govinfo:USCOURTS-ksd-5_25-cr-40024-0

1 
 
In the United States District Court 
for the District of Kansas 
_____________ 
 

_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
Plaintiff 
 
v. 
 
STEVEN MARK DUCA, 
 
Defendant 
_____________ 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
 
Steven Duca is charged with two counts of possession of cocaine 
and methamphetamine with intent to distribute. Doc. 1; see 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(a)(1). He moves to suppress evidence uncovered during a traffic 
stop. Doc. 17. For the following reasons, that motion is denied. 
I 
A 
The Fourth Amendment protects the “ right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures .” U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also New Jersey 
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334 (1985) (recognizing incorporation against 
the states). Absent a recognized exception, t he Fourth Amendment 
prohibits suspicionless seizures or warrantless searches that violate a 
person’s objectively reasonable expectation of privacy by invading a 
constitutionally protected space or thing. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 
400, 406 (2012); see also United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1307 
(10th Cir. 2016). Traffic stops are seizures for Fourth Amendment pur-
poses, United States v. Pettit, 785 F.3d 1374, 1379 (10th Cir. 2015) , and 
in a traffic stop “a passenger is seized as well and so may challenge the 
constitutionality of the stop.” Brendlin v. California , 551 U.S. 249, 251 
(2007). 

2 
 
A warrantless stop is valid where the officer has reasonable suspi-
cion to believe that a traffic violation occurred . Kansas v. Glover , 589 
U.S. 376, 380 (2020). In particular, the officer must have “a reasonable 
articulable suspicion that this particular motorist violated any one of 
the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations of the 
jurisdiction.” United States v. Salas, 756 F.3d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 2014) 
(quotation marks omitted). The stop also must be “reasonably related 
in scope to th e circumstances which justified the interference in the 
first place.” United States v. Morales, 961 F.3d 1086, 1090–91 (10th Cir. 
2020). 
Ordinarily, the traffic stop is circumscribed by the traffic violation 
giving rise to the initial encounter. That means o fficers may conduct 
unrelated inquiries during a stop only if that conduct does not prolong 
the stop. United States v. Frazier , 30 F.4th 1165, 1173 (10th Cir. 2022) 
(citing Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 355 (2015)). For example, 
it is accepted that officers may reasonably inquire as to the driver’s 
license, automobile’s registration and proof of insurance, identity of 
the individuals, and driver’s travel plans. United States v. Cates, 73 F.4th 
795, 806 (10th Cir. 2023) (citations omitted). But once the mission of 
the stop has concluded, the motorist is generally free to leave. Morales, 
961 F.3d at 1091. 
There are, of course, justifications for continued detention. For ex-
ample, the driver may consent to further questioning. United States v. 
Woody, 45 F.4th 1166, 1173 (10th Cir. 2022). Or an officer may develop 
reasonable suspicion of other illegal activity distinct from the traffic 
violation. See United States v. Munoz , 162 F.4th 1210, 1219 (10th Cir. 
2025). “To satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard, an officer need 
not ‘rule out the possibility of innocent conduct,’ or even have evi-
dence suggesting ‘a fair probability’ of criminal activity.” Pettit, 785 
F.3d at 1379 (citations omitted). Instead, the officer needs only “a par-
ticularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal conduct under a 
totality of the circumstances. ” Munoz, 162 F.4th at 1219 (quotation 
marks omitted); see id. at 1222 (finding that police developed reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity after initiating a traffic stop based on the 
totality of the circumstances). A non-exhaustive list of factors that the 
Tenth Circuit has recognized as supporting reasonable suspicion i n-
clude nervousness, unusual travel plans, criminal history, and travel 
route. See id. at 1220–22; see also Pettit , 785 F.3d at 1380 –83 (holding 
that no one factor is determinative of reasonable suspicion of illegal 
activity). Accordingly, an officer who develops reasonable suspicion of 

