govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_24-cv-03136-1

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
JULIAN SANCHEZ MORA, et al., 
 
Plaintiffs, 
 
v. 
 
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION; 
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY , 
 
Defendants. 
 
 
 
Civil Action No. 24-3136 (BAH) 
 
Judge Beryl A. Howell 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 Plaintiffs, three immigration attorneys and three individuals, who sought their clients’ or 
their own international travel and immigration records from CBP , allege that defendant s, the 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and its component, Customs and Border Protection 
(“CBP”), maintain a policy or practice of taking longer than statutorily permitted to process 
requests for documents directed at CBP, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 
U.S.C. § 552. Pls.’ Renewed Mot. for Class Cert. (“Pls.’ Class Cert. Mot.”), ECF No. 88; Pls.’ 
Mem. in Support of Renewed Mot. for Class Cert. (“Pls.’ Class Cert. Mem.”), ECF No. 88-1. 1 
Three motions are pending before the Court. To vindicate their statutory rights under FOIA, 
plaintiffs have moved to certify a class of “persons who filed, or will file, FOIA requests with CBP 
for an individual’s records which have been pending, or will be pending, with CBP for more than 
30 business days without a determination.” Pls.’ Class Cert. Mem. at 2. Meanwhile, defendants 
 
1 The three individual plaintiffs are Ali Ainab, Rafael Edgardo Flores Rodriguez, and Beatriz Ariadna Garcia 
Mixcoa, each of whom filed a FOIA request seeking their own travel or immigration records from CBP. See Decl. of 
Ali Ainab (“Ainab Decl.”) ¶ 5, ECF No. 9-5; Decl. of Rafael Edgardo Flores Rodriguez (“Rodriguez Decl.”) ¶ 4, ECF 
No. 89; Decl. of Beatriz Garcia Mixcoa (“Mixcoa Decl.”) ¶ 4, ECF No. 88-4. The three attorney plaintiffs are Julian 
Sanchez Mora, Siobhan Marie Waldron, and Carlos Moctezuma Garcia, each of whom practice immigration law and 
regularly submit FOIA request s for clients’ travel and immigration records to CBP. Decl. of Julian Sanchez Mora 
(“Sanchez Mora Decl.”) ¶¶ 2, 5, ECF No. 9-1; Decl. of Siobhan Marie Waldron (“Waldron Decl.”) ¶¶ 1, 3, ECF No. 
9-2; Decl. of Carlos Moctezuma Garcia (“Garcia Decl.”) ¶¶ 1, 3, ECF No. 9-3. 

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seek summary judgment and, if that is unsuccessful, oppose any class certification, see Defs.’ Mot. 
for Summ. J. & Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Class Cert. (“Defs.’ MSJ”), ECF No. 93, which dispositive 
motion plaintiffs oppose while , in the alternative, mov ing for additional discovery prior to a ny 
grant of summary judgment, Pls.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ MSJ (“Pls.’ MSJ Opp’n”), ECF No. 101; Pls.’ 
Mot. for Disc. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) (“Pls.’ Disc. Mot.”), ECF No. 102. 
 For the reasons described below , defendants’ motion for summary judgment is 
GRANTED, and plaintiffs’ motions for class certification and discovery are DENIED. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The factual background and procedural history of this case are summarized below. 
A. Factual Background 
Plaintiffs are “attorneys and individuals who seek records that pertain to their clients and 
themselves, respectively, including records related to an individual’s entry into and/or exit fro m 
the United States, admission, criminal history, and records of inspection, apprehension, or 
interaction with CBP employees.” Pls.’ Class Cert. Mem. at 1. “The only way to obtain a copy of 
an individual’s CBP records is to submit a FOIA request.” Id. at 4. Each of the putative class 
representatives had FOIA requests pending before CBP for more than 30 business days at the time 
this action was filed. Id. at 7 -8. The factual allegations describing plaintiffs’ situations are 
addressed first, followed by the plaintiffs’ description of the challenged policy and practice. 
1. Individual Plaintiffs 
The three individual plaintiffs are each involved in immigration proceedings and had 
pending, overdue FOIA requests at the time this action was filed. Ali Ainab , a U.S. citizen, has 
two children who “currently reside in Somalia.” Decl. of Ali Ainab (“Ainab Decl.”) ¶ 2, ECF No. 
9-5. His “understanding is that . . . [his] children are also U.S. citizens,” which he sought to 

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“prove” by filing an application with the U.S. Embassy in Turkey, where these two children were 
born. Id. ¶ 3. “As part of that process, [he] must show that [he] ha[s] lived for five years in the 
United States,” and was told by the embassy that “the only documents they would accept to prove 
that [he] ha[d] spent enough time living in the United States are [his] entry and exit records from 
the U.S. government.” Id. ¶¶ 3-4. He submitted a FOIA request to CBP, via his attorney, on 
December 22, 2023. Id. ¶ 5. At the time this action was filed, CBP had yet to make a determination 
on his FOIA request, and, in the meantime, his children could not “travel to the United States, and 
[they could] []not live as a family.” Id. ¶ 6. In November 2024, CBP released the records sought 
to Mr. Ainab. See Defs.’ MSJ, Decl. of Patrick Howard , Branch Chief , CBP FOIA Division 
(“Howard Decl.”) ¶ 23, ECF No. 93-2. 
Rafael Edgardo Flores Rodriguez , a citizen of Honduras , “entered the United States in 
August 2003 on a B2 tourist visa.” Decl. of Rafael Edgardo Flores Rodriguez (“Rodriguez Decl.”) 
¶ 2, ECF No. 89. To seek an adjustment of status and obtain a green card, he needed to prove that 
he entered the United States legally. Id. ¶ 3. He filed a FOIA request with CBP on June 23, 2023, 
and that request was pending when he joined this action in August 2024. Id. ¶ 4. After an initial 
determination and administrative appeal, CBP released his records on December 10, 2024, 
approximately four months after he joined this lawsuit. Id. 
Finally, on August 23, 2023, Beatriz Garcia Mixcoa “submitted a request for records from 
[her] file” with CBP, pursuant to FOIA, in order to obtain her “immigration history for the asylum 
application [she] intended to file.” Decl. of Beatriz Garcia Mixcoa (“Mixcoa Decl.”) ¶ 3-4, ECF 
No. 88-4. When this action was filed, in April 2024, she “had not received a response to [her] 
FOIA request, which by then had been pending for 7 months.” Id. ¶ 5. Eventually, after an initial 
determination and administrative appeal, her case was “administratively closed” on November 21, 

