govinfo:USCOURTS-alnd-2_26-cv-00194-1

1 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 
SOUTHERN DIVISION 
 
GIORGI TOSHKHUA, 
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
BARRY SMITH, et al., 
 
Respondents. 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
 
 
 
 
 

 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
Giorgi Toshkhua filed a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 after the 
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement took him into custody in 
Tennessee and detained him in Alabama. (Doc. 1). On March 16, 2026, the Court 
ordered the respondents to provide Mr. Toshkhua with an individualized custody 
determination and instructed DHS to confirm compliance with the order within 48 
hours of its entry. (Doc. 20). On March 18, 2026, the respondents notified the Court 
that Mr. Toshkhua participated in a bond hearing earlier that day via video 
conference with an immigration judge. (Doc. 21, p. 1). 
Mr. Toshkhua argues that his bond hearing was insufficient, and he asks the 
Court to order the respondents to immediately release him from detention, or 
alternatively, to order the respondents to provide him a new bond hearing. (Doc. 
24). The respondents oppose Mr. Toshkhua’s request. (Doc. 28). 
FILED
 
 2026 May-18 PM 02:23
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

2 
This opinion addresses the parties’ motions. First, the Court describes the 
procedural standards for Mr. Toshkhua’s challenge to his bond hearing. Next, the 
Court summarizes the facts and procedural posture of this matter. The Court then 
describes the legal standards that govern Mr. Toshkhua’s challenge to his bond 
hearing and applies those standards to the record in this case. 
I. 
Section 2241 enables district courts to grant writs of habeas corpus if a 
petitioner demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the United States 
Constitution or laws. § 2241(a), (c). Habeas relief “is at its core a remedy for 
unlawful executive detention[;]” district courts have the authority to grant habeas 
relief in immigration-related cases. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 
U.S. 103, 119 (2020) (brackets added) (quoting Munaf v. Green, 553 U.S. 674, 693 
(2008)); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. § 678, 687–88 (2001). 
In reviewing the sufficiency of Mr. Toshkhua’s bond hearing, the scope of the 
Court’s authority is limited. The Court may consider only “whether [the hearing] 
satisfied due process or otherwise suffered some defect that rendered [the hearing] 
noncompliant with this Court’s Order.” Trejo v. Bullock, No. 3:26-CV-47, 2026 WL 
598391, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 3, 2026); see Perez v. Paulk, No. 7:26-CV-00029-
WLS-ALS, 2026 WL 961948, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 6, 2026) (finding that district 
courts lack jurisdiction to review immigration judges’ decisions but may exercise 

3 
jurisdiction to “review due process challenges” or “to enforce compliance with their 
lawful orders through civil contempt.”) (quotation omitted). 
II. 
 Mr. Toshkhua is a citizen of the country of Georgia. He fled Georgia and 
entered the United States on foot without inspection on September 3, 2022, to seek 
asylum. (Doc. 1, p. 2, ¶ 1; Doc. 1, p. 6, ¶ 17; Doc. 14-1, p. 1).1 That day, United 
States Border Patrol in Calexico, California detained Mr. Toshkhua, and on 
September 8, 2022, he was paroled into the United States. (Doc. 13-2, pp. 2–3; Doc. 
14-1, p. 1). On February 4, 2026, Mr. Toshkhua was arrested and detained by ICE 
officers. (Doc. 1, p. 2, ¶ 2). Mr. Toshkhua is detained at the Etowah County Jail. 
(Doc. 1, p. 5, ¶ 11). 
Mr. Toshkhua petitioned this Court for habeas relief based on alleged 
violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act, his Fifth Amendment Due 
Process rights, and his Fourth Amendment rights. (Doc. 1, pp. 7–12). Mr. Toshkhua 
asked the Court, among other things, to prohibit the respondents from removing him 
from the United States without a court order, to direct the respondents to show cause 
as to why the Court should not grant his petition, to declare his detention unlawful, 
to order his immediate release, and to enjoin the respondents from re-detaining him 
 
1 The circumstances of Mr. Toshkhua’s entry, parole, and arrest are detailed in this Court’s March 
16, 2026 memorandum opinion. (Doc. 20, pp. 2–6). Accordingly, the Court provides only a brief 
description of these events in this order. 