3 
 
illegal activity “may initiate an investigatory detention even if it is more 
likely than not that the individual is not involved in any illegality.” Pettit, 
785 F.3d at 1379 –80 (quoting United States v. Johnson , 364 F.3d 1185, 
1194 (10th Cir. 2004)) (emphasis in original). 
As a general matter, the authority to detain a motorist while inves-
tigating reasonable suspicion does not include the right to search the 
vehicle. Instead, a search of the vehicle must be justified by, for exam-
ple, probable cause. United States v. Phillips, 71 F.4th 817, 823 (10th Cir. 
2023); see also United States v. Pinder , 121 F.4th 1367, 1371 (10th Cir. 
2024) (allowing contemporaneous search incident to a lawful arrest). 
“Probable cause to search a vehicle is established if, under the totality 
of the ci rcumstances, there is a fair probability that the car contains 
contraband or evidence.” Phillips, 71 F.4th at 823 ( quotation marks 
omitted). When an officer smells drugs, such as marijuana emanating 
from the vehicle, that observation is “entitled to substantial weight in 
the probable cause analysis and can be an independently sufficient ba-
sis for probable cause.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Additional ob-
servations—such as nervous behavior and vague travel plans —obvi-
ously strengthen the existence of probable cause. See Munoz, 162 F.4th 
at 1220–22. 
B 
In March 2025, Geary County Sheriff’s Deputy Nicholas Blake re-
ceived a phone call from a deputy with the Saline County, Nebraska 
Sheriff’s Office.1 The deputy told Blake about a Toyota Corolla that 
had made a quick roundtrip from Indiana to California . In particular, 
license plate data showed that the rented Corolla had traveled to Cali-
fornia, that it remained in California for only twenty-nine hours, and 
was taking a different route back toward Indiana (Interstate 70) than it 
used traveling out to California (Interstate 80). Based on his training 
and experience, these factors fit certain drug trafficking criteria that , 
according to Blake, made the Corolla a good candidate for an 
 
1 The following facts were found based on the witness ’s testimony and the 
evidence produced at the suppression hearing. 

4 
 
interdiction stop. Accordingly, Blake decided that he would stop the 
Corolla when it entered his area of operation.2 
Blake parked on Interstate 70 near mile marker 290 to wait for the 
Corolla to pass by him. When it drove past him, he pulled out behind 
it. He observed the Corolla commit what he believed were three viola-
tions of a Kansas traffic law concerning the utilization of a turn signal. 
In particular, K.S.A. § 8-1548(b) provides, in material part, as follows: 
“A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required shall 
be given continuously during not less than the last one hundred (100) 
feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.” The first alleged violation 
occurred when he saw the Corolla move right to the highway exit lane 
without signaling for 100 feet prior to its movement . Ex. CF6 at 
20:11:32.3 Second, he saw it turn left onto a street leading to a shopping 
center parking lot—Lacy Drive—without giving a proper signal. Ex. 
CF6A at 20:12:34. Third, it turned left onto a parking lot in the shop-
ping center, again without signaling for the requisite 100 feet. Id. at 
20:12:55. 
Based on these perceived infractions, Blake activated his lights and 
initiated a stop of the Corolla. Defendant Duca was driving the Corolla 
and Shantelle Rose was in the passenger seat. Blake approached the 
Corolla and requested Duca’s driver’s license and the rental agreement. 
As Duca handed over his license, Blake noticed that Duca was nervous 
and uneasy; his hand was shaking visibly. Rose explained that she had 
to search for the rental agreement on her phone, so Blake went to his 
patrol car to run a Triple I check of Duca’s license through dispatch. 
Blake then returned to the Corolla. Rose showed Blake a rental 
confirmation email, which noted that the Corolla was due back in In-
diana the following day. Blake asked the pair what they were doing in 
 
2 The Fourth Amendment generally forbids roving patrols. Almeida-Sanchez v. 
United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973 ). But pretextual stops are not imper-
missible. Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806, 811 (1996). Moreover, “[i]t is 
irrelevant that the officer may have had other subjective motives for stopping 
the vehicle.” Phillips, 71 F.4th at 822. Blake expressly admitted that he decided 
he would stop the Corolla, and he parked on Interstate 70 waiting for it to 
pass by his location in the hopes that he would find a legal basis to do so . 
Duca makes no argument that this behavior was unlawful. 
3 These citations refer to exhibits that were filed conventionally. See Doc. 33-
2. 