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2024, without release of records . Id. ¶ 6. “Due to the delays in obtaining [her] file from CBP, 
[she] did not file [her] asylum application until January 21, 2025,” which “delayed [her] ability to 
obtain an employment authorization document.” Id. 
None of the three individual plaintiffs state that they intend to pursue any additional FOIA 
requests from CBP any time in the future. 
2. Attorney Plaintiffs 
The three attorney plaintiffs, Julian Sanchez Mora, Siobhan Marie Waldron, and Carlos 
Moctezuma Garcia, also seek to represent the class. First, Julian Sanchez Mora is an attorney who 
practices immigration law and criminal defense in California. Decl. of Julian Sanchez Mora 
(“Sanchez Mora Decl.”) ¶ 2, ECF No. 9 -1. In his criminal defense practice, he “must advi se 
noncitizen criminal defendants about the risk of deportation based on a conviction when they are 
deciding whether to plead guilty,” and accordingly “submits FOIA requests to various federal 
agencies,” including CBP, to obtain information about clients’ immigration status and history. Id. 
¶ 3. In his immigration practice, he file s FOIA requests “to assess clients’ eligibility for 
immigration relief or benefits.” Id. ¶ 5. At the time this action was filed, he had “at least 37 FOIA 
requests pending before CBP,” all of which had been “pending for more than 30 business days.” 
Id. ¶ 6. He reports that he typically receiv es a determination in “10 to 11 months.” Id. ¶ 7. He 
had two requests pending for which he sought expedited processing because they were related to 
“pending removal proceedings” for clients, which requests he submitted in August 2023 and had 
not received a response at the time he filed this action approximately seven months after 
submission. Id. ¶ 8. 
Siobhan Marie Waldron is an immigration attorney in California. Decl. of Siobhan Marie 
Waldron (“Waldron Decl.”) ¶¶ 1-2, ECF No. 9-2. She “regularly file[s] [FOIA] requests on behalf 

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of [her] clients with [CBP].” Id. ¶ 3. She “ha[d] ten FOIA request pending before CBP that were 
filed on behalf of clients more than 30 business days ago,” as of the filing of this action. Id. ¶ 4. 
She requested expedited processing for FOIA requests related to two detained clients on August 2, 
2023, and November 29, 2023, both of which were still pending at the time the action was filed. 
Id. ¶ 6. She files these requests “primarily to assess an individual’s eligibility for immigration 
benefits and relief from removal.” Id. ¶ 7. 
Carlos Moctezuma Garcia is an immigration and criminal defense attorney in Texas. Decl. 
of Carlos Moctezuma Garcia (“Garcia Decl.”) ¶¶ 1-2, ECF No. 9-3. He reports that, “in general, 
it takes over 12 months for CBP to respond to FOIA requests.” Id. ¶ 5. Similarly to the other 
attorney plaintiffs, obtaining individual records from CBP “is necessary to determine if the [client] 
is eligible to file an application for immigration benefits and/or whether they qualify for any 
required waivers,” among other things. Id. ¶ 7. CBP’s “delays sometimes prevent [him] and [his] 
colleagues from applying for a client’s lawful permanent residency until many months, and 
sometimes years, later than [they] would have if [they] had promptly received the client’s CBP 
records.” Id. ¶ 8. Additionally, “asylum applicants must file for asylum within one year after 
arriving in the United States,” and “[w]ithout timely access to CBP records through the F OIA 
process, it may be difficult to gather the necessary evidence to determine the filing deadline.” Id. 
Plaintiffs additionally submit declarations from thirteen additional attorneys who similarly 
describe submitting multiple FOIA requests and experiencing wait times longer than 20 to 30 
business days prior to receiving a response from CBP. See Decls. in Support of Pls.’ [First] Mot. 
to Certify Class, ECF No. 9, Exs. B1 to B16, ECF Nos. 9- 6 to 9- 21. Like the named attorney 
plaintiffs, they attest that the delays inhibit them from taking certain actions on behalf of their 
clients, since FOIA requests to CBP are the only way to obtain the records sought. See, e.g., Decl. 

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of Stacy Tolchin ¶¶ 3-6, ECF No. 9-6; Decl. of Bardis Vakili ¶¶ 4-6, ECF No. 9-9; Decl. of Lizz 
Cannon ¶¶ 3-4, ECF No. 9-11. 
3. CBP’s Alleged Policy and Practice 
Plaintiffs allege, as shown by the affidavits submitted by the named plaintiffs and others, 
that defendants have a policy or practice of waiting until after the statutory deadlines imposed by 
FOIA to make determinations on FOIA requests for “individual records,” which they define to 
mean “records related to an individual, including the individual’s entry into and/or exit from the 
United States; admission, withdrawal of admission, or denial of admission to the United States; 
criminal history; apprehension, inspection by, or interactions with, CBP employees; and removal, 
deportation, exclusion, voluntary return, and/or expulsion under any provision of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act or 42 U.S.C. § 265.” Pls.’ Class Cert. Mem. at 2. 
For their part, d efendants do not deny that CBP regularly exceeds FOIA’s statutory 
deadlines, Defs.’ MSJ at 5 -6, but point primarily to an increasing number of FOIA requests in 
recent years as the reason for the delays, supported by two declarations from DHS and CPB . See 
Howard Decl.; Defs.’ MSJ, Decl. of Catrina Pavlik -Keenan, DHS Deputy Chief FOIA Officer 
(“Pavlik-Keenan Decl.”), ECF No. 93- 3. CBP has 123,018 open FOIA cases, 107,521 of which 
are “in backlog status,” meaning that more than 20 business days have passed. Howard Decl. ¶ 34. 
According to public, annual FOIA reports published by DHS, CBP’s backlog has increased from 
1,008 in 2017 to 110,271 in 2024, Pls.’ MSJ Opp’n at 16 (citing DHS, 2017 Freedom of 
Information Act Report to the Att’y Gen. (“DHS 2017 Report”) 16 (2018); DHS, 2024 Freedom of 
Information Act Report to the Att’y Gen. (“DHS 2024 Report”) 31 (2025)), reduced somewhat to 
107,521 in 2025, Howard Decl. ¶ 34. 