4 
unlawfully. (Doc. 1, p. 14). 
 In a March 16, 2026 memorandum opinion, this Court found that Mr. 
Toshkhua had been detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and that, consequently, the 
respondents violated § 1226 and Mr. Toshkhua’s right to due process by detaining 
him without a bond hearing. (Doc. 20, p. 13). Accordingly, the Court ordered the 
respondents to provide Mr. Toshkhua a bond hearing in the Northern District of 
Alabama within 48 hours. (Doc. 20, p. 14). 
 On March 18, 2026, an immigration judge in Louisiana held Mr. Toshkhua’s 
bond hearing. (Doc. 21, p. 1). Mr. Toshkhua participated in the hearing remotely 
from the Etowah County Jail. (Doc. 21, p. 1). A Georgian interpreter participated 
in the hearing, and Mr. Toshkhua was represented by an attorney who submitted 
evidence on his behalf. (Doc. 21, p. 1). 
 During the hearing, the immigration judge provided the government and Mr. 
Toshkhua an opportunity to present arguments regarding bond. (See Doc. 28-1).2 
The immigration judge stated that she lacked jurisdiction to provide Mr. Toshkhua 
bond because he was an arriving alien. (Doc. 28-1, 9:50). Still, “in light of [this 
Court’s] directive,” the immigration judge considered whether Mr. Toshkhua should 
 
2 The respondents have provided a recording of Mr. Toshkhua’s bond hearing. (Doc. 28-1). On 
the recording, the immigration judge’s comments are audible. Mr. Toshkhua and the respondents’ 
arguments are not audible. 

5 
receive bond under the Guerra factors. (Doc. 28-1, 10:15).3 The immigration judge 
found that Mr. Toshkhua poses a danger to the community because he drove a 
commercial vehicle without a license. (See Doc. 28-1, 18:30). The immigration 
judge also found that, notwithstanding Mr. Toshkhua’s marriage to a citizen of the 
United States, he poses a flight risk because he has been in the United States for 
fewer than four years, he has not filed for relief based on his marriage, and the relief 
pending before the immigration court was speculative. (Doc. 28-1, 19:05). Thus, 
the immigration judge denied Mr. Toshkhua’s request for a bond. (See Doc. 27-1, 
p. 2). 
The immigration judge memorialized her decision, writing: 
The court lacks jurisdiction due to the respondent being an arriving 
alien[,] see Matter of Oseiwusu 22 I&N Dec 1998, but alternatively, the 
court denies bond due to danger to the community and flight risk. 
Respondent only recently arrived in the United States and “has made 
no claim to lawful status in this country, either now or in the past.” 
Matter of R-A-V-P-, 27 I&N Dec. 803, 805 (BIA 2020). 
 
 
3 In Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37 (BIA 2006) the BIA held that in a bond hearing under 
INA § 236(a), the respondent bears the burden to show that release is warranted, but an 
immigration judge must make an individualized determination based on recognized factors, 
including fixed address and length of residence in the United States; family ties; employment 
history; record of court appearances and compliance; criminal record and any history of violence; 
manner of entry and immigration violations; and other evidence bearing on danger and flight risk. 
The immigration judge may weigh factors differently but must act reasonably and cannot rely on 
arbitrary or clearly erroneous grounds. 

6 
(Doc. 27-1, p. 2).4 The immigration judge informed Mr. Toshkhua that he had the 
right to appeal the bond decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals. (Doc. 28-1, 
20:00). 
III. 
 Mr. Toshkhua argues that his March 18 bond hearing was insufficient because 
it occurred in an improper venue and because the immigration judge made “legal 
and factual errors.” 
 The Court lacks jurisdiction to review the immigration judge’s “legal and 
factual” findings. Section 1226(e) “precludes an alien from ‘challenging [in court] 
a discretionary judgment by the Attorney General or a decision that the Attorney 
General has made regarding his detention or release.’” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 
U.S. 281, 295 (2018) (quoting Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 516 (2003)); see 8 
U.S.C. § 1226(e) (“The Attorney General’s discretionary judgment regarding the 
application of this section shall not be subject to review. No court may set aside any 
action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the detention 
or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole.”). As 
discussed, this Court’s jurisdiction to review the immigration judge’s bond decision 
is limited to determining “whether [the hearing] satisfied due process or otherwise 
 
