govinfo:USCOURTS-mdd-1_21-cv-00809-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
SAIREE WRIGHT, et al., * 
* 
v. * Civil Action No. CCB-21-809 
* 
FRANCIS ALEXANDER AUDISIO n/k/a * 
JOHN DOE, et al. * 
* 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
MEMORANDUM 
Pending before the court is a partial motion to dismiss filed by defendant Francis Alexander 
Audisio, (ECF 8), and a motion to dismiss filed by defendant Maricela Alexandersson, (ECF 9). 
The motions have been fully briefed and no hearing is required. See Local Rule 105.6. For the 
reasons stated below, Mr. Audisio’s motion will be denied in part and granted in part. Ms. 
Alexandersson’s motion will be granted. 
BACKGROUND 
The following facts are described as alleged in the amended complaint. (ECF 7, Am . 
Compl.). The plaintiff, Sairee Wright (“S. Wright”), and the defendant, Francis Alexander Audisio 
(“Audisio”), were involved in a romantic relationship and in 2015 resided together in St. Louis, 
Missouri. (ECF 7 ¶¶ 9-10). In June 2015, S. Wright’s sister, plaintiff Haydee Wright (“H. Wright”), 
who was a 12-year-old child at the time, traveled to visit the residence of S. Wright and Audisio, 
who was then 22 years old. (ECF 7 ¶¶ 11-13). One night during the visit, after S. Wright fell asleep, 
Audisio forcibly raped H. Wright (“first assault”). (ECF 7 ¶ 16). Three years later, on March 20, 
2018, H. Wright again visited S. Wright and Audisio, who remained in a relationship, now residing 
together in Pikesville, Maryland. At this time, H. Wright was still a minor child, 15 years of age, 
and Audisio was 25. (ECF 7 ¶¶ 18-20). One night during the visit, after S. Wright fell asleep, 

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Audisio again forcibly raped H. Wright, (“second assault”). (ECF 7 ¶ 22). After the second assault, 
H. Wright disclosed both assaults to S. Wright for the first time. (ECF 7 ¶ 23). 
On or about August 10, 2018, following a dinner with Audisio’s family , S. Wright and 
Audisio began to argue about the two assaults committed by Audisio. (ECF 7 ¶¶ 25-26). Audisio 
then “violently perpetuated a forceful physical touching of [S. Wright],” from which she sustained, 
among other things, “fractures to her skull and traumatic brain injury from w hich she never fully 
recovered.” (ECF 7 ¶ 27). Alexandersson, allegedly acting on Audisio’s beh alf, gained access to 
the property that same day and destroyed evidence, including surveillance tapes, of the battery 
committed by Audisio on S. Wright. (ECF 7 ¶ 53). 
The plaintiffs initiated this suit on March 30, 2021, and the amended complaint alleges 
nineteen counts. Seventeen counts are against Audisio. S. Wright, specifically, brings counts one 
through four, and count seven, against Audisio. Count one is for battery , count two is for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, count three is for negligence, count four is for civil 
conspiracy, and count seven is for gross negligence. H. Wright brings counts eight through 
nineteen against Audisio, alleging separate but related claims arising from both incidents: battery 
(count eight and fourteen), intentional infliction of emotional distress (count nine and fifteen), 
negligence (count ten and sixteen) , gross negligence (count eleven and seventeen) , false 
imprisonment (count twelve and eighteen), and sexual abuse (count thirteen and nineteen). Against 
Alexandersson, S. Wright alleges civil conspiracy (count five) and aiding and abetting (count six). 
Audisio moves to dismiss only the intentional infliction of emotional distress and civil 
conspiracy claims. Alexandersson moves to dismiss both the civil conspiracy claim and the aiding 
and abetting claim against her. 