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Defendants explain that “CBP faces an enormous and ever-increasing burden on its FOIA 
program.” Id. ¶ 31. “[P]ublic awareness and use of the FOIA have increased” in recent years, id., 
a claim supported with citation to the number of FOIA requests received, which increased 
dramatically from fiscal year (“FY”) 2016, in which CBP received 66,690 FOIA requests, to FY 
2025, in which CBP received 207,396, id. ¶ 33, as well as the fact that “CBP’s use of various 
communication technologies and the rise of digital records has expanded the universe of 
potentially responsive records that need to be searched,” id. ¶ 32. Despite this substantial increase 
in the number of requests received, “CBP FOIA Division staff has not increased to account for the 
increased workload.” Id. ¶ 35. 
The government describes additional factors to increased numbers of FOIA requests and 
insufficient staffing, as causes of the increased workload. First, “CBP is required to consult” with 
other agencies or components who have an interest in documents potentially releasable, which can 
delay production, id. ¶ 15, and, at the same time, CBP must participate in consultations from other 
agencies, which diverts resources from requests directed to CBP, id. ¶ 18. Second, CBP cites 
significant variance in the “specificity and clarity” of requests, the cooperativeness of the 
requestors, and “the law enforcement sensitivities present in the records that necessitate additional 
safeguarding.” Id. ¶ 17. Third, of the 107,521 cases in backlog status, CBP indicates that this 
agency has 154 open FOIA litigation cases against it “requir[ing] the FOIA Division to divert 
resources to process such requests.” Id. ¶ 29. 
Short of hiring more staff, CBP points to various steps the agency has taken in an effort to 
reduce the backlog and processing times. For example, i n April 2024, CBP “reviewed its 
onboarding process for personnel processing FOIA requests” and provided a training to employees 
at field offices who help pull local records responsive to FOIA requests. Id. ¶ 45. CBP has also 

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entered, at some unspecified date, into an agreement with United States Customs and Immigration 
Services (“USCIS”) wherein certain records requests directed to USCIS that would normally 
require a consultation with CBP can be handled directly by USCIS. Id. ¶ 46. CBP has also sought 
additional staff time by “periodically approv[ing] overtime hours” and “utiliz[ing] temporary duty 
. . . and light duty assignments” to process FOIA requests. Id. ¶¶ 47-48. CBP has also created two 
separate tracks for simple individual records requests and more complex requests from, for 
example, media. Id. ¶ 40. In addition, in January 2025, CBP made certain technological changes, 
including adding “new information fields” to its FOIA request portal to encourage clear requests, 
id. ¶ 49, and creating seven “bots” that “assist with completing various tasks and reduce the manual 
transactions” needed to complete FOIA requests, though a human worker “is still required to 
complete a manual responsive review of the records compiled by the bot assistant, ” id. ¶ 50. 
Finally, CBP has made some individual records available through an online portal without the need 
for a FOIA request. Id. ¶ 51. 
Defendants also attest to DHS’s role in CBP’s FOIA processing, including that DHS 
promulgates FOIA regulations that apply to all the department’s components, including CBP, 
Pavlik-Keenan Decl. ¶ 10, and provides CBP with the software it uses to process FOIA requests, 
id. ¶ 11. DHS has also lent staff time to certain aspects of CBP’s FOIA processing to reduce the 
backlog and expedite requests. Id. ¶ 5. 
Plaintiffs dispute nearly all of defendants’ representations as to the steps taken to address 
backlogs in CBP’s FOIA request processing, arguing that “[p]laintiffs need discovery to ascertain 
the veracity of the statements . . . because the information is solely in Defendants’ possession.” 
See, e.g., Pls.’ Statement of Material Facts (“Pls.’ SMF”) ¶ 4, ECF No. 101-1. As support, plaintiffs 
identify factual disputes as to whether defendants have “allocated sufficient staffing and budgetary 

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resources to CBP’s FOIA division,” Pls.’ Statement of Genuine Issues (“Pls.’ SGI”) ¶ 1, ECF No. 
101-1 at 10, and whether “an annual increase in FOIA requests—as opposed to inadequate funding, 
mismanagement, inadequate training, insufficient stop- gap measures, or a policy of treating 
FOIA’s response timeframes as not mandatory, among other things—is the primary cause of the 
ever-increasing backlog,” id. ¶ 2. Specifically, p laintiffs point to the fact that in FY 2024, the 
“backlog jumped by over 400%” compared to the prior year whereas FOIA filings “rose by only 
23.56%.” Id. ¶ 2(a). Nevertheless, aside from stating that they have insufficient information to 
respond, plaintiffs do not otherwise substantially dispute any of defendants’ proposed undisputed 
facts. 
B. Procedural History 
Plaintiffs filed this case on April 24, 2024, in the Northern District of California, see 
Compl., ECF No. 1, along with an initial class certification motion, see Pls.’ First Mot. to Certify 
Class, ECF No. 8. The original complaint asserted a single claim that defendants maintained a 
“pattern or practice of violating the FOIA statute by failing to make timely determinations .” 
Compl. ¶¶ 8, 68-70. In response, defendants moved to transfer the case to this Court, on grounds 
that FOIA claims may only be litigated in the district of the requestor’s residency or the District of 
Columbia, and only some plaintiffs lived in the Northern District of California, or , in the 
alternative, moved to dismiss DHS as a defendant since the allegedly delayed FOIA requests were 
directed to CBP. Defs.’ First Mot. to Transfer or Dismiss, ECF No. 40. Plaintiffs subsequently 
amended their complaint to add two claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 
U.S.C. § 706(1) -(2). See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 77 -100, ECF No. 42. In response to the Amended 
Complaint, defendants renewed their dismissal motion as to DHS, and further moved to dismiss 

