govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-2_20-cv-16149-0

Not for Publication 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
 
EVELYN OKPARAEKE, 
 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
NEWARK BOARD OF EDUCATION, and 
KATHY DUKE-JACKSON, Assistant 
Superintendent, Newark Board of 
Education, in her individual and official 
capacities, 
 
Defendants. 
 
 
 
 
Civil Action No. 20-16149 
 
OPINION 
 
 
John Michael Vazquez, U.S.D.J. 
 In this matter, Plaintiff Evelyn Okpar aeke contends that she was subjected to 
discrimination and retaliation because of her gende r, sex, and/or pregnancy as well as a hostile 
work environment. Plaintiff asserts claims against her former employer, Defendant Newark Board 
of Education (“Newark BOE”) and the Assistant Superintendent, Defendant Kathy Duke-Jackson 
(collectively, “Defendants”). Presently befo re the Court is Defenda nts’ motion for summary 
judgment, D.E. 30. The Court reviewed all submissions made in support and in opposition to the 
motion and considered the motion without oral argument pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) and L. 
Civ. R. 78.1(b). 1 For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is 
 
1 The Court refers to Defendants’ brief in support of its moti on for summary judgment as “Def. 
Br.” (D.E. 30-1); Plaintiff’s brief in opposition to the motion for summary judgment as “Plf. Opp.” 
(D.E. 32); and Defendants’ reply brief as “Def. Reply” (D.E. 34). PageID:
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GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 
I. FACTUAL2 AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Background 
In August 2012, Plaintiff was hired by the Newark Board of Education as the Vice Principal 
at the Quitman Street Community School (“Quitma n”). DSUMF ¶ 1; PSUMF ¶ 1. In this role, 
Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor was Erkine Glover, the Principal at Quitman. Id. In 2016, when 
Glover took the position of Assistant Superintendent, Plaintiff replaced Glover as the Principal at 
Quitman. DSUMF ¶ 4; PSUMF ¶ 4. As Principal, Plaintiff was responsible for “running the entire 
school operation, including responsibility for being the instructional leader, for providing coaching 
and instructional support to the administrators and staff, for budget, and for relations with parents 
and the community.” DSUMF ¶ 7; PSUMF ¶ 7. During the 2016-17 and 2017-18 school years, 
Plaintiff continued to be supervised by Glover, and during the 2018-19 school year, Plaintiff was 
supervised by Duke-Jackson, who had replaced Glover as the Assistant Superintendent. DSUMF 
¶¶ 5, 24; PSUMF ¶¶ 5, 24. 
 
2 The background facts are drawn from Defendants ’ Statement of Undis puted Material Facts 
(“DSUMF”), D.E. 27-1; Plaintiff’s Responsive Statement of Material Facts and Supplemental 
Statement of Disputed Material Facts (“PSUMF ”), D.E. 28-1; Defendants’ Certification of 
Counsel (“Adams Cert.”) and supporting exhib its, D.E. 30-2 (“Def. Ex.__”); Plaintiff’s 
Certification of Counsel (“Vasquez Cert.”) and supporting exhibits, D.E. 33-1 (“Plf. Ex.__”), and 
Defendants’ Supplemental Cert ification of Counsel (“Adam s Supp. Cert.”) and supporting 
exhibits, D.E. 34-1 (“Def. Rep. Ex.__”). When citing to exhibits, the pages numbers cited 
correspond with those in the ECF header. 
 
Both parties’ briefs often lack citations to th e factual record and incl ude purported facts that do 
not appear in the DSUMF or the PSUMF. Facts that appear only in the briefs and without proper 
citations to the record will be disregarded by the Court. See Jake Ball Trust v. Durst, No. 12-5225, 
2013 WL 4008802, at *1 n.1 (D.N.J. A ug. 5, 2013) (“Facts stated by the parties in their briefs or 
in their Statements of Material Facts Not in Dispute which were not supported by record citations 
were disregarded by the Court in accordance with L. Civ. R. 56.1(a).”). PageID:
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Duke-Jackson prepared her first written assessment3 of Plaintiff’s performance in January 
2019 (“January Review”). DSUMF ¶ 57; PSUMF ¶ 57. Duke-Jackson then met with Plaintiff on 
February 14, 2019, to discuss the review, for which Plaintiff received an overall rating of 
“effective.” DSUMF ¶ 68; PSUMF ¶ 68; Def. Ex. 5. After discussing the review, Duke-Jackson 
advised Plaintiff that she had heard rumors that Plaintiff was pregnant and asked Plaintiff whether 
this was true. DSUMF ¶ 68; PSUMF ¶ 68. Plaintiff confirmed that she was pregnant and informed 
Duke-Jackson that she had just entered her sec ond trimester and had not yet told many people 
about the pregnancy. Id.; DSUMF ¶ 69; PSUMF ¶ 69. Duke -Jackson agreed to keep this 
information confidential. DSUMF ¶ 68; PSUMF ¶ 68. Duke-Jack son then told Plaintiff that she 
had also heard a rumor that Plaintiff was not planning to return to work after taking leave. DSUMF 
¶ 70; PSUMF ¶ 70. Plaintiff responded that she did intend to return. Id. They then discussed who 
might cover for Plaintiff while she was on leave. DSUMF ¶ 70; PSUMF ¶ 70. Thereafter, Duke-
Jackson advised Plaintiff of another rumor that she had heard: that Plaintiff was telling colleagues 
that Duke-Jackson was “out to get her.” DSUMF ¶ 73; PSUMF ¶ 68. Plai ntiff denied telling 
colleagues this. Id. 
The following day, Plaintiff reached out to he r union representative to schedule a call to 
discuss her interaction with Duke-Jackson. Plf. E x. 2. Plaintiff also foll owed up with an email 
complaint to her union representative on February 25, 2019, summarizing the interaction. Id. The 
 
3 Duke-Jackson prepared three wr itten assessments of Plaintif f during the 2018-19 school year. 
The same rubric was used for each. See Def. Exs. 5, 7, 8. The rubric rates four competency areas: 
(1) management and coaching of in structional staff; (2) curriculum , assessment, and instruction; 
(3) student and family support; and (4) transfor mational leadership. W ithin these competency 
areas, the observer evaluates anywhere from 4-7 sub-categories of performance, providing a rating 
of “ineffective,” “partially effec tive,” “effective,” or “highly eff ective.” As a result, there are 23 
individual ratings as well as an “overall” rating. PageID:
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following month, Duke-Jackson prepared her second written assessment of Plaintiff’s 
performance—the Mid-Year Review—which rated Plaintiff’s performance as “ineffective” 
overall. DSUMF ¶¶ 77-78; Def. Ex. 7. Duke-Jackson presented the Mid-Year Review to Plaintiff 
on April 1, 2019. DSUMF ¶ 78. On April 12, 2019, Duke-Jackson prepared and presented Plaintiff 
with her Annual Review, which rated Plaintiff’s performance as “partial ly effective” overall. 
DSUMF ¶ 87; Def. Ex. 8. Likewi se, Superintendent Shakira Harr ington observed Plaintiff on 
April 11, 2019, and Duke-Jackson presented the written assessment from this observation to 
Plaintiff on April 12, 2019, which also rated Plaintiff as “partially effective” overall (“Harrington 
Review”).
4 DSUMF ¶ 97; Def. Ex. 9. 
Plaintiff submitted numerous formal rebuttals to the “Educator Effectiveness Team” 
regarding the criticism that she received in her reviews. See Def. Ex. 10. The first was submitted 
on April 15, 2019, and it challenged the Mid-Year Re view conference, arguing that based on the 
comments received in the Mid-Year Review, an overall rating of “effective” was warranted. See 
Def. Ex. 10 at 168-175. The next was submitte d on May 3, 2019, and it ch allenged the April 5, 
2019 observation and April 11, 2019 post-conference, again asserting that an overall rating of 
“effective” was warranted for the observation that had been held on April 5, 2019. Id. at 161-167.5 
On May 6, 2019, Plaintiff submitted multiple rebuttals. Def. Ex. 10 at 143-160. The first contested 
the April 11, 2019 observation held by Harrington and the April 12, 2019 post-conference held by 
 
