govinfo:USCOURTS-nynd-9_25-cv-00665-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
 
 
JARELL MONTEZ WALKER, 
 
 Petitioner, 
v. 9:25-CV-0665 
 (DNH) 
WARDEN, FCI Ray Brook, 
 
 Respondent. 
 
 
APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL: 
 
JARELL MONTEZ WALKER 
Petitioner pro se 
24157-055 
Hazelton Federal Correctional Institution 
P.O. BOX 2000 
Bruceton Mills, WV 26525 
 
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY 
FORREST T. YOUNG, ESQ. 
Assistant United States Attorney 
100 S. Clinton Street – Suite 900 
Syracuse, New York 13261 
 
 
DAVID N. HURD 
Senior United States District Judge 
 
DECISION and ORDER 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Pro se petitioner Jarell Montez Walker seeks federal habeas corpus relief pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 2241. Dkt. No. 1, Petition ("Pet."). Respondent has opposed the Petition. Dkt. 
No. 8, Memorandum of Law in Opposition (“Resp. Memo.”); Dkt. No. 8-1, Declaration of 
Yancy Matteau (“Matteau Decl."); Dkt. Nos. 8-2–8-8, Exhibits in Support of Matteau Decl. 

 
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Petitioner then filed a reply. Dkt. No. 11, Traverse.1 
For the reasons outlined below, the Petition is denied and dismissed. 
II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND 
A. Petitioner’s Conviction and Sentence 
On September 15, 2016, the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
North Carolina sentenced petitioner to a 204-month term of imprisonment, followed by five 
years of supervised release, based on his conviction for Possession of a Firearm by a 
Convicted Felon. See Matteau Decl. ¶ 5; see also United States v. Walker et al., No. 1:15-
CR-0323 (M.D.N.C.) (“Walker I”), Dkt. No. 56, Plea Agreement; Walker I, Dkt. No. 90, 
Judgment; Walker I, Dkt. No. 113, Opinion (affirming the district court's judgment). 
 As of the filing date of the Response, Petitioner’s projected release date, via good 
conduct time, was November 18, 2030. Matteau Decl. ¶ 7. Petitioner’s offense is not one of 
the enumerated disqualifying convictions listed in the First Step Act (“FSA”), at 18 U.S.C. § 
3632(d)(4)(D), and he is therefore eligible to earn FSA time credits. Matteau Decl. ¶ 6. 
B. FSA Time Credits 
 The FSA allows an eligible prisoner determined to be a medium or high risk of 
recidivism to earn 10 credits for every 30 days of successful programming, and an eligible 
prisoner determined to be a minimum or low risk of recidivism to earn 15 credits for every 30 
days of successful programming. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A). The Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") 
utilizes the Prisoner Assessment Tool Targeting Estimated Risk and Needs (“PATTERN”) to 
 
1 After the Petition was filed, petitioner was transferred from the Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI”) in Ray 
Brook, New York to the United States Penitentiary (“USP”) in Big Sandy, Kentucky. Dkt. No. 7. Several months 
after the Traverse was filed, petitioner notified the Court of his transfer from USP Big Sandy to FCI Hazelton. 
Dkt. No. 12. 
 

 
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“determine the recidivism risk of each inmate and classify him/her as having a minimum, low, 
medium, or high risk of recidivism.” See Matteau Decl. ¶¶ 10-12.2 
The BOP may apply FSA earned time credits toward pre-release custody or early 
transfer to supervised release for prisoners who have “shown through periodic risk 
assessments a demonstrated recidivism risk reduction or ha[ve] maintained a minimum or 
low recidivism risk.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g). A prisoner seeking to have time credits applied 
toward early transfer to supervised release must have been determined to “be a minimum or 
low risk to recidivate pursuant to the last reassessment of the prisoner.” 18 U.S.C. § 
3624(g)(1)(d)(ii). 
A prisoner seeking to have FSA time credits applied toward prerelease custody must 
“be a minimum or low risk to recidivate pursuant to the last 2 reassessments of the prisoner,” 
or be approved for such a transfer by the Warden. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(d)(i). Upon 
receipt of a petition to be transferred to prerelease custody or supervised release, a Warden 
may apply FSA time credits and transfer an eligible prisoner to prerelease custody if, among 
other things, the Warden determines that the prisoner “has made a good faith effort to lower 
[his] recidivism risk through participation in recidivism reduction programs or productive 
activities[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(D)(i)(II)(bb). 
BOP Program Statement 5410.01, CN-2 provides that this “good faith effort” is 
demonstrated by, among other things, the prisoner “maintaining clear conduct for at least 
three years from the date of the request” and “[s]uccessfully completing at least one of the 
[BOP’s] residential [evidence-based recidivism reduction] programs” if commensurate with an 
 