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the APA claims, and, again, to transfer the FOIA claim to this Court. Defs.’ Second Mot. to Dismiss 
and Transfer to the District of Columbia, ECF No. 46. 
In November 2024, the District Court for the Northern District of California granted 
defendants’ second motion, dismissing plaintiffs’ APA claims for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, dismissing DHS as a defendant, and transferring the remaining FOIA claim against 
CBP to this Court. See Order Granting Mot. to Dismiss in Part & Transferring Case, ECF No. 59. 
At this Court’s direction to provide information on the status of the case, see Minute Order (Nov. 
7, 2024), plaintiffs indicated they intended to move for reconsideration of dismissal of DHS as a 
defendant to their remaining FOIA claim. Jt. Meet & Confer Report (Jan. 10, 2025), ECF No. 76. 
Following briefing, upon reconsideration, DHS was reinstated as a defendant . Sanchez Mora v. 
CBP, No. 24-cv-3136 (BAH), 2025 WL 1713252, at *7 (D.D.C. June 18, 2025), ECF No. 85. 
Plaintiffs subsequently filed a renewed motion for class certification. See Pls.’ Class Cert. 
Mot.; see also Defs.’ MSJ (incorporating opposition to class certification); Pls.’ Reply in Support 
of Mot. for Class Cert. (“Pls.’ Class Cert. Reply”), ECF No. 97. Defendants opposed that motion 
and moved for summary judgment. See Defs.’ MSJ; see also Pls.’ MSJ Opp’n; Defs.’ Combined 
Reply in Support of MSJ & Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for Disc. (“Defs.’ Disc. Opp’n”), ECF No. 107. 
Plaintiffs, in addition to opposing defendants’ motion for summary judgment, moved for discovery 
“to test the veracity of facts Defendants rely on in their motion for summary judgment and to 
support Plaintiffs’ policy or practice claims,” pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). 
See Pls.’ Disc. Mot.; see also Defs.’ Disc. Opp’n; Pls.’ Reply in Support of Mot. for Disc. (“Pls.’ 
Disc. Reply”), ECF No. 109. These three pending motions are now ripe for resolution. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 

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Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[a] party is entitled to summary judgment only 
if there is no genuine issue of material fact and judgment in the movant’s favor is proper as a matter 
of law.” Soundboard Ass’n v. FTC, 888 F.3d 1261, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (citation omitted); see 
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Generally, summary judgment may be granted to the moving party upon 
establishing facts entitling it to judgment on a claim, if the nonmoving party fails to rebut that 
evidence. Winston & Strawn, LLP v. McLean, 843 F. 3d 503, 507 (D.C. Cir. 2016). “[T]he mere 
existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly 
supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of 
material fact,” where “material” facts are those “that might affect the outcome of the suit under 
governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247- 48 (1986) (emphasis in 
original). In considering whether a dispute is “genuine ,” “the judge must view the evidence 
presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden” that would ultimately decide 
the case. Id. at 254. 
In FOIA cases, summary judgment may be granted in favor of the government based on 
agency affidavits “[i]f they contain reasonable specificity of detail rather than merely conclusory 
statements, and if they are not called into question by contradictory evidence in the record or by 
evidence of agency bad faith.” Evans v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons , 951 F.3d 578, 584 (D.C. Cir. 
2020); see also Schaerr v. DOJ, 69 F.4th 924, 929 (D.C. Cir. 2023) . Agency declarations are 
afforded “a presumption of good faith, whic h cannot be rebutted by ‘purely speculative claims 
about the existence and discoverability of other documents.’” SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 
F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting Ground Saucer Watch, Inc. v. CIA, 692 F.2d 770, 771 
(D.C. Cir. 1981)); see also Watkins L. & Advocacy, PLLC v. DOJ , 78 F.4th 436, 450 (D.C. Cir. 
2023). The D.C. Circuit has noted that “[t]he vast majority of FOIA cases can be resolved on 

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summary judgment.” Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. DOJ, 58 F.4th 1255, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 
2023) (Sentelle, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting Evans v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons , 
951 F.3d 578, 584 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (quoting Brayton v. Off. of the U.S. Trade Representative, 641 
F.3d 521, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2011))). 
III. DISCUSSION 
Plaintiffs allege, in support of their FOIA claim, that “CBP has a nationwide pattern or 
practice of failing to make records related to an individual ‘promptly available’ upon request,” Am. 
Compl. ¶ 103, and a corresponding “policy that 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) and (B)(i) do not impose 
an affirmative obligation or require CBP to make determinations within the specified statutory 
time frames in 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) and (B)(i),” id. ¶ 105. As a result, DHS has failed in its 
obligations to “ensure Defendant CBP complies with its obligations under the FOIA.” Id. ¶ 108. 
As relief, plaintiffs seek declaratory judgment that defendants’ “failure to make determinations on 
Plaintiffs’ and proposed class members’ FOIA requests filed with Defendant CBP for individual 
records within the statutory time frame and to make records promptly available violates the FOIA,” 
and “a permanent injunction requiring Defendants to make determinations on FOIA requests for 
individual records that have already been pending for more than 30 business days with CBP within 
60 business days of the Court’s order or as the Court deems appropriate,” and on any new requests 
within 30 days. Id. at 26-27 (Prayer for Relief). 
Defendants advance multiple arguments why summary judgment in their favor is 
appropriate. First, they argue that “a failure to meet FOIA’s statutory deadlines cannot by itself 
constitute an illegal policy or practice,” and, in particular, “is not sufficient to support equitable 
relief” in the form of the injunction sought by plaintiffs. Defs.’ MSJ at 11 (capitalization modified). 
Second, defendants argue that “the record does not establish that Defendants maintain any sort of 

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unlawful policy or practice as to how they handle FOIA requests.” Id. at 12. Third, defendants 
contend that, even if such a policy or practice existed, plaintiffs could not show that “ordinary 
remedies, such as a production order, would be inadequate to overcome an agency policy or 
practice.” Id. at 15-16 (quoting Jud . Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 895 F.3d 770, 783 
(D.C. Cir. 2018) ). Finally, if all else fails, defendants argue that the Court should exercise its 
equitable discretion to deny the relief sought by plaintiffs. Id. at 17.2 
Before turning to the parties’ arguments regarding the merits of defendants ’ summary 
judgment motion, the timing requirements under FOIA are briefly reviewed. 
A. FOIA’s Timing Requirements 
FOIA generally requires government agencies to “make . . . records promptly available to 
any person” when that person submits a “request for records which (i) reasonably describes such 
records and (ii) is made in accordance with published rules stating the time, place, f ees (if any), 
and procedures to be followed,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A), subject to certain exemptions, id. 
§ 552(b). Specific time limits are set out for an agency’s response to FOIA requests, requiring that 
 