4 The parties agree that Harring ton observed Plaintiff’s perfor mance on April 11, 2019, and that 
Duke-Jackson presented a written assessment of this evaluation to Plaintiff on April 12, 2019; 
however, they dispute whether Harrington was an independent evaluator and whether it was 
Harington who wrote the assessment, rather than Duke-Jackson. DSUMF ¶ 97; PSUMF ¶ 98. 
 
5 The record does not include a written assessment from the April 5, 2019 observation. PageID:
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Duke-Jackson, arguing that a rating of “effective” was warranted.6 See id. at 158-160. The second 
contested the April 12, 2019 Annual Review, again arguing that the findings warranted an overall 
rating of “effective.” Id. at 143-157. 
Around May 2, 2019, Plaintiff received approval for her request to take FMLA/maternity 
leave from June 27, 2019 through October 25, 2019. DSUMF ¶ 110; PSUMF ¶ 111; Def. Ex. 11. 
Less than two weeks later, the Newark BOE informed Plaintiff that her contract as principal would 
not be renewed for the 2019-20 school year and th at her employment would be terminated as of 
June 20, 2019. DSUMF ¶ 111; PSUMF ¶ 112. A few days later, Plainti ff requested that the 
Newark BOE provide her with a “Statement of Reasons for Non-Renewal.” Plf. Opp. at 7; see Plf. 
Ex. 3, 4. The Newark BOE responded with a letter dated May 21, 2019, which stated that the basis 
for non-renewal was “economy and/or organization re structuring.” Plf. E x. 4. Plaintiff then 
requested a Donaldson Hearing, which was scheduled for June 26, 2019, and Plaintiff received an 
updated letter, dated June 7, 2019, wh ich also provided that the ba sis for Plaintiff’s non-renewal 
was “economy and/or organization restructuring.” Plf. Ex. 3. Notwithstanding these letters, 
Defendants maintain that “Plaintiff’s contr act was not renewed based on the performance 
evaluations which reflected that Plaintiff was not doing her job effectively.” DSUMF ¶ 112. 
B. Procedural Background 
Plaintiff filed suit on November 13, 2020, asserting claims for (1) discrimination based on 
gender, sex, and/or pregnancy under Title VII and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination 
(“NJLAD”) (Count One and Count Four, respectiv ely); (2) retaliation under Title VII (Count 
 
6 The Harrington Review appears to have been a pa rtial assessment, as it only provides feedback 
on one of the twenty-three compet ency categories along with an overall rating of “partially 
effective,” Def. Ex. 9, and Plaintif f’s rebuttal is likewise confined to these areas. Def. Ex. 10 at 
158-60. PageID:
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Two); (3) hostile work environm ent under Title VII (Count Three) ; and (4) discrimination based 
on pregnancy under the New Jersey Fami ly Leave Act (“NJFLA”) (Count Five). 7 Defendants 
subsequently sought leave to file a motion fo r summary judgment, D.E. 27, which the Court 
granted, D.E. 29. 
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
A moving party is entitled to summary judgment where “the movant shows that there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material when it “might affect the outco me of the suit under the 
governing law” and is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict 
for the non-moving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Disputes 
over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not prec lude granting a motion for summary judgment. 
Id. “In considering a motion for summary judgment , a district court may not make credibility 
determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the non-moving party’s 
evidence ‘is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.’” Marino v. 
Indus. Crating Co. , 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255)). A 
court’s role in deciding a motion for summary judgment is not to evaluate the evidence and decide 
the truth of the matter but rather “to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 
477 U.S. at 249. 
 
7 A plaintiff may seek recovery under the NJFLA pursuant to either the entitlement theory or the 
retaliation theory. Wolpert v. Abbott Lab'ys, 817 F. Supp. 2d 424, 437-38 (D.N.J. 2011). Based 
on the facts alleged, the Court construes C ount Five as a retaliation claim. See Compl. ¶ 70 
(claiming retaliation “based solely on her sex/ gender and/or being pregnant and requesting leave 
under FMLA”); see also Parker v. Hanhemann Univ. Hosp. , 234 F. Supp. 2d 478, 487 (D.N.J. 
2002) (acknowledging that claims brought under the FMLA (which mirrors the requirements of 
the NJFLA) may be brought under the retaliation theory, which is also known as the discrimination 
theory.). PageID:
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A party moving for summary judg ment has the initial burden of showing the basis for its 
motion and must demonstrate that there is an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex 
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). After the moving party adequately supports its motion, 
the burden shifts to the nonmovi ng party to “go beyond the pleadin gs and by her own affidavits, 
or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324 (internal quotation marks omitted). To 
withstand a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must identify 
specific facts and affirma tive evidence that contradict the moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 
250. “[I]f the non-movant’s evidence is merely ‘colorable’ or is ‘not significantly probative,’ the 
court may grant summary judgment.” Messa v. Omaha Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. , 122 F. Supp. 2d 
523, 528 (D.N.J. 2000) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50)). 
Ultimately, there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact” if a party “fails to make a 
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case.” Celotex 
Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. “If reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence,” 
however, summary judgment is not appropriate. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51. PageID:
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III. ANALYSIS8 
A. Discrimination Claims (Counts One and Four) 
Plaintiff asserts gender, sex, a nd/or pregnancy discrimination claims under Title VII and 
the NJLAD. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Ac t prohibits discrimination on the basis of an 
“individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. The Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act, a 1978 amendment to Title VII, provides in relevant part as follows: 
The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are 
not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, 
or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, 
childbirth, or related medical condi tions shall be tr eated the same 
for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so 
affected but similar in their ability or inability to work[.] 
42. U.S.C. § 2000e(k). Likewise, the NJLAD makes it illegal 
[f]or an employer, because of the race, creed, color, national origin, 
ancestry, age . . . , pregnancy or breastfeeding, sex, . . . , disability . 
. . of any individual . . . to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to 
 
8 Defendants move, without opposition, to dismiss “[t]he claims asserted against Duke-Jackson 
individually under Title VII.” Def. Br. at 4 n.1. Because “Congress did not intend to hold 
individual employees liable under Title VII,” Counts One, Two, and Three are dismissed insofar 
as they assert claims against Defendant Duke-Jackson—in her individual or official capacity— for 
violations of Title VII. Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1078 (3d Cir. 
1996); see also Gretzula v. Camden Cnty. Tech. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 965 F. Supp. 2d 478, 486 (D.N.J. 
2013) (“Title VII provides for liability against em ployers, not supervisors,” therefore, “[n]aming 
a supervisor as a defendant in hi s official capacity is redundant espe cially when, as in this case, 
the employer is named as a [d]efendant.”). 
 