2 The tool takes into account fifteen factors, such as age, prior sex offense convictions, prior violent offenses, 
criminal history, history of violence, time since last incident report, and work programs. Id., ¶ 12. 
 

 
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identified need. Matteau Decl. ¶ 21; Dkt. No. 8-6 at 19. The Program Statement also sets 
forth the procedure by which a prisoner may demonstrate this good faith effort and seek the 
Warden’s approval to apply credits to transfer them to pre-release custody— namely, by 
submitting a Form BP-A0148 to staff during a regularly scheduled Program Review. Id., Dkt. 
No. 8-6 at 20. 
III. THE PETITION AND RESPONSE 
 Petitioner challenges the calculation by the BOP of his prison sentence and seeks an 
order directing the BOP to apply his alleged FSA time credits to reduce his term of 
confinement. See Pet. at 2-8. Respondent contends that the Petition should be dismissed 
because Petitioner failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies regarding his claim 
before filing this suit, and, alternatively, the claim lacks merit because Petitioner has never 
been deemed a minimum or low risk for recidivism and has not invoked the established 
process to seek the Warden’s approval to apply his FSA credits to pre-release custody. See 
Resp. Memo. at 3-9. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
A. Jurisdiction 
Habeas corpus relief is available if a prisoner is "in custody in violation of the 
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). A petition is 
properly brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 where a federal prisoner challenges the 
execution of his or her sentence, rather than its imposition. See Adams v. United States, 372 
F.3d 132, 134-35 (2d Cir. 2004); Jiminian v. Nash, 245 F.3d 144, 146-47 (2d Cir. 2001). 
Because execution of a sentence includes, among other things, the computation of the 
sentence, a § 2241 petition is the proper means to challenge sentence computation. Adams, 
372 F.3d at 135 (citing Nash, 245 F.3d at 146); see also Cook v. N.Y.S. Div. of Parole, 321 

 
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F.3d 274, 278 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining that a petitioner can use 2241 to challenge a federal 
official's computation of a sentence, parole decisions, or prison disciplinary actions); see also, 
e.g., Lugo v. Hudson, No. 9:13-CV-0753 (GTS), 2014 WL 11350815, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. June 
16, 2014) (explaining the petitioner's challenge to “the BOP's calculation of his federal 
sentence,” was “properly brought pursuant to section 2241.”), aff'd, 785 F.3d 852 (2d Cir. 
2015); Holton v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 6:22-CV-6528 , 2023 WL 2965145, at *2 
(W.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2023) (habeas petitioner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241was “the 
appropriate vehicle” for the petitioner's claim he was entitled to FSA time credit). 
Petitions filed under section 2241 must name the petitioner's warden as respondent 
and be filed in the district of the petitioner's confinement. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a); Rumsfeld 
v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435, 447 (2004). When a petitioner files a petition under Section 
2241 challenging the BOP’s sentence calculations and application of FSA credits and is 
thereafter transferred to a facility outside of the filing district, the district court in which the 
action was originally filed may retain jurisdiction over the proceeding. See, e.g., Rivera-Perez 
v. Stover, 757 F. Supp. 3d 204, 211 (D. Conn. 2024) (stating that the “application of FSA time 
credits” is a “type of relief [that] can be effectuated by the BOP generally, not any one warden 
specifically”); Mason v. Alatary, No. 23-CV-0193, 2023 WL 2965619, at *1-3 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 
17, 2023) (denying request to transfer venue and noting that “courts have found that the 
presence of a BOP facility within the jurisdiction, even after a petitioner was transferred to a 
different judicial district, was sufficient to keep the respondent ‘within reach’ and allow the 
original district court to maintain jurisdiction”). 
Here, Petitioner was incarcerated at Ray Brook, in the Northern District of New York, 
when he filed this action. Although Petitioner was subsequently transferred to a facility 