2 Given that the three individual plaintiffs have already received responses to their FOIA requests and do not 
express any intent to submit future FOIA requests to CBP, an obvious mootness issue comes to the fore, though 
defendants have not raised this issue and would normally bear the burden of establishing mootness, which “ is . . . 
heavy.” Porup v. CIA, 997 F.3d 1224, 1231-1232 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (omission in original) (quoting Cnty. of Los Angeles 
v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (quoting United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953))). Nonetheless, 
since mootness “implicates [the Court’s] jurisdiction,” courts may address mootness sua sponte . St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry , 438 U.S. 531, 537 (1978); see also United States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. 932, 933- 34 
(2011) (per curiam). Plaintiffs’ claim hinges on an alleged policy or practice, not denial of any single FOIA request, 
and the D.C. Circuit has described policy- or-practice claims as an “exception to mootness.” Jud. Watch, 895 F.3d at 
777. Yet, typically, such cases have featured repeat requestors , who are likely therefore to be affected repeatedly in 
the future by any unlawful FOIA policy or practice. See, e.g. , Jud. Watch, 895 F.3d at 777 (requestor sought similar 
records repeatedly and intended to submit similar requests in the future); Wash. Lawyers’ Comm. for C.R. & Urb. Affs. 
v. DOJ, 145 F.4th 63, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (requestor “frequently” requested prison records of clients); Citizens for 
Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. CDC, No. 25-cv-1020 (TJK), 2026 WL 890427, at * 1 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2026) (requestor 
“routinely” filed FOIA requests with CDC); cf. Walsh v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 400 F.3d 535 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that a plaintiff ’s policy-or-practice claim was moot when he had shown only a “faint possibility” that he 
would “ever request additional records”). In contrast here, however, the record is silent as to whether the individual 
plaintiffs intend to submit future FOIA requests. Nevertheless, since defendants did not raise mootness, plaintiffs have 
had no opportunity to address this issue, and since the attorney plaintiffs would qualify as repeat requesters to defeat 
a mootness challenge as to them to satisfy this jurisdictional threshold, the issue of mootness is not further addressed. 

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agencies “shall . . . determine within 20 [business] days . . . after the receipt of any such request 
whether to comply with such request and shall immediately notify the person making such request 
of . . . such determination and the reasons therefor.” Id. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i). In certain enumerated 
“unusual circumstances,” an agency may extend the deadline for a determination by ten business 
days, while also offering the requestor the opportunity to narrow their request. Id. § 552(a)(6)(B). 
After an agency makes an initial determination, such determination may be appealed 
administratively, and then to a district court. See id. § 552(a)(4)(B). 
For an agency to make a “determination,” the agency “need not go so far as to produce the 
responsive documents but it must at least inform the requester of the scope of the documents it 
will produce and the exemptions it will claim with respect to any with held documents.” Citizens 
for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. FEC (“CREW”), 711 F.3d 180, 185 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
(Kavanaugh, J.). More specifically, “the agency must at least: (i) gather and review the documents; 
(ii) determine and communicate the scop e of the documents it intends to produce and withhold, 
and the reasons for withholding any documents; and (iii) inform the requester that it can appeal 
whatever portion of the ‘determination’ is adverse.” Id. at 188; accord Machado Amadis v. Dep’t 
of State, 971 F.3d 364, 372 (D.C. Cir. 2020). 
Although FOIA requires exhaustion of administrative appeals before a requestor may seek 
judicial review of an agency’s determination whether records are releasable, Elec. Privacy Info. 
Ctr. v. IRS, 910 F.3d 1232, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2018), “[a]ny person making a request to any agency 
. . . shall be deemed to have exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to such request if 
the agency fails to comply with the applicable time limit,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C)(i). In other 
words, if the agency fails to make a determination within 20 business days or invokes the “unusual 
circumstances” provision but fails to make a determination within 30 business days, the requestor 

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may sue the agency in federal court to seek production of documents. CREW, 711 F.3d at 189-90 
(“[I]f the agency does not adhere to FOIA’s explicit timelines, . . . the agency cannot rely on the 
administrative exhaustion requirement to keep cases from getting into court.”). After a requestor 
files suit, “[i]f the Government can show exceptional circumstances exist and that the agency is 
exercising due diligence in responding to the request, the court may retain jurisdiction and allow 
the agency additional time to complete its review of the records.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C)(i). 
“[T]he term ‘exceptional circumstances’ does not include a delay that results from a 
predictable agency workload of requests under this section, unless the agency demonstrates 
reasonable progress in reducing its backlog of pending requests.” Id. § 552(a)(6)(C)(ii). 
B. Delay Can Constitute an Impermissible Policy or Practice 
Defendants contend at the outset that they are entitled to summary judgment because 
“[d]elay alone, even repeated delay, is not the type of illegal policy or practice that is actionable 
under Payne Enterprises[, Inc. v. United States, 837 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1988)].” Defs.’ MSJ at 
11 (italicization added) (quoting Cause of Action Inst. v. Eggleston, 224 F. Supp. 3d 63, 72 (D.D.C. 
2016)). In defendants’ view, the only remedy for delay in the processing of FOIA requests is “the 
right to file a lawsuit in district court and avoid administrative exhaustion requirements.” Id. 
(citing CREW, 711 F.3d at 189 (“If the agency does not adhere to FOIA’s explicit timelines, the 
‘penalty’ is that the agency cannot rely on the administrative exhaustion requirement to keep cases 
from getting into court.”)). 
 Contrary to defendants’ position, the D.C. Circuit has made plain that “ a plaintiff states a 
plausible policy or practice claim under Payne by alleging prolonged, unexplained delays in 
producing non-exempt records that could signal the agency has a policy or practice of ignoring 
FOIA’s requirements.” Jud. Watch, 895 F.3d at 780. Indeed, in Judicial Watch, the D.C. Circuit 

