govinfo:USCOURTS-ctd-3_25-cv-01752-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT 
VERNON STANCUNA, 
 Plaintiff, 
 
 v. 
 
TOWN OF WALLINGFORD, PATROL 
OFFICER VINCENT ANASTASIO, LT. 
STEPHEN JAQUES, DET. MICHAEL 
FRIELLO, and SGT. BRIAN NOWEK, 
 Defendants. 
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NO. 3:25-CV-1752 (KAD) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MAY 19, 2026 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: [25] DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS THE 
[1] COMPLAINT 
 
Kari A. Dooley, United States District Judge: 
Plaintiff Vernon Stancuna, proceeding pro se , brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 (“Section 1983”) against Defendants Town of Wallingford (“Wallingford”), Patrol Officer 
Vincent Anastasio, Lieutenant Stephen Jaques, Detective Michael Friello, and Sergeant Brian 
Nowek (collectively, “Defendants”) , alleging that in December 2023, Defendants violated his 
rights under the First and Fourt eenth Amendments to the United States Constitution . See 
Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1. On December 19, 2025, Defendants filed the instant Motion 
to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing principally 
that the Complaint does not plausibly allege a viable Section 1983 claim against any Defendant, 
and otherwise additionally fails to allege the personal involvement of the individual Defendants . 
See MTD, ECF No. 25. 
For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED without 
prejudice, and Plaintiff will be given leave to file an Amended Complaint with respect to some of 
the claims asserted. 
 

2 
Allegations 
 The following facts are taken from the Complaint and accepted as true for the purpose of 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 
Plaintiff is a resident of Wallingford, Connecticut. Compl. at ¶ 4. On December 3, 2023, 
Plaintiff reported a burglary to the Wallingford Police Department (“WPD”), arising from an 
alleged theft of approximately $70,000 in precious metals and $7,000 in cas h from Plaintiff’s 
residence and sprinter van, respectively. See id. at ¶ 7. According to Plaintiff, “[c]redible evidence 
was given to the [WPD] that the crime was perpetrated by Doug Cone and an accomplice.” Id. at 
¶ 9. Doug Cone is a “experienced master mechanic” who had worked on many of Plaintiff’s 
vehicles, and “evidence was provided to the [WPD] that the battery inside [Plaintiff’s] [s]printer 
van was tampered with, signs that only a master mechanic would be able to perpetrate.” Id. 
Plaintiff repeatedly called the WPD’s investigating officer regarding this evidence, which 
nevertheless “never made it into the final report.” Id. 
Plaintiff alleges that the WPD’s criminal investigation into the burglary was inadequate 
because: (1) Doug Cone’s brother was previously a member of the WPD, and “no Defendant would 
present evidence against or seek an arrest warrant against the family member of a fellow officer”; 
and (2) it wa s premised on the WPD’s “desire to hurt [Plaintiff] financially for his past federal 
lawsuits filed against its officers.” See id. at ¶ 12. Indeed, Plaintiff claims that Defendants 
“actions/inactions with respect to investigating [the burglary] [were] made for the purpose of 
retaliating against [Plaintiff] for having filed” such lawsuits, “and to protect the good character 
and prevent a criminal case against Doug Cone, brother to an officer of the [WPD].” Id. at ¶ 13. 
The Complaint further suggests that Defendants’ retaliatory conduct resulted in harm to Plaintiff’s 

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“good character,” as well as financial loss to Plaintiff, to the extent he was restricted from accessing 
the courts and receiving an order of restitution against Doug Cone. See id. at ¶¶ 14–15. 
Plaintiff contends that the WPD has a “vendetta against [him],” and that Defendants 
conspired with other WPD officers named in Plaintiff’s prior lawsuits to violate his constitutional 
rights. The Complaint alleges that Defendants furthered such conspiracy by prolonging the ir 
criminal investigation “to allow the statute of limitations to expire,” thereby permitting Doug Cone 
“to escape any criminal investigation”; preventing Plaintiff’s access to the courts; and 
“stigmatiz[ing] and defam[ing]” Plaintiff’s character. See id. at ¶ 19. 
Procedural History 
Plaintiff filed the Complaint on October 16, 2025. See Compl., ECF No. 1. The Complaint 
asserts a retaliation claim arising under the First Amendment (“Count One”), an equal protection 
claim arising under the Fourteenth Amendment (“Count Two”), and a related civil conspiracy 
claim (“Count Three”). See generally id. Liberally construed, the Complaint also attempts to 
assert a municipal liability claim against Defendant Wallingford, under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See id. at ¶¶ 4–5. Plaintiff seeks compensatory 
damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees and costs. See id. at p. 6. 
On December 19, 2025, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. MTD, ECF 
No. 25. On January 21, 2026, Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Pl. 
Opp., ECF No. 31. Defendants filed their reply brief on February 4, 2026. Defs. Reply, ECF No. 
32. On April 14, 2026, the Court stayed discovery pending adjudication of the instant Motion to 
Dismiss. See ECF No. 34. 
 