5 
 
Kansas. They responded that they were visiting friends in Colorado. 
Given the license plate data, Blake knew this to be a lie. At this point, 
based on a combination of the Corolla’s quick roundtrip to California, 
the different routes to and from, the length of stay out west, the vehi-
cle’s due date in Indiana the next day, Duca’s nervousness, and the 
pair’s lies about their travel plans, Blake suspected that criminal activity 
was afoot. Based on his suspicion, Blake deployed his canine partner, 
Chera, to investigate. 
Chera alerted to the odor of narcotics in the Corolla. Blake left the 
area and made Chera sniff again, and she alerted a second time. Blake 
then searched the Corolla and found twenty -six pounds of metham-
phetamine and one kilogram of cocaine. 
The United States indicted Duca, charging him with possession of 
methamphetamine and cocaine with the intent to distribute. Doc. 1. 4 
Duca moves to suppress. Doc. 17. He makes two principal arguments: 
that Blake lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop, id. at 4, 
and that he unreasonably prolonged the stop, id. at 5. The Government 
opposes each argument. Doc. 18. Blake testified and was subject to 
cross-examination at an evidentiary hearing that was held on April 30, 
2026. Doc. 30. 
II 
Blake had reasonable suspicion to stop the Corolla. And he did not 
unreasonably prolong the stop. Accordingly, Duca’s motion is denied. 
A 
Duca first argues that the stop was unlawful at its inception. Doc. 
17 at 4. That argument fails because Blake , based on his observation 
of the vehicle, had reasonable suspicion to believe the rented Corolla 
had violated a Kansas traffic law. 
Kansas law requires that “a signal of intention to turn or move 
right or left . . . shall be given continuously during not less than the last 
one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.” Kan. 
Stat. Ann. § 8-1548(b). Blake credibly testified that he saw the Corolla 
 
4 All document citations are to the document and page number assigned in 
the CM/ECF system. 

6 
 
move one lane to the right and make two left turns without a proper 
signal. His dashboard camera video confirms as much. The parties dis-
pute the length of Duca’s signals, but there is no question that he sig-
naled for less than 100 feet. In particular, the second signal—when 
Duca turned left onto Lacy Drive—occurred almost at the very mo-
ment the turn began. That evidence, standing alone, is sufficient to 
support Blake’s finding of reasonable suspicion that the Corolla vio-
lated Section 8-1548(b). Phillips, 71 F.4th at 823 (finding that officer’s 
observation of the defendant committing a traffic violation was “suf-
ficient to support the traffic stop”); State v. Gilliland , 490 P.3d 66, 71 
(Kan. Ct. App. 2021) (finding that police had reasonable suspicion to 
conduct a traffic stop when the officers observed the defendant turn 
left without signaling). 
The parties also dispute what the law requires. Duca contends that 
Section 8-1548(b) requires a signal for 100 feet before a motorist 
crosses into another lane regardless of the motorist’s movement to-
ward the other lane .5 On the other hand, Blake and the Government 
contend that motorists must signal for 100 feet before they make any 
movement right or left, meaning that one who begins to change lanes 
without signaling for 100 feet —even if he only moves right or left 
within a lane and does not ultimately change lanes—has violated Sec-
tion 8-1548(b). 
It is unnecessary to resolve this dispute. Even if Duca is correct 
that Section 8-1548(b) requires a signal for 100 feet before a motorist 
physically crosses into another lane, the evidence offered at the sup-
pression hearing showed that Blake reasonably suspected the Corolla 
of failing to do precisely that . His dashboard camera confirms that 
conclusion. See Gilliland, 490 P.3d at 71 (finding that the officer’s ob-
servation of a turn without the proper signal was sufficient to initiate 
a traffic stop). 
Duca’s argument establishes, at best, that there would be insuffi-
cient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he violated 
 
5 Duca invoked State v. Marx , 215 P.3d 601 (Kan. 2009), in support of his 
argument at the suppression hearing. Given that Marx dealt with a different 
statute—Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1522—its relevance to this case is not immedi-
ately clear. See 215 P.3d at 606. In any event, Blake had reasonable suspicion 
to stop the Corolla even if Duca’s construction of Section 8-1548(b) is cor-
rect. 