Individual liability also does not exist under the NJFLA, and only exists under the NJLAD under 
an aiding and abetting theory of liability. See Fisher v. Schott, No. 13-5549, 2014 WL 6474216, 
at *6 (D.N.J. Nov. 19, 2014) (finding that “indivi dual liability does not exist as a matter of law 
under the NJFLA” in light of “the more lim ited definition of ‘employer’ under the NJFLA”); 
Varughese v. Robert Wood Johnson Med. Sch. , No. 16-2828, 2017 WL 4270523, at *12 (D.N.J. 
Sept. 26, 2017) (quoting Cicchetti v. Morris Cnty. Sheriff's Office , 194 N.J. 563, 593 (2008)) 
(“[I]ndividual liability under the NJLAD can only arise through the ‘aiding and abetting’ 
mechanism.”). But Defendants have not moved in this regard, and the Court declines to do so sua 
sponte. PageID:
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discharge or require to retire . . . from employment such individual 
or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in 
terms, conditions or privileges of employment[.] 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(a). 
 The burdens of proof and production for disc rimination claims arising under Title VII and 
the NJLAD are the same. Martinez v. Nat’l Broad. Co. , 877 F. Supp. 219, 227 (D.N.J. 1994). 
Where a plaintiff does not present direct evidence of discrimination, courts apply the three-step, 
burden-shifting standard set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
“Under this burden-shifti ng framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination.” Palatnik v. Home Depot, Inc., No. 04-1229, 2006 WL 680981, at *8 (D.N.J. Mar. 
10, 2006) (internal citations omitted). If a pl aintiff puts forth a prima facie case, there is a 
rebuttable presumption of unlawful discrimination. Id. To rebut this pres umption at the second 
step, a defendant must produce evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its decision. 
Id. At the third step, a plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the employer’s 
articulated reason was not the real reason for the employment action but rather was a mere pretext 
for discrimination. Id. These standards are discussed in more detail below. 
1. First Step - Prima Facie Case 
To establish a prima facie discrimination claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she (1) is 
a member of a protected class; (2) was qualified for and performing the essential functions of the 
job; (3) suffered termination or an adverse em ployment action; and (4) the adverse employment 
action gives rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Tourtellotte v. Eli Lilly & Co., 636 F. 
App’x 831, 842 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted). The burden of establishing a prima 
facie case is “not onerous.” Anderson v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp. , 621 F.3d 261, 270-71 (3d Cir. 
2010) (quoting Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)). Here, Plaintiff PageID:
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argues, and Defendants concede, that Plaintiff establishes a prima facie claim for ge nder, sex, 
and/or pregnancy discrimination under Title VII and the NJLAD. Plf. Opp. at 6-10; see also Def. 
Br. at 1, 4-29 (arguing only that Plaintiff cannot meet her pretext burden); Def. Reply at 1-8 (same). 
Thus, the burden of production shifts to De fendants to articulat e some legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 
at 802. 
2. Second Step - Non-Discriminatory Reason for the Adverse Employment Action 
An employer can satisfy its burden of production at the second step of the McDonnell 
Douglas framework “by introducing evidence which, if taken as true, would permit the conclusion 
that there was a non-discriminatory reason for the unfavorable employment decision.” Martinez, 
877 F. Supp. at 228. This burde n is “relatively light.’” Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d 
Cir. 1994). Moreover, an employer “need not prove that its tendered reason actually motivated its 
behavior.” Martinez, 877 F. Supp. at 228 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802); see also 
DiMare v. Metlife Ins. Co. , No. 07-4268, 2008 WL 5109556, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 2, 2008) 
(explaining that an employer merely needs to articulate, not prove, a non-discriminatory motive at 
the second step). 
Defendants maintains that Plaintiff’s contra ct was not renewed because Duke-Jackson 
determined that “Plaintiff’s job performance was less than effective. ” Def. Br. at 5. In support, 
Defendants point to the drop in Plaintiff’s overall rating on perfo rmance evaluations after she 
became Principal at Quitman. Def. Br. at 14-15. Defendants note that while Plaintiff received 
overall ratings of “highly effective” from Glover in her role as Vi ce Principal, once Plaintiff was 
promoted to Principal, Glover rated her as “effective” during the 2016-17 and 2017-18 school PageID:
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years.9 Id. Thereafter, Plaintiff received overall rati ngs of “effective,” “partially effective,” and 
“ineffective” from Duke-Jackson during the 2018-19 school year. Id. at 15-16. Defendants also 
point to specific performance-related issues that are identified in Duke-J ackson’s evaluations of 
Plaintiff, both prior to and after learning that Plaintiff was pregnant, including Plaintiff’s practice 
of delegating responsibilities, concerns regarding her leadership, and the passive role that Plaintiff 
took when it came to addre ssing parent complaints. See, e.g., Def. Br. at 15-16 (citing Ex. 5). 
With this evidence, Defendants meet their minimal burden of production. 
In Defendants’ reply, Defe ndants rely on another non- discriminatory reason for 
termination: economy and/or or ganization restructuring, which was the reason articulated in 
Defendants’ May 21, 2019, and June 7, 2019, letters to Plaintiff. Def. Re ply at 2-4 (citing Plf. 
Ex. 3); Plf. Ex. 4. “[C]ourts ordinarily decline to consider arguments raised for the first time in a 
reply brief, on the grounds that consideration of the same would prejudice the non-moving party.” 
In re Blackrock Mt. Funds Advisory Fee Litig., 327 F. Supp. 3d 690, 736 n.42 (D.N.J. 2018). Here, 
however, this argument was raised by Plaintiff (alb eit, in the context of arguing that the reasons 
proffered by Defendants are inconsistent and thus pretextual), therefore, the Court’s ordinary 
concern of prejudice does not apply.10 See Plf. Opp. at 8-10. Defendants then embraced Plaintiff’s 
 
9 According to Defendants, Glover intended to provide Plaintiff with an overall rating of “partially 
effective” on her 2016-17 Mid-Year Review. DSUMF ¶ 14. Plaintiff maintains that while Glover 
indicated that she might receive a “partially effective rating” on that review, once Plaintiff 
provided Glover with additional documentation, her performance was “effective” (in accordance 
with the protocols permitted by the Newark BOE) as reflected in the review. PSUMF ¶ 14. 
 