 

4 
Standard of Review 
To survive a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 
570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it 
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Legal conclusions and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause 
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are not entitled to a presumption of truth. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Nevertheless, when reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept 
well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw “all reasonable inferences in the non -movant’s 
favor.” Interworks Sys. Inc. v. Merch. Fin. Corp., 604 F.3d 692, 699 (2d Cir. 2010). Moreover, 
where a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court must construe his pleadings liberally, and interpret the 
complaint to raise the strongest arguments it suggests. See Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d 
Cir. 2007). 
Discussion 
In seeking to dismiss the Complaint , Defendants argue that: (1) Plaintiff fails to state any 
claim against Defendant Wallingford ; (2) the Complaint fails to adequately allege the personal 
involvement of any individual Defendant ; (3) any claim arising from Defendants’ failure to 
investigate or failure to conduct an adequate investigation is not cognizable under Section 1983; 

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and (4) the Complaint fails to adequately allege either an equal protection or conspiracy claim .1 
In his opposition, Plaintiff contends that “the Complaint fairly asserts a claim for retaliation against 
the [WPD] and its officers.”2 Pl. Opp. at 3. The Court agrees with Defendants that the Complaint 
must be dismissed , but the Court does so without prejudice to Plaintiff repleading his First 
Amendment claim against the individual Defendants. 
Personal Involvement 
As an initial matter, the Complaint fatally fails to allege the personal involvement of any 
individual Defendant in the alleged constitutional violations. 
“It is well settled that, in order to establish a defendant ’s individual liability in a suit 
brought under [Section] 1983, a plaintiff must show . . . the defendant’s personal involvement in 
the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 
2013); see also Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994). “In other words, because 
vicarious liability is inapplicable to [Section] 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each defendant, 
through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Doe v. State Univ. of 
New York at Stony Brook, No. 19-CV-6039 (RRM), 2021 WL 1209563, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 
2021) (cleaned up) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676). 
 
1 Defendants additionally argue that even to the extent the Complaint adequately allege s personal involvement, the 
individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. See MTD at 11. But insofar as the Court is herein dismissing 
Plaintiff’s claims against the individual Defendants on personal involvement grounds, it need not reach this alternative 
argument. 
2 T he Court observes that Plaintiff’s opposition attaches a purported “expert report” completed by Officer James 
Baranowski (the “Baranowski Report”) , which purports to “detail how the [WPD] officers violated [Plaintiff’s] 
constitutional rights when they engaged in retaliation against [him] to cause [him] financial harm.” See Pl. Opp. at 1 
(citing Baranowski Report, ECF No. 31- 1). It is well- settled that “a plaintiff cannot amend his pleadings via his 
opposition to a motion to dismiss.” Jackson v. New York State Off. of Mental Health, No. 11 -CV-7832 (KNF), 2012 
WL 3457961, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 5862741 (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 15, 2012). As such, the Court has not considered the Baranowski Report in deciding the instant Motion to 
Dismiss. See e.g. , Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co. , No. 21-CV-5433 (RA), 2022 WL 986109, at *6 
n.8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2022). The Court further observes that the Baranowski Report is unsigned and otherwise 
noncompliant with Rule 26(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

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Here, the Complaint broadly describes the WPD’s failure to adequately investigate the 
burglary of Plaintiff’s home and vehicle, and asserts that such inaction on the part the WPD was 
in retaliation for Plaintiff’s previous federal lawsuits involving the WPD and WPD officers. But 
the Complaint fails to sufficiently identify any individual Defendant’s personal involvement in the 
foregoing purported constitutional deprivation, instead relying on group pleading “Defendants” 
and generalized allegations regarding the WPD as a whole. See Moore v. Westchester Cnty., No. 
18-CV-7782 (KMK), 2019 WL 3889859, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2019) (“[N]onspecific 
allegations that rely on group pleading and fail to differentiate as to which defendant was involved 
in the alleged unlawful conduct are insufficient to state a claim.”). Indeed, other than identifying 
the individual Defendants in the case caption and later indicating broadly that “Defendants” are 
WPD officers, see Compl. at ¶ 5, the Complaint fails to set forth a single allegation attributing any 
specific conduct to an individual Defendant. This is plainly insufficient, and accordingly, each of 
Plaintiff’s claims against the individual Defendants must be dismissed.
3 
Counts Two and Three 
The Court additionally concludes that Plaintiff has abandoned his equal protection and 
conspiracy claims, insofar as his opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss does not include 
 