16 
 
found that an agency’s “alleged practice of prolonged, repeated, and unexplained delay, if allowed 
to continue, would harm [plaintiff]” and was therefore actionable under FOIA . Id. at 782. Thus 
“prolonged, unexplained delays” can constitute a policy or practice in violation of FOIA . Id. at 
780. As explained next, the ultimate success of the claim and availability of injunctive relief hinges 
on fact-specific questions about the reasons for the pattern of delay and the agency’s efforts to 
improve. 
C. Defendants Do Not Maintain a Policy or Practice of Violating FOIA’s 
Timelines 
Defendants further argue entitlement to summary judgment in their favor because “the 
record does not establish that Defendants maintain any sort of unlawful policy or practice as to 
how they handle FOIA requests.” Def.’s MSJ at 12. Although the D.C. Circuit has “not spell[ed] 
out . . . the precise legal standard” for determining when a FOIA policy-and-practice claim based 
on delay is meritorious, Wash. Lawyers’ Comm. for C.R. & Urb. Affs. v. DOJ , 145 F.4th 63, 70 
(D.C. Cir. 2025), precedent provides some guideposts. 
The ultimate question is “ whether the agency ’s conduct in failing to conform to FOIA’s 
procedural requirements demonstrates a lack of due diligence and is so delinquent or recalcitrant 
as to warrant injunctive relief because ordinary remedies, such as a production order, would be 
inadequate to overcome an agency policy or practice .” Wash. Lawyers’ Comm., 145 F.4th at 70 
(quoting Jud. Watch, 895 F.3d at 783). The D.C. Circuit has elaborated that “[a]n agency may be 
‘delinquent or recalcitrant’ in meeting its FOIA obligations without rising to the level of bad faith,” 
and, further, that “not all agency delay or other failure to comply with FOIA’s procedural 
requirements will warrant judicial intervention.” Id. “[A]n agency’s invocation of factors like 
‘staffing shortages and work overload’ do not by themselves necessarily ‘render injunctive relief 
inappropriate,’” id. (quoting Jud. Watch, 895 F.3d at 783) , though “ exceptional circumstances” 

17 
 
may justify even numerous delays “when an agency . . . is deluged with a volume of requests for 
information vastly in excess of that anticipated by Congress, when the existing resources are 
inadequate to deal with the volume of such requests within the time limits of subsection (6)(A), 
and when the agency can show that it ‘ is exercising due diligence ’ in processing the requests .” 
Open Am. v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d 605, 612 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In such 
exceptional circumstances, the practical and logistical obstacles to complying with FOIA time 
limits explain the compliance failure rather than a finding of an impermissible policy or practice 
of violating FOIA, and FOIA’s built -in remedy for dealing with delays caused by “ exceptional 
circumstances”—judicial supervision of individual cases —will suffice. See, e.g., Democracy 
Forward Found. v. DOJ, 354 F. Supp. 3d 55, 61 (2018) (finding “exceptional circumstances” based 
on a “sudden increase in requests” and retaining jurisdiction to supervise production). 
Here, defendants’ declarations establish that the agency has indeed been “deluged” over 
the last few years by an ever-increasing volume of requests. Open Am., 547 F.2d at 612. Of note, 
the number of FOIA requests received annually by CBP increased threefold between 2016 and 
2025, from 66,690 requests in FY 2016 to 207,396 in FY 2025. Howard Decl. ¶ 33. Defendants 
explain that “[o]ver the past decade, public awareness and use of the FOIA have increased,” and 
“[t]he option to virtually submit requests has made submission easier and more efficient for 
requestors. Id. ¶ 31. Between FY 2024 and FY 2025 alone, the number of FOIA requests jumped 
from 155,702 in FY 2024, which was already more than twice the FOIA requests received in FY 
2016, to 207,396 in FY 2025. Id. ¶ 33. These dramatic jumps in the number of requests go beyond 
the “predictable agency workload” and constitute “ exceptional circumstances” that justify some 
delays in FOIA processing. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C)(ii). See, e.g., Ctr. for Public Integrity v. Dep’t 
of State , No. 05- cv-2313 (JDB) , 2006 WL 1073066, at *4 (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 2006) (finding 

18 
 
exceptional circumstances when requests to agency increased from 3,355 annually to 4,602 
annually over the course of eight years) ; Daily Caller v. Dep’t of State , 152 F. Supp. 3d 1, 12 
(D.D.C. 2015) (concluding that “nearly a 20% year -over-year increase . . . certainly removes the 
present increase from the ambit of a ‘predictable agency workload’”). 
Defendants’ declarations also establish that CBP and DHS are exercising “due diligence” 
in attempting to address these challenges, including by reaching an agreement with USCIS to 
divert certain FOIA consultations away from CBP, Howard Decl. ¶ 46, increasi ng staff time on 
FOIA processing, id. ¶¶ 47-48, tracking simple and complex requests separately, id. ¶ 40, and 
making technological updates by modifying the request form and using bots to assist with 
processing, id. ¶¶ 49-50. See Informed Consent Action N etwork v. FDA, No. 25- cv-823 (JEB), 
2025 WL 2938703, at *4 (D.D.C. Oct. 16, 2025) (“Courts in this district have found that a ‘ first-
in, first-out multitrack system for processing requests’ . . . indicates due diligence.”). Additionally, 
the Deputy FOIA Officer for DHS attests that since at least 2023, DHS has lent staff time to 
processing thousands of CBP FOIA requests. Pavlik-Keenan Decl. ¶ 5. 
Plaintiffs respond to almost all of defendant’s factual assertions by claiming that plaintiffs 
lack sufficient information to respond without discovery, but offer little, other than speculative 
possibility, that discovery may somehow rebut the presumption of good faith afforded to 
defendants’ declarations. Plaintiffs cite to the D.C. Circuit’s instruction that “[n]othing in FOIA 
suggests that a plaintiff in a FOIA policy or practice case must affirmatively demonstrate that the 
agency is acting in bad faith to survive summary judgment ,” Pls.’ Disc. Mem. at 5 n.2 (quoting 
Wash. Lawyers Comm., 145 F.4th at 70), but that directive speaks to the merits of a policy- or-
practice claim, not to the appropriateness of relying on declarations from agency officials to 
establish facts about the agency’s workload and ongoing efforts to address a backlog. See Wash. 

