govinfo:USCOURTS-pawd-2_24-cv-01128-0

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RACHEL BRANNON, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION,
successor by merger to FEDEX GROUND
PACKAGE SYSTEM, INC.,

Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 2:24-1128-RJC

MICHAEL ABNER, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION,
successor by merger to FEDEX GROUND
PACKAGE SYSTEM, INC.,

Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 2:24-1129-RJC

AARIN SMITH, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION,
successor by merger to FEDEX GROUND
PACKAGE SYSTEM, INC.,

Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 2:25-1507-RJC

MEMORANDUM ORDER
Robert J. Colville, United States District Judge
I. Background
The three above-captioned actions are substantively identical lawsuits that are essentially
“spinoffs” from a lawsuit that was previously pending in this District for nearly seven years ,
Claiborne, et al. v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., 2:18- cv-1698. In late April 2024, the
plaintiffs in Claiborne moved to voluntarily decertify a conditionally certified collective that
included, among 30,000+ individuals, opt-ins who were dismissed without prejudice and who have
now joined the above -captioned cases. The Court granted the Claiborne plaintiffs’ request for
decertification on May 2, 2024, and, pursuant to the parties’ agreement, granted the dismissed opt-
ins’ request to toll their statute of limitations in which to pursue their claims through August 6,
2024. Claiborne – ECF No. 526. The Claiborne plaintiffs subsequently withdrew their Rule 23
class action allegations in July 2024.
Plaintiffs’ counsel has designated these cases as related to Claiborne . In their respective
Complaints, Plaintiffs assert that they were employed as delivery drivers by FedEx through
intermediary employers to perform delivery services on FedEx’s behalf. Plaintiffs further assert
that FedEx has violated the FLSA and certain states’ laws by not paying overtime compensation
to Plaintiffs for all hours worked over forty each week. Given the Court’s voluminous description
of the facts at issue and the more temporally distant procedural history in prior opinions, the Court
foregoes a more detailed description of the background of this case and will instead merely
describe the direct procedural history that has led to the issues presently before the Court.
On September 29, 2025, the Court granted a Motion on Misjoinder, Change of Venue, and
Separate Trials in Claiborne and a Motion on Misjoinder and Change of Venue in a related matter,

Atwood, et al. v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., 2:24-cv-1127. The Court severed the claims
of the twelve remaining Plaintiffs in Claiborne and the claims of the two Plaintiffs in Atwood, and
subsequently transferred those claims to appropriate forums. On the same date, the Court also
issued Memorandum Orders in two of the above -captioned matters, Brannon and Abner,1 noting
that the claims of the Plaintiffs in those mass actions were likely also mis-joined and subject to
potential sua sponte action by the Court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. The Court ultimately
directed the Brannon and Abner plaintiffs to show cause as to why the Court should not dismiss
the claims of all but one Plaintiff in each matter without prejudice to the remaining Plaintiffs filing
their independent claims via individual lawsuits in their state of employment.
The Brannon and Abner plaintiffs filed their Responses (Brannon – ECF No. 41; Abner –
ECF No. 40) to the Court’s show cause order on October 20, 2025. FedEx filed its Responses
(Brannon – ECF No. 44; Abner – ECF No. 43) thereafter, Plaintiffs filed Replies (Brannon – ECF
No. 45; Abner – ECF No. 44), and FedEx subsequently filed Surreplies (Brannon – ECF No. 48;
Abner – ECF No. 47) and Notices of Supplemental Authority ( Brannon – ECF No. 49; Abner –
ECF No. 48). On April 8, 2026, Plaintiffs in each of the three above -captioned matters filed
Motions to Sever and Transfer Claims (“Motions to Sever”) (Brannon – ECF No. 50; Abner – ECF
No. 49; Smith – ECF No. 10). FedEx filed Responses in Opposition ( Brannon – ECF No. 53;
Abner – ECF No. 52; Smith – ECF No. 22 ) to those motions, and Plaintiffs have filed Replies
(Brannon – ECF No. 54 ; Abner – ECF No. 53 ; Smith – ECF No. 23) . The Motions to Sever
involve, effectively, continuations of the arguments raised in re sponse to the Court’s show cause
orders, with each of the cases involving substantively identical arguments, and the issues presently
before the Court can, thus, be addressed in tandem. In light of the voluminous briefing on the