10 Plaintiff also relies on this proffered reason to argue that summary judgment should be denied 
because Defendants’ performance-based r eason for terminati on differs from the 
economy/restructuring-based reason, and thus creates a dispute of material fact as to the basis for 
non-renewal. Plf. Opp. at 5. But Defendants may proffer multiple nondiscriminatory reasons for 
termination. And where Defendants proffer sufficient evidence to satisfy their burden as to each 
nondiscriminatory reason for termination, the burden will shift back to Plai ntiff to demonstrate 
that each proffered reason is pretextual. See Kautz v. Met-Pro Corp., 412 F.3d 463, 476 (3d Cir. PageID:
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argument in their reply, asserting that Plaintiff fails to satisfy her burden of demonstrating that this 
basis for termination was pretextual. Def. Reply at 2-4 (citing Plf. Ex. 3). This additional evidence 
also supports Defendants burden of production. 
3. Third Step - Proffered Reason is Pretextual 
At the third step, a plaintiff “may defeat summary judgment by pointing ‘to some evidence, 
direct or circumstantial, from which a factfind er could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the 
employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason 
was more likely than not a moti vating or determinative cause of the employer’s action.’” Diaz, 
2013 WL 85262, at *6 (quoting Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764). “To discredit the employer’s proffered 
reason, [], the plaintiff cannot s imply show that the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken, 
since the factual dispute at issue is whether discriminatory animus moti vated the employer, not 
whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent.” Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765 (citations 
omitted). Instead, a plaintiff must proffer suffic ient evidence to “demonstrate such weaknesses, 
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered 
legitimate reasons for its acti on that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find [each reason] 
unworthy of credence, and hence infer that th e employer did not act for [the asserted] non-
discriminatory reasons.” Id. (emphasis in original) (interna l quotation marks and citations 
omitted). If the plaintiff does so, “she need not present additional evidence of discrimination 
beyond her prima facie case to survive summary judgment.” Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 
427 (3d Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). Rather, “the factfinder may infer from the combination of 
 
2005) (“[T]he plaintiff must demonstrate that each of the employers proffered nondiscriminatory 
reasons are pretextual,” which “can be done by s howing that some of the employers’ proffered 
reasons are a pretext in such a way that the employer’s credibility is seriously undermined, 
therefore throwing all the proffered reasons into doubt.” (internal citations omitted)). PageID:
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the prima facie case, and its own rejection of the empl oyer’s proffered reason, that the employer 
engaged in the adverse employment action for an invidious reason.” Id. (citing Fuentes, 32 F.3d 
at 764). 
According to Plaintiff, the inconsistencie s between Defendants’ proffered reasons for 
termination—initially, economy a nd/or restructuring reasons and later performance-based 
reasons—are such that a reason able factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence 
and infer that they were a pretext. Plf. Opp. at 2, 9. Plaintiff also attacks each proffered reason on 
its own, arguing that both the economy/restructuring reason and the performance-based reason are 
undermined by the record. Plf. Opp. at 9-13. The Court first addresses the latter arguments, before 
considering the inconsistencies between the proffered reasons. 
As to the economy/restructuring reason, Plaint iff contends that because the Newark BOE 
hired a male replacement to fill Plaintiff’s precise role, and paid the replacement a higher salary 
than Plaintiff, a reasonable factfinder could dete rmine that this proffere d reason was pretextual. 
Plf. Opp. at 10. Plaintiff offers no support for the assertion that her replacement was paid a higher 
salary. See L. Civ. R. 56.1(a). Nevertheless, a reasonable factfinder could find that claiming that 
Plaintiff was terminated for economic and/or restructuring reasons, and subsequently hiring a male 
replacement to fill the same role that Plaintiff held—without any indication of restructuring roles 
within the school and/or the economic benefits of doing so—is inconsiste nt, and thus creates a 
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the pro ffered reason was pretextual. 11 And this 
 
11 Cf. Waldron v. SL Indus., Inc. , 56 F.3d 491, 497 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that a jury could 
reasonably question whether the “reorganization” that ostensibly precipitated the plaintiff’s 
termination was in fact a wa y of removing the pl aintiff for a younger re placement where the 
evidence demonstrated that the defendant split the plaintiff’s job into two roles, fired the plaintiff, 
offered one-half of his former job to the younger employee while the other half remained 
unadvertised, and then recombined the jobs and placed the younger employee in the recombined 
position). PageID:
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purported basis for termination is further undermined by Defendants’ inconsistent positions.12 
Next, the Court turns to Plaintiff’s challe nges to Defendants’ performance-based reason 
for termination.13 In arguing that a reasonable factfinder could find that Defendants’ performance 
reviews were pretextual, Plaintif f points to the letters of suppor t from parents, students, and 
colleagues, which describe Plai ntiff as “an overall excellent administrator,” “responsive to 
parents,” “caring and understanding,” and “always willing to go the extra mile for her students and 
school.” Plf. Opp. at 12 (citing Plf. Ex. 1). The Third Circuit has held that an employee’s assertion 
of his or her own good performance is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment where 
the employer has produced perform ance reviews or documentary ev idence of insubordination or 
poor performance. Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins , 45 F.3d 724, 731 (3d Cir. 1995) (citation 
omitted). The same is true for le tters of support from the community. See Adams v. Borough of 
Ridley Park, No. 98-5530, 2000 WL 1781955, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 2000) (explaining that while 
the community’s view on the plaintiff “might arguably shed light on whether the [defendant] was 
wrong or mistaken in not reappointing [the plaintiff], it does not shed light on the question of the 
 
 
12 Defendants first embrace this basis for termination to argue that Plaintiff fails to establish that 
this basis for termination is pretextual. Def. Reply at 2-3. But Defendants then disclaim this basis 
for termination one page later, ar guing that the letters that Plaint iff received inadvertently stated 
that the basis for termin ation was “economy and/or organizati on restructuring,” when the actual 
basis for termination was due to performance. Def. Reply at 4 n.4. 
 
13 Defendants argue at length that Plaintiff ca nnot rely on her past positive performance reviews 
from Glover and Duke-Jackson to show that the more recent performance reviews were pretextual. 
See Def. Opp. at 10-11 (citing Kautz, 412 F.3d at 474; Ezold, 938 F.2d at 528; Healy v. New York 
Life Ins. Co., 860 F.2d 1209, 1211 (3d Cir. 1988). The Cour t agrees that “prior good evaluations 
alone cannot establish that later unsatisfactory evaluations are pretextual” because “[t]o hold 
otherwise would be to hold that things never change[.]” Billet v. CIGNA Corp. , 940 F.2d 812, 
826-27 (3d Cir. 1991) (citations omitted), overruled in part on other grounds, St. Mary’s Honor 
Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1993). Bu t here, Plaintiff does not rely on such reviews to 
argue pretext. PageID:
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[defendant’s] motivation.”). This is because “[i]t is the defendants’ view of [the plaintiff’s] 
performance which is at issue in this case,” t hus, the plaintiff must introduce evidence that 
contradicts or undermines the defendan t’s articulated performance concerns. Id. (emphasis in 
original) (citing Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765). As such, the Court does not consider the letters of 
support. 
Plaintiff also contends that Duke-Jackson’s performance reviews are “false or contrived.” 
Plf. Opp. at 10-13. To recap, Duke-Jackson comp leted three written asse ssments for Plaintiff 
during the 2018-19 school year. 14 Def. Exs. 5, 7, 8. The first was the January Review, which 
reflected that Plaintiff’s perf ormance was “effective” in twenty out of the twenty-three 
categories,15 and “partially effective” in three categ ories, resulting in an overall rating of 
“effective.” Def. Ex. 5. The next was the Mid-Year Review, which was completed in March 2019 
(one month after Plaintiff’s interaction with Duke-Jackson) and reflected that Plaintiff’s 
performance was not “effective” in any of the twenty-three categories—instead, Plaintiff was rated 
“partially effective” in thirt een out of the twenty-three cate gories and “ineffective” in the 
remaining ten categories (each of which had been rated “effective” on the prior review), resulting 
in an overall rating of “ineffective.”
16 Def. Ex. 7. The final review—the Annual Review—came 
less than two weeks after Plaintiff received her Mid-Year Review. Def. Ex. 8. This review rated 
 