19 
 
Lawyers’ Comm. for C.R. & Urb. Affs. v. DOJ, No. 23-cv-1328 (BAH), 2024 WL 1050498, at *12 
(D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2024), aff’d sub nom. Wash. Lawyers’ Comm., 145 F.4th 63 (D.C. Cir. 2025) 
(denying discovery in FOIA policy-or-practice claim because, while “permitting plaintiff to obtain 
discovery . . . could yield a lot more information[,] . . . [p]laintiff has suggested nothing to rebut 
the good faith afforded to defendant’s declarations” (internal quotation marks to briefing omitted)). 
In an additional push to call into question the good faith of defendants’ declarations , 
plaintiffs also point to minor discrepancies between those declarations and defendants’ published 
reports, as plaintiffs describe those reports in their statement of material facts, but none of these 
nits undermines the overall veracity and good faith of the declarations themselves. For instance, 
plaintiffs note that the Howard Declaration contains slightly different numbers as to the total 
number of FOIA requests in 2017 and 2021, compared to DHS’s public reports about the same. 
Pls.’ SMF ¶ 14. In particular, defendants’ declarations report that in FY 2017, CBP received 88,937 
FOIA requests, Howard Decl. ¶ 33, whereas the FY 2017 DHS report cited by plaintiffs lists 88,840 
requests that year, Pls.’ SMF ¶ 14 (citing DHS 2017 Report at 19); and defendants list 108,181 
requests in FY 2021, Howard Decl. ¶ 33, whereas the public report for that year lists 108,177 
requests for that year, Pls.’ SMF ¶ 14 (citing DHS, Fiscal Year 2021 Freedom of Information Act 
Report to the Att’y Gen. 15 (2022)). These miniscule differences do not undermine the credibility 
of the government’s declarations. 
Similarly, plaintiffs argue that certain statements of material fact by defendants are not fully 
supported by defendants’ declarations. They cite as an example that defendants’ statement of 
material facts conveys that CBP has “improved” its training for new employees, whereas the 
declaration relied upon only says that CBP “reviewed” its training for new employees, Pls.’ SMF 
¶ 18, and defendants’ statement of material facts conveys that CBP has “increased” the amount of 

20 
 
overtime approved for FOIA staff, whereas the declaration relied upon only says that CBP 
“periodically” approves overtime without saying whether such overtime has increased. Pls.’ SMF 
¶ 19. Even relying on the declarations themselves, rather than defenda nts’ statement of material 
facts, defendants are entitled to summary judgment, so these small discrepancies are immaterial. 
Giving defendants’ declarations therefore a presumption of good faith, they demonstrate 
that CBP’s admittedly substantial backlog of FOIA requests is the result of a deluge of requests far 
exceeding the agency’s capacity to process them, rather than a policy or practice of violating 
FOIA’s statutory deadlines , a conclusion confirmed by the defendants’ attestations about 
developing various strategies to respond to the deluge that is wholly inconsistent with plaintiffs’ 
alleged policy to do otherwise. 
Plaintiffs attack this conclusion on three main grounds, none of which are successful. First, 
and most broadly, they suggest solutions to the backlog that defendants have not taken and more 
generally that defendants have not “allocated sufficient staffing and budgetary resources to CBP’s 
FOIA Division.” Pls.’ SGI ¶ 1; Pls.’ MSJ Opp’n at 15. For example, plaintiffs query “whether the 
evaluation of FOIA staff includes any assessment of whether they resolve FOIA requests within 
the time period provided by t he statute” and whether “the level of funding currently provided to 
process FOIA requests . . . has increased” in recent years. Pls.’ MSJ Opp’n at 17- 19. These 
inquiries do not create a genuine issue of material fact, however, because plaintiffs point to no 
authority indicating that under the policy- or-practice test set out by the D.C. Circuit, an agency 
must take all available measures to reduce delays. Instead, the question is whether the agency is 
exercising “due diligence” to reduce its backlog, Wash. Lawyers’ Comm., 145 F.4th at 69 (quoting 
Jud. Watch, 895 F.3d at 783); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C)(i), and defendants’ declarations 
indicate CBP and DHS are doing so in the face of a marked uptick in recent years of FOIA requests. 

21 
 
Plaintiffs’ suggestion that defendant agencies must explain each and every decision about their 
FOIA program would invite micromanaging of agencies and go beyond FOIA’s statutory text, 
which provides for extra time and judicial supervision of requests so long as the agency is diligent 
in completing those requests. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C)(i); see also Democracy Forward, 354 
F. Supp. 3d at 62 (rejecting FOIA plaintiffs’ arguments about agency not acting with “due 
diligence” to reduce FOIA backlog because agency had “requested less total funding from 
Congress” in a particular year, because “it is not the role of the judiciary to question how executive 
agencies request and allocate resources, absent some compelling evidence of purposeful conduct” 
(emphasis in original)). 
Second, plaintiffs note that two Judges in the Northern District of California , in two 
separate cases, allowed similar claims to proceed: one denied these same two defendants ’ motion 
to dismiss similar claims in 2015, and the other granted summary judgment to a class of plaintiffs 
alleging a policy or practice of delay ed FOIA processing by DHS and other components: 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement and USCIS. See Pls.’ MSJ Opp’n at 16-17 (citing Brown 
v. CBP, 132 F. Supp. 3d 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2015)); id. at 23-24 (citing Nightingale v. USCIS, 507 F. 
Supp. 3d 1193 (N.D. Cal. 2020)). Neither of these cases is either binding or persuasive here. Each 
decision applied the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of FOIA, which has articulated a different 
standard for policy- and-practice claims focused on “the effect on the public of disclosure and 
nondisclosure.” See Nightingale, 507 F. Supp. 3d at 1207- 08 (citing Long v. IRS, 693 F.2d 907, 
909 (9th Cir. 1982)); Brown, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 1173) (citing same). In contrast, the D.C. Circuit’s 
standard, binding on this Court, focuses on whether an agency is exercising “due diligence” in 
responding to an extraordinary influx of requests . Wash. Lawyers’ Comm., 145 F.4th at 69. In 
addition to being decided under a different standard, Brown involved a motion to dismiss, Brown, 