 
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outside of this District, Respondent does not challenge the Court’s jurisdiction. See Resp. 
MOL. at 1-2 n.1. 
Accordingly, a § 2241 petition was both the appropriate procedural vehicle to address 
Petitioner's challenge to the execution of his sentence, Adams, 372 F.3d at 135, and 
commenced in the proper court, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a); Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 447. 
B. Exhaustion 
1. Relevant Legal Standard 
Federal inmates seeking habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 must exhaust 
their administrative remedies prior to filing a petition. See Carmona v. U.S. Bureau of 
Prisons, 243 F.3d 629, 634 (2d Cir. 2001). “This requires compliance with the BOP's four-
step Administrative Remedy Program.” Lallave v. Martinez, 609 F. Supp. 3d 164, 179 
(E.D.N.Y. 2022) (citing 28 C.F.R. § 542.10(a)). 
The exhaustion process is aptly summarized as follows: 
Available to all federal prison inmates is an internal, four-step 
administrative grievance procedure adopted by the BOP for the 
stated purpose of "allow[ing] an inmate to seek formal review of 
an issue relating to any aspect of his/her own confinement." . . . 
The first step of the prescribed process entails making an effort to 
obtain an early resolution of the matter by raising the issue 
informally to staff. . . . In the event this avenue does not lead to a 
successful resolution, the inmate next may submit a formal written 
[Administrative Remedy ("AR")] to the warden of the particular 
facility involved, utilizing a designated BP–9 form, within twenty 
days of the relevant event. . . . If the AR is denied, an appeal may 
be taken to the appropriate BOP Regional Director within twenty 
calendar days of the date of denial. . . . As a fourth and final step, 
an unfavorable decision from the Regional Director may be 
appealed to the General Counsel's office (also referred to as the 
"Central Office" [or "CORC"]) within thirty days of the date on 
which the Regional Director rejects the inmate's appeal. 
 

 
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Barber v. Perdue, No. 9:11-CV-0127 (NAM/DEP), 2012 WL 5996342, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 
2012) (citing cases and 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10(a), 542.13(a), 542.14(a), & 542.15(a)) (internal 
citations omitted)). In sum, "[n]o administrative appeal is fully exhausted until the BOP's 
Central Office reviews it." Reynolds v. Warden of FCI Ray Brook, No. 9:16-CV-1264 
(TJM/TWD), 2019 WL 8064012, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2019). 
“The exhaustion requirement protects the authority of administrative agencies, limits 
interference in agency affairs, develops the factual record to make judicial review more 
efficient, and resolves issues to render judicial review unnecessary.” Rosenthal v. Killian, 
667 F. Supp. 2d 364, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (cleaned up). “Failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies results in a procedural default, which bars judicial review unless the petitioner 
persuades the Court that the failure to exhaust should be excused.” Id.; see also Zucker v. 
Menifee, No. 03-CV-10077, 2004 WL 102779, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2004) (“[T]he 
exhaustion requirement for § 2241 petitions is prudential, not statutory, unlike habeas corpus 
petitions filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Therefore, [Petitioner's] failure to exhaust may 
be excused at the court's discretion.”) (cleaned up). 
 In situations in which “an exhaustion requirement is judicially imposed instead of 
statutorily imposed,” exhaustion of administrative remedies may be excused “when ‘(1) 
available remedies provide no genuine opportunity for adequate relief; (2) irreparable injury 
may occur without immediate judicial relief; (3) administrative appeal would be futile; and (4) 
in certain instances a plaintiff has raised a substantial constitutional question.’” Beharry v. 
Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51, 62 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280, 1288 
(2d Cir. 1996)) (additional citations omitted); see also Lopez v. Terrell, 697 F. Supp. 2d 549, 
556 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“The exhaustion requirement for § 2241 petitions, however, is 