3 Plaintiff’s failure to adequately allege the personal involvement of any individual Defendant is fatal to Counts One, 
Two, and Three. Nonetheless , as to Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim (Count One), the Court further 
observes that Defendants, in seeking dismissal, appear to have conflated Plaintiff’s retaliation claim with a purported 
“failure to investigate” claim. Defendants are correct that any claim arising from Defendants’ purported failure to 
investigate or adequately investigate the burglary of Plaintiff’s home and vehicle is not cognizable under Section 1983. 
See McArthur v. Yale New Haven Hosp., No. 3:20-CV-998 (SRU), 2021 WL 3725996, at *6 (D. Conn. Aug. 23, 2021). 
However, the Court construes the Complaint as asserting the failure to investigate not as a constitutional claim in and 
of itself, but rather, as the purported “adverse action” involved in Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim. See 
Galgano v. County of Putnam , No. 16-CV-3572, 2024 WL 1623401, at *104 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2024) ( “A plaintiff 
asserting a First Amendment retaliation claim must establish that: (1) his speech or conduct was protected by the First 
Amendment; (2) the defendant took an adverse action against him; and (3) there was a causal connection between this 
adverse action and the protected speech.”) (citation omitted). 

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any discussion whatsoever as to such claims.4 It is well- settled that “[a]t the motion to dismiss 
stage, where review is limited to the pleadings, a plaintiff abandons a claim by failing to address 
the defendant’s arguments in support of dismissing that claim.” Horsting v. St. John’s Riverside 
Hosp., No. 17- CV-3230 (CS), 2018 WL 1918617, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2018) (collecting 
cases). W hile some courts in this Circuit have applied this principle in cases involving pro se 
litigants, others have cautioned that a pro se plaintiff should not be presumed to have abandoned 
his claims merely because his opposition did not address defendants’ specific arguments for 
dismissal. Compare, Romain v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 639 F. Supp. 3d 416, 421 n.3 
(E.D.N.Y. 2022) (deeming pro se plaintiffs’ claims abandoned when they were not addressed in 
their opposition to defendant’s motion to dismiss); Komatsu v. City of New York, No. 20-CV-7046 
(ER), 2021 WL 3038498, at *9 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2021) (pro se plaintiff “arguably abandoned 
his claim” when he failed to address defendant’s argument for dismissal); McNair v. Ponte, No. 
16-CV-1722 (LAP), 2019 WL 1428349, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2019) (“This Court has deemed 
claims abandoned even in cases where the plaintiff was proceeding pro se .”) (collecting cases); 
with, Harriram v. Fera, No. 21-CV-3696 (RA), 2024 WL 1020266, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2024) 
(declining to dismiss complaint where pro se plaintiff’s opposition brief failed to address any of 
defendants’ arguments) (citing Tsismentzoglou v. Milos Estiatorio Inc., No. 18-CV-9664 (RA), 
2019 WL 2287902, at *2 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2019)); Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 
1983) (“Implicit in the right to self-representation is an obligation on the part of the court to make 
reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants from inadvertent forfeiture of important rights 
because of their lack of legal training.”). 
 
4 Plaintiff’s opposition likewise includes no discussion whatsoever as to any potential Monell claim against Defendant 
Wallingford. But insofar as the Complaint plainly fails to state any such claim, the Court need not deem it abandoned. 

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“Ultimately, the question of abandonment is one of intent.” Austin v. Ford Models, Inc., 
149 F.3d 148, 155 (2d Cir. 1998). And h ere, Plaintiff’s opposition is silent as to the viability of 
either his equal protection or conspiracy claims. Conversely, Plaintiff’s opposition makes 
abundantly clear that he fully intends to prosecute his First Amendment retaliation claim. 
Moreover, Plaintiff is an admittedly experienced litigator, having filed previous federal lawsuits 
in this District. 5 See Marin v. New York, No. 17- CV-4668 (CM), 2017 WL 6405847, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2017) (“The [c]ourt ordinarily accords pro se litigants a substantial degree of 
solicitude in proceeding with their claims, but ‘the degree of solicitude may be lessened where the 
particular pro se litigant is experienced in litigation.’”) (quoting Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 
102 (2d Cir. 2010)); see, e.g., Flemming v. Rock, No. 15-CV-30 (DNH), 2016 WL 632248, at *3 
(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2016) (special solicitude not afforded to pro se plaintiff who had “ ample 
experience litigating and ha[d] particular experience in this district”). For all of these reasons, the 
Court concludes that Plaintiff has abandoned Count Two and Count Three. 
Municipal Liability – Monell 
In naming the Town of Wallingford as a Defendant in this Section 1983 lawsuit, Plaintiff 
attempts to assert a municipal liability claim under Monell. Indeed, Monell is the only vehicle by 
which to assert municipal liability pursuant to Section 1983. In Monell, the Supreme Court 
determined that “[l]ocal governing bodies . . . can be sued directly under [Section] 1983 for 
monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where . . . the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional 
implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted 
and promulgated by that body’s officers.” Id. at 690. “Demonstrating that the municipality itself 
caused or is implicated in the constitutional violation is the touchstone of establishing that a 
 
5 The Court’s CM/ECF system reveals approximately 20 previously filed lawsuits by Plaintiff. 

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municipality can be held liable for unconstitutional actions taken by municipal employees.” 
Amnesty Am. v. Town of West Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 124–25 (2d Cir. 2004). 
A “municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other 
words, a municipality cannot be held liable under [Section 1983] on a respondeat superior theory.” 
Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (emphasis in original). “Instead, it is when execution of a government’s 
policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be 
said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible 
under [Section 1983].” Id. at 694. A plaintiff may demonstrate a government “policy or custom” 
by “alleging the existence of (1) a formal policy; (2) actions taken or decisions made by final 
municipal policymakers that caused the violation of plaintiff ’s rights; (3) a practice so persistent 
and widespread that it constitutes a custom or usage and implies the constructive knowledge of 
policymakers; or (4) a failure to properly train or supervise municipal employees that amounts to 
deliberate indifference to the rights of those with whom municipal employees will come into 
contact.” Gomez v. City of Norwalk , No. 3:15- CV-1434 (MPS), 2017 WL 3033322, at *3 (D. 
Conn. July 17, 2017) (quotations omitted). 
Here, the Complaint utterly fails to assert any allegations even arguably s uggesting that 
Defendants’ purportedly retaliatory conduct resulted fr om a Wallingford municipal policy, 
practice, or custom . At best, Plaintiff alleges that Wallingford has a “vendetta against [him] ,” 
which is wholly conclusory, factual ly vague, and therefore plainly insufficient. See Iqbal, 556 
U.S. at 678. Similarly inadequate are Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Doug Cone, and the WPD’s 
failure to “present evidence against or seek an arrest warrant against the family member of a fellow 
officer.” Compl. at ¶ 12. Once again, such allegations do not suggest that Defendants’ actions or 
inactions were motivated by any formal WPD policy, practice, or custom, and it is well-settled that 

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“a single incident, like the one alleged here, cannot form the basis for a Monell claim.” Harrison 
v. New York, No. 14-CV-1296 (LDH), 2021 WL 1176146, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2021) (citing 
City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823–24 (1985)). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s purported 
Monell claim must be dismissed. 
Leave to Amend 
Defendants urge that, upon dismissal of his claims, Plaintiff should not be permitted leave 
to amend, insofar as “there are substantive issues with all of [P]laintiff’s claims” and “repleading 
would be futile.” See MTD at 12–13. The Court disagrees. 
Rule 15(a)(2) provides that a court should freely give leave to amend “when justice so 
requires.” See McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 200 (2d Cir. 2007). “Leave 
to amend may be denied, however, if the amendment would be futile.” Ong v. Chipotle Mexican 
Grill, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 3d 199, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (citation omitted). “Leave to amend may 
also be denied ‘when a party has been given ample prior opportunity to allege a claim.’” Id. 
(quoting De Jesus v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 1996)); see also Foman 
v. Davis , 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (“repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments 
previously allowed” constitutes grounds for denying amendment). “It is within the sound 
discretion of the district court to grant or deny leave to amend.” WC Capital Mgmt., LLC v. UBS 
Sec., LLC, 711 F.3d 322, 334 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Here, given that Counts Two and Three have been deemed abandoned, the Court declines 
in its discretion to grant Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint reasserting such claims . As 
to Count One, however, the Court has dismissed Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim 
because he has not provided sufficient factual allegations regarding the personal involvement of 
each named individual Defendant. However, based on the allegations in the Complaint, as well as 

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certain extrinsic evidence, see ECF No. 33, it appears that Plaintiff likely possesses adequate 
information to sufficiently allege how, and to what extent, at least some of the individual 
Defendants participated in the underlying First Amendment violation . Thus, at this juncture the 
Court cannot determine that leave to amend would be futile. Accordingly, the Court will permit 
Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint. 
Conclusion 
For all of the reasons set forth herein, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. The 
Complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety. Counts Two and Three, as well as any purported Monell 
claim, are DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate Defendant 
Town of Wallingford. 
Count One is DISMISSED without prejudice. On or before June 18, 2026, Plaintiff may 
file an Amended Complaint asserting a First Amendment retaliation claim against the individual 
Defendants. Any Amended Complaint will completely replace the Complaint, and for the reasons 
set forth herein, must adequately assert the personal involvement of each named Defendant in the 
alleged First Amendment violation. 
SO ORDERED at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 19th day of May 2026. 
 /s/ Kari A. Dooley 
KARI A. DOOLEY 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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