22 
 
132 F. Supp. 3d at 1172, and the bar for stating a plausible claim of an impermissible FOIA policy 
or practice is lower than that to survive summary judgment. These cases therefore do nothing to 
counsel against summary judgment in favor of defendants on the record in this case. 
Third, plaintiffs argue that defendants have not shown that “an annual increase in FOIA 
requests—as opposed to inadequate funding, mismanagement, inadequate training, insufficient 
stop-gap measures, or a policy of treating FOIA’s response timeframes as not mandatory, among 
other things—is the primary cause of the ever -increasing backlog,” pointing in particular to the 
fact that, according to publicly available DHS FOIA reports “the backlog jumped by over 400%” 
between FY 2023 and FY 2024 “(from 21,444 to 110,271) ,” when FOIA requests between FY 
2023 and FY 2024 “rose by only 23.56% (144,474 to 178,517) ,” Pls.’ SGI ¶ 2 (citing DHS 2024 
Report at 33), with the implication being that a slowdown in processing, rather than a (relatively) 
modest increase in requests led to an exploding backlog. This misapprehends the nature of a FOIA 
backlog: as requests come in and are not timely processed, they add cumulatively to the backlog 
list. Thus, some of the 144,474 requests made in FY 2023 may well be part of the backlog listed 
for FY2024. The same report cited by plaintiffs —indeed, the same chart in that report —reveals 
that CBP processed 148,760 requests in FY 2024, compared to only 89,727 in FY 2023, a more 
than 65% increase. DHS 2024 Report at 33. If anything, this backs up defendants’ contention that 
CBP is exercising due diligence to manage its backlog of cases, despite ever -increasing requests 
pushing that figure skyward. 
Certainly, the fact that individuals facing immigration proceedings can only obtain their 
own CBP records through the protracted FOIA process is concerning, but the lack of typical civil 
discovery in removal or other immigration proceedings is a problem for Congress, not this Court, 
to resolve. In any event , “the identity of the requesting party has no bearing on the merits of his 

23 
 
or her FOIA request,” DOJ v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 771 (1989), 
so the compelling reasons why plaintiffs seek these records does not affect the analysis of whether 
defendants have an unlawful policy or practice. 
C. Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled to Discovery Prior to Summary Judgment 
In concert with their disputes of various facts asserted by defendants, plaintiffs seek 
discovery to support their opposition to defendants’ summary judgment motion, pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). The D.C. Circuit has set out the standard for ruling on Rule 
56(d) discovery requests, explaining that the “movant must submit an affidavit which states with 
sufficient particularity why additional discovery is necessary,” and satisfies three criteria: (1) “it 
must outline the particular facts the non-movant intends to discover and describe why those facts 
are necessary to the litigation”; (2) “it must explain why the non- movant could not produce the 
facts in opposition to the motion for summary judgment”; and (3) “it must show the information 
is in fact discoverable.” United States ex rel. Folliard v. Gov’t Acquisitions, Inc., 764 F.3d 19, 26 
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Convertino v. DOJ , 684 F.3d 93, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (cleaned up)). 
Plaintiffs fail to meet this standard to state with sufficient particularity why additional discovery 
is warranted on the record in this case. 
In the context of FOIA, the D.C. Circuit has made clear that discovery should be ordered 
“only ‘where there is evidence— either at the affidavit stage or (in rarer cases) before—that the 
agency acted in bad faith in conducting the search.’” Shapiro v. DOJ, 40 F.4th 609, 615 (D.C. Cir. 
2022) (quoting In re Clinton, 973 F.3d 106, 113 (D.C. Cir. 2020)) . Even where an agency ’s 
declarations are inadequate to support summary judgment in FOIA litigation, courts have been 
instructed “that the appropriate remedy is usually to allow the agency to ‘submit further affidavits’ 
rather than to order discovery.” Id. Plaintiffs argue that “[b]ecause this is a policy or practice case 

24 
 
(not an individual FOIA case), the general rule — that discovery is limited in FOIA cases —does 
not apply, and the Court should permit the parties to utilize the ordinary rules for discovery in civil 
cases.” Pls.’ Disc. Mem. at 4. The D.C. Circuit has not yet “decide[d] whether the FOIA-specific 
discovery standard applies to policy or practice claims in the same way it does to other FOIA 
cases.” See Wash. Lawyers Comm., 145 F.4th at 73 (affirming this Court’s denial of discovery in 
FOIA policy-or-practice case while declining to announce the applicable standard). This Court is 
bound by the D.C. Circuit’s holdings about the appropriateness of discovery in FOIA cases and 
declines to carve out an exception to that precedent on the record in this case. 
Under the standard for FOIA discovery, plaintiffs have not shown that discovery is 
warranted here, for the same reason that plaintiffs have not rebutted the presumption of good faith 
afforded to defendants’ declarations. Plaintiffs cite two cases in which discovery was permitted in 
non-policy-or-practice FOIA cases involving challenges to an agency’s processing of the plaintiffs’ 
FOIA requests, but neither is applicable here. In Pulliam v. E PA , 292 F. Supp. 3d 255, 260-61 
(D.D.C. 2018) , discovery was allowed where a government declarant submitted two sworn 
declarations that directly contradicted each other as to how a search was conducted. In Citizens 
for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 828 F. Supp. 2d 325, 333-34 (D.D.C. 
2011), the government first stated that the agency had destroyed potentially responsive re cords 
after the filing of a FOIA request for those records, then reversed course and produced some but 
not all of the records supposedly destroyed. No such s et of directly contradictory agency 
statements is present here. Indeed, plaintiffs point to no conflicting declarations or statements by 
the government, but rather simply object that plaintiffs cannot independently test the veracity of 
defendants’ declarations. Under the FOIA discovery standard, these seemingly blanket objections 
are not enough. See Bartko v. DOJ , 898 F.3d 51, 74 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (according agency’ s 

25 
 
declarations “a presumption of good faith, which cannot be rebutted by purely speculative claims 
about the existence and discoverability of other documents”) (internal quotation and citation 
omitted); SafeCard Servs., 926 F.2d at 1200. 
In sum , defendants’ declarations are sufficiently detailed to show that CBP’s FOIA 
workload has increased substantially in recent years, that CBP and DHS have diligently worked to 
improve processing times, and that when CBP has failed to comply with FOIA’s statutory 
guidelines for timing, these delays have been justified by “ exceptional circumstances” going 
beyond the agency’s “ordinary workload” and are therefore not part of a policy or practice of FOIA 
noncompliance. 
* * * 
 D efendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs’ policy and practice claim, and 
therefore the question whether plaintiffs are entitled to class certification need not be reached. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 93, is 
GRANTED; plaintiffs’ Motion for Discovery Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), 
ECF No. 102, is DENIED; and plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, ECF No. 88, is DENIED 
AS MOOT . An order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be entered 
contemporaneously. 
Date: May 18, 2026 
__________________________ 
BERYL A. HOWELL 
United States District Judge 
 

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