 
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prudential, not statutory, and may be excused at the court's discretion.”), rev'd on other 
grounds, 654 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2011). 
2. Analysis 
Respondent has adduced record evidence showing that Petitioner did not exhaust his 
administrative remedies before commencing this action. See Matteau Decl. ¶¶ 29-31; Dkt. 
No. 8-8. Indeed, BOP records show that Petitioner never even submitted a BP-9 form related 
to the issue of FSA credits, which would have been only the second step in the exhaustion 
process. Id. 
Petitioner acknowledges that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before 
commencing this action. See Pet. at 7; Traverse at 1-2, 4-5. However, Petitioner contends, 
in his Petition, that he was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies before 
commencing this action because his “conditional date has already passed [and] therefore 
exhaustion is futile.” Pet. at 7. 
Petitioner somewhat shifts his reasoning for non-exhaustion in his Traverse, arguing 
that the relevant factors courts consider when deciding whether or not to excuse exhaustion 
all favor waiver of the requirement. See Traverse at 4. More specifically, Petitioner contends 
that “[t]he BOP has consistently maintained a categorical policy of denying application of FSA 
credits to prisoners it labels ‘high risk,’ regardless of individual circumstances” such that 
requiring exhaustion would be futile and result in a delay of judicial review that “would cause 
[irreparable harm.]” Id. at 4-5. Petitioner further contends that “[o]nly a federal court can 
compel the BOP to correctly apply FSA credits as Congress intended.” Id. 
As an initial matter, Petitioner argues that he was entitled to release to home 
confinement or a halfway house by November 2, 2025, based on his belief that he had 

 
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earned, as of the filing date of the Petition, 4,296 days of time credits redeemable for 1,968 
days off his 204-month prison sentence. Pet. at 2. Petitioner further contends that (1) the 
“full benefits” of the FSA apply to him, (2) he initially earned FSA credits at a rate of 10 days 
per month, but that number “should have then changed to ‘low recidivism’ and 15 days per 
month over two years ago according to the codified PATTERN tool[,]” and (3) his recidivism 
level is “incorrect” in SENTRY.3 Id. at 3, 5-7. In other words, Petitioner is challenging the 
BOP's policies as applied to him to determine his PATTERN Score, custody level score, and 
institution placement.
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Respondent disputes Petitioner’s FSA credit calculation, noting that BOP records 
show that Petitioner’s projected release date is November 18, 2030, and he has only earned 
750 FSA time credits. Matteau Decl. ¶¶ 13-14, 18; Dkt. No. 8-5. Respondent also contends 
that Petitioner is not eligible to have these credits applied toward early transfer to supervised 
release because he has “never been deemed a minimum or low risk of recidivism” and there 
is no record of Petitioner requesting an exercise of discretion from the Warden at FCI Ray 
Brook. Id., ¶¶ 13, 15-16, 20. 
As an initial matter, the BOP can recalculate Petitioner’s FSA credits based on any 
legitimate error identified by Petitioner and/or update his entitlement to these credits based 
on any “incorrect” recidivism level entry or exercise of discretion from the appropriate 
Warden. Therefore, it cannot be said that available administrative remedies provided 
Petitioner with no genuine opportunity for adequate relief, or that it would have been futile for 
 
3 SENTRY is the BOP’s computerized data base that maintains records of federal prisoners. See Matteau Decl. 
¶ 3. 
 
4 Although Petitioner argues that his recidivism classification should have been changed to “low” “over two 
years ago[,]” he does not clearly identify the reason he believes this change was required at that time, let alone 
indicate how or when he attempted to address this discrepancy with appropriate officials. 

 
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him to pursue exhaustion. Schulz v. Warden, No. 9:23-CV-0295 (AJB/TWD), 2025 WL 
4070712, at *2-4 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 2025) (noting that “the calculation of [petitioner’s] 
recidivism risk score is solely within the discretion of the BOP” and citing, inter alia, Asbury v. 
Kelly, No. 25-HC-2020, 2025 WL 3211220, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 17, 2025) (explaining that 
“calculating [the petitioner]’s recidivism risk score is solely within the discretion of the BOP”)), 
report and recommendation adopted by 2026 WL 173999 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2026); Rosales 
v. Petrucci, No. 20-CV-2136, 2021 WL 5449701, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2021) (“To the 
extent Petitioner's challenge is unique to his specific background and circumstances, it would 
not be futile for Petitioner to raise the alleged mistakes that resulted in an incorrect PATTERN 
score and security classification through the ARP. This type of challenge falls squarely within 
the sorts of issues to be raised with the BOP.”); Simon v. Bergami, No. 21-CV-489, 2021 WL 
3856256, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 30, 2021) (petitioner must exhaust administrative remedies when 
challenging the calculation of his PATTERN score and entitlement to credits under the FSA); 
United States v. Nwankwo, No. 12-CR-31, 2019 WL 4743823, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2019) 
(inmate requesting clarification on eligibility for time credits contemplated by FSA “must then 
exhaust his administrative remedies before the BOP prior to moving the Court for a reduction 
of his sentence”); Guzman-Mogrovejo v. United States, No. 10-CV-4123, 2010 WL 3747885, 
at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2010) (“Petitioner may not challenge the BOP's computation of his 
sentence in this Court before exhausting administrative remedies.”); see also Rosenthal v. 
Killian, 667 F. Supp. 2d 364, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[E]ven if it is likely that [Petitioner's] 
administrative appeals would have been denied, such a showing would not prove futility.”); 
Beharry, 329 F.3d at 62 (“That [petitioner's] argument would likely have failed is not 
tantamount to stating that it would have been futile to raise it; and indeed, many of the 