7 
 
Section 8-1548(b). But establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is 
not the inquiry for purposes of reasonable suspicion: The pertinent 
inquiry is whether Blake had an objectively reasonable basis to suspect 
that the Corolla failed to signal as required. See United States v. Vercher, 
358 F.3d 1257, 1261 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[R]easonable suspicion may rely 
on information less reliable than that required to show probable cause, 
and it need not be correct .”) (citation omitted). Blake’s testimony es-
tablished that he had such a basis. 
B 
Duca also argues that suppression is required because Blake unrea-
sonably extended the stop. Doc. 17 at 5 (invoking Rodriguez v. United 
States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015)). He contends that Blake deviated from the 
mission of the traffic stop three times: First when he ran a Triple I 
check through dispatch; second when he asked about the pair’s travel 
plans; and third when he deployed Chera. Id. at 6. But none of these 
actions impermissibly prolonged the stop. 
As noted, a traffic stop constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure 
and, as a result, must be reasonable. United States v. Baker , 108 F.4th 
1241, 1246 (10th Cir. 2024). This means that it must be “justified at its 
inception and . . . the officer’s actions during the stop must be reason-
ably related in scope to ‘the mission of the stop itself.’” Id. (quoting 
United States v. Mayville, 955 F.3d 825, 829 (10th Cir. 2020)). 
In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court held that a traffic stop “becomes 
unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to com-
plete” it. Baker, 108 F.4th at 1246–47 (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 350–
51) (citations omitted). And while there is no de minimis exception to 
the rule, Mayville, 955 F.3d at 830, the question is only whether “police 
diligently pursued the [traffic] investigation,” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354, 
and not whether they took the quickest route humanly possible to con-
cluding the stop. Mayville, 955 F.3d at 827. Thus, courts are not per-
mitted to “second-guess the logistical decisions of officers so long as 
their actions were reasonable and diligently completed within the con-
fines of a lawful traffic stop[ ] . . . because reasonableness—rather than 
efficiency—is the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. 
The Tenth Circuit has established a three -part test for analyzing 
the lawfulness of a delay under Rodriguez. In particular, an unlawful sei-
zure occurs when an officer diverts from the traffic -based mission of 
the stop to investigate ordinary criminal conduct, does so in a way that 

8 
 
“prolongs” (i.e., adds time to) the stop, and the investigative detour is 
unsupported by any independent reasonable suspicion. Baker, 108 
F.4th at 1248. That means “the government prevails if the officers’ 
actions did not divert from the traffic mission, the search was not pro-
longed, or reasonable suspicion existed.” Id. In other words, an of-
ficer’s conduct does not offend the Fourth Amendment if he or she 
has, at a minimum, reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. Id. at 
1247 (citing Mayville, 955 F.3d at 830). The moment reasonable suspi-
cion becomes necessary is referred to as the Rodriguez moment. Leon, 
80 F.4th 1160, 1165 (10th Cir. 2023) (citing United States v. Batara-Mo-
lina, 60 F.4th 1251, 1255 n.1 (10th Cir. 2023)). 
Although the Government bears the burden of satisfying the rea-
sonable suspicion standard, it is not an onerous one. Munoz, 162 F.4th 
at 1219 (citing United States v. Pettit , 785 F.3d 1374, 1379 (10th Cir. 
2015)). Courts frequently describe the minimal standard of reasonable 
suspicion by contrasting it with the easy -to-satisfy probable cause: 
Where probable cause requires a “substantial chance of criminal activ-
ity,” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13 (1983), reasonable suspicion 
requires only “some mi nimal level of objective justification,” United 
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). 
The inquiry depends on “the totality of the circumstances.” 
Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014) (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. 
411, 417 (1981)). The emphasis is on the “whole picture,” Cortez, 449 
U.S. at 417, and rejects a “divide-and-conquer analysis” of a situation’s 
relevant factors, United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002). Rea-
sonable suspicion “depends on the factual and practical considerations 
of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men , not legal techni-
cians, act,” allowing officers to make “commonsense judgments and 
inferences about human behavior.” Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 380–
81 (2020) (emphasis in original) (cleaned up). 
This low bar has been explained in recent Supreme Court cases 
concerning the greater intrusion of stopping a motor vehicle’s travel. 
For example, the Supreme Court held an officer had reasonable suspi-
cion to initiate a traffic stop for driving with a revok ed license based 
on the fact that the registered owner of the vehicle had a revoked li-
cense even when it was unclear who was driving the vehicle. Glover, 
589 U.S. at 381. More recently, the Supreme Court reversed a lower 
court’s conclusion that reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop was lack-
ing where an officer encountered a vehicle, its occupants fled the ve-
hicle, and the driver began backing out of a parking space even though 