1 The Smith case was filed September 29, 2025, i.e., the same day that the Court issued its Memorandum Orders in
the four earlier-filed related matters.

issues before the Court, the Court considers the issues of misjoinder and Court action based upon
misjoinder to be fully briefed and ripe for disposition.2
II. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20, which addresses permissive joinder of parties, provides
as follows with respect to joinder of plaintiffs:
Persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if:

(A) they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with
respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences; and

(B) any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the
action.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1) (emphasis added). While misjoinder is not a ground for dismissal of a
case, the Court may, on motion or on its own, add or drop a party or sever any claim against a
party at any time on just t erms. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21; see also Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1-
15, No. CIV.A. 12-2077, 2012 WL 3089383, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 2012) (“Where misjoinder
occurs, the court is empowered, by motion or sua sponte, to add or drop a party or sever any claim
against a party.”).
“[S]everance under Rule 21 creates independent actions resulting in separate judgments[,]”
and is appropriate when the plaintiffs’ claims “are ‘discrete and separate,’ each capable of
resolution without dependence or effect on the ot her.” Henderson v. Mahally , 639 F. Supp. 3d
481, 486 (M.D. Pa. 2022). While the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit “has

2 While the Court did not issue a show cause order in Smith, the law firm Lichten & Liss -Riordan P.C. (“Plaintiffs’
counsel”) represents the plaintiffs in each of the five lawsuits against FedEx that were , or are currently , pending in
this District. In light of Plaintiffs’ counsel’s familiarity with this litigation, the substantive identicality of the facts and
issues before the Court, the Court’s inherent authority to address misjoinder sua sponte under Rule 21, and the fact
that the Smith Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Sever, the Court sees no basis to delay a decision as to the issue of misjoinder
and a potential remedy for such misjoinder in Smith.

not established specific parameters for deciding a motion to sever claims[,]” district courts often
consider:
(1) [W]hether the issues sought to be severed are significantly different from one
another and would require distinct evidentiary proof; (2) whether severance would
promote judicial economy; and (3) whether either party will be unduly prejudiced
by severance or its absence.

Henderson, 639 F. Supp. 3d 486-87. Where the plaintiffs do not meet the standard for permissive
joinder under Rule 20, “[t]he proper remedy is to grant severance or dismissal to the improper
party if it will not prejudice any substantial rig ht.” Sabolsky v. Budzanoski, 457 F.2d 1245, 1249
(3d Cir. 1972).
III. Discussion
While Plaintiffs maintain their position that joinder is appropriate, they request by way of
their filings that the Court sever their claims and transfer those claims to appropria te forums, as
the Court did in Claiborne and Atwood. Notably, Claiborne involved only twelve remaining
Plaintiffs and Atwood involved only two. By contrast, Brannon involves nearly 400 named
Plaintiffs, Abner involves a frankly astounding 11,643 named Plaintiffs, and Smith involves 2,253
Plaintiffs. As the Court intimated, if not explicitly stated, in its prior Memorandum Orders, the
Court believes that Plaintiffs filed these mass actions as a tactical maneuver around the standard
class or collective action procedures, as Plaintiffs have acknowledged that they could not maintain
their claims as either a collective or class action. See Robert D. Mabe, Inc. v. OptumRX, 43 F.4th
307, 319 (3d Cir. 2022) (describing mass actions as “class actions in disguise.”); see also Acevedo
v. Allsup’s Convenience Stores, Inc., 600 F.3d 516, 522 (5th Cir. 2010) (“[B]ut Acevedo fails to
cite any cases in which a group of plaintiffs even remotely as numerous as 800 were able to join
their claims.”).