14 The fourth written assessment that Plainti ff received was a partia l assessment based on 
Harrington’s April 11, 2019 observa tion of Plaintiff, which Duke-J ackson presented to Plaintiff 
on April 12, 2019. DSUMF ¶ 97; PSUMF ¶¶ 97-98; Def. Ex. 9; see also supra n.6. The parties 
dispute whether this assessment was completed by Harrington independen tly or in conjunction 
with Duke-Jackson. DSUMF ¶ 97; PSUMF ¶¶ 97-98. 
 
15 See supra n.3 (explaining the categories that are rated on each written assessment). 
 
16 Defendants do not explain why thirteen “partially effective” ratings and ten “ineffective” ratings 
resulted in an overall rating of “ineffective” rather than “partially effective.” PageID:
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Plaintiff “partially effective” in twenty out of the twenty-three categories and “ineffective” in the 
remaining three categories (an improvement from the ten categories that had been rated 
“ineffective” two weeks prior on the Mid-Year Review), resulting in an overall rating of “partially 
effective.” Id. 
In an apparent attempt to explain the disc repancies among these reviews, Defendants 
represent that the Mid-Year Review was intended to “reflect concerns that had been identified 
throughout the year, not just since the January [Review],” DSUMF ¶ 79, and that the Annual 
Review “reflected an assessment of progress made during the entire school year to that time, not 
just for the period since the pr ior review.” DSUMF ¶ 93. Yet, Defendants also acknowledge (1) 
that the Mid-Year Review accounts in part for the same period as the January Review (the start of 
the school year through January, and March, respectively)17 and (2) that the Mid-Year Review and 
Annual Reviews account for virtually the same peri od (the start of the school year through late 
March, and early April, respectivel y). As a result, the drastic fluctuation in ratings among the 
reviews cast doubt on Defendants’ articulated concerns.18 As does the fact that Plaintiff’s higher 
ratings on the Annual Review coincided w ith an increase in negative feedback. 19 Compare Def. 
 
17 DSMUF ¶ 79; see also Def. Ex. 5 (indicating that the January Review accounted for the start of 
the school year through January based on obse rvations such as “[i]nformal and [f]ormal 
observations have taken place throughout the first part of the year,” and feedback regarding 
“teacher activity completion data as of 1/4/2019.”). 
 
18 Indeed, within a two-month spa n, and after learning that Plaintiff was pregnant and planned to 
request leave, the same supervisor who provided twenty “effective,” three “partially effective,” 
and zero “ineffective” ratings to Plaintiff then pr ovided Plaintiff with zero “effective,” thirteen 
“partially effective,” and ten “ineffective” rati ngs while accounting, in part, for the same period. 
And less than two weeks after that, Plaintiff received “partially effective” ratings in twenty out of 
the twenty-three ca tegories on her Annual Review (an im provement in nearly half of the 
categories), for effectively the same time frame that was assessed in the Mid-Year Review. 
 
19 The comments between Plaintif f’s Mid-Year Review, for which she received an “ineffective” 
overall rating, and her Annual Review, for which she received a “partially effective” rating overall, PageID:
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Exs. 7, 8. 
Plaintiff’s written rebuttal st atements also undermine Defendan ts’ articulated concerns. 
See Plf. Opp. 10-12 (citing Ex. 10). Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s rebuttal statements are not 
sufficient to cast doubt on Duke-Jackson’s evaluations because they fail to address most of the 
deficiencies noted and because they express Plaintiff’s own opinion of her performance. Def. Br. 
at 19-26; Def. Reply at 7-8.20 The Court disagrees. Plaintiff’s April 15, 2019 rebuttal statement, 
submitted in response to the Mid-Year Review , and Plaintiff’s May 6, 2019 rebuttal statement, 
submitted in response to the Annual Review, togeth er challenge the factual bases of nearly all 
twenty-three competency ratings included in each review.21 See Def. Ex. 10 at 143-157, 168-175. 
 
are virtually the same, with the primary differen ce being that the Annual Review contains more 
substantive comments, each of which notes additional areas of concern, while providing improved 
ratings in nearly all individual competency areas. Compare Def. Exs. 7, 8. 
 
20 In support, Defendants cherry-pick language from Healy and Kautz, both of which are 
distinguishable. See Kautz, 412 F.3d at 466, 474-76 (affirming, in the RIF context, that the plaintiff 
failed to show that the performance-based reasons articulated in his file were pretextual because 
rather than assert that they had no factual bases and present so me evidence to support this, the 
plaintiff instead provided explanations for his noted lack of pr eparation, asserted that he lacked 
memory of certain criticism, and “ma[de] no effort to show that other criticism was pretextual.”); 
Healy, 860 F.2d at 1219-20 (affirming, in the RIF context, that the articulated business reasons did 
not serve as a pretext because the defendant dem onstrated that competitive pressures required 
consolidating positions, the statistical evidence showed that the RIF did not disproportionately 
impact older workers, and the replacement demonstrated strengths in areas where the plaintiff had 
shown weaknesses, while also noting that the RIF context is unique in that “competent employees 
who in more prosperous times would continue and flourish at a company may nevertheless have 
to be fired.”). 
 
21 Defendants direct the Court to Plaintiff’s rebutta l to the Annual Review to argue that most of 
Duke-Jackson’s comments go undisputed. Def. Br. at 19-23. But as noted above, supra n.19, the 
comments between Plaintiff’s Mid-Year Review and Plaintiff’s Annual Review remained virtually 
the same, and Plaintiff disputed the comments in the Mid-Year Review in her rebuttal to that 
review, and subsequently disput ed any additional comments made in the Annual Review in her 
rebuttal to that review. To the extent that Defend ants suggest that Plaintiff needed to re-raise the 
same contentions made in her Mid-Year rebuttal in her Annual rebuttal, the Court disagrees. PageID:
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By way of example, Plaintiff attacks Duke-Jac kson’s observation that “[m]ost students at the 
various grade levels have not met the mark for pr ogress as per Interim and SRI data,” Def. Ex. 8 
at 132, by contending that this data was not even available at the time of the evaluation. Def. Ex. 
10 at 156. Likewise, Plaintiff challenges Duke-Jackson’s observation that a PD Plan had not been 
completed for a teacher on CAP by pointing to th e date stamps on the “EdReflect” system to 
demonstrate that she had completed the PD plan for that teacher in October and that it was 
reopened in February for adjustments. Id. at 144. And while certain challenges sound more closely 
in opinion, casting doubt on some of the proffered reasons may be sufficient to throw all of the 
proffered reasons into doubt.22 Kautz v. Met-Pro Corp., 412 F.3d 463, 476 (3d Cir. 2005) 
Finally, the Court turns to Plaintiff’s argument that the inconsistencies between 
Defendants’ proffered reasons fo r termination—initially, economy an d/or restructuring reasons, 
and later performance-based reasons —are such that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find 
them unworthy of credence and infer that they we re a pretext. Plf. Opp. at 8-10. The Court 
agrees.23 Plaintiff received her te rmination notice in May 2019 a nd requested a Statement of 
 