 
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purposes for requiring exhaustion would have been served had [petitioner] raised his claim 
below.”). 
In addition, if the BOP’s FSA credit calculation is accurate, Petitioner remains more 
than two years away from the earliest date that he could be awarded prerelease custody, 
setting aside the issue of his entitlement to these credits based on his determined recidivism 
level. Thus, the Court has no basis to conclude that irreparable injury may occur without 
immediate judicial relief. 
Finally, this is not a case in which Petitioner has credibly raised a substantial 
constitutional question that would warrant excusing the exhaustion process. 
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that Petitioner was not excused from pursuing 
relief through administrative procedures before commencing this action, and that the Petition 
must therefore be dismissed for non-exhaustion. Notwithstanding this ruling, the Court will 
also address the merits of the Petition for the sake of completion. 
C. Merits 
 A petitioner in a habeas proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 “bears the burden of 
proving that he is being held contrary to law; and ... must satisfy his burden of proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence.” Skaftouros v. United States, 667 F.3d 144, 158 (2d Cir. 
2011) (citing Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 31 (1992)) (additional citation omitted). In this 
case, setting aside the issue of exhaustion, Petitioner has failed to meet this burden. 
The FSA created parameters for a “risk and needs assessment system” to classify, 
identify, and provide evidence-based recidivism reduction programs or productive activities 
for incarcerated individuals. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(a). Under the FSA, eligible inmates may earn 
specified time credits per month, if they “successfully participate in recidivism reduction 

 
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programs or productive activities,” and such time credits “shall be applied toward time in 
prerelease custody or supervised release.” Id. § 3632(d)(4)(C). 
A prisoner is eligible to be placed in “supervised release” if he “has been determined 
under the System to be a minimum or low risk to recidivate pursuant to the last reassessment 
of the prisoner.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(D)(ii). A prisoner may alternatively be placed in 
“prerelease custody” if he has either “been determined under the System to be a minimum or 
low risk to recidivate pursuant to the last 2 reassessments of the prisoner;” or “had a petition 
to be transferred to prerelease custody or supervised release approved by the warden of the 
prison,” after the warden has determined: 
(aa) the prisoner would not be a danger to society if transferred to 
prerelease custody or supervised release; 
 
(bb) the prisoner has made a good faith effort to lower their recidivism 
risk through participation in recidivism reduction programs or productive 
activities; and 
 
(cc) the prisoner is unlikely to recidivate[.] 
 
Id. § 3624(g)(1)(D)(i). As set forth above, the process for a prisoner to petition the warden to 
be transferred is set forth in BOP Program Statement 5410.01 CN-2, which states as follows: 
“[i]nmates may initiate a request ... by submitting a BP-A0148, Inmate Request to Staff, 
during their regularly scheduled Program Review. The Unit Manager will submit a request, 
along with the unit team's recommendation, to the Warden (or designee) for final decision.” 
Dkt. No. 8-6 at 20; Matteau Decl. ¶ 19; see also, e.g., Chandler v. United States, No. 25-
1248, 2025 WL 3270524, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 2025). 
At Petitioner's most recent risk assessment at the time the Petition was filed, he was 
assessed as a “high” risk of recidivism. Matteau Decl. ¶ 13; Dkt. No. 8-4. Since Petitioner 
“has not been deemed a ‘minimum’ or ‘low’ risk to recidivate, . . . he is not eligible for 

