typically considered 
part of a litigant’s pleading papers.”). 

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courts need not accept as true “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” nor an 
“inference[] . . . unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.” Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 
193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (cleaned up). 
A pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards 
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) 
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) ). “This benefit is not, however, a license to 
ignore the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates , 658 F. Supp. 2d 
135, 137 (D.D.C. 2009). “Although a pro se complaint must be construed liberally, the complaint 
must still present a claim on whic h the Court can grant relief to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) 
challenge.” Smith v. Scalia, 44 F. Supp. 3d 28, 36 (D.D.C. 2014) (cleaned up). 
DISCUSSION 
Ms. Pearson brings this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).3 CACI moves to dismiss for improper service of process 
under Rule 12(b)(5) and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Mot. 1, ECF No. 4-1. The 
Court agrees that CACI was improperly served and dismisses this action under Rule 12(b)(5). 
CACI contends that Ms. Pearson failed to effectuate service because she served only a 
summons without an accompanying complaint. Mot. 6; Cook Decl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 4-3.4 
Ms. Pearson argues that dismissal is not warranted because her summons still gave CACI “actual 
notice” of this action and so the omission was merely a “technical defect[]” by a “pro se” litigant. 
Opp’n 2. Although the Court empathizes with the challenges that pro se litigants face in navigating 
 
3 Ms. Pearson’s Complaint does not identify Title VII and the ADA as her causes of action. But in 
opposing dismissal, she clarifies that those statutes are the bases for her claims. Opp’n 5. 
4 The Parties dispute whether service was made on an agent authorized to receive service on behalf 
of CACI. Mot. 6; Opp’n 2. The Court need not address this question because service was 
independently improper as it omitted the Complaint. 

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the judicial process, those challenges “‘do[] not constitute a license for’” this Court “to ignore the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Garlington v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 62 F. Supp. 3d 23, 
27 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Moore v. Agency for Int’l De v., 994 F.2d 874, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). 
And “[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require service of a copy of both the summons and 
the complaint” to effectuate service. James v. Booz -Allen & Hamilton, Inc. , 206 F.R.D. 15, 18 
(D.D.C. 2002) (citing Fed. R. Ci v. P. 4(h)). Consequently, Ms. Pearson’s attempt at service was 
“insufficient” under Rule 12(b)(5). Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5). 
Rather than dismiss her Complaint, Ms. Pearson asks this Court to extend the deadline for 
service under Rule 4(m) so that she can correct her mistake. Opp’n 3. She also seeks leave to 
amend her Complaint under Rule 15(a)(2). Opp’n 5. While the Court would ordinarily grant such 
requests from a pro se plaintiff, it may not do so in this case. 
Starting with service, Rule 4(m) allows for extension of the service deadline “if the plaintiff 
shows good cause for the failure .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Ms. Pearson has not demonstrated good 
cause to warrant an extension of the service deadline because any “extension would be futile.” 
Atchison v. U.S. Dist. Ct s., 190 F. Supp. 3d 78, 84 (D.D.C. 2016). Both Title VII and the ADA 
require a suit to be filed within ninety days of a “Notice of Right to Sue ” from the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1) (Title VII); 
Gordon v. District of Columbia , 605 F. Supp. 2d 239, 244 (D.D.C. 2009) ( recognizing the ADA 
borrows the same deadline). And Ms. Pearson filed this action on June 20, 2025, ninety-two days 
after she received her EEOC Notice of Right to Sue on March 20, 2025. Compl. 1; Oppn. 3–4. As 
CACI argues, this alone would be grounds to dismiss this case under Rule 12(b)(6). Mot. 6–7. 
Ms. Pearson’s arguments to the contrary fall short. First, Ms. Pearson argues that the 
ninety-day filing period should begin when she “actually viewed or accessed” the notice, which 

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she claims was “ several days after issuanc e.” Opp’n 3. But this is not correct. The ninety -day 
period established in Title VII “begins the day after the letter is received[] an d . . . expires on the 
90th day thereafter.” Gill v. Dist rict of Columbia, 872 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35 (D.D.C. 201 2). Thus, 
according to Ms. Pearson’s representations about when she received the EEOC letter, the period 
began on March 21, 2025, and concluded on June 18, 2025, two days before Ms. Pearson filed her 
Complaint. See Opp’n 3. 
Second, Ms. Pearson asks this Court to equitably toll the statutory deadline, arguing that 
tolling is warranted “where a pro se litigant” : “acted diligently,” “lacked clarity on the date of 
receipt,” “faced confusion caused by the EEOC’s electronic delivery system,” or “encountered 
circumstances outside her control.” Opp’n 4. But courts may equitably toll a missed deadline “only 
in ‘rare instances where—due to circumstances external to the party’s own conduct —it would be 
unconscionable to enforce the limitation period against the party and gross injustice would result.’” 
Jackson v. Modly, 949 F.3d 763, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (quoting Head v. Wilson, 792 F.3d 102, 111 
(D.C. Cir. 2015)). The plaintiff bears the burden of pleading and proving equitable reasons to toll, 
see United States v. Saro , 252 F.3d 449, 454 (D.C. Cir. 2001), and must show “(1) that she has 
been pursuing her rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in her way 
and prevented timely filing,” Dyson v. District of Columbia, 710 F.3d 415, 421 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
(cleaned up). Ms. Pearson has not carried that burden here. Her vague and conclusory allegations 
fail to establish that extraordinary circumstances prevented her from meeting the deadline . Thus, 
equitable tolling is not warranted. 
Turning to amendment , Ms. Pearson requests leave to amend her Complaint under 
Rule 15(a)(2) in lieu of dismissal for lack of service . Opp’n 5. But a “request for leave to amend 
may be denied if a plaintiff fails to comply with [D.D.C.] Local Rule 15.1, which dictates that a 

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motion for leave to amend ‘shall be accompanied by an original of the proposed pleading as 
amended.’” Ali v. Carnegie Inst. of Washington, 309 F.R.D. 77, 87 (D.D.C. 2015). Here, the Court 
informed Ms. Pearson of her obligation to file a proposed pleading under Local Rule 15.1 and 
asked Ms. Pearson to supplement her motion with such a proposal. See Min. Order (Apr. 6, 2026). 
But Ms. Pearson failed to respond to the Court’s order. Accordingly, without a proposed amended 
pleading to evaluate, the Court denies Ms. Pearson’s request for leave to amend. See Bradley v. 
D.C. Pub. Schs., 87 F. Supp. 3d 156, 162 –63 (D.D.C. 2015) (denying leave to amend for failure 
to attach amended complaint under local rules); Belizan v. Hershon, 434 F.3d 579, 582– 83 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006) (affirming denial of oral offer to amend for failure to comply with Rule 15(a) and Local 
Rule 15.1). 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the Court grants the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 4. A 
separate order will issue. 
 
 
 
SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN 
United States District Judge 
 
Date: May 19, 2026 
 

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