9 
 
a passenger door had been left open. District of Columbia v. R.W., 2026 
WL 1052344, 608 U.S. ___ (2026) (per curiam) (summarily reversing 
lower court’s conclusion that reasonable suspicion was lacking). That 
makes sense given the purpose of an investigative detention is merely 
to dispel that suspicion. See generally Cortez, 449 U.S. at 421 (recognizing 
the purpose of the stop is limited by the suspicion). 
Under this commonsense approach, “factors consistent with inno-
cent travel may collectively amount to reasonable suspicion.” Leon, 80 
F.4th at 1165. Courts generally defer to the officer —the individual 
with specialized training and experience —to distinguish between in-
nocent and suspicious behavior unless “an officer relies on a circum-
stance incorrigibly free of associations with criminal activity.” Id. (quot-
ing Frazier, 30 F.4th at 1174) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Cortez, 449 U.S. at 419 (“[W]hen used by trained law enforcement of-
ficers, objective facts, meaningless to the untrained, can be combined 
with permissible deductions from such facts to form a legitimate basis 
for suspicion of a particular person and for action on that suspicion.”). 
“As long as an officer has a particularized and objective basis for sus-
pecting an individual may be involved in criminal activity, he may ini-
tiate an investigatory detention even if it is more likely than not that 
the individual is not involved in any ill egality.” Munoz, 162 F.4th at 
1219–20 (quoting Pettit, 785 F.3d at 1379) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (alterations in original). But an officer must point to the spe-
cific, articulable facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion; “inchoate sus-
picions and unparticularized hunches” will not do. Leon, 80 F.4th at 
1165 (quoting United States v. Simpson , 609 F.3d 1140, 1147 (10th Cir. 
2010)). 
Blake did not unreasonably extend the stop. Contra Doc. 17 at 6. 
The Tenth Circuit has explicitly held that a n officer does not violate 
Rodriguez by conducting a Triple I check through dispatch. Mayville, 955 
F.3d at 831. Neither is it a Rodriguez violation for an officer to ask travel 
plan questions. Cates, 73 F.4th at 806. Duca cites no authority to the 
contrary. 
The totality of the circumstances supported Blake’s determination 
of reasonable suspicion and justified deploying Chera . See Frazier, 30 
F.4th at 1173 (noting that the rule in Rodriguez—that police may not 
unlawfully prolong a traffic stop—applies only when their investigative 
detour is “unsupported by any independent reasonable suspicion”). In 
particular, Blake knew that the Corolla had been rented, made a quick 
roundtrip to California, used different routes to travel to and from, and 