 
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application of time credits under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(D)(i)(I) to be placed in prerelease 
custody or 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(D)(ii) to be placed in supervised release.” Schulz v. 
Warden, No. 9:23-CV-0295 (AJB/TWD), 2025 WL 4070712, at *2-4 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 2025) 
(collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted by 2026 WL 173999 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 
22, 2026). 
As Respondent acknowledges, “most of Petitioner’s PATTERN score points are 
attributed to his criminal history, which is a static factor.” Matteau Decl. ¶ 13 n.6. Petitioner 
appears to argue the weight of this static factor runs contrary to Congress’ intent, asserting 
that “[b]y treating high-risk status as an automatic bar, the BOP has effectively written an 
exclusion into the statute that Congress never enacted.” Traverse at 6. 
However, as recently noted by the Honorable Therese Wiley Dancks, “the fact that 
[P]etitioner has not committed one of the ‘certain crimes . . . that exempt the prisoner from 
earning Time Credits,’ under 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D), does not preclude him from being 
assessed at a ‘medium’ or ‘high’ recidivism risk score such that his time credits could not be 
applied.” Schulz, 2025 WL 4070712, at *4 (citing Brown v. Garrett, No. 7:22-CV-00551 
(AMM/JHE), 2022 WL 18161601, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 22, 2022) (rejecting the petitioner's 
argument that “she ‘will never be a [l]ow or [m]inimum risk due to [her] past criminal history’” 
and explaining, “[w]hile [the petitioner] is free to earn time credits as an inmate with a medium 
risk recidivism level, under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(D)(i)-(ii), the BOP cannot apply those time 
credits to her sentence unless and until she has a minimum or low risk recidivism level for 
two consecutive assessments for prerelease custody or a minimum or low risk recidivism 
level for the last assessment for supervised release.”), report and recommendation adopted, 
2023 WL 130519 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 9, 2023)). 

 
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Moreover, insofar as Petitioner asks this Court to modify his recidivism risk score 
based on his age, programming, and conduct since his incarceration, “the Court may not do 
so as the calculation of his recidivism risk score is solely within the discretion of the BOP.” 
Schulz, 2025 WL 4070712, at *4 (collecting cases). 
Finally, as Respondent asserts, see Resp. Memo. at 8-9; Matteau Decl. ¶¶ 20-22, and 
Petitioner does not contest, see Traverse at 7-9, Petitioner has not submitted a BP-A0148 
form request to petition the Warden for transfer. Therefore, while Petitioner is correct that a 
“high risk” PATTERN score does not preclude transfer to prerelease custody or supervised 
release under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(D)(i)(II), “because he has not made the requisite 
request to the warden in the manner set forth in the relevant BOP Program Statement, he is 
not entitled to habeas relief on this basis.” Schulz, 2025 WL 4070712, at *4 (citing Bridges v. 
Rickard, No. 3:25-CV-1201, 2025 WL 2375271, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2025) (explaining, 
“an inmate with a high or medium PATTERN score can petition the warden to be considered 
on an individualized basis for placement in prerelease custody or supervised release” and 
denying habeas relief where there was “nothing in the record indicating that [the petitioner 
had] made such a request to the warden.”) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(D)(i)(II))). 
In short, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to an application of FSA 
time credits and reduction of his sentence. Accordingly, irrespective of whether Petitioner’s 
failure to exhaust his administrative remedies should be excused, the instant Petition is 
meritless and is therefore denied and dismissed. 
V. CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, it is 
 ORDERED that the Petition, Dkt. No. 1, is DISMISSED AND DENIED; and it is further 

 
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 ORDERED that the Court declines to issue a Certificate of Appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 
2253(c); Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 705 (2004) ("To obtain a certificate of appealability, a 
prisoner must 'demonstrat[e] that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's 
resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are 
adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.'" (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 
U.S. 322, 327 (2003))). Any further request for a Certificate of Appealability must be 
addressed to the Court of Appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 22(b); 2d Cir. R. 22.1. 
 ORDERED that the Clerk serve a copy of this Decision and Order on the parties in 
accordance with the Local Rules. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
Dated: May 15, 2026 
 Utica, New York. 
 

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