22 Defendants also argue that Pl aintiff’s rebuttal st atements are undermined by her deposition 
testimony because such testimony acknowledges that her performance was subpar in certain areas. 
Def. Br. at 24-25 (citing Def. Ex. 13 at 164:25-178:30, 181:9-12, 184: 10-21, 185:3-23). But 
Defendants mischaracterize the cited testimony. There was no acknowledgement of “subpar” 
performance. Instead, when asked about the in crease in parent complaints during the 2018-19 
school year, Plaintiff offered an explanation: a newly available forum for parents to file complaints 
that became effective at the start of the school year. Def. Ex. 13 at 181:9-181:19. And when asked 
about her involvement in handling such complaints, Plaintiff stated that she took an active role in 
any incident that required principal involvement, alongside the school’s Harassment, Intimidation, 
and Bullying (“HIB”) Specialist. Id. at 181:9-184:21. 
 
23 See Laurora, No. 21-2764, 2022 WL 4093738, at *7 (acknow ledging that shifting rationales 
may establish pretext, while finding that the purportedly shifting rationales provided by appellees 
(initially, a lack of leadership sk ills, and later a lack of requisite qualifica tions and experience) 
were not contradictory or inconsistent, and thus were not sufficient to establish pretext). PageID:
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Reasons for Non-Renewal and a Donaldson Hearing thereafter. Plf. Exs. 3, 9. In response to each 
of these requests, Plaintiff received two letters from the Newark BOE—one dated May 21, 2019, 
and one dated June 7, 2019—and each stated that the basis for Plaintiff’s non-renewal was 
“economy and/or organization restructuring.” Plf. Exs. 3, 4. Although Defendants now argue that 
a document from Plaintiff’s D onaldson Hearing file and Dr . Yolanda Mendez’s deposition 
testimony demonstrate that the reason for ter mination was performanc e-based, and that any 
inconsistencies were the result of an internal mistake,24 this is a question of fact for the jury.25 
In sum, because a reasonable juror could find that Defend ants’ proffered reasons for 
termination are unworthy of credence, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied as to 
 
24 Defendants direct the Court to the testimony of Dr. Mendez, the Executive Director of Human 
Resource Services at the Newark BOE, who si gned the May 21, 2019 and J une 7, 2019 letters to 
Plaintiff indicating that the basis for non-renewal was “economy and/or organization 
restructuring.” Def. Reply at 4 n.4 (citing Def. Ex. 16 at 26: 22-31:16, 37:6-38:9, 92:15-98:24). 
According to Dr. Mendez, in preparing for he r deposition, she came across documents that 
indicated that Duke-Jackson listed performance as the reason for nonrenewal in the database; thus, 
Dr. Mendez believes that when an individual at the labor office created the letters that were sent 
to Plaintiff (containing her signatu re), they must have inadverten tly noted the wrong reason for 
non-renewal. Def. Ex. 16 at 79:24-80:6; 94:19 -98:10. This testimony, without more, creates 
nothing more than a dispute of fact. See Marino, 358 F.3d at 247 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 
255)) (“In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility 
determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the nonmoving party's evidence 
‘is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.’”). 
 
25 The parties also dispute, at length, Plaintiff’s initial understanding of the basis for termination—
an argument that the Court need not engage with because “[i]t is the defendants’ view of [the 
plaintiff’s] performance which is at issue in this case.” Adams, 2000 WL 1781955, at *7 (citing 
Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765) (empha sis in original). Nevertheless, the Court cautions both parties 
against mischaracterizing the record in this respect. For example, Defendants point to Plaintiff’s 
May 17, 2019 EEOC complaint to ar gue that Plaintiff failed to mention economic reasons for 
discharge and thus underst ood that this was no t the basis for ter mination; yet the record reflects 
that Plaintiff did not receive Defendants’ letter that provided the economic/restructuring basis for 
termination until at least May 21, 2019. Def. Reply at 5, Pl f. Ex. 4. Likewise, Plaintiff argues 
repeatedly that because “performance was not part of the reason for non-renewal,” the hearing did 
not address Plaintiff’s performance or qualifications, yet Plaintiff herself testified that she spoke 
about her accomplishments at the hearing. Plf. Opp. at 5, 7-8, Def. Ex. 13 at 273:8-274:1. PageID:
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Plaintiff’s discrimination claims. 
B. Retaliation Claim (Counts Two and Five) 
Defendants also seek summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s retaliation claims under Title VII 
and the NJFLA. Under Title VII, it is unlawful “f or an employer to discriminate against any of 
his employees . . . because [the employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment 
practice by [Title VII], or becau se [the employee] has made a charge, testifie d, assisted, or 
participated in any manner in an investigati on, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].” 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). The NJFLA also makes it unlawful for employers to discriminate against 
employees for exercising their rights under the statute. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:11B–9; Wolpert v. 
Abbott Lab'ys, 817 F. Supp. 2d 424, 439 (D.N.J. 2011). 
Retaliation claims are subject to the same McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis as 
the discrimination claims: a plai ntiff must first establish a prima facie case for retaliation under 
Title VII or the NJFLA by showing that (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer 
took an adverse employment action against her; and (3) there was a causal connection between her 
participation in the protected activi ty and the adverse employment action. Moore v. City of 
Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 340-41 (3d Cir. 2006), as amended (Sept. 13, 2006); Gary v. Am. 
Bread Co., LLC, No. 19-15017, 2021 WL 5356093, at *6 (D.N.J. Nov. 17, 2021). If the plaintiff 
does so, the burden shifts to the employer to ad vance a legitimate, non-re taliatory reason for its 
adverse employment action. Carvalho-Grevious v. Del. State Univ. , 851 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir. 
2017) (citing Moore, 461 F.3d at 342). And if the employer satisfies that burden, the plaintiff must 
“convince the factfinder both that the employer’s proffered expl anation was false [that is, a 
pretext], and that retaliation was the real reason for the adverse employment action.” Id. (quoting 
Moore, 461 F.3d at 342). In other words, a plai ntiff must prove, by a preponderance of the PageID:
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evidence, that the harm would not have occurred but-for the protected activity. Id. at 258. 
1. First Step - Prima Facie Case 
Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed because Plaintiff cannot make 
out a prima facie retaliation claim. Defendants assert that Plaintiff fails to establish the first and 
third elements of a retaliation claim: that she enga ged in protected activity, and that there was a 
causal connection between her participation in such activity and the adverse employment actions. 
Def. Br. at 30-33. 
The first element of a retaliat ion claim requires a protest of discriminatory employment 
practices, and that protest—in whatever me dium and whether form al or informal—must 
specifically relate to the protected conduct allegedly being infringed. Barber v. CSX Dist. Servs., 
68 F.3d 694, 702 (3d Cir.1995); see also Sabo v. UPMC Altoona, 386 F. Supp. 3d 530, 555 (W.D. 
Pa. 2019) (“Protected activity under Title VII is whenever an employee complains to management 
about discrimination so that it is possible for management to discern from the context of the 
statement that the employee opposes an unlawful employment practice.” (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted)). Here , there is no dispute that Plai ntiff complained to her union 
representative on multiple occasions about her February 14, 2019 interaction with Duke-Jackson, 
and that these complaints related to protected conduct. Plf. Opp. at 14-15; Def. Reply at 8-9; Plf. 
Ex. 2. Defendants argue, however, that because Plaintiff complained to her union representative, 
as opposed to the administration, Plaintiff did not engage in “protected activity.” Def. Reply at 8-
9. While Defendants’ argument has at least superficial appeal, they offer no legal support for this 
assertion.26 
 