10 
 
was due back in Indiana the next day . He testified that based on his 
training and experience —both of which are entitled to deference —
this behavior is often indicative of drug trafficking. See United States v. 
Hayes, 62 F.4th 1271, 1279 (10th Cir. 2023) (finding that police reason-
ably suspected the defendant of drug trafficking when he had, among 
other things, “made multiple short trips between [two distant cities]”); 
accord United States v. Batara-Molina, 60 F.4th 1251, 1257 (10th Cir. 2023) 
(“To make such a long trip—only to stay at the destination for such a 
short amount of time—is also consistent with the behavior of a drug 
courier.”); Pettit, 785 F.3d at 1381 (“We have consistently held that im-
plausible travel plans can contribute to reasonable suspicion.”) (altera-
tions omitted); United States v. Kitchell , 653 F.3d 1206, 1221 (10th Cir. 
2011) (noting that the use of a rental car “can potentially contribute to 
an officer’s reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking”) . In addition, 
Duca and Rose lied about their travel plans, which further aroused 
Blake’s suspicions. Cf. United States v. Simpson , 609 F.3d 1140, 1152 
(10th Cir. 2010) ( finding that evasiveness a bout travel plans contrib-
uted to reasonable suspicion). Moreover, Blake testified that Duca was 
extremely nervous, so much so that his hand was visibly shaking. This 
too served as a basis for reasonable suspicion. See Pettit, 785 F.3d at 
1383 (finding that “abnormal nervousness” contributed to reasonable 
suspicion). These factors collectively established reasonable suspicion 
of drug trafficking warranting further investigation. As a result, Blake 
was justified in deploying Chera to confirm his suspicion. See United 
States v. Mercado-Garcia, 989 F.3d 829, 838–39 (10th Cir. 2021) (finding 
that an officer deployed a drug dog after he had reasonable suspicion 
of criminal activity based on similar facts). 
C 
There is one additional issue that arose at the suppression hearing. 
Six months after filing his motion to suppress, Duca filed a pleading 
he called a supplement. Doc. 29. That document—for the first time—
generally challenges the reliability of Chera’s alert, arguing that the or-
ganization that certified Chera is not a bona fide organization and that 
Blake was predisposed to interpret Chera’s behavior as an alert because 
he was motivated by the possibility of financial gain through civil asset 
forfeiture. Id. at 5, 29. The supplement contains roughly 486 pages of 
attachments whose relevance is difficult to discern. 
This argument is rejected for two reasons. First, it has been waived. 
Supplemental briefing is for pertinent and significant authorities that 
could not have been found when the original brief was filed. See D. 

11 
 
Kan. R. CR1.3(c) (noting that notices must “state reasons for the sup-
plemental citations”). It is not an avenue or an invitation to submit new 
arguments or authorities that could have and should have been raised 
earlier. United States v. Romero, 132 F.4th 1208, 1220 n.4 (10th Cir. 2025), 
cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 176 (2025). If Duca wanted to challenge Chera’s 
reliability, the time in which to do so was in his initial brief so that the 
Government could have responded to it and the issue could have been 
addressed at the hearing. His failure to do so inhibited the adversarial 
process and prevented the parties from meaningfully addressing that 
argument. See United States v. Palmer , 25 -cr-40011 (D. Kan. Apr. 27, 
2026), Doc. 37 -1 at 29 (finding that untimely arguments and docu-
ments were waived).6 
Second, it lacks merit even if it had been raised in a timely fashion. 
As noted, most of the documents Duca invokes do not relate to 
Chera’s reliability. See, e.g., Docs. 29-10, 29-11, 29-12, 29-13 (newspa-
per articles about civil asset forfeiture); Doc. 29 -14 (power point 
presentation from a law enforcement class that Blake teaches); Doc. 
29-21 (manual of an unrelated association that certifies canines). And 
those that do, along with any relevant arguments, have been previously 
rejected. See Palmer, 25-cr-40011, Doc. 37 -1 at 22 (rejecting the same 
arguments that Duca now makes against Chera’s reliability and Blake’s 
integrity). Simply put, Duca’s new arguments and documents do not 
overcome the evidence regarding Chera’s reliability. See id. at 29 (ex-
plaining how these same documents, submitted in a different case re-
garding Blake and Chera, do not overcome the evidence of Chera’s 
reliability). 
III 
For the foregoing reasons, Duca’s Motion to Suppress, Doc. 17, is 
DENIED. 
 
6 Duca suggested at the suppression hearing that his tardiness should be ex-
cused because he could not have procured the documents in his supplement 
earlier. Even assuming that were true, it does not change the result. Most of 
the documents in the supplement are, at best, only tangentially related to 
Chera’s reliability. Those that are germane do not call Chera’s reliability into 
question. See Palmer, No. 25 -cr-40011, Doc. 37 -1 at 29 (rejecting this same 
argument on the merits). 

12 
 
It is so ordered. 
 
Date: May 15, 2026 s/ Toby Crouse 
 Toby Crouse 
United States District Judge 

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