Plaintiffs now ask the Court, despite previously representing that they would file each of
their claims individually, see Abner – ECF No. 30 at 1 n.1, to sever each of the 14,296 Plaintiffs’
claims and transfer them to appropriate forums. The request for the Court to transfer these cases
is neither just nor warranted, and such a transfer would represent a massive administrative burden
on the Court and the Clerk’s Office that is simply not justified under the circumstances presented
here. Plaintiffs have filed nationwide mass actions that the Court finds to be improper, and they
have sought to shift the burden of the filing of their individual claims to the Court. Their request
that the Court transfer each of the Plaintiffs’ claims will be denied. That said, Plaintiffs have also
offered to personally file their individual claims following severance, so long as the Court severs
their claims as opposed to dropping parties or dismissing claims . The Court believes that such
relief, while somewhat uncommon, is, nonetheless, consistent with Third Circuit precedent . See
DirecTV, Inc. v. Leto, 467 F.3d 842, 846-47 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Hannah v. Johnson & Johnson
Inc., No. CV 18- 10319, 2020 WL 3497010, at *2 (D.N.J. June 29, 2020) (severing claims and
holding that the severed plaintiffs “must file separate complaints and shall each proceed under a
separate civil action number upon payment of the requisite filing fee.”).
The Court finds that Plai ntiffs are mis -joined in the above -captioned matters. The basis
for the Court’s finding of misjoinder is set forth in the Court’s prior Memorandum Order s in
Claiborne, Atwood, Brannon, and Abner, and is bolstered by the United States District Court for
the District of Massachusetts’s holdings regarding misjoinder in Doyle and Alleyne, see Brannon
– ECF No. 49. In particular, the Court’s findings in Claiborne and Atwood as to whether the issues
sought to be severed are significantly different from one anot her and would require distinct
evidentiary proof, whether severance would promote judicial economy, and whether either party
will be unduly prejudiced by severance or its absence apply equally in these substantively identical,

though significantly larger i n terms of name d Plaintiffs, lawsuits. As the Court previously
explained, any suggestion that this Court could hold a trial in these cases involving hundreds or
thousands of plaintiffs when plaintiffs themselves acknowledge d that individual issues exist ed,
and frankly predominated, in a matter involving only twelve plaintiffs, i.e., Claiborne, is patently
untenable. As it did in Claiborne and Atwood, the Court further finds that Plaintiffs’ claims do not
arise from the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences. Having made
such a finding, the Court has discretion to drop parties on just terms or to sever the Plaintiffs’
claims.
As alluded to above, any suggestion that the Court and the Clerk’s Office should bear the
overly burdensome duty of ensuring that Plaintiffs’ claims are filed in appropriate forums
following severance is unfounded. Plaintiffs filed the instant actions after acknowledging that
individualized issues would prevent the Plaintiffs from proceeding on a class - or collective-basis
in Claiborne. They should not be granted a benefit from the Court simply because they filed
improper mass actions after voluntarily decertifying a collective and withdrawing their Rule 23
allegations. The Court wil l thus sever Plaintiffs’ claims, and it will permit Plaintiffs to file their
claims individually in appropriate forums. The Court will not transfer Plaintiffs’ claims, as the
Court will instead direct Plaintiffs , consistent with their offer to do so, to file their severed
individual actions in such appropriate forums. The Court believes that this remedy balances
Plaintiffs’ concerns, and Third Circuit precedent, respecting the appropriateness of severance over
dismissal where the statute of limitations is implicated, while also preventing the filing of improper
mass actions to impose an undue burden on this District’s Clerk’s Office. The question thus turns
to how much time should be afforded to Plaintiffs to file their individual claims, and whether those
claims should be filed individually in light of the Court’s misjoinder finding.