26 Cf. Hibbard v. Penn-Trafford Sch. Dist. , No. 13-622, 2014 WL 640253, at *16-17 (W.D. Pa. 
Feb. 19, 2014) (citing Barber, 68 F.3d at 701-02) (finding that th e plaintiff’s complaint to her 
union representative was not sufficient to show that she engaged in protected activity—not because PageID:
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The second element of a prima facie retaliation claim requires showing that there was an 
adverse action. Moore, 461 F.3d at 340-42. The S upreme Court defines an adverse action as a 
“significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment 
with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” 
Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998). Plaintiff contends, without opposition, 
that her negative performance reviews and termination were adverse employment actions taken in 
retaliation for reporting her interaction with Duke-Jackson. Plf. Opp. at 17. The Court agrees. See 
Clark v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth. , 701 F. App’x 113, 117 (3d Cir. 2017) (citations omitted) 
(explaining that for an unfavorab le performance review to cons titute an adverse employment 
action sufficient to support a retaliation claim, the plaintiff “must allege facts from which it could 
be inferred that the unfavorable performance review adversely affected the terms or conditions of 
her employment.”). 
To establish the third element of a prima facie retaliation claim—the causal connection—
the plaintiff “must produce evidence sufficient to raise the inference that her protected activity was 
the likely reason for the adverse em ployment action.” Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at 259 
(quoting Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc. , 109 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 1997)) (emphases in 
original). A court may consider a “broad array of evidence” to find a causal link. Farrell v. 
Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 283-84 (3d Cir. 2000). “Unusually suggestive” temporal 
proximity between the protected activity and adverse action “is sufficient standing alone to create 
an inference of causality and defeat summary judgment.” LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. 
 
it was made to a union representative, but because the contents of the complaint were too vague to 
plausibly infer that the defendant refused to rescind her resignation in retaliation for her choice to 
engage in protected activities). PageID:
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Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 232 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). Otherwise, a court considers “whether 
the proffered evidence, looked at as a whole, may suffi ce to raise the inference.” Id. (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Plaintiff contends that the “timing alone [] establishes pretext.” Plf. Opp. at 17. In support, 
Plaintiff reiterates that in February 2019, Duke-J ackson learned that Plaintiff was pregnant and 
planned to take leave, and that Plaintiff compla ined about this interaction that same month. Id. 
The following month, Duke-Jackson “began targ eting [Plaintiff] with negative performance 
reports,” which continued through May 2019, when Pl aintiff learned that her contract would not 
be renewed. Id. Plaintiff also cites to Miller v. Patterson Motors, Inc. , and Waters v. Genesis 
Health Ventures, Inc., both of which found that the temporal proximity between the complaint and 
the adverse action—one week ( Miller), and three business days ( Waters)—were “unusually 
suggestive” and therefore sufficient to create an inference of causa lity and defeat summary 
judgment. Plf. Opp. at 17 (citing Miller v. Patterson Motors, Inc., No. 2007-33, 2009 WL 789897, 
at *25 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2009); Waters v. Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., No. 3-2909, 2004 WL 
2958436, *6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2004)). Here, in contrast, approximately one month passed 
between Plaintiff’s complaint to the union repres entative and her first negative performance 
review, and approximately three months passed between the complaint and Plaintiff’s termination. 
Accordingly, those cases do not support Plainti ff’s position to the extent claimed, and the Court 
considers whether timing plus other circumstantial evidence supports the inference of causality.27 
 
27 See Thomas v. Town of Hammonton , 351 F.3d 108, 114 (3d Cir. 2003) (temporal proximity of 
three weeks was not unduly suggestive, thus, “timi ng plus other evidence” in the context of the 
record as a whole, were considered); see also Farrell, 206 F.3d at 280-81 (“Although timing and 
ongoing antagonism have often been the basis for the causal link, our case law clearly has allowed 
a plaintiff to substantiate a cau sal connection for purposes of the prima facie case through other 
types of circumstantial evidence that support the inference.”). PageID:
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Circumstantial evidence may include an “intervening antagonism or retaliatory animus, 
inconsistencies in the employer’s articulated reas ons for terminating the employee, or any other 
evidence in the record sufficient to support the inference of retaliatory animus.” LeBoon, 503 F.3d 
217 at 232-33. Thus, the Court co nsiders the inconsistent reas ons proffered by Defendants for 
Plaintiff’s termination, that is, the in itial economy and/or organization restructuring and the later 
performance-based concerns.28 See Plf. Opp. at 18 (arguing that such inconsistencies demonstrate 
pretext). Likewise, the Court considers the evidence that, as discussed above, undermines each of 
Defendants’ proffered reasons ( i.e., the hiring of a male replacement for the precise role that 
plaintiff held, the drastic variation in reviews that purport to cover some of the same time periods, 
and the rebuttal statements submitted by Plaintiff that challenge the factual bases of many of the 
concerns articulated in the reviews). In light of the timing, coupled with this circumstantial 
evidence, a reasonable juror could infer that Plaintiff’s protected activity was likely the reason for 
the negative performance reviews and subsequent termination. 
2. Step Two - Non-Discriminatory Reason for the Adverse Employment Action 
Because Plaintiff makes out a prima facie retaliation claim, the Court turns to the second 
step of the McDonnell Douglas framework. An employer can sa tisfy its burden of production at 
the second step by providing evidence that “advance[s] a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its 
conduct.” Moore, 461 F.3d at 342 (quoting Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500-01 (3d 
 