4 It appears to be undisputed that Mr. Toshkhua has been in the U.S. for nearly four years, has 
applied for and received a work authorization social security card, and applied for asylum in late 
2022. (Doc. 1-1, p. 6; Doc. 13-2, p. 3) 

7 
suffered some defect that rendered it noncompliant with this Court’s Order.” Trejo, 
2026 WL 598391, at *2. 
Mr. Toshkhua has not demonstrated that his bond hearing violated this Court’s 
March 16 order. The Court ordered the respondents to provide Mr. Toshkhua a bond 
hearing in the Northern District of Alabama. (Doc. 20, p. 14). The location for Mr. 
Toshkhua’s bond hearing was meant to ensure that Mr. Toshkhua was not transferred 
outside this district while his habeas petition is pending. The respondents complied 
with the order by arranging for Mr. Toshkhua to participate in his bond hearing 
virtually. (Doc. 21).5 
Mr. Toshkhua has not demonstrated that his bond hearing violated due 
process. “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 
‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). “Due 
process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation 
demands.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 
481 (1972)). “In a fundamentally fair bond hearing, due process has three essential 
 
5 There is no immigration court in the State of Alabama. (Doc. 28, p. 5); see Find an Immigration 
Court and Access Internet-Based Hearings, E XEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/find-immigration-court-and-access-internet-based-hearings 
[https://perma.cc/B6RX-ZDBN] (archived April 20, 2026). Mr. Toshkhua argues that the 
respondents scheduled his bond hearing before a Louisiana Judge to ensure that the Fifth Circuit 
law applied. 
 

8 
elements.” Ghanem v. Warden Essex Cnty. Corr. Facility, No. 21-1908, 2022 WL 
574624, at *2 (3d Cir. Feb. 25, 2022). “An alien: (1) is entitled to factfinding based 
on a record produced before the decisionmaker and disclosed to him or her; (2) must 
be allowed to make arguments on his or her own behalf; and (3) has the right to an 
individualized determination of his [or her] interests.” Ghanem, 2022 WL 574624 
at *2 (quoting Kamara v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 420 F.3d 202, 211 (3d Cir. 2005)). 
Here, the immigration judge considered the record before her, allowed Mr. 
Toshkhua’s attorney to make arguments on his behalf, and made an individualized 
determination concerning Mr. Toshkhua’s request for a bond. Accordingly, Mr. 
Toshkhua’s bond hearing satisfies the minimal requirements of due process. 
For these reasons, the Court denies Mr. Toshkhua’s motion to enforce the 
judgment in this case. 
*** 
The respondents have asked the Court to reconsider the portion of the Court’s 
March 16, 2026 memorandum opinion in which the Court held that Mr. Toshkhua’s 
initial notice to appear was void because the notice contained false information. 
(Doc. 20, p. 14, ¶ 2). Respondents argue, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), that the 
“Court lacks jurisdiction to void or specify the contents of an NTA.” (Doc. 22, pp. 
1, 7–12). Additionally, the respondents state that DHS “has already issued a new 
notice to appear [] on February 20, 2026,” and “the purported incorrect information 

9 
contained in the original NTA before the Court was resolved.” (Doc. 22). On March 
19, 2026, the Court held a telephone conference to discuss the motion. (Doc. 23). 
Consistent with the conversations during the March 19 telephone conference, 
pursuant to Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court grants the 
respondents’ motion. The Court strikes paragraph 2 on page 14 of its previous 
memorandum opinion, (Doc. 20). 
IV. 
 In summary, the Court denies Mr. Toshkhua’s motion to enforce judgment, 
(Doc. 24), and grants the respondents’ motion to reconsider, (Doc. 22). Mr. 
Toshkhua’s motion to expedite, (Doc. 33), is moot. Because the respondents have 
satisfied the requirements of this Court’s March 16, 2026 order, the Court dismisses 
this action. 
The Clerk of Court shall please TERM Docs. 22, 24, and 33. The Clerk of 
Court shall please close the file. 
DONE and ORDERED this May 18, 2026. 
 
 
 _________________________________ 
 MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
 
 

Passage view · GavelSight