Taking the second issue first, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are attempting to “have their
cake and eat it too,” specifically in that they request that the Court not “drop” or dismiss their
claims, while also seeking the opportunity to further argue whether joinder is appropriate in
different forums. Had the Court “dropped” their claims, it might follow that Plaintiffs could make
such an argument. However, a case ci ted by Plaintiffs seems to directly contradict an assertion
that Plaintiffs should be able to again address the issue of joinder after severance:
The effect of each option is quite different. When a court “drops” a defendant under
Rule 21, that defendant is dismissed from the case without prejudice. Publicker
Indus., Inc. v. Roman Ceramics Corp., 603 F.2d 1065, 1068 (3d Cir.1979); see also
Elmore v. Henderson, 227 F.3d 1009, 1011–12 (7th Cir.2000) (Posner, J.). When
that occurs, the “statute of limitatio ns is not tolled” because we treat the initial
complaint “as if it never existed.” Brennan v. Kulick , 407 F.3d 603, 606 (3d
Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). But when a court “severs” a claim
against a defendant under Rule 21, the suit simply continues against the severed
defendant in another guise. White v. ABCO Eng’g Corp., 199 F.3d 140, 145 n. 6
(3d Cir. 1999); Elmore, 227 F.3d at 1012. The statute of limitations is held in
abeyance, and the severed suit can proceed so long as it initially was filed within
the limitations period. Id.

DirecTV, 467 F.3d at 845 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Because Plaintiffs’ severed claims
will effectively constitute continuations of the present cases at different case numbers (and in
different jurisdictions) , the Court sees no reason why its determination on joinder would not
constitute the law of the case. That said, the Court has no intention of offering an advisory opinion.
Plaintiffs proceed at their own peril should they attempt to file further mass actions after this
Court’s (and/or the Massachusetts District Court’s) misjoinder determination, and FedEx appears
prepared to address the law of the case doctrine and collateral estoppel issues should Plaintiffs take
such action. The Court’s Order will, however, direct the filing of individual lawsuits consistent
with the Court’s misjoinder finding.
As to timing, Plaintiffs’ counsel and Plaintiffs have been on notice for some time that
severance (or dismissal without prejudice) was a possibility, and Plaintiffs have now insisted that

the Court act on severance in their Motions to Sever. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs
are, and should be, prepared to proceed, and believes that Plaintiffs’ proposal of a 120-day filing
deadline is excessive given the amount of time for preparation that Plaintiffs have been afforded.
Plaintiffs’ claims will be severed, Plaintiffs shall be afforded 60 days to file their actions
individually in appropriate forums, and the Court will mark this case as closed consistent with
Plaintiffs’ request. See Abner – ECF no. 44 at 6 n.4 (“As Plaintiffs explained in their initial
response, should the Court issue an order severing their claims, they are willing to take it upon
themselves to refile to ease administrative burden on the Court. If the Court severs claims and
does not transfer them, there would be no need to, as FedEx posits, ‘ensure that each case has been
refiled or not within the allotted time,’ since any issue regarding timeliness would be an issue for
the transferee court to address. All the Court would need to do is close the action (as it did in
Claiborne and Atwood), which would not be equivalent to dismissal.”). To be clear, the Court’s
Order is intended to provide Plaintiffs with only 60 days to file their individual claims, otherwise
their claims will be time-barred. Again, given the amount of preparation time already afforded to
Plaintiffs, this Court has no intention or expectation of extending that deadline.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will sever the Plaintiffs’ claims in each of the
three above-captioned cases. Plaintiffs shall be afforded 60 days from the date of the Court’s
Order to file their claims and pay their filing fees in appropriate forums. An appropriate Order of
Court follows.
BY THE COURT:
/s/Robert J. Colville_______
Robert J. Colville
United States District Judge
DATED: May 18, 2026
cc: All counsel of record.

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