28 See Farrell , 206 F.3d at 281 (citation om itted) (“[A] plaintiff ma y establish the [causal] 
connection by showing that the employer gave inconsistent reasons for terminating the 
employee.”); Waddell v. Small Tube Prod., Inc., 799 F.2d 69, 73 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding no clear 
error where the district court conc luded that the defendant’s proffered reason for failure to rehire 
was pretextual based on the defendant’s inconsistent explanations—claiming on the one hand that 
the plaintiff was considered for rehiring by mistake, and on the other, that the basis for not rehiring 
was due to plaintiff’s negative attitude and the f act that certain employees were against rehiring 
the plaintiff). PageID:
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Cir. 1997)). Defendants appear to incorporat e by reference the “non-d iscriminatory reason” 
arguments that were set forth as to the discrimination claims. 29 Thus, for the reasons set forth 
above, the Court finds that Defe ndants have sufficiently establ ished their step two burden of 
production for purposes of the current motion. 
3. Step Three - Proffered Reason is Pretextual 
At the third step, a plaintiff’s “ultimate burden is to prove that retaliatory animus was the 
but-for cause of the adve rse employment action.” Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at 258 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitte d). Accordingly, a plaintiff “must be able to convince the 
factfinder both that the employer’s proffered explanati on was false, and that retaliation was the 
real reason for the adve rse employment action.” Moore, 461 F.3d at 342 (quoting Krouse, 126 
F.3d at 500-01). A plaintiff can do this by “demonstrat[ing] weaknesses, implausibilities, 
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions from which a reasonable juror could conclude 
that the [d]efendants’ explanation is unworthy of credence, and hence infer that the employer did 
not act for the asserted nonretaliatory reasons.” Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at 262 (internal 
quotation marks and brackets omitted). The court may “rely largely on the evidence produced in 
support of [the plaintiff’s] prima facie case,” as “nothing about the McDonnell Douglas formula 
requires [the court] to ration the evidence between one stage or the other.” Id. (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
Here, to prevail at trial, Plaintiff need onl y convince the factfinder that had Plaintiff not 
complained of her interaction with Duke-Jackson, Defendants would not have issued the negative 
performance reviews and recommended non-renewal. See Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at 262. 
 
29 See Def. Opp. at 30 n.4 (not ing in the retaliation section that the same McDonnell Douglas 
burden-shifting framework applies). PageID:
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Duke-Jackson’s first written review of Plaint iff was completed in January 2019. DSUMF ¶ 57; 
PSUMF ¶ 57. This review rated Plaintiff’s perf ormance as “effective” ove rall, with Plaintiff 
earning “effective” ratings across twenty out of the twenty-three categories, and “partially 
effective” ratings in only three categories. Def. Ex. 5. In February 2019, Duke-Jackson confronted 
Plaintiff about whether she was pregnant and the extent of the leave that she intended to take, and 
Plaintiff reported this interaction that same month. DSUMF ¶¶ 68, 70; PSUMF ¶¶ 68, 70; Plf. Ex. 
2. The following month, Duke-Jackson completed Plaintiff’s Mid-Year Review, which rated 
Plaintiff’s performance as “ine ffective” overall, with Plaintiff earning zero “effective” ratings 
(despite receiving twenty “effective” ratings less than two months prior, and during a period which 
was purportedly accounted for in th is review), thirteen “partially effective” ratings, and ten 
“ineffective” ratings (across categories that had each been rated “effective” less two months prior). 
DSUMF ¶¶ 77-78; Def. Ex. 7. A nd just weeks after that, Duke-Jackson completed Plaintiff’s 
Annual Review, this time rating Plaintiff as “partially effective” overall with “partially effective” 
ratings across twenty out of the twenty-three categories (including ten that had been rated 
“ineffective” approximately two weeks before), and “ineffectiv e” ratings across three of the 
categories. DSUMF ¶ 87; Def. Ex. 8. For the reasons set forth above, these inconsistencies raise 
a factual issue regarding the empl oyer’s true motivation, partic ularly when coupled with the 
inconsistencies between Defendants’ proffered reasons, and the evidence that undermines the 
economy/restructuring reason. As such, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants withstand summary 
judgment. 
C. Hostile Work Environment Claim (Count Three) 
Defendants also seeks summary judgment for Pl aintiff’s hostile work environment claim. 
To establish a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, the plaintiff must present evidence PageID:
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that: (1) she suffered intentional discrimination because of her memb ership in a protected class; 
(2) the discrimination was severe or pervasive; (3) it detrimentally affected her; (4) it would have 
detrimentally affected a reasonable person of the same protected class in her position; and (5) there 
is a basis for employer liability. Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 260 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation 
omitted). “To determine whether an environment is hostile, a court must consider the totality of 
the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it 
is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably 
interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Nitkin v. Main Line Health, 67 F.4th 565, 570 
(3d Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks and cita tions omitted). For discrimination to be 
considered severe or pervasive, it must be “extreme” such that it “alter[s] the conditions of [the 
victim’s] employment and create[s] an abusive working environment.” Id. (quoting Meritor Sav. 
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 
(1998)). Thus, “simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely 
serious)” are insufficient. Id. (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788). 
Here, Plaintiff concludes, without analysis or citations to the record, that she has 
established a prima facie case for a hostile work environment claim. See Plf. Opp. at 18-22. As 
to the first and second elements, Plaintiff asserts that she was subjected to intentional 
discrimination when Duke-Jackson “rated [Plaintif f] three different times” “between March and 
May of 2019,” “more than any othe r principal in [] [Plaintiff’s] ne twork, and possibly more than 
any other principal in the Board,” after finding out that Plaintif f would be requesting FMLA in 
February 2019. Id. at 19. Plaintiff continues that each of these ratings indicated that she was an 
“ineffective” principal, despite her “being a model principal,” and th at such conduct “was 
sufficiently severe and pervasive as to alter the terms and conditions of [Plaintiff’s] employment.” PageID:
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Id. In support, Plaintiff cites to Zastrow for the proposition that “two lone incidents” of harassment 
may be sufficient to satisfy the “severe and pervasive” element. Id. at 20 (citing Zastrow v. Ikegami 
Elecs. (U.S.A.) Inc., No. 97-3384, 1997 WL 827456, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 2, 1997)). But Zastrow is 
distinguishable. In Zastrow, the plaintiff brought a hostile wo rk environment sexual harassment 
claim under the NJLAD and the defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff’s 
allegations—that the President of the company attempted to touch the plaintiff’s breast on two 
occasions, each of which were at business receptions with colleagues present—failed to adequately 
plead severe or pervasive conduct. Id. at *1-3. The Zastrow court disagreed, finding that whether 
such conduct was “merely offensive” or sufficien tly “severe or pervasive enough to create an 
objectively hostile or abusive work enviro nment” was a question for the jury. Id. The court 
emphasized that “[o]n a motion to dismiss, the issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately 
prevail but whether [the plaintiff] is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” Id. (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). 
Here, in contrast, Plaintiff is not only entitle d to present evidence of severe or pervasive 
discrimination at this stage, but such evidence—sufficient to produce a genuine dispute of material 
fact—must be produced. Plaintiff fails to meet her burden. Even if the Court assumes that Plaintiff 
satisfies the first element, Plaintiff provides no basis for a reasonable jury to find that such 
conduct—an increase in the num ber of reviews and negative ratings on these reviews—was 
“severe and pervasive,” such that it “alter[ed ] the conditions of [Pla intiff’s] employment and 
create[d] an abusive working environment.”
30 Nitkin, 67 F.4th at 570. Thus, Defendants’ motion 
for summary judgment is granted with respect to the hostile work environment claim. 
 
30 Because Plaintiff has not satisfied her burden with respect to the second element, the Court does 
not address the remaining elements. PageID:
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29 
 
IV. CONLCUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, D.E. 30, is 
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendants’ motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s 
hostile work environment claim and is otherwise DENIED. An appropriate Order accompanies 
this Opinion. 
Dated: July 10, 2023 
 
 ______________________________ 
 John Michael Vazquez, U.S.D.J. PageID:
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