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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
To survive a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of a complaint “must be enough to 
raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the 
complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) 
(internal citations omitted). “To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff need not ‘forecast’ evidence 
sufficient to prove the elements of the claim. However, the complaint must allege sufficient facts 
to establish those ele ments.” Walters v. McMahen , 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012) (citation 
omitted). “Thus, while a plaintiff does not need to demonstrate in a complaint that the right to 
relief is ‘probable,’ the complaint must advance the plaintiff’s claim ‘across the line from 
conceivable to plausible.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Additionally, although courts 
“must view the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,” they “will not accept ‘legal 
conclusions couched as facts or unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments’” 
in deciding whether a case should survive a motion to dismiss. U.S. ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda 
Pharm. North Am., Inc. , 707 F.3d 451, 455 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Wag More Dogs, LLC v. 
Cozart, 680 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2012)). 
ANALYSIS 
I. The Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims Against Audisio 
Both plaintiff s, Sairee and Haydee Wright , bring claims of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress (“IIED”) against the defendant, Francis Audisio. S. Wright specifically alleges 
that Audisio is liable for IIED due to the physical battering of her person, which caused her to 
sustain extreme, permanent, and debilitating injuries. (ECF 7 ¶ 34). H. Wright claims that Audisio 
is liable for IIED for physically battering her person, causing her to sustain extreme mental anguish 
and emotional distress. (ECF 7 ¶¶ 76, 112). The defendant has moved to dismiss this claim on the 

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ground that both plaintiffs fail to allege facts showing either that Audisio’s conduct was outrageous 
and extreme or that she suffered severe emotional distress . (ECF 8-1, at 6, 9, Mem. in Supp. of 
Mot. to Dismiss). 
In order for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress to be successful in 
Maryland, “a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant intentionally or recklessly engaged in 
extreme and outrageous conduct that caused the plaintiff to suffer severe emotion al 
distress.” Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451 (2011) (citing Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 614 
(Md. 1977)). Specifically, four elements must be sufficiently pled to state a claim for relief under 
IIED: “(1) The conduct must be intentional or reckless; (2) The conduct must be extreme and 
outrageous; (3) There must be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the 
emotional distress; (4) The emotional distress must be severe.” Harris, 380 A.2d at 614 (internal 
references omitted). All elements “must be satisfied completely before a cause of action will lie,” 
and responsibility for the initial determination of whether the elements have been satisfied belongs 
to the trial judge. Hamilton v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 502 A.2d 1057, 1063 (Md. 
1986) (citing Harris, 380 A.2d at 611). “Where reasonable [people] may differ, it is for the jury to 
determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous 
to result in liability.” Harris, 380 A.2d at 615. 
“In evaluating whether the identified conduct is extreme and outrageous, courts should 
consider multiple factors, including the context in which the conduct occurred, the personality of 
the plaintiff and [ their] susceptibility to emotional distress, and the relationship between the 
defendant and plaintiff.” Mathis v. Goldberg, 2013 WL 524708, at *10 (D. Md. Feb. 12, 
2013), aff’d, 538 Fed. Appx. 310 (4th Cir. 2013).1 Maryland courts have recognized the tort of 
 
1 Unpublished cases are cited for the soundness of their reasoning, not for precedential value. 

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IIED where the defendant “implement[ed] a course of extreme conduct ” engaging in “repeated 
sexual intercourse” with the plaintiff’s family member. See Figueiredo–Torres v. Nickel, 584 A.2d 
69, 71, 75 (Md. 1991) (permitting IIED claim to go forward where plaintiff alleged psychologist 
engaged in sexual relations with plaintiff’s wife during the time he was counseling the couple). 
With respect to the IIED claims brought by H. Wright—who was a 12-year-old at the time 
the first assault took place and a 15-year-old at the time of the second assault—the court finds that 
she has sufficiently pleaded facts alleging conduct by Audisio which rise to the level of outrageous 
and extreme. H. Wright alleges that Audisio, who is ten years H. Wright’s senior, intentionally 
and forcibly raped her twice , causing painful and permanent injuries and requiring medical care. 
Furthermore, H. Wright alleges that the traumatic assaults have disrupted her daily functioning 
and resulted in past and future medical and other related expenses as well as lost time from her 
daily pursuits. This is sufficient. 
Plaintiff S. Wright alleges an assault sufficiently violent to result in a traumatic brain injury 
and arising out of a confrontation about the rape of a minor child in her care. Her ongoing daily 
functioning and pursuits have been impaired as a result. Thus, she has also stated a plausible claim 
for IIED, and the motion to dismiss these counts will be denied. 
II. The Civil Conspiracy Claims Against Audisio and Alexandersson 
A claim for civil conspiracy requires proof of: “1) [a] confederation of two or more persons 
by agreement or understanding; 2) some unlawful or tortious act done in furtherance of the 
conspiracy or use of unlawful or tortious means to accomplish an act not in itself illegal; and 3) 
[a]ctual legal damage resulting to the plaintiff.” Lloyd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 916 A.2d 257, 284 
(Md. 2007) (citation omitted). “‘[C]onspiracy’ is not a separate tort capable of independently 
sustaining an award of damages in the absence of other tortious injury to the plaintiff.” Id. 

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(quoting Alleco Inc. v. The Harry & Jeanette Weinberg Foundation, Inc. , 665 A.2d 1038, 1045 
(Md. 1995)). “There is no doubt of the right of a plaintiff to maintain an action on the case against 
several, for conspiring to do, and actually doing, some unlawful act to his damage . . . It is not, 
therefore, for simply conspiring to do the unlawful act that the action lies. It is for doing the act 
itself, and the resulting actual damage to the plaintiff, that afford the ground of the action.” Alleco 
Inc., 655 A.2d at 1045 (quoting Kimball v. Harman and Burch, 34 Md. 407, 409 (1871)). 
S. Wright alleges that Audisio and Alexandersson agreed to enter the property where the 
August 10, 2018, battery took place and destroy evidence of the battery and the resulting injury to 
S. Wright. (ECF 7 ¶¶ 46, 53). She cites to Great American Insurance Co. v. Nextday Network 
Hardware Corp., 73 F. Supp. 3d 636 (D. Md. 2014) (“Great American”), to support her argument 
that “Maryland courts have clearly recognized that tort liability can be upheld for actions occurring 
after a completed offense . . . .” (ECF 10-1 at 11, Mem. in Supp. of Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss). The 
instant case, however, is distinguishable. S. Wright fails to allege Alexandersson participated in 
her battery claim, and also fails to identify the tort of destruction of evidence in her amended 
complaint. See Lloyd, 916 A.2d at 284; see also Eichen v. Jackson & Tull Chartered Eng’rs, 2019 
WL 3968330, at *8-9 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Aug. 22, 2019) (dismissing civil conspiracy allegation 
where plaintiff failed to plead underlying tort). Thus, she has failed to plead independent tortious 
conduct underlying the alleged conspiracy. In Great American, by contrast, the plaintiffs stated a 
plausible claim for the tortious act of convers ion which supported the corresponding allegation 
that the defendants conspired by acting as a “fence” to facilitate the unlawful conversion of 
property. See Great Am. Ins. Co., 73 F. Supp. 3d at 640-644. For the foregoing reasons, the court 
will grant the motions by Audisio and Alexandersson to dismiss the civil conspiracy claim against 
each of them. 

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III. The Aiding and Abetting Claim Against Alexandersson 
Finally, Alexandersson argues the court should dismiss S. Wright’s aiding and abetting 
claim against her on the grounds that the “plaintiff has not alleged that Alexandersson provided 
substantial assistance to Audisio in the commission of the battery, but instead t hat she 
‘perpetuat[ed] and assist[ed] in the destruction of evidence’ after the fact.” (ECF 9 -1 at 8, Mem. 
in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss). 
Under Maryland law, a person who “ encouraged, incited, aided or abetted the act of the 
direct perpetrator of the tort” may be held liable as a principal for the underlying tortious conduct. 
Alleco Inc., 665 A.2d at 1049 (quoting Duke v. Feldman, 226 A.2d 345, 347 ( Md. 1967)). To be 
held liable for aiding and abetting, there must, necessarily, be a “direct perpetrator of the tort.” Id. 
(quoting Duke, 226 A.2d at 347). “ Thus, civil aider and abettor liability, somewhat like civil 
conspiracy, requires that there exist underlying tortious activity in order for the alleged aider and 
abettor to be held liable.” Id. 
In the present case, the plaintiffs allege that Alexanders son “provided substantial 
assistance, aid, and encouragement in the . . . destruction of evidence.” (ECF 7 ¶ 60). The plaintiffs 
do not allege , however, that Alexandersson gave substantial assistanc e or encouragement to 
Audisio to engage in the underlying torts, that is, the claims stemming from the assaults , and as 
discussed above, they have not alleged tortious destruction of evidence. As a result, Alexandersson 
cannot be held liable as an aider and abettor and the court will grant her motion to dismiss on this 
claim. 
CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons stated above, the court will deny Audisio’s motion to dismiss as to the 
intentional infliction of emotional distress c laims and grant his motion to dismiss as to the civil 

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conspiracy claim. The court will grant Alexandersson’s motion to dismiss. A separate order 
follows. 
__________________ 
Date Catherine C. Blake 
United States District Judge 
09/30/